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Preface
This book brings together nine essays around a central thesis, namely, 
Kant’s radical subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge, which 
is delineated in the introductory essay. All of the essays were written, 
for various occasions, after the publication of my Kant’s Deduction and 
Apperception: Explaining the Categories (Palgrave Macmillan 2012), 
except for Chap. 9, which is based on a contribution to a volume on 
Kant’s idealism, which I co-edited with Jacco Verburgt (Kant’s Idealism: 
New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine, Springer 2011), and 
Chap. 5, which has its origin in an article that first appeared in Dutch 
in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie in 2010. The essays address central issues 
in the Deduction—and in the case of Chap. 9, questions that are the 
corollary of the claims of the Deduction—that were not, or only tan-
gentially, dealt with in that earlier book. Importantly, the present book 
deals with the core arguments in the so-called ‘second step’ of the 
B-Deduction as well as the essential account of the threefold synthesis
in the A-Deduction, neither of which I addressed in the earlier book.
It also includes a short essay on a historical interpretation of Kant’s
Deduction by G.W.F. Hegel.
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viii     Preface
I would like to express my gratitude to Corey Dyck, Marcel 
Quarfood and Andrew Stephenson for taking part in the discussion 
of my previous book on the Deduction in the pages of Studi kan-
tiani, and for providing detailed and thoughtful criticisms. I thank 
Claudio La Rocca for facilitating the discussion in Studi kantiani. My 
response to the critics, which forms the basis of Chap. 2, should ide-
ally be read in tandem with their critiques, published in the 2014 
issue of Studi kantiani (see Dyck 2014; Quarfood 2014; Stephenson 
2014). An early version of Chap. 7 was originally written for an 
invited talk at the conference Kant’s Conception of Empirical Knowledge, 
organised by Ido Geiger in collaboration with the Israel Institute of 
Advanced Studies, and held at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 
8–11 December 2013. Unfortunately, I could not attend. I thank 
Ido for the initial opportunity to write the essay, which is presented 
here for the first time. I also thank Marcel Quarfood and Scott 
Stapleford for providing extensive feedback on earlier drafts of vari-
ous chapters, Robert Hanna for his comments on an earlier version of 
Chap. 4, Jacco Verburgt for his feedback on Chap. 8, and Wolfgang 
Ertl for his very useful comments on the penultimate draft of Chap. 9.
Christian Onof read the entire book in its penultimate form, and 
I am ever so grateful for his insightful and critical observations and 
suggestions for improvement. Parts of Chap. 7 would not have been 
if not for our collaborative research project on ‘Kant and space’ dur-
ing 2011–2014, which was presented in outline at the UK Kant 
Society conference in St Andrews, 1–3 September 2011, and resulted 
in two co-authored articles: ‘Kant, Kästner and the Distinction between 
Metaphysical and Geometric Space’, which appeared in Kantian Review 
19(2) (2014): 285–304, and ‘Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal 
Intuition. On the Note to B160 in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason’, 
which was published in the Philosophical Review 124(1) (2015): 1–58, 
as well as a translation of Kant’s Über Kästners Abhandlungen, which 
appeared as ‘On Kästner’s Treatises’ in Kantian Review 19(2) (2014): 
305–313.
Some of the material in this book appeared in print in an earlier form 
elsewhere. I gratefully acknowledge permission of the respective publish-
ers to reprint material here. Chapter 2 appeared, in a shorter version, 
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Preface     ix
under the title ‘Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: A Reply to My 
Critics’, in Studi kantiani XXVII (2014): 95–118. An abridged  version 
of Chap. 4 also appears in G. Motta and U. Thiel (eds.) Immanuel 
Kant. Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 
forthcoming). Some arguments in Sect. 4.10 are based on arguments 
first presented in my article ‘Kant’s Idealism: The Current Debate’, 
in Kant’s Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine, 
ed. D. Schulting and J. Verburgt (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 1–25. 
Chapter 5 is based on material that appeared originally in ‘Kant, non-
conceptuele inhoud en synthese’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 72(4)(2010): 
679–715, and in ‘Probleme des „kantianischen“ Nonkonzeptualismus 
im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion’, Kant-Studien 106(4)(2015): 
561–580. Some of the ideas in Chap. 8 date back to a paper I wrote 
for the Hegel conference on the occasion of the 200th anniversary 
of Faith and Knowledge in Jena, Germany, in 2002, published as 
‘Hegel on Kant’s Synthetic A Priori in “Glauben und Wissen”’, in 
Hegel-Jahrbuch: Glauben und Wissen. Dritter Teil, ed. A. Arndt et al. 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005), pp. 176–182. Lastly, Chap. 9 is a 
substantially revised and expanded version of ‘Limitation and Idealism: 
Kant’s “Long” Argument from the Categories’, which appeared in Kant’s 
Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine, ed. D. Schulting 
and J. Verburgt (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 159–191.
Unfortunately, as most of the manuscript was already completed when 
Henry Allison’s magisterial new book on the Transcendental Deduction 
(Allison 2015) came out, I do not address it here. I intend to publish 
a separate essay on the newest literature on the Deduction, which will 
include a discussion of themes from Allison’s book (see Schulting MS). I 
was also not able to incorporate an account, in particular in Chap. 7, of 
Michael Friedman’s latest reflections on the issue of space and geometry 
in the B-Deduction (Friedman, forthcoming). Professor Friedman kindly 
provided me with a copy of his article, but the book was already in pro-
duction. I hope to engage with it on another occasion.
This book is dedicated to Cristiana Battistuzzi, my companion in 
 everything.
Dennis Schulting
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cited, by volume and page numbers, from the critical Akademie edition (GW) 
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translation of the Critique of Pure Reason (London and New York: Palgrave 
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1.1  Kant’s Representationalism
In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant asks at a pivotal 
point in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories (henceforth 
TD):
What does one mean […] if one speaks of an object corresponding to and 
therefore also distinct from the cognition [Erkenntniß ]? (A104)
This question makes it seem as if, for Kant, it were in doubt that that 
which we cognitively represent as object and about which we make 
knowledge claims is the actual object that has an existence indepen-
dently of us as cognisers, and is invariant with respect to our various 
cognitions. A direct realist would confidently declare that the object of 
my cognition just is the ordinary mid-sized spatiotemporally located 
object outside me. The answer seems unproblematic. But Kant’s view is 
radically different, and is as assured as it is puzzling. He writes:
1
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2     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in 
general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set 
over against this cognition as corresponding to it. (A104; emphasis added)
Kant appears in fact to deny here that there is an object outside of my 
representation of it, with which my cognition should in some way cor-
respond. As he says, the object is “only” a representation of “something 
in general”, an x, that is, a mere placeholder for any particular objects 
that we may claim to have knowledge of.1 Kant could here be taken to 
be a coherentist of sorts, in that nothing outside our experience can be 
appealed to as the ground of experience, since we would not understand 
what such a “transcendental object” could be, “even if someone were in 
a position to tell us”. We can only understand what is delivered in sen-
sible intuition as “something corresponding to our words” (A277/B333; 
trans. Kemp Smith). All we have to go on are our representations and 
their interrelations or their coherence. This can be compared to Kant’s 
variant understanding of truth as correspondence between cognition 
and object: to determine this correspondence we cannot just compare 
our cognition with the object to establish the truth or falsity of our cog-
nition. Kant says in a lecture on logic:
On what rest truth and falsity in each judgement? On the fact that cog-
nition [Erkenntniß ] corresponds [übereinstimme] to the object. Good, 
but how can I see that my cognition accords with the object [mit dem 
Gegenstande stimmt]? I can compare the object only insofar as I know 
it. I cannot compare the object itself with my cognition [of it], but only 
[this] cognition of the object with [another] cognition of the same object, 
and when they accord I then say that the cognition is true. […] The one 
cognition of the object, of which I do not know if it is true, refers to 
another cognition of the object, of which I also do not know if it is true, 
but still, if they accord, I assert that it is true. […] Truth is the harmony 
[Zusammenstimmung] of cognitions of the object among themselves. For 
what we call objects are just our cognitions. (V-Log/Philippi, 24:387; trans. 
mine and emphasis added)
The truth of one’s cognition rests on the coherence between cognitions, 
and not on a comparison of our cognition with a putative factual object. 
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However, Kant’s coherentism, if it can be so called, is of a special kind2: 
it is not the case that our cognition of objects is simply based on the 
coherence merely among “our words” or concepts, for objective reality—
the correspondence to objects—is first established when these “words” 
or concepts, that is, more specifically, a priori concepts or the catego-
ries, are instantiated in a sensible intuition of the object of our cogni-
tion. In other words, mere coherence between cognitions as such does 
not yet yield a sufficient material condition of truth. More precisely, the 
coherence that establishes objective reality requires some criterion in 
addition to the logical coherence between cognitions. However, with the 
additional requirement of instantiation of a priori concepts in a sensi-
ble intuition of the object, this is still coherentism and not some covert 
form of foundationalism, where sensibility or some alleged fact or actu-
ality would be the evidentialist basis on which cognition builds. For it 
is the combination of concepts and intuition, enabled by the categories, 
which provides the ground for cognition, by virtue of what Kant calls, 
at a certain point in the B-edition of TD, the intellectual and figurative 
syntheses of representations (this will be discussed in Chaps. 6, 7).
All this ties in with Kant’s view, enunciated a few lines earlier, that 
appearances, i.e. Kantian empirical objects, are “nothing but sensi-
ble representations”, and must not be considered things in themselves, 
or objects “outside the power of representation” (A104; cf. A109, 
A493–4/B522), a view that presents a challenge for any interpretation, 
as it seems to conflict with Kant’s professed empirical realism about 
appearances as the substantial spatiotemporal objects of experience 
that are independent of any mere particular experience. Kant’s epis-
temology thus appears intimately bound up with his doctrine of ideal-
ism, something that is often disputed by Kant commentators who wish 
strictly to separate the epistemological claims made in TD from those 
that relate to the ontological aspects of idealism (see e.g. Allais 2011, 
2015:285ff.).3 Some believe that Kant’s epistemology is strictly speak-
ing only compatible with realism sans phrase, not idealism (Westphal 
2004). But there are systematic reasons for Kant’s idealist position in the 
theory of knowledge. Of course, considerations that concern the spati-
otemporal nature of the objects of our cognition play a significant role 
in this, but on account of Kant’s Copernican revolution, also already 
1.1 Kant’s Representationalism     3
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4     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
the conceptual constraints of our cognition imply idealism (cf. Bxvii).4  
I would even go so far as to say that only a suitably amended phenomenal-
ist construal of his idealism is compatible with Kant’s theory of knowl-
edge. That is, objects of experience, or in Kantian parlance, appearances, 
are real, actual, enduring spatiotemporal objects, but strictly speaking 
they do not as such exist outside of the capacity of representation, just as 
Kant writes at A104, which I quoted at the outset (see also A120).5
The above-quoted question regarding the object of our cognition is 
directly concerned with the central question of TD, which Kant already 
famously posed in an early letter to Marcus Herz: “What is the ground 
of the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object?” 
(Br, 10:130 [Kant 1999:133]).6 In the first edition of TD, Kant makes 
it clear, in line with that earlier formulation of the central issue, that the 
project of justifying the use of the categories as pure concepts “requires 
an elucidation of the possibility of this relation”, that is, an elucidation 
of the “understanding itself, as a faculty of cognition that is to be related 
to objects” (A97). Such an enquiry might still be read in non-idealist 
terms, as bearing on the necessary conditions of the representability of 
objects, but not necessarily having to do with the conditions for objects 
to be objects, that is, conditions that first constitute the actual existence 
of objects. Indeed, Kant’s emphatic empirical realism about the objects 
of our experience would appear to indicate that objects do specifically 
not depend on subjective conditions of representability for their exist-
ence.7 As Kant clearly states in §14 of TD, “representation in itself […] 
does not produce its object as far as its existence is concerned” (A92/
B125). Objects (Gegenstände) are given to us (A19/B33), not generated 
by us, as far as their existence is concerned.
Nevertheless, he also argues that a representation “is still determinant 
of the object a priori if it is possible through it alone to cognize some-
thing as an object [etwas als einen Gegenstand zu erkennen]” (A92/
B125; Kant’s emphasis). What is essential here is the phrase “cognize 
something as an object”. Notice the ‘as’ structure.8 This does not concern 
merely the possibility of cognising an object as if the cognition, ostensi-
bly something merely subjective (as an occurrence, or belief formed, in 
the head), were separate or separable from the object cognised. Kant’s 
interest lies in finding a case in which “synthetic representation and its 
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objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, 
meet each other” (A92/B124; emphasis added). He is interested in find-
ing out what first enables us to conceive of an object, so that we can 
have knowledge of any particular object at all. The analysis takes place 
on a much more fundamental level than epistemological only (see again 
note 1). At any rate, Kant excludes the alternative, where the object 
enables or produces the representation, such as in empiricist theories of 
knowledge, as these are not capable of proving in an a priori way that 
our representations of the object are veridical.
The Copernican solution that Kant presents is that, instead, we regard 
objects as conforming to our modes of cognition, specifically our a priori 
forms of intuition as well as a priori concepts (Bxvi–xvii).9 This means 
that, although as said our representation of the object does not at all 
generate the object, as thing in itself, as far as its existence is concerned, 
it does determine something a priori about that which we represent, 
such that what is being represented can first be considered an object. 
There is thus a constitutive element involved in our a priori representa-
tion of the object, which goes beyond any mere capacity for representing 
and all kinds of psychological conditions or empirical constraints that it 
may involve (including conditions for belief formation and possession), 
and rather concerns our very intentional relation to the object itself, 
the way we, as human beings, conceive of an object in the first place. 
Indeed, without a priori concepts and the a priori forms of intuition 
“nothing is possible as object of experience”, as Kant writes (A93/B126), 
thus showing that the a priori conditions of experience are at the same 
time necessary (and in some sense sufficient) conditions of the object of 
experience. Kant himself puts it thus, in a formula which is often quoted 
but the radicality of which is seldom grasped: “The a priori conditions 
of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the 
possibility of the objects of experience” (A111; cf. B197/A158).
The possibility of experience—or possible experience as Kant often 
calls it—does not, or not merely, concern the subjective conditions of 
experience, the necessary ways in which we, as subjects of cognition, 
as minds, experience or perceive. ‘Possible experience’ is a technical 
term, for Kant, which designates the same realm, within which, and 
only within which, both actual objects can be conceived of as existing 
1.1 Kant’s Representationalism     5
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6     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
and experienced and subjects of experience possess the capacity to con-
ceive of and experience actual objects. Our mindedness and the world 
of perceivable or experienceable objects belong to this same realm. 
Importantly, this realm, which is “one and the same universal experi-
ence” (A110),10 has no existence of its own that—insofar as empirical 
objects and not intelligible beings such as God, the soul, etc. are con-
cerned—would be separate or separable from the realm of really exist-
ing things in themselves (hence no need for strict two-worldism). As 
counterintuitive as it may sound, the objects that populate this realm 
are, in some importantly qualified sense (see Chap. 4), just a logical 
construction out of our representations, a projection by the cognitive 
subject on to the world of things in themselves, but one which none-
theless “gives all of our cognitions a priori objective reality” (B195/
A156)—given, of course, that the underlying things in themselves 
exist. Appearances are the “data for a possible experience”, and outside 
cognition they have no existence (A119–20). As such, they are mere 
representations and “exist only in cognition” (A120), but within pos-
sible experience they can be determined as actual, empirically real and 
enduring objects in space that have their existential ground in things in 
themselves. Importantly, this does not imply a reductive phenomenal-
ism, whereby the existence of the things that appear is reducible to their 
representation by us. Nor does it mean that the existence of objects 
as appearances is dependent on their really being perceived by us (i.e. 
on the object being present in our perceptual experience): magnetic 
fields are not really perceived by us, but are objects of possible experi-
ence.11 Objects as appearances must not be perceived in order to exist, 
but they must be part of possible experience in order for them to exist. 
But note that possible experience encompasses not only actually existing 
objects, of which we can have real, actual sensible experience, but also 
objects that existed prior to us or prior to any human being, who could 
have had experience of them, or indeed also possible future objects, or 
objects not perceivable by mere sensible means (such as magnetic mat-
ter), as long as these objects can be justifiably related to what we are 
able to determine or establish as real and actual, in accordance with the 
a priori rules of what counts as objectively valid experience (cf. B521/
A493; B523–4/A495–6).
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The crucial pillar on which this concept of experience of objects as 
appearances rests is a priori synthesis, which provides the “third thing” 
(B196/A157) that establishes the required synthetic relation between 
the understanding and its object, by virtue of which representation and 
object “necessarily relate to”, and, “as it were, meet each other” (A92/
B124). This “third thing” is “a pure object” (B196/A157), that is, the 
aforementioned “something in general = X ”, which is a placeholder 
for all particular objects of which I can have experience. It is not any 
existing, actual object, to which our current representations are taken to 
correspond, that provides the ground for the synthetic relation between 
subject and object. Such a relation could never be a priori determined as 
a necessary one. Rather, the synthetic relation among the representations 
themselves defines the pure, or as Kant also says, “transcendental object” 
(A109), and gives our conceptual representations objective reality. There 
is nothing outside of the representations, to which they would corre-
spond. To assume that there is something outside our representations 
to which the representations must correspond and which alone bestows 
veridicality on our representations would invite an explanatory circle. 
For if indeed the presumed outside entity were to impart veridicality to 
our representations, from the outside, it would still have to be explained 
from within the perspective of our representations, of our thought, that 
this is indeed the case. In other words, establishing veridicality can only 
occur within the perspective of our representations, and there is noth-
ing outside of this perspective that is a determining factor in this. Or, 
to put it in the terms of the earlier quoted A277/B333, we could not 
understand anything about what Kant calls the “transcendental object”, 
which is the putative ground of the object as the appearance of outer 
sense, even if someone “would be in a position to tell us” (trans. Kemp 
Smith). We are constrained by our mind’s disposition, which requires 
that the object of our representation is presented in outer sense, in intu-
ition, hence internal to our representational capacity, and only thus can 
it be said to correspond to our “words”.12 There is nothing psychological 
about this: it has to do with the structure of discursive thinking about 
objects, of how we can conceive of objects in the first place.
It is for this reason that Kant argues that that which gives our rep-
resentations objective validity (veridicality) is not some putative object 
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8     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
outside them, but the way they are related among one another, by 
means of a necessary synthetic unity, such that they relate to the tran-
scendental object, i.e. the object that is projected as over against them 
(see A104–5). The synthetic relation among the representations that 
defines the transcendental object consists in what Kant calls “the for-
mal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the 
representations” (A105). It is this synthetic unity in the series of rep-
resentations which defines an object (see A106), or put differently, our 
representations have relation to an object just by standing in certain 
necessary, synthetic relations to one another (Van Cleve 1999:93).13 If, 
as in the original question quoted at the outset, we put this in terms of 
‘correspondence’ between our representations, it is the categories as con-
cepts of objects in general that are the means by which things are first 
“conceived as objects corresponding to our representations” (Refl 3054, 
16:633–634 [Kant 2005:60]).
Wolfgang Becker (1984:42) rightly emphasises the idealist aspect 
that if it is impossible to compare our cognition with the object in an 
immediate fashion, since objects are only given to us in sensible intui-
tion, so via representations, then the possibility of objects of our cog-
nition depends on the possibility of the cognition of these objects, that 
is, any object must be that which corresponds to the totality of all pos-
sible true cognitions of it. As Becker says, we cannot meaningfully talk 
about an object independently of the possibility of a cognition in general 
that is true of this object. This does not, of course, mean that the object 
is not invariant with respect to, and so in a sense independent of, cer-
tain particular cognitions, nor does it mean that the actual existence of 
the thing, of which one has objective knowledge, is not independently 
assumed to be given. The notion of object is basically that which con-
forms to the “fabric of general conditions” (Becker 1984:43) that estab-
lish objectively valid cognitions, and can only be understood from within 
that perspective. Consequently, an object can only be known to exist, 
and therefore as appearance only exists, within that perspective. This is 
a recurring theme of the present book, but will be particularly addressed 
in Chap. 4, where I criticise the standard realist assumptions underly-
ing criticisms against Kant on this idealist issue, by contemporary read-
ers such as Lucy Allais, James Van Cleve and Anil Gomes. Of course, 
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the actuality itself of an object of experience, its actual existence (de re), 
is not in any way dependent on the subject, though the determination of 
its existence is. An object as appearance (i.e. an object of possible expe-
rience) could actually exist without being currently perceived, hence, 
independently of an actual instantiation of transcendental apperception, 
which governs possible determinations—a spatiotemporal object in a 
location distinct from my own location, say, or indeed a spatiotemporal 
object that is located outside the reach of all actual human perception, 
e.g. an impact crater on the far side of the moon (we can of course send a 
space probe in order to photograph it, so it is at any rate necessarily part 
of possible experience).
Apart from the idealist implications of the conception of objectivity 
as defined by the synthetic relation among representations, what is also 
insufficiently appreciated in interpretations of TD is the subjectivism of 
Kant’s position. It is not just that we only have direct cognitive access 
to the object in terms of the formal unity among our representations 
through a function of synthesis, but this formal unity is, for its neces-
sity, also grounded on a so-called transcendental condition, which, Kant 
says, is “nothing other than the transcendental apperception” (A106–7). 
In other words, the function of synthesis that grounds the formal unity 
among my representations, which constitutes the concept of an object, 
is just the subject’s capacity to unite her own representations, i.e. the 
transcendental unity of apperception. Kant might be taken to claim 
merely that objective cognition, which requires a certain unity among 
the representations that relate them to an object, also requires a subjec-
tive component, namely a self who is the agent of the cognition. This 
would mean that transcendental apperception is only a necessary condi-
tion of objective cognition, not a sufficient condition (at least in the for-
mal sense). But by saying that the transcendental or original ground of 
objective cognition is “nothing other than the transcendental appercep-
tion” (my emphasis), Kant appears to say transcendental apperception is 
both a necessary and (at least formally)14 sufficient condition of objec-
tive cognition. And indeed, there seems to be no distinction between 
“the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself ” and 
the “consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all 
appearances in accordance with concepts […] that […] determine an 
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10     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
object for their intuition” (A108; notice the adverb zugleich that Kant 
uses in this passage, expressing contemporaneity of the awareness of self 
and the consciousness of objects).15 Both consciousness of self and con-
sciousness of an object reduce to the “common function of the mind for 
combining [the manifold] in one representation” (A109).
There are all sorts of issues concerning this relation between unitary 
consciousness defining an object and the identity of self-consciousness, 
especially in the A-version of TD, that are less than clear-cut and call for 
clarification,16 but it seems at least clear that, for Kant, our representa-
tions’ relation to an object is, in some specific sense, intricately bound up 
with, indeed inseparable from, self-consciousness, or transcendental apper-
ception, as Kant calls it, whatever this latter may turn out to consist in.
1.2  Subjectivism and the ‘Radikalvermögen’ 
of Our Cognition
In this book, I advance and defend the claim that Kant is a radical sub-
jectivist regarding the possibility of knowledge, specifically by look-
ing at various perspectives on central arguments of TD, including the 
intricate interpretation of G.W.F. Hegel, Kant’s most prominent suc-
cessor. Subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge is to be under-
stood as the thesis that the possibility of knowledge of objects essentially 
and wholly depends on subjective functions of thought or the capac-
ity to judge, given sensory input, that is, on transcendental appercep-
tion—in its twofold guise of intellectual and figurative synthesis—as 
the Radikalvermögen of all knowledge, as Kant says (A114). This has 
of course nothing to do with some kind of psychology of the subject, 
or how supposedly things are literally constructed out of sensations, 
which form their parts (though sensations are indeed the material basis 
for the appearances as the genuine objects of our knowledge); nor does 
the thesis of Kantian subjectivism that I advance mean that knowledge 
is wholly and ‘merely’ subjective, implying that there is no objective 
truth—Kant rejects the Humean view that the mind is just a reposi-
tory of fleeting subjective ideas originating from the objects external to 
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it, nor does Kant think that the mind is just the capacity to carry out 
logical operations upon those ideas. And of course, the truths of ana-
lytically necessary judgements or propositions are as such not in any way 
dependent on the cognising subject; analytic judgements are absolutely 
or conceptually true, and not “subjective” in any sense (see Ameriks 
2015:54). But the truth of analytic judgements is not at issue in Kant’s 
Critical philosophy.
What I mean by Kantian subjectivism is the fact that Kant’s Critical 
project is concerned with seeking to formulate a manner in which 
a rational structure can be discerned, explained and a priori justified, 
within our immediate relation to an object, as it is present in empirical 
intuition—that is, within experience, hence in judgement—which first 
determines that relation as genuinely objectively valid. The object is not 
so much a construction, as if we produced ex nihilo the object as such 
in our imagination, but the result of a rational re-construction of sorts, 
based on an immediate relation, via empirical intuition, to the experi-
enced given object, i.e. the thing itself, even though we do not experi-
ence the affecting thing in itself, which lies at the root of our experience, 
directly, as thing in itself.17 Our relation to the thing is always and only 
mediated by the forms of intuition and the forms of the understanding; 
nothing of our cognition of the thing, not even the material, empirical a 
posteriori properties, is direct.18
The a priori conformity between known object or properties of the 
object and the cognising subject is at the centre of Kant’s Copernican 
solution to the problem of a priori knowledge. This a priori conformity 
comes to the fore in the way Kant delineates the intimate, conceptual 
relation between subject and object. The manner in which we talk or 
make claims about the thing (as object for us) is not separable from the 
way the thing that we talk or make claims about, qua object, is itself 
characterisable. The object qua object is always an object for thought 
(how else could we talk about it?).19 In other words, the objectivity 
of an object or thing is a characteristic uniquely attributed to it by 
the understanding, but at the same time it is the object or thing (as 
appearance) that is immediately present to us in experience that is so 
characterised. In this way, one discerns a certain conceptual reciprocity, 
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12     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
in a one-to-one mapping of sorts, between thought and thing insofar 
as the thing is an object for thought.
It should be stressed though that, evidently, Kant opposes the 
straightforward conflation, in the School metaphysics, of the nexus 
rationis, the way things and their relations are conceived of in thought, 
and the way really existing things would have to be seen to be caus-
ally related in the realm of being. In Kant’s view, the realm of thought 
and the realm of being as such no longer correspond in a strong sense, 
precisely as a result of his stronger sense of the bond between the caus-
ally governed object as represented and our representation of the object 
as causally governed. The mutual aspect of both thought and object as 
the two relata of a reciprocal conceptual relation between represented 
and representation reflects two sides of the same function that reason or 
thought operates by means of a kind of self-reflection on its own rep-
resentations, including objective representations of things. This actual-
ity necessarily arises from the notion that the thought itself about the 
relation between thought and the world of things, the very business of 
metaphysics, logically assumes the privileged position in that relation, 
which therefore is best seen as a three-place relation. To put this differ-
ently, reflecting on the relation between thought and object necessarily 
and irreducibly involves the thinking subject as the central, unique and 
ineliminable viewpoint from which the relation must be considered. 
This is the central aspect that is expressed by the thesis of Kantian sub-
jectivism.
Although the clearest textual evidence for Kant’s radical subjectivism 
can be found in the A-Deduction, I believe his position in the B-edition 
is no less subjectivist in the aforementioned Critical sense. Fully aware 
of the prima facie peculiarity of his position, Kant writes at the end of 
the second section of the A-Deduction:
That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of 
apperception, indeed in regard to its lawfulness even depend on this, may 
well sound quite contradictory and strange. But if one considers that this 
nature is nothing in itself but a sum of appearances, hence not a thing 
in itself but merely a multitude of representations of the mind, then one 
will not be astonished to see that unity on account of which alone it can 
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be called object of all possible experience, i.e., nature, solely in the radi-
cal faculty [Radikalvermögen] of all our cognition, namely, transcendental 
apperception. (A114)
At B163–5, one can read a similar account of the way in which the 
laws of nature only exist relative to the subject of knowledge, and do 
not “exist […] in the appearances”, that is, in the empirical objects of 
nature. The appearances, as “mere representations” of things that are 
unknown as to how they are in themselves, only stand under laws of 
combination, “which the connecting faculty prescribes” (B164). And 
this connecting faculty is the understanding, indeed the intellectual 
synthesis, or, transcendental apperception, which insofar as empirical 
objects are concerned combines sensible manifolds in its function as 
productive imagination (synthesis speciosa; B151). All “appearances of 
nature” (B165), that is, all objects in nature, are dependent on this syn-
thesis, such that no objects of nature can exist outside of this synthe-
sis. This goes beyond a standard epistemological claim that says that for 
objects of nature to be known by us certain necessary conditions must 
be satisfied. Rather, the categories, as so many modes of transcendental 
synthesis, are constitutive of nature, including its objects, even though 
of course empirical laws of nature cannot be derived a priori from them 
and depend on a posteriori experience.20
To say that the above picture I painted of Kant’s subjectivism is not 
popular—neither among more or less orthodox Kantians, nor among 
those philosophers chiefly critical of Kant, such as Hegel—is an under-
statement. It seems to reduce Kant’s theory of knowledge to some form 
of psychology or theory of mind and, most worryingly, it seems to bur-
den Kant with the (presumably) wrong kind of idealism—namely, phe-
nomenalism. Surely, nature and the world of physical objects should 
not be seen as reducible to a set of representations, or even to a logi-
cal construction out of appearances that just inhere in the subject of 
thought, but have no existence outside it. Such a prima facie eliminative 
view of the objects of nature flies in the face of realism as standardly 
conceived, which views empirical objects as individual, interacting sub-
stances that subsist independently of minds. At first sight, it also seems 
to conflict with Kant’s own avowedly realist commitments. Moreover, 
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14     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
the viewpoint that the laws of nature are not intrinsic elements of the 
appearances themselves, as empirical objects, “but rather exist only rela-
tive to the subject in which the appearances inhere” (B164), would be 
unacceptable too for any straightforward realist about nature.21
But whereas the majority of Kantians would play down any hint of 
phenomenalism or psychologism in Kant’s idealism, Hegel lambastes 
Kant’s transcendental idealism as quintessentially just another form of 
subjectivistic, psychological, phenomenalistic idealism of the empiri-
cist kind. But the former’s motivation is the same as Hegel’s, namely 
the assumption of a robust realism, although it should be noted that 
Hegel’s realism is quite non-standard. Most current interpretations of 
Kant’s idealism tend to put a realist slant on his talk of appearances as 
representations, either by construing things in themselves as the very 
same things that are appearances (Allison 2004; Prauss 1974) or by 
construing appearances as mind-dependent or relational properties of 
things, which also have mind-independent, non-empirical properties, 
an in-itself side (Langton 1998; Westphal 2004; Rosefeldt 2007). In all 
these cases, although of course one is aware that appearances must not 
be identified with things in themselves as such (namely, with things qua 
having so-called intrinsic or non-relational, mind-independent proper-
ties), a realist position vis-à-vis appearances as publicly perceivable, per-
during empirical objects independent of their possible representation is 
taken for granted. Kant’s clear assertion that appearances are mere rep-
resentations—i.e. nothing but representations (see e.g. A30/B45), and 
so not in any sense properties of things in themselves—is played down.22
This overtly ‘objectivist’ focus on Kant’s transcendental idealism in 
recent metaphysical/realist interpretations creates a problem for under-
standing the Copernican turn away from classical realism (what Kant 
calls transcendental realism). What I mean by ‘objectivist’ is the ten-
dency to regard Kant’s idealism as a theory primarily about the differ-
ential status of the object (in the generic sense) as a given thing, i.e. as 
the thing in itself and as appearance, and as a theory about the nature 
of their relation, without showing any specific interest in the constitu-
tive features of the appearance aspects of the object that are due to the 
subject’s agency, not least the fact that appearances are just representa-
tions and nothing outside the subject. What is conspicuous about these 
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‘objectivist’ interpretations is that they all try to explain away Kant’s 
assertion that appearances are ‘mere representations’. It is unclear to 
what extent these aforementioned takes on Kant’s idealism are still able 
to estimate the absolute centrality of the subject, for Kant, in establish-
ing the possibility of knowledge. Talk of ‘mind-dependent’ features of 
things insofar as they are known by means of the a priori forms of our 
intuition and understanding is clearly insufficient to gauge the kind of 
self-critical rationality that Kant puts centre stage in his analysis of the 
possibility of a priori knowledge, because such talk omits an account 
of the irreducible and ungrounded spontaneous activity that is centrally 
involved on the part of the mind, not just to enable experience, but also 
first to establish objectivity itself. The neutral term ‘mind-dependence’ 
suggests a factual quality that things presumably have, and hence cannot 
explain spontaneous subjective activity. The realist, objectivist emphasis 
comes at the cost of cognitive spontaneous agency.
One of the major problems of the metaphysical dual-aspect reading 
of idealism is that it cannot explain the status of the relation between, 
on the one hand, the subject (or mind) that cognises the putative mind-
dependent aspects of the thing that also has an unknowable intrinsic 
side and, on the other hand, the putative mind-dependency of those 
aspects of the thing that are or can be cognised, namely, appearances. 
What connects the mind-dependency of the appearance aspects of the 
thing with the mind that knows appearances as aspects of things, if 
indeed appearances are not mental states? A phenomenalist reading of 
appearances is not faced with this acute problem, for on this reading 
the relation between mind and mind-dependent appearances is one of 
identity, where the appearances are indeed just the representations of 
the cognising subject that are the causal effects of the things in them-
selves affecting her, precisely as Kant says. By contrast, the metaphysi-
cal two-aspect reading must deny the identity relation between subject 
and appearances, since on account of it the appearances are aspects of 
the thing, rather than the cognising subject’s mental states (or, more pre-
cisely, logical constructions out of the subject’s mental states). It lacks 
the means to explain the a priori connection between the thinking sub-
ject and appearances as objects, between mind and world. It thus singu-
larly fails to explicate a crucial ‘Copernican’ element of Kant’s Critical 
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philosophy, namely, that the object must be taken to conform to our 
subjective forms of cognition for a priori knowledge to be possible, in a 
way that is explainable from within an analysis of the subjective forms of 
cognition, namely a priori, rather than that our cognition conforms to 
the object and its putative disposition to be mind-dependent; in other 
words, it fails to explain Kant’s subjectivism.23
This is much less a problem for Allison (1983, 2004), who, contro-
versially, sees talk about things in themselves just as an abstraction from 
the necessary conditions under which objects can be known, in which 
the spontaneity of the understanding plays a significant role. Whatever 
the case may be about his deflationary reading of Kant’s idealism, 
Allison rightly emphasises the necessary reflexive aspect of cognition by 
pointing out that any cognitive representation of an object involves an 
element of a subject ‘taking’ such a representation ‘as’ of an object, and 
simultaneously, ‘as’ her representation.24
It is no problem at all for Hegel, who considers the aspect of self-
activity, as manifested by an original-synthetic unity or identity, the 
most speculatively promising element of Kant’s Critical philosophy. But 
he still laments Kant’s subjectivism, his failure of nerve to be committed 
to his own principle of original synthesis, which if strictly adhered to, 
according to Hegel, truly subverts modern, uncritical forms of realism, 
which presume the givenness of individual things independently of the 
mind, and as absolutely distinct from it. In Hegel’s view, Kant’s contin-
ued talk about unknowable things in themselves shows him implicitly 
to be still beholden to the type of realism that he aims to overcome, 
and at the same time betrays his essentially “psychological idealism”, as 
Hegel at one point calls it (GuW, 4:331; cf. WL, 12:22). Hegel there-
fore is able to combine his appreciation of Kant’s stress on spontane-
ous agency with his criticism of Kant’s putative antirealist tendency (in 
the sense that, on Kant’s account, objective knowledge does not reach 
the things in themselves).25 This makes Hegel a complex critic, for he 
praises and criticises Kant’s radical subjectivism at the same time. But, 
as we shall see below, the subjectivism that Hegel descries in Kant is 
what I shall call ‘bad’ subjectivism, the subjectivism that says that what 
we know is true relative merely to our own perspective, because that is 
just how we are psychologically (or culturally, or epistemologically, etc.) 
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disposed, in contrast to the ‘Critical’ subjectivism that says that subjec-
tive agency is first constitutive of objectivity, so that there would not 
even be anything objective, any nature, without the subjective forms 
of the understanding. When I refer to Kant’s radical subjectivism, it is 
this ‘Critical’ subjectivism that is meant, the subjectivism that centrally 
involves transcendental apperception as the Radikalvermögen of our cog-
nition, as Kant says (A114).
The psychological or relativistic reading of Kant’s thesis of the nec-
essary conditions of experience is quite common, among Kantians as 
well as Hegelians, which results in the mistaken charge that the objec-
tivity that Kant claims for the categories is merely an objectivity for 
us, and does not apply to reality itself—i.e. the things in themselves, 
or in Hegel’s language, “the only true reality” (GuW, 4:325). Although 
Kant indeed says that the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus the 
categories, are required for a manifold of representations to constitute 
“an object for me”, this should precisely not be read psychologically or 
as if it concerned a merely epistemological constraint, for just prior to 
this Kant specifically says that this condition is not “merely something 
I myself need in order to cognize an object” (B138), which rules out 
the psychological reading but also the merely epistemological reading. 
Rather, the very constitution of the object as object, its objectivity, is at 
issue, so that I am able to know the thing I perceive. Hence, the thesis 
of radical subjectivism says that objectivity itself is dependent on our 
forms of cognition, contrary to the ‘bad’, psychological subjectivism 
that Hegel charges Kant with, which says that the categories (and the 
forms of intuition) are merely our ways of cognising, but do not reach 
the real objects themselves.26
1.3  Subjectivism and Non/Conceptualism
The emphasis in this book is put on Kant’s theory of apperception 
as the central constitutive element of his theory of knowledge, with 
a focus on TD, in both its A- and B-versions. A view of Kant’s reli-
ance on a form of a priori representationalism that is constitutive of 
objectivity is defended against criticisms both from (Hegelian) strong 
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conceptualists, who accuse Kant of an unduly subjectivist view that 
putatively results in scepticism about objective reality, and from con-
temporary realists, who by contrast argue that Kant is unable to estab-
lish even a conceptual link between the subjective forms of thought 
and knowledge of objects. It is no coincidence that these realists are 
often also those who favour the metaphysical, ‘objectivist’ interpreta-
tion of Kant’s idealism that I mentioned above. An absolute distinc-
tion between subject and object is assumed, as a result of which Kant’s 
claim that the unity of apperception is an objective unity that defines 
objectivity is regarded as overly ambitious, to say the least. One such 
realist objection against Kant’s claim (a claim known as what Henry 
Allison has called the reciprocity thesis) is considered and critiqued in 
Chap. 4. Strangely, one commentator who indeed believes that Kant’s 
claim conflates epistemological and ontological conditions—which, 
if true, undercuts my thesis of Kant’s radical subjectivism—is at the 
same time committed to a phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism, 
which is normally seen as antirealist. I argue that, properly construed, 
phenomenalism facilitates an understanding of the intimate relation of 
subject and object, and supports radical, Critical subjectivism about 
the possibility of knowledge.
The label ‘subjectivism’ is borrowed from the subtitle of Robert 
Pippin’s article ‘Leaving Nature Behind. Or Two Cheers for 
“Subjectivism”’, in his key study The Persistence of Subjectivity. On the 
Kantian Aftermath (Pippin 2005). My approach to Kant’s TD is to 
some extent influenced by Pippin’s general outlook on the fundamental 
issues of Kant’s Critical philosophy, specifically, the centrality of apper-
ception as indicative of free agency that is as such constitutive of objec-
tive cognition, and how, in his view, German Idealism took up these 
issues. However, I want to go one step further than Pippin in defend-
ing Kantian subjectivism, by claiming that the Hegelian overcoming 
of (some allegedly problematic aspects of ) Kantian subjectivism is not 
unavoidable or even needed, much as it is true to say that Pippin sees 
Hegel as much closer to Kant than does for example John McDowell 
(1996), whose naturalising take on Hegel is the object of Pippin’s justi-
fied critique in the aforementioned article (to the extent Pippin criti-
cises McDowell, I fully concur with Pippin). Put briefly, I contend that 
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Kant’s subjectivism is even more radical than Pippin deems salvageable, 
and not in any sense psychologistic or solipsistic or individualist, that 
is, subjectivist in the ‘bad’ sense, as Hegel alleges. Relatedly, I claim that 
Hegel’s critique of Kant is based on a misappropriation of the very prin-
ciple of apperception that is central to Pippin’s Kantianising reading 
of Hegel.27 My critique of Hegel regarding apperception also bears on 
some elements of the standard Kantian readings of apperception and its 
foundational role in knowledge.
One of the most conspicuous aspects of Hegel’s take on transcen-
dental apperception is his assertion that the productive imagination as 
the original-synthetic unity of apperception is “the principle of sensi-
bility” itself (GuW, 4:327). This might seem an appropriate reading of 
Kant’s account of the role of the imagination in determining the sen-
sible manifold in §24 of the B-Deduction, insofar as the productive 
imagination, as the effect of the understanding in the sensible manifold, 
determines that manifold. But by asserting that the imagination is the 
original-synthetic unity of the manifold and the understanding, Hegel 
contends that there is no way that Kant can maintain his position that 
the manifold is determined only insofar as the understanding so deter-
mines it, because this latter addition of a limiting condition means that 
the capacity of the understanding is abstracted from the original unity 
between manifold and understanding that obtains by virtue of the pro-
ductive imagination. Such a view of the relation between understand-
ing and manifold, in which the understanding takes precedence as the 
determining factor, would betray the foundational speculative insight 
into their original unity, in which understanding and sensible manifold 
are co-determined, shown so splendidly by Kant’s concept or “idea” of 
the productive imagination. Or so Hegel argues.28
Hegel’s prima facie valid point is that, contrary to what Kant’s 
empiricism suggests, it is not the case that the understanding, the sub-
ject, finds itself confronted with an aggregate of sensations or represen-
tations, “which are first picked up, and then the synthesis supervenes 
upon them afterwards” (GuW 4:328 [FK, 71]). Insofar as cognition is 
concerned, the manifold is always already unified with the understand-
ing, and the distinction between the two is posterior to the original 
unity, and becomes first manifest in judgement, in which the subject 
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(the universal predicate) and object (represented by the subject term) 
are separated, which becomes explicitly manifest in the basic form of 
the proposition S is P (cf. WL, 12:22–23). This means that neither 
does the synthesis supervene on the manifold afterwards, nor can there 
strictly speaking be what is called nonconceptual content. This argu-
ment, which Hegel brings to bear against Kant’s supposedly overly 
dualist construal of the relation between sensibility and understanding, 
foreshadows the current debate on Kant’s putative nonconceptualism, 
where conceptualists such as McDowell, explicitly following Hegel, 
argue that conceptual capacities are already actual in sensible intuition, 
and that intuition does not separably contribute to cognition. On the 
other hand, nonconceptualists such as Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais 
argue, on behalf of Kant, that sensible manifolds in intuition need not 
be conceptualised, and in fact, can and do separably refer to the objects 
that are intuited.
These two contradictory perspectives, both claiming to fall back on 
core Kantian arguments, throw into relief the complexity of Kantian 
subjectivism: While it is decidedly not the psychological, ‘bad’ subjec-
tivism that Hegel bemoans, with its alleged sceptical, antirealist implica-
tions, neither is it committed to the strongly conceptualist idealism that 
Hegel wishes to see expressed by the original principle of apperception, 
for apperception is emphatically not the principle of sensibility sim-
pliciter, contrary to what Hegel contends (GuW, 4:327). One crucial 
aspect of my own view of Kantian, Critical subjectivism is therefore its 
leaving room for nonconceptual content in some sense,29 that is, mere 
subjective mental content that is not conceptualised or even subject 
to conceptualisation, and thus not subject to the original principle of 
apperception.
In conformity with the Copernican principle that we only deter-
mine a priori of the things what we have put into them (Bxviii), 
the sensible manifold or content is determined by the subject—the 
understanding—only insofar as the latter takes the manifold as a 
unified manifold and thus as object for itself. It is often ignored 
that this analytic truth has a flip side, an inbuilt restriction: what is 
not so taken by the subject, is also not conceptually determined by 
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it nor does a manifold of representations need to be conceptually 
determined by it, hence it is non-conceptual. Importantly, the pos-
sibility of not being determined by the subject does not imply that 
whatever is not so determined eo ipso does not exist. Of course, it 
is quite another question what epistemic relevance such nonconcep-
tual content could have for us, since it is precisely content that we 
do not determine as content for us. Secondly, there are serious prob-
lems with nonconceptualist readings of Kant, insofar as it is alleged 
that by means of nonconceptualised intuitions alone, independently 
of the categories, we can have relation to an individual object, even 
if only indeterminately.30 This position falsely assumes the givenness 
of the object as such. Kant does of course say that for there to be an 
intuition, an object (Gegenstand ) needs to be given (A19/B33)—this 
is what Kantian nonconceptualists rightly stress is the dependency cri-
terion for our intuitions. But Kant’s talk of objects in this context, at 
the start of the Transcendental Aesthetic, should be taken as point-
ing to the non-technical, generic sense of the word, not the technical 
sense of the term ‘object’ as it gets defined in TD (B137). Object in 
the sense defined there (as Objekt) is not the same as the Gegenstand 
that is assumed as given and as affecting our receptivity, of which 
Kant speaks at the outset of the Aesthetic. Of course, Kant’s empiri-
cal realism commits him to the empirical thesis that such Gegenstände 
are indeed given, and not of our making, but this empirical thesis 
does not conflict with my take on Kant’s subjectivism, namely, that 
apperception is wholly constitutive of objectivity (Objektivität), given 
sensory input. Kantian nonconceptualists do not seem to differenti-
ate between the various senses of ‘object’ in Kant’s texts. To the extent 
that Kantian nonconceptualists argue that objects in the non-techni-
cal sense (Gegenstände) are given, they are of course right. But they 
also seem to argue that the mere intuition of such given objects pro-
vides us with an objectively valid relation to objects, thus confusing 
this sense of object with the technical sense of object (Objekt)—rather, 
the function of objective validity is one which Kant argues in TD is 
solely due to the understanding in the way we make judgements, and 
is not already given with intuitions.
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1.4  Overview
Kant’s subjectivism is addressed with respect to four seminal strands of 
current research in Kant’s theoretical philosophy: (1) the role of self-
consciousness in objective cognition, (2) perceptual knowledge of spa-
tial objects, (3) nonconceptualism and (4) transcendental idealism. The 
central claim of the book is that in all of these strands Kant is shown to 
be a radical subjectivist regarding the possibility of knowledge, and that 
only reading Kant as a thoroughgoing subjectivist, in the Critical, non-
reductive sense defined, saves TD from standard charges of incoherence, 
inconsistency, or relativism/scepticism:
1. Kantian subjectivity, in virtue of the principle of apperception or 
transcendental self-consciousness, is solely constitutive of the very 
conception of what an object is or what objectivity means, so that 
objective validity must be seen as intrinsic to thought itself;
2. Kantian subjectivity, in virtue of the principle of apperception, 
given sensory input, is solely constitutive of the possibility of per-
ceiving objects as determinate spaces, without however thereby 
reducing space as infinite given magnitude to being the product of 
the understanding (contra an influential reading), which ties in with 
the fact that
3. not all mental content or intuition, in Kant’s terms, is dependent on 
the understanding, leaving room for ‘merely’ subjective representa-
tion or non-apperceptive consciousness or ‘blind’ intuition of spatial 
objects, i.e. minimally nonconceptual content;
4. our subjective conceptuality, not just the forms of our sensible intui-
tion, already entails idealism about objects (contra a standard reading 
that the argument of TD can and must be seen separately from the 
doctrine of idealism) but does not run afoul of the absolute-idealist 
critique that Kantian ‘merely’ “subjective” idealism leads to scepti-
cism (contra Hegelian appropriations).
In the first part of the book, I address primarily the first strand of my 
thesis (1), and also touch on central elements of (4). I address strand 
(1) by expanding on the theme of apperception, which was the chief 
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topic of my Kant’s Deduction and Apperception (Schulting 2012), in rela-
tion to important topics that were only peripherally or less thoroughly 
discussed in that book, namely, in relation to judgement and sponta-
neity (Chap. 3), and in relation to objectivity and objective validity 
(Chaps. 3, 4). Further, I criticise a prominent realist objection to Kant’s 
claim that the instantiation of the categories in experience entails that 
the categories are instantiated in the objects of experience, which alleg-
edly presents a fundamental gap in the master argument of TD, which 
would undermine a core element of my thesis of radical subjectivism 
(Chap. 4). While rehearsing the main planks of my earlier treatment of 
apperception and the logical derivation of the categories from self-con-
sciousness, I also reply to various criticisms against my earlier account, 
which basically argue that I failed to prove that Kant actually derives the 
categories, as concepts of objectivity, from apperception as the principle 
of thought (Chap. 2). Central aspects of strand (4) will be discussed in 
Chap. 4, mainly in the context of an account of the conceptual intimacy 
between apperception and objectivity. In this chapter, I shall defend a 
‘benignly’ phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism.
In the second part of the book, strands (2) and (3) are addressed in 
detail, with further discussion of (4) taking place in Chaps. 7, 8 and 9. 
One of the most controversial aspects of my reading is the claim that 
these strands of my general thesis are the direct corollaries of strand (1), 
namely, the claim that apperception is solely constitutive of objectivity. 
I show how apperception itself is to be seen as responsible, by means 
of figurative synthesis—which is the understanding itself in its effect 
on sensibility—for the possibility of knowledge of objects as “determi-
nate spaces”, as Kant calls them, in material or empirical space (MAN, 
4:480–481), and why this implies the transcendental idealism of 
“nature”. My reading is different from the standard reading that sees the 
determination of space, through figurative synthesis, as distinct, and as 
separable, from the activity of the understanding and/or conceptualisa-
tion in judgement. However, my reading is not by implication strongly 
conceptualist. By distinguishing between two distinct kinds of spatial 
unity, only one of which is due to the determination by the understand-
ing and corresponds to the transcendental unity of apperception, my 
reading allows for nonconceptual intuitional content, i.e. the possibility 
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of ‘sheer subjective’ non-conceptualised perception of indeterminate 
spatial regions. While delineating my view, I address Kant’s central argu-
ments for the synthesis that enables determination of spatial objects, 
both in the A-Deduction (Chap. 6) and in the B-Deduction (Chap. 7). 
Grounds for deviating from both strongly conceptualist and strongly 
(essentialist) as well as relative nonconceptualist interpretations of Kant 
are further provided in a critical exposition of the views of the most 
prominent defenders of Kantian conceptualism and nonconceptualism, 
McDowell, and Hanna and Allais, respectively (Chap. 5). A proto-con-
ceptualist critique of Kantian nonconceptualism by Hegel is expounded 
in Chap. 8. I claim that, in his critique of Kant, Hegel understands well 
the central epistemic role of transcendental apperception, but typically 
misreads the modality of Kant’s argument for the relation between con-
cept and intuition, and consequently misinterprets Kant’s conception 
of objectivity as resulting in psychological relativism. This ties in with 
Hegel’s interpretative misunderstanding of Kantian transcendental ide-
alism, which he claims is unduly subjectivist (‘bad’ subjectivism) and 
leads to scepticism.
Lastly, in Chap. 9, I show that (1) in abstraction from their appli-
cation to sensibility, categories, as subjective functions of thought, do 
not yield even merely conceptual determinative knowledge of things 
in themselves, and (2) by expounding on Kant’s concept of the tran-
scendental Ideal and the concept of material synthesis, that discursive 
knowledge ex hypothesi cannot determine the thing in itself. In other 
words, Kant’s conception of the thing in itself as unknowable (the 
so-called restriction thesis) is not a separable component of his theory 
of discursive knowledge, but a direct consequence of it.31 This shows 
that Kant’s subjectivism and idealism are inseparably linked, but not in 
an arbitrary way, as Hegel alleges, because Kant’s subjectivism is not a 
“psychological idealism”.
Below is a more extensive summary of each of the 8 chapters to fol-
low. Whilst holding a continuity between them, the chapters can 
be read on their own as self-standing essays, which will benefit those 
looking for specific topics relating to TD. And although this book is 
intended as a complement to my previous book on the Deduction 
(Schulting 2012), which focused on the so-called ‘first step’ of the 
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B-Deduction, it can, with the possible exception of Chap. 2, without 
problems be read independently of the earlier book.
1.5  Summary of the Chapters
In Chap. 2, I consider critical arguments levelled against central ele-
ments of my view, expounded in my earlier book Kant’s Deduction and 
Apperception (Schulting 2012), that the categories are derived a priori 
from the principle of apperception, the ‘I think’. This view goes back to 
a much earlier, and more famous attempt by Klaus Reich, first proposed 
in 1932 (see Reich 2001), to argue that the functions of thought are 
ultimately and a priori derivable from the objective unity of appercep-
tion. Reich looked to textual sources outside the Deduction for support, 
while I argued that TD itself provides supporting grounds for this view, 
or at least for the derivation of the categories from apperception.32 This 
has not been a popular view among Kantians, and gathering from the 
criticisms against my take on it, one may safely assume it is not going to 
be the standard view any time soon (see Dyck 2014; Stephenson 2014; 
though Quarfood 2014 is much more positive).33
But one of the reasons why I remain convinced of, not just the plau-
sibility, but indeed the unavoidability, of the claim that the categories 
derive a priori from the unity of apperception, is that the categories, as 
logical functions of judgements (B143), are nothing but so many modes 
of unitary consciousness (cf. Prol, 4:305; A401). This becomes clear, 
among other places, at A109, where Kant reasons that the “pure con-
cept of this transcendental object”, which is constituted by the catego-
ries that are the “fundamental concepts for thinking objects in general 
for the appearances” (A111), is “that which in all of our empirical con-
cepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality”. 
This concept of the transcendental object “concerns nothing but that 
unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as 
it stands in relation to an object”, whereby “[t]his relation […] is noth-
ing other than the necessary unity of consciousness” (A109), that is, the 
transcendental unity of apperception. Indeed, the very possibility and 
necessity of the categories rests on the relation between all appearances 
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to the original apperception (A111). In the understanding, which is 
“[t]he unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagina-
tion”, are “pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of 
the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appear-
ances”, which “are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understand-
ing” (A119). The categories thus are the concepts of necessary synthesis 
(see B151),34 and hence are a priori, analytically derivable from tran-
scendental or “pure apperception” as the “principle of the synthetic 
unity of the manifold in all possible intuition” (A116–17).
To deny that the categories are analytically derivable from the unity 
of apperception would rather create a problem as to how to explain 
the very possibility and necessity of the categories (A111), when the 
original apperception is what lends them this necessity and even con-
stitutes their possibility. If the combination of the understanding 
(Verstandesverbindung), which is the intellectual synthesis, is that which 
is “thought in the mere category” (B151), how then could the categories 
not be seen as analytically related to the unity of apperception? There is 
a widespread assumption among commentators that categories are dif-
ferent things or functions than acts of synthesis, but textual evidence 
and philosophical reasons show that they cannot be (I provide some of 
these in the chapters to follow). And if they are not, then neither can 
they be seen as separable from the unity of apperception, since acts of a 
priori synthesis are nothing but so many modes (twelve, to be precise) 
of the unity of apperception.
Especially, nonconceptualist readings of Kant appear to want to see 
a priori synthesis and acts of conceptualisation—which involve the 
categories and/or the understanding and/or judgement (depending on 
whether one sees acts of the understanding, and the involvement of the 
categories, as acts of judgement, in which alone categories are instanti-
ated35)—separated. But such readings are vulnerable to what has aptly 
been called the “schmimagination vicious regress problem” (Hanna 
2013), the problem namely that if acts of a priori synthesis come sep-
arated from acts of the understanding or conceptualisation, or from 
acts of judgement, it is not clear which more original (i.e. more a pri-
ori) act of synthesis, or more originary productive imagination, could, 
per impossibile, be considered responsible for their synthesis. Separating 
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the various formally distinguishable elements of synthesis as an act of 
the understanding, both intellectual and figurative, invites an obvi-
ous explanatory regress, where a priori synthesis was supposed to pro-
vide the explanation stopper. If a priori synthesis is conceived by Kant 
as the “original-synthetic unity of apperception”, in its various guises as 
productive imagination or mere intellectual synthesis (the understand-
ing), then there cannot be an even more original synthesis that lies at 
the root of the productive imagination and the understanding, and a 
priori combines them. The “schmimagination” problem also holds, 
mutatis mutandis, for the view that not all concept use, or not all acts 
of understanding, involves judgement (Land 2015). Given the above, 
there are thus good reasons to believe that the deduction of the catego-
ries can best be seen as a logical derivation from the unity of appercep-
tion, because the categories are analytically related to it.
While responding to my critics, I go over some of the main planks 
of my interpretation of the so-called ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction, 
which was delineated in much greater detail in my earlier book. Among 
other things, against Corey Dyck I maintain that the analytic unity 
of consciousness is crucially important to the argument of §16 of the 
B-Deduction and I argue that the categories are more intimately related 
to the functions of judgement than some interpreters, including Dyck, 
make them out to be. Secondly, I argue that the progressive argument of 
TD should not be construed as a transcendental argument against the 
sceptic, as so many Anglophone readers of TD (still) do. To construe 
TD as aimed at the sceptic is to underestimate Kant’s epistemic confi-
dence and to miss the real point of the Critical project, which should 
be seen more in the context of rationalism, namely: justifying the use of 
the pure concepts of the understanding by showing that they are only 
objectively valid in conjunction with empirical intuitions of objects. In 
this context, I criticise a standard reading of the reciprocity between the 
subject and object of experience and critically consider construals of a 
supposed gap in Kant’s argument. I argue why, in his critique of my 
book, Andrew Stephenson is mistaken in thinking that showing that the 
categories apply to the objects of experience is not entailed by showing 
that the categories are instantiated in the experience of objects (I expand 
on this crucial point, which has a direct bearing on understanding 
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the core claim of TD and my claim of Kant’s radical subjectivism, in 
Chap. 4). Thirdly, I defend my claim that the derivation of the catego-
ries is a proper deduction, by answering the critique of a level confusion 
in my argument. This concerns a methodological point about the way 
TD proceeds, and why it involves self-consciousness.
In the last part of the chapter, I respond to the incisive question, 
raised by Marcel Quarfood, whether it is at all possible to derive the 
category of contingency from within the first-person perspective. In 
formulating an answer, I point out that we can only have a negative 
concept of contingency, which at the same time shows the limits of the 
transcendental-subjective perspective. Ironically, on account of Kant’s 
radical subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge we are at the 
same time barred from accessing what is truly merely subjectively valid. 
This shows that Kant’s radical subjectivism is not a psychological sub-
jectivism.
In Chap. 3, I address the intimate reflexive relation between self-
consciousness and objective cognition, by linking self-consciousness 
explicitly to the topic of judgement. First, I explain that already early 
on in his published work, even before the Critique—in which this con-
nection of course centrally informs his theory of knowledge, there are 
clear hints about the epistemic significance of self-consciousness or the 
mind, even though a fully-fledged theory of judgement and a fully-
fledged theory of apperception only first appear in the Critical period. 
After providing some historical background concerning judgement in 
Kant’s pre-Critical published works, I go on to argue more systemati-
cally for the close connection between his theory of apperception and 
theory of judgement, which reinforces my thesis about Kant’s radical 
subjectivism about possible knowledge. I focus on two crucial, closely 
related aspects, whilst considering Robert Pippin’s well-known reading 
of Kantian apperception (Pippin 1987, 1997, 2014): (1) the objectivity 
of judgement36 and (2) the necessary imputability of agency inherent to 
judgement, which points to the involvement of spontaneity. Spontaneity, 
i.e. original subjective agency, is perhaps the single most recognisable 
aspect of Kantian thought, and arguably the quintessential element of 
Kant’s thought from which German Idealism sprouted. Objectivity and 
spontaneity are both defining elements of Kant’s account of judgement, 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
and are inextricable. Spontaneity concerns the self-legislative normativ-
ity that governs any judgement about objects, such that a judgement 
counts as objectively valid only because the apperceiving subject takes 
the judgement to be so valid. It is this objective validity, grounded on 
the spontaneity of the judging subject, the agent of judgement, that first 
constitutes the very objectivity of the object of my judgement.
As regards point (1), unlike other commentators, I argue that the 
objective validity of a judgement that x is F is not the truth value of 
the judgement, but rather concerns the primordial connection between 
every determinative judgement and the empirical object x about which 
one judges that it has property F, or G, etc., even if the attribution 
of empirical properties is itself contingent and can of course be false. 
Objective validity is concerned with the intimate relation between, 
on the one hand, the objective unity of apperception, which defines a 
judgement, and the object of judgement, on the other. It is here that 
Kant’s radical subjectivism, as defined above, really comes to the fore: 
the apperceiving subject defines what is first conceived as object, there-
fore there is no object as such outside apperception, hence outside 
judgement!37
With respect to (2), I argue, like Pippin and Allison (1990), that the 
spontaneity involved in the act of judging is irreducible to the causal 
system determining the content of the judgement, but unlike them, 
I argue that the spontaneity of judging is not absolute, but relative in 
a non-Sellarsian sense. To make it clear that the relative  spontaneity 
in theoretical cognition is relative in a non-Sellarsian sense, I adopt 
and argue for the “concurrence” model of spontaneity, first proposed 
by Karl Ameriks (1991). This is a crucial point which differenti-
ates Kantian spontaneity from Hegelian spontaneity or freedom in 
the theoretical context, which is to be seen as the agency, not of the 
 understanding, as is the case for Kant, but of reason itself.
In Chap. 4, I address the problem, raised in some recent Anglophone 
Kant literature (Van Cleve 1999; Gomes 2010; Stephenson 2014) and 
going back to Stroud (1968), of an alleged ‘gap’ in Kant’s argument in 
TD for the necessary application of the categories to objects of experi-
ence that needs bridging, and show that it is based on a misunderstand-
ing about the principle of the unity of apperception and its inherent 
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objective validity. The ostensible gap is construed in terms of the differ-
ence between, on the one hand, arguing that we must apply categories 
in order to be able to think of, experience, or perceive objects and, on 
the other, arguing that the categories must so apply. Put in more gen-
eral terms: The truth of our conceptual scheme does not imply the truth 
about objects. The claim here is that Kant argues for the necessary con-
ditions of our conceptual scheme only, but fails to show that the cat-
egories are actually exemplified by the objects of our experience. This 
problem will already have been discussed briefly in Chap. 2 in response 
to Stephenson’s (2014) criticism of my earlier reading of Kant’s reci-
procity thesis (Schulting 2012:53ff.). Here, in Chap. 4, the charge of a 
gap will be rebutted in an in-depth formal analysis of Kant’s argument 
for the necessary and (formally) sufficient conditions of experience. 
Both the claim that there is an apparent gap and the solutions for bridg-
ing it proposed by the aforementioned authors are rejected.
The general implicit assumption behind this charge of a gap in Kant’s 
argument is much the same as the one driving Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
subjectivism. Hegel criticises Kant for denying the categories’ appli-
cation to the things in themselves, as a result of which they lack truly 
objective reality. According to Hegel, Kant reduces knowledge of real-
ity to what reality merely means to us, even if it is true that Kant insists 
on the objective purport of such knowledge. The basic objection is thus 
that Kant’s epistemology fails to provide a convincing theory of truth 
and effectively remains subjectivist through and through (i.e. subjectiv-
ist in the ‘bad’ sense). This critique, however, rests on a psychologistic 
misreading of Kant’s argument that the categories are not only condi-
tions of experience but also conditions of the objects of experience, and 
on a misunderstanding with regard to the categories’ putative applica-
bility to things in themselves. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for 
contemporary commentators such as Van Cleve and Gomes, whose 
readings of Kant reveal a realist bias and at heart misapprehend the ide-
alist thrust of the Critical turn. (These authors are thus the main targets 
of my refutation in Chap. 4.)
I want to confront this conundrum, for realists at least—that is, 
that categories are said by Kant to be the necessary conditions of both 
experience and the objects of experience—by also looking at a related 
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construal of an ostensible gap in Kant’s argument, which has been 
noted by Carl (1989a, b), Guyer (1992), Mohr (1991) and others. This 
concerns the gap between the argument for the subjective principle of 
transcendental apperception as a principle of self-consciousness and the 
argument regarding the objective unity of apperception. Presumably, so 
these authors claim, Kant illicitly moves directly from the transcenden-
tal unity of apperception as a subjective principle of self-consciousness 
(argued in §16 of the B-Deduction) to the objective unity of appercep-
tion as a principle of objective experience (argued in §§17 and 18 of the 
B-Deduction).
I contend that a fundamental misunderstanding about, on the one 
hand, the analytic principle of apperception and its transcendental 
ground and, on the other, the notion of objective validity, and what this 
entails for the concept of objectivity, underlies the criticism of a gap 
in Kant’s argument, in both aforementioned construals. To show that 
there is no gap between the analytic principle of apperception and the 
notion of object that Kant espouses, and that Kant indeed shows how 
subjectivity is constitutive of objectivity—the thesis of radical subjectiv-
ism, I rehearse central arguments regarding the scope of transcendental 
apperception as a principle governing representations from my previous 
book (Schulting 2012). To reinforce my contention that there is no gap 
between the unity of apperception and the object of cognition, I also 
consider Van Cleve’s phenomenalist claim that the existence of objects is 
dependent on the subject and hence that appearances are merely “virtual 
objects”. I argue that, suitably amended, phenomenalism about appear-
ances facilitates an understanding of the intimacy between apperception 
and object, i.e. Kant’s subjectivism, without this resulting in a deflation-
ary reading of Kant’s empirical realism about spatiotemporal objects or 
indeed in an eliminative ontological idealism à la Berkeley.38 In short, 
the right sort of phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism will show that 
one need not worry about any gaps in Kant’s argument in TD.
I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content in Chap. 5. 
Inspired by Kant’s account of the intimate relation between intui-
tion and concepts, McDowell (1996) has forcefully argued that the 
relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible 
content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in 
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conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism.39 
Recently, Kantians Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have 
brought against this view the charge that it neglects the possibility of 
the existence of essentially nonconceptual content that is not concep-
tualised or subject to conceptualisation. Their critique of McDowell 
amounts to nonconceptualism. However, both views, conceptualist and 
nonconceptualist, share the assumption that intuition is synthesised 
content in Kant’s sense.40 My interest is not in the validity of the philo-
sophical positions of conceptualism or nonconceptualism per se. I am 
particularly interested in the extent to which the views that McDowell 
and Hanna and Allais respectively advance are true to Kant, or can val-
idly be seen as Kantian positions. I argue that although McDowell is 
right that intuition is only epistemically relevant in conjunction with 
concepts, Hanna and Allais are right with regard to the existence of 
essentially nonconceptual content (intuitions) independently of the 
functions of the understanding, but that they are wrong with regard to 
non-conceptualised intuition being synthesised content in Kant’s sense.
Kantian conceptualists (Bowman 2011; Griffith 2012; Gomes 2014) 
have responded to the recent nonconceptualist offensive, with refer-
ence to A89ff./B122ff. (§13)—which, confusingly, the nonconceptu-
alists also cite as evidence for their contrary reading—by arguing that 
the nonconceptualist view conflicts with the central goal of TD, namely, 
to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I contend that 
the conceptualist reading of A89ff./B122ff. is unfounded, but also that 
the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer 
strictly to objects independently of the functions of the understanding, 
and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthe-
sis and intellectual synthesis.
I argue that Kant is a conceptualist, albeit not in the sense that stand-
ard conceptualists assume. Perceptual knowledge is always judgemental, 
though without this resulting in the standard conceptualist claim that, 
necessarily, all intuitions or all perceptions per se stand under the cate-
gories (strong conceptualism). I endorse the nonconceptualist view that, 
for Kant, perception per se, i.e. any mere or ‘blind’ intuition of objects 
(i.e. objects as indeterminate appearances) short of perceptual knowl-
edge, does not necessarily stand under the categories.41 Perception is not 
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yet perceptual knowledge. In this context, I point out the common fail-
ure in the literature on TD, both of the conceptualist and nonconceptu-
alist stripe, to take account of the modal nature of Kant’s argument for 
the relation between intuition and concept insofar as cognition should 
arise from it.
In Chap. 6, to expand on my account of synthesis in relation to non-
conceptual content in the previous chapter, I advance a moderately con-
ceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in 
the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is 
thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. 
Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction 
Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in deter-
mining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the 
A-Deduction. It also appears that in the A-Deduction the seemingly 
pre-conceptual aspects of a priori synthesis, namely those of the synthe-
sis of apprehension and the imagination, are more prominently featured 
than in the B-Deduction. And the fact that in the A-Deduction judge-
ment does not appear to play any significant role reinforces the view 
that the A-Deduction is less strongly conceptualist.
I believe that Kant is a conceptualist also in the A-Deduction (as 
much as in the B-Deduction) in the sense that all syntheses, which are 
expounded in the second section of the A-Deduction, must be seen 
as involving the categories or the understanding as the seat of the cat-
egories. However, despite some apparent strong modal claims regarding 
apperception in the A-Deduction, I argue that Kant is a moderate con-
ceptualist in the sense that he allows for the real possibility that some 
representations are apprehended that are not subsumed or subsumable 
under the categories, or determined or determinable by the understand-
ing as the seat of the categories. Not all representations must be synthe-
sised and hence be conceptualised (by means of the categories), nor are 
all representations necessarily conceptualisable (by means of the catego-
ries). Often it is argued that the application of the categories must be 
seen as separate from or prior to conceptualisation (that is, employment 
of concepts in a judgement), so that the categories must be considered 
to apply to representations at least to the extent that the productive 
imagination or recognitive synthesis is involved, even if no empirical 
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concepts are applied in an actual judgement.42 But it is difficult to see 
how categories can apply outside the context of an actual judgement in 
which ipso facto empirical concepts are employed, because, after all, cat-
egories are nothing but logical functions of judgement (e.g. B143).
More in particular, I shall argue for the claims that (1) appearances to 
the contrary, all three levels of syntheses in the A-Deduction, including 
the synthesis of recognition, are interdependent and are not to be seen 
as operating singly or independently of each other, and hence of the cat-
egories; (2) ‘mere’ apprehension, or ‘mere’ intuition, is not dependent 
on the understanding and the application or possible application of the 
categories; and that (3) ‘mere’ apprehension does not even invoke a pri-
ori synthesis of apprehension and hence is as such fully lawless in terms 
of Kantian a priori laws. In this context, I also address Kant’s argument 
in the A-Deduction about the role of the imagination in the production 
of spatial objects and explain his apt use of the example of cinnabar to 
show that the kind of association that is at issue here concerns the pos-
sibility of knowledge, not the possibility of mere association, as is often 
assumed.
Besides addressing structural and methodical issues relating to the so-
called ‘second step’ of the B-Deduction, Chap. 7 expands on the theme 
of synthesis and addresses Kant’s argument in that second step about 
how figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa) or transcendental or produc-
tive imagination accounts for the possibility of perceptual knowledge of 
spatiotemporal objects. I consider three key points:
First, I discuss some systematic issues regarding the precise relation 
between intellectual and figurative synthesis. I argue that figurative syn-
thesis is in fact intellectual synthesis in the mode of the a priori synthe-
sis of apprehension in empirical intuition, and that therefore figurative 
synthesis is always a function of the understanding, and hence can never 
operate independently of it. Figurative synthesis is simply how the 
understanding operates in the empirical domain, in an actual empirical 
judgement. This undercuts certain nonconceptualist construals of Kant’s 
argument, which argue that nonconceptual content is synthesised con-
tent by virtue of figurative synthesis, but not synthesised by virtue of 
intellectual synthesis, since the latter ex hypothesi implies conceptualisa-
tion by the understanding.
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Secondly, I examine in detail how figurative synthesis must be seen 
as providing the a priori formal ground for the knowledge of concrete 
spatiotemporal objects, and why synthesis is in one sense also a suffi-
cient condition for the empirical reality of such objects but in another 
sense not a sufficient condition of their existence. I shall particularly pay 
attention to the role that synthesis plays in the determination of space, 
and stress the fact that Kant’s claims regarding the conceptual determi-
nation of space does not require, and in fact cannot mean, a collapse 
between what is receptively given in intuition and the spontaneous act 
of determining intuitions, nor imply that necessarily, what is receptively 
given is subject to the categories. My reading allows for a notion of 
not-yet-determined metaphysical space as irreducibly nonconceptual, in 
the sense that its unity is sui generis and not reliant on the unity of the 
understanding that is required for determinate spaces.43
Thirdly, I address Kant’s claims—adumbrated at the outset of this 
introduction—that the categories, through figurative synthesis, consti-
tute “the original ground of [nature’s] necessary lawfulness” (B165) and 
that the laws of nature “exist just as little in the appearances, but rather 
exist only relative to the subject in which the appearances inhere, insofar 
as it has understanding” (B164). Of particular concern here is the need 
for the unity of apperception, hence the categories by means of figura-
tive synthesis, as a guarantee and foundation of the a priori knowable 
uniformity of nature. All this reinforces my thesis that Kant is a radical 
subjectivist about the possibility of knowledge, indeed, of nature itself.
In Chap. 8, I expound Hegel’s critique of Kant, which he first and 
most elaborately presented in his early essay Faith and Knowledge 
(1802), by focusing on the criticism that Hegel levelled against Kant’s 
(supposedly) arbitrary subjectivism about the categories. This relates to 
the restriction thesis of Kant’s transcendental idealism: categorially gov-
erned empirical knowledge only applies to appearances, not to things in 
themselves, and so does not reach objective reality, according to Hegel. 
Hegel claims that this restriction of knowledge to appearances is unwar-
ranted merely on the basis of Kant’s own principle of transcendental 
apperception, and just stems from Kant’s empiricist bias. He argues that 
Kant’s principle of apperception as the foundational principle of knowl-
edge is in fact incompatible with his empiricism.
1.5 Summary of the Chapters     35
Fo
r S
ch
lar
ly 
Pu
rp
o
es
On
ly
36     1 Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: An Introductory Essay
Hegel rightly appraises the centrality of transcendental apperception 
for the constitution of objectivity. But he is wrong about its incompat-
ibility with Kant’s empirical realism. By virtue of a misapprehension of 
the formal distinction between the accompanying ‘I think’, i.e. the ana-
lytical principle of apperception, and what Hegel calls “the true ‘I’” of 
the original-synthetic unity of apperception, Hegel unjustifiably prises 
apart the productive imagination, which is supposedly this “true ‘I’”, 
and the understanding, which is supposedly just a derivative, subjective 
form of the productive imagination; the latter, according to Hegel, is 
Reason or Being itself, and is the truly objective. This deflationary read-
ing of the understanding, which hypostatises the imagination as the 
supreme principle, rests on a distortion of key elements of Kant’s theory 
of apperception. In this chapter, I show that Hegel’s charge of inconsist-
ency against Kant, namely, Hegel’s claim that the principle of appercep-
tion as the highest principle of cognition does not comport with Kant’s 
restriction thesis, is the direct consequence of a psychological misread-
ing of Kant’s subjectivism.
In Chap. 9, I show that there is at least one crucial, non-short, argu-
ment, which does not involve arguments about spatiotemporality, why 
Kant’s subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge, argued in TD, 
must lead to idealism. This has to do with the fact that given the impli-
cations of the discursivity thesis, namely, that the domain of possible 
determination of objects is characterised by limitation, judgements of 
experience can never reach the completely determined individual, i.e. 
the thing in itself or the unlimited real, but only objects as objects of 
possible experience. As such, it can be shown by reference to a key argu-
ment from Kant, that Hegel’s famous criticism that Kant is not licensed, 
on the basis of his core arguments concerning the original-synthetic 
unity of apperception, to restrict our knowledge to appearances (see 
Chap. 8), is mistaken on purely systematic grounds.
More specifically, I argue that idealism follows already from the 
constraints that the use of the categories, in particular the categories 
of quality, places on the very conceivability of things in themselves. 
My claim is that, although it is not only possible but also necessary to 
think things in themselves, it does not follow that by merely thinking 
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them we have a full grasp of the nature of things in themselves, as some 
important commentators claim we have. We must therefore distinguish 
between two kinds of conceiving of things in themselves: conceiving 
in the standard sense of ‘forming the notion of ’, and conceiving in the 
narrow sense of ‘having a determinate intellectual grasp’. So although we 
must be able notionally to think things in themselves, as the grounds 
of their appearances, we cannot even conceive, through pure concepts, 
of how they are in themselves in any determinate, even if merely intel-
lectual, sense. To put it differently, we cannot have a positive conception 
of things in themselves (this is in line with Kant’s distinction between 
noumena in the negative and positive senses; cf. B307–9).
For support, I resort to a much overlooked chapter in the Critique, 
concerning the transcendental Ideal, where Kant discusses what it is for 
a thing to be a thing in itself proper, namely, something that is thor-
oughly determined. This concerns the real ontological conditions of 
things, which are not satisfied by the modal categories alone, namely, 
their existence conditions. I claim that the chief reason why, given 
Kant’s view of determinative judgement, we cannot determine a thing 
in itself is because of two connected reasons: (1) a thing in itself is 
already fully determined and therefore not further determinable and (2) 
we cannot possibly determine all of the thing’s possible determinations. 
In this context, I also discuss the notion of material (not: empirical) 
synthesis—of which Kant speaks in the chapter on the transcendental 
Ideal—which must be presupposed as the ground of the formal a pri-
ori synthesis that grounds possible experience. This material synthesis, 
which is an idea of reason that defines a thing as thoroughly determined 
with regard to all of its possible predicates and has mere regulative sta-
tus, can by implication not be determined by the forms of the under-
standing, which synthesise only a limited set of predicates. As a result, 
given this definition of ‘thing in itself ’, any object (appearance) as at 
best44 a limited set of determinations of the thing can never be numeri-
cally identical to the thing in itself as thoroughly determined individ-
ual. This undercuts a standard assumption about the identity relation 
between appearances and things in themselves in many contemporary 
interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism.45
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Notes
 1. One could claim that Kant here says that we only must think the object 
“as something in general = X ”, not that the object is only so. But the 
German construction is such (“Es ist leicht einzusehen, daß dieser 
Gegenstand nur als etwas überhaupt = X müsse gedacht werden…”) 
that the immediate point of the passage is not about the constraints 
merely of our thinking (with the emphasis on “müsse gedacht 
werden”), such that we can only know or cognise the object by think-
ing of it as “only something in general = X ” but, in reality, the object is 
outside us as thinkers. Rather, the point of the passage, and its context, 
is about the very conception of an object; an object is to be conceived 
of as being merely “something in general = X ”, and not as something 
existing outside of us as thinkers to which our thought refers. To avoid 
the potential ambiguity of “thought of”, as if a merely epistemologi-
cal or even psychological point were being made, a better translation 
of “…müsse gedacht werden” would be “…must be considered”, or 
“…must be conceived of”, rather than “…must be thought of”. This 
is of course not to deny that the reason that we must conceive of the 
object as only “something in general = X ” has to do with the way our 
thinking works. But this does not mean that Kant is only making an 
epistemological or even just a psychological claim, and not making a 
metaphysical claim regarding the status of the object, as it should be 
conceived of. It is clear that Kant wants to argue that in order for us 
to be able to know the thing about which we make claims, we must 
somehow internalise the thing, how odd or counterintuitive this may 
at first blush sound. Already here, we are in the thicket of a specifically 
Kantian theory of knowledge, which shows the inextricability of episte-
mological and ontological issues.
 2. Cf. Becker (1984:62).
 3. Allais is right to claim that it cannot be the case that the argument of 
TD, namely, that our concepts of objects are a function of our sub-
jective forms of thinking, depends on idealism, as this would “estab-
lish the conclusion of the argument [of TD] too easily” (2015:287). 
But denying that the argument of TD depends on the premise of ide-
alism does not imply that, as Allais believes, the central claim of the 
‘first step’ of TD, namely, that the categories give us relation to objects, 
does not “express idealism” (2015:285). I do agree with Allais’s point 
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that TD cannot just be the thesis of “transcendental idealism plus the 
metaphysical deduction”: “Compared with the tortuous argument 
of the Deduction, the idea that the subjective conditions of thinking 
apply to objects simply because objects are a function of the subjec-
tive conditions of thinking, again, seems much too quick and easy” 
(Allais 2011:98). TD requires more than just stipulating that the 
objects can only be thought of in terms of certain a priori concepts 
(the Copernican hypothesis). But the fact that the Copernican hypoth-
esis, which involves the idealist claim that objects are a function of 
our thought, is not sufficient for proving the legitimate application of 
a priori concepts (cf. Bxxii note), does not imply that that proof does 
not explain and thus justify the idealist hypothesis. In the B-Deduction, 
the operative premise of the argument (the ‘I think’ proposition) does 
indeed not rely on the assumption of idealism (see Schulting 2012), but 
the argument overall nonetheless implies or “expresses” idealism about 
objects. It expresses idealism to the extent that Kant argues, in §17 of 
the B-Deduction, that an object sensu stricto is a function of the unity 
of apperception, and, as stated in A104, that by implication an object 
sensu stricto does not exist outside that unity, but is a ‘mere’ representa-
tion, or, a unified set of representations. This combined set of claims 
clearly amounts to idealism, even of the phenomenalist kind (in some 
sense), as I shall argue in Chap. 4. Likewise, in the conclusion of the 
so-called ‘second step’ (B164–5), when Kant asserts that “nature in gen-
eral” itself depends on the categories, this claim expresses the quintes-
sential idealist position of Kant’s Copernican revolution in metaphysics 
(see Chap. 7). Contrary to what Allais (2011:101) believes, the cen-
tral claim of TD is therefore not compatible with what a realist would 
accept, or if he did he misunderstands that central claim (see my cri-
tique of Stephenson in Chap. 2, and also Chap. 4). On the nature of 
Kant’s Copernican revolution, see Schulting (2009).
 4. This does not mean that we could not even represent conceptually non-
ideal things in themselves, such as the soul, God or aspects of our free-
dom (cf. A96), or make rationally assertible statements or claims about 
these entities in the noumenal realm, which are certainly not depend-
ent on our sensible forms of intuition for their logical or even real pos-
sibility. If we could not even make claims about things in themselves, 
then Kant’s consistent talk about noumenal affairs would be liter-
ally senseless. Certainly, analytically true statements about things in 
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themselves are possible, and Kant must be granted at least this theo-
retical possibility, although in the practical philosophy, his claims are of 
course not merely analytic, but special cases of synthetic a priori judge-
ments, which instantiate a priori concepts in special kinds of object 
(which makes these concepts objectively valid in a practical sense; cf. 
KpV, 5:5–6, 48–49). The conceptual constraints of transcendental 
idealism concern rather the fact that we are not able to determine our 
mere conceptual representations as theoretically objectively real, unless 
backed up by empirical experience, which thus requires the involve-
ment of the forms of sensible intuition. Kant’s transcendental idealism 
concerns both concepts and forms of intuition, which are inextricably 
bound up. So although, as I am suggesting here, conceptual claims 
about the categories already imply their restrictive use, namely, in that 
by means of mere concepts we cannot theoretically determine the truth 
about e.g. our personal substantiality, our freedom, or God’s existence, 
this is not yet the whole, or even most important story of transcenden-
tal idealism per se; that story is first presented in full with the claims 
concerning the spatiotemporality of the objects of our knowledge, which 
specifically restricts them to appearances only.
 5. I can of course not elaborate already here, but shall provide grounds for 
this controversial position in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
 6. For discussion, see Schulting (2012:15–19).
 7. This might be taken as flatly contradicting my earlier statement that 
appearances do not “as such” exist outside of the capacity of representa-
tion. But as will become clearer in Chaps. 4 and 9, the existence de re 
of objects of our experience, which we posit by means of the de dicto 
application of the modal category of existence in a judgement, is indeed 
not dependent on our capacity of representation, because objects of 
objectively valid experience are the appearances of really, independently 
existing things in themselves, on which they depend existentially. 
However, the existence status of appearances is that they do not as such 
exist de re outside of our capacity of representation, that is, outside the 
realm of possible experience (this should not be conflated with the idea 
that objects as appearances must be seen as not existing outside my 
or your particular actual or possible mental states, which is not Kant’s 
view). Only things in themselves exist de re outside of our capacity of 
representation, or, possible experience. Cf. B520–2/A492–4. This of 
course raises the question of the identity between the objects that we 
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posit as existing in judgements and the things in themselves as existing 
de re, independently of our judgements. I discuss this in Chap. 9.
 8. The importance of the preposition ‘as’ will be explored further in the 
context of apperception and spontaneity as necessary adverbial ele-
ments of judgement in the last section of Chap. 3.
 9. For an extensive account of the meaning and aptness of Kant’s 
Copernican analogy, see Schulting (2009).
 10. Cf. A581–2/B609–10: “[T]hat in which the real of all appearances is 
given is the one all-encompassing experience […]” (trans. emended).
 11. Magnetic fields are part of possible experience, but only indirectly 
knowable. But magnetic fields are on that account of course not things 
in themselves. A distinction should be heeded between the transcen-
dental and empirical levels of indirect cognition. The thing in itself is 
known indirectly transcendentally, while magnetic fields are known 
indirectly empirically, since our sense organs, and by extension our 
scientific instruments, are not sufficiently fine-grained to detect these; 
magnetic matter would be perceivable, if we had finer senses. I thank 
Marcel Quarfood for raising this issue.
 12. Cf. Becker (1984:40–41).
 13. Cf. B522/A494, where Kant asserts that what “are called objects”, are 
just “representations […] insofar as they are connected and determi-
nable in these relations (in space and time) according to laws of the 
unity of experience”. At A106, Kant writes that the “object” that one 
“think[s] [...] for our intuitions” is “nothing more than the something 
for which the concept expresses such a necessity of synthesis”.
 14. I say “at least formally”, for sensory input must still be assumed as a 
given, which is not due to the subject’s agency. Only such sensory input 
will provide a materially sufficient condition of empirical knowledge, 
namely an immediate connection to the thing in itself, which exists 
independently of our representations and our subjective agency.
 15. This is an important aspect of Kant’s theory of apperception, which 
goes back to Wolff (see Schulting 2015a). See further Chap. 3 (this vol-
ume).
 16. For further analysis of the problematic passages concerning transcen-
dental apperception in the A-Deduction, see Schulting (2012:75–82, 
99–102).
 17. This should not be read as if there were already an independently exist-
ing individual empirical object, in the strict sense of Kant’s definition of 
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an object, that is subsequently reconstructed in thought. On an empiri-
cal level, there is an experience of a particular, whose objective possi-
bility as a spatiotemporal substance is explained in the transcendental 
analysis by means of a rational reconstruction of what is empirically 
sensed. There is, however, no independently given objectively valid indi-
vidual object, of which I can have an intuition. This goes against a cen-
tral assumption of nonconceptualist readings of Kant (see Chap. 5).
 18. Things in themselves are in fact as such not in any way representable 
by us (cf. Schulting 2016a). Again, this does not mean that the idea or 
notion of things in themselves cannot be represented, for I can surely 
represent the notion of ‘God’ or ‘soul’, or indeed speculate about the 
soul’s or God’s putative properties. See further note 4 above. We do 
represent, by way of its appearance(s), the real thing in itself, which 
exists outside us (if it exists), but nothing of it as thing in itself literally 
forms part of our representation. In other words, we do not represent 
the thing in itself as such, neither its intrinsic properties, but nor even 
its putative mind-dependent properties. We only represent its appear-
ance, more precisely, the appearance is what we represent of the thing 
in itself. The appearance is thus not a property or determination or 
opaque description of the thing in itself (cf. Prol, 4:293), contrary to 
what the current crop of metaphysical interpretations of Kant’s ideal-
ism believe (see further below). The view that an appearance is what we 
represent of the thing in itself, but is not a property of the thing that 
appears, is entirely compatible with Kant’s statement that “the things 
that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be” (B59/
A42), which is often read as confirmation of a metaphysical two-aspect 
reading. By implication, what we intuit things to be, namely appear-
ances, is not how things are in themselves. Whether appearances and 
things in themselves are still the same things, even if not numerically 
identical, as e.g. Marshall (2013:534) proposes, is a moot point.
 19. One could raise the objection that talking about the object says nothing 
about how the object would be constituted independently of our talk 
about it, so that it is not necessarily the case that an object is always an 
object for thought. But this confuses the object, in Kant’s strict sense 
of the word, with the thing in itself. Being an appearance, and hence a 
mere representation, an object in Kant’s sense of the word is not sepa-
rable from our ways of conceiving of or speaking about it, whereas a 
thing in itself is—as the label already indicates—indeed that which is 
wholly independent of us and can exist unaccompanied, i.e. in itself.
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 20. In the Prolegomena, §36, 4:320, a section entitled “How is nature 
itself possible?”, Kant also delineates the distinction between empirical 
laws of nature and the pure or general laws of nature, which “contain 
merely the conditions of [the] necessary unification [of perceptions] 
in experience” (Kant 1977:62). Insofar as nature concerns only these 
general laws, “nature and possible experience are quite the same” (Kant 
1977:62; emphasis added). The possibility of nature and the role played 
by apperception in this is discussed in Chap. 7.
 21. But notice that also here Kant makes a distinction between a priori and 
empirical laws of nature (B165), one which a realist or a naturalist is 
not wont to make.
 22. See Kanterian’s (2013) interesting critique of Langton on this point. 
See also Schulting (2016a).
 23. An objection to this might be that ‘mind-dependence’ does in fact 
express neatly the idea of conformity of the object to the  subjective 
forms of cognition, suggesting that the orientation is from the 
object to the subject, rather than from the subject to the object 
(in the original German this seems even more the case, since the orig-
inal says sich richten nach for conform to; Bxii). In this way, however, 
talk of mind-dependency of the object cannot explain what the role 
is of the subject or mind in the a priori constitution of the object 
and knowledge thereof, precisely the goal of Kant’s Copernican turn 
in metaphysics (see Schulting 2009). In other words, speaking of 
‘mind-dependence’ has no real explanatory force and is thus purely 
stipulative.
 24. See further Chap. 3, where this ‘taking as’ will be delineated in the con-
text of the spontaneity involved in judgement.
 25. Hegel does appear to make contradictory criticisms of Kant: both that, 
as a realist old-style, he clings to things in themselves, and as an anti-
realist pur sang, at the same time denies knowledge of things in them-
selves, for on Kant’s account the objects of our knowledge are ‘mere 
representations’. What lies at the root of these ambiguous criticisms is 
the basic Hegelian critique that Kant remains committed to the abso-
lute distinction between subject and object, between mind and thing 
(see Houlgate 2015).
 26. Cf. Hegel, Enz, §42 Anm. 3; WL, 12:23–25. Apart from the psycholo-
gistic reading, this criticism also rests on the assumption of a two-world 
interpretation of Kant’s idealism, and on a misunderstanding of the 
very concept of objectivity—as if there were an objectivity ‘for us’ and 
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an objectivity ‘in itself ’, as Houlgate (2015) appears to be claiming; 
but notice that Hegel does have a good grasp of what objectivity means 
for Kant (e.g. WL, 12:23–24). On Hegel’s critique of Kant, see further 
Chap. 8 (this volume).
 27. The misappropriation is not a mere misunderstanding on Hegel’s part, 
but turns out to be a productive one for Hegel’s own positive phi-
losophy, which must be seen as both continuous with, and critical of, 
Kant’s metaphysics. I deal with this topic in future work on Hegel’s 
Science of Logic. See also Schulting (2016d).
 28. In Hegel’s view, the determinative relation between understanding and 
sensibility is one of reciprocal determination (see Sedgwick 2012:9–10, 
68, et passim), rather than one where the understanding only deter-
mines and the sensible is merely the determinable, such as Kant argues 
(B151–2).
 29. There is debate as to the appropriateness of the use of the term ‘con-
tent’ in the Kantian context, since our contemporary notion of mental 
content denotes the object of various epistemic attitudes, which have 
veridicality conditions, which seems closer to Kant’s notion of judge-
ment. The kind of mental state or sensible state that is at issue in the 
debate around Kantian nonconceptualism is, I believe, precisely not 
to be defined in those terms, as Kantian nonconceptualism con-
cerns the claim that mental content is to be considered while it in fact 
does not concern the correctness conditions for an epistemic attitude. 
Nevertheless, it seems that Kantian nonconceptualists do think that 
nonconceptual content is intentional content. Whilst not committing 
myself to a position on this, in this book I continue using the term ‘non-
conceptual content’ in relation to the Kantian debate, mostly because 
this has been standard since at least the publication of McDowell’s work 
(1996). ‘Nonconceptual content’ refers to those representational states 
(sensibility, intuition) which neither are conceptual nor necessarily entail 
conceptualisation. See further Schulting (2015b, 2016b, c).
 30. Some proponents of the nonconceptualist view argue that we have rela-
tion to an individual object independently of the categories, but not 
independently of a priori synthesis. But this in turn problematically 
assumes the separability of the categories and a priori synthesis. That 
this view is mistaken will be argued in Chaps. 6 and 7. I assess the pros-
pects of seeing Kant as a nonconceptualist, as well as the most impor-
tant literature on the topic, in Chaps. 5 and 6.
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 31. At any rate, I agree with Ameriks (2003, 2006, 2012) as well as Allais 
(2011) that, in TD, Kant does not presuppose transcendental idealism. 
However, I disagree with them that the argument of the necessary 
application of the categories, in abstraction from the account concern-
ing spatiotemporality, is wholly separable from idealism. See again note 3 
above.
 32. My view is structurally different from Reich’s in that, among other 
things, I claim that the categories are derivable from the ‘I think’ itself, 
not from the objective unity apperception, which is first addressed in 
§17 of the B-Deduction, although of course the ‘I think’ turns out to 
be the objective unity of apperception (see §18 of the B-Deduction). 
Reich also focussed on the functions of judgement, rather than the cat-
egories as such.
 33. Quarfood (2014:88) expresses the hope that the book will “stimulate 
a renewal of the debate”. Thus far, besides the ones mentioned, the only 
other commentator who has specifically taken note of my attempt of a 
derivation is Allison (2015:352n.33), although he does not discuss it.
 34. “This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible 
and necessary a priori, can be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), as 
distinct from that which would be thought in the mere category in 
regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is called 
combination of the understanding [Verstandesverbindung] (synthesis 
intellectualis)” (B151; boldface mine).
 35. Despite Kant being clear that the act of the understanding is an act 
to judge (A69/B94) and that categories are functions of judgement 
(B143), some commentators, both conceptualist and (quasi-)non-
conceptualist (Longuenesse 1998; Grüne 2009; Land 2015), attempt 
to prise apart the understanding, and the use of concepts, and acts of 
judgement. See also Chaps. 6 and 7.
 36. Whenever, in the course of this book, I speak of ‘judgement’, this 
should be understood as short for ‘determinative judgement’, thus 
excluding analytic statements or judgements, aesthetic judgements, 
or indeed beliefs or opinions, unless from the context it is clear that I 
talk about analytic or aesthetic judgements. In a Kantian perspective, a 
judgement proper is about an object in the strict sense, i.e. a statement 
or claim that has objective validity. Neither analytic judgements, nor 
aesthetic judgements or beliefs have objective validity, in the sense that 
Kant defines this.
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 37. To preempt Pavlovian realist reflexes, I should note again that, for 
Kant, of course the affecting thing in itself does exist, necessarily, out-
side judgement, as explained above. See further on this Chaps. 5 and 6.
 38. Cf. Sellars (1992:48).
 39. To be precise, one should distinguish between (1) the view that sensible 
content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in 
conjunction with concepts, and (2) the view that sensible content must 
always occur in conjunction with concepts. The latter view is strong 
conceptualism, whereas the former view is only relative conceptual-
ism, since it places a constraint on the extent to which sensible content 
must be related to concepts, namely, only to the extent that it con-
tributes to cognition. View (1) does not imply view (2), although it is 
often thought it does. McDowell does not appear to distinguish clearly 
between the two views.
 40. For an exception among nonconceptualists see e.g. Onof and Schulting 
(2015). Recently, Allais (2015, 2016) has modified her position some-
what.
 41. Again, this does not mean that such intuition of objects involves an 
objectively valid reference to well-defined subsistent particulars, which 
is the prerogative of judgement. The intuition always depends on a 
given object (V-Met/Schön, 28:484; B72; Prol, 4:282), but this should 
be understood in the sense of an intuition as necessarily implying the 
affecting Gegenstand that is presupposed as given, which is an “undeter-
mined object” (A19–20/B33–4).
 42. For example, Longuenesse (1998) argues that the application of the 
categories happens in two stages (by means of a “first” and a “second” 
application).
 43. I draw here partly on research by Onof and Schulting (2014, 2015).
 44. Strictly speaking, appearances as representations cannot be determi-
nations or properties or descriptions of things in themselves (cf. Prol, 
4:293; B332/A276; A493–4/B522). Therefore, other than that things 
in themselves must be thought of as the grounds of appearances, with-
out which appearances could not even exist, appearances do not bear 
any determinate or descriptive relation to things in themselves, such that 
appearances could be said to be the determinations or properties or 
descriptions of things in themselves qua things in themselves.
 45. See also Marshall’s (2013) proposal of sameness without (numerical) 
identity. Unlike Marshall, who criticises readings that interpret the 
putative identity between things in themselves and their appearances as 
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numerical identity, it seems to me to be a problem in general to say that 
things in themselves and appearances share anything, not even the sub-
stance that a thing in itself may be. So even if we agreed with Marshall 
to reject strict (numerical) identity between a thing in itself and its 
appearance—which we must on the grounds of Leibniz’s principle of 
the identity of indiscernibles and the fact that spatiotemporality is an 
exclusive property of appearances, I believe there is not even sameness to 
the extent that at least ‘substance’ is shared between them or minimally 
one property. This might seem to pose a problem for Kant, since in 
judgement at least existence, as modal category, is asserted of the thing 
in itself, though this must be taken as an application of the category of 
existence to the extent that the thing in itself appears, that is, an applica-
tion of the category to an appearance of the thing in itself only.
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From Apperception to Objectivity
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2.1  Introduction
In my previous book on the Deduction, Kant’s Deduction and 
Apperception: Explaining the Categories (Schulting 2012; henceforth 
in this chapter abbreviated as KDA), I presented a narrowly focused 
interpretation of the so-called ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction (running 
through §§15–20), including the introductory sections 13 and 14. I 
also dedicated a chapter to §10, i.e. the Third Clue section, that is, the 
section in the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) where Kant catalogues 
the categories (A76–83/B102–9), after having furnished the famous 
guiding thread (Leitfaden) to finding the categories. The central hypoth-
esis I advanced was—and no Kantian in his or her right (orthodox) 
mind, bar Klaus Reich (2001) and a few others following in his wake, 
has dared to make this claim so far—that, to put it very boldly, in the 
Transcendental Deduction (TD) Kant effectively derives the categories 
‘from scratch’.1 This is not entirely accurate, as Kant of course starts 
with the premise, or undisputed fact,2 of the discursivity of the human 
mind, the very general characteristics of which he first lists in the first 
two sections of MD (leading up to the table of judgement), which I did 
2
Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
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54     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
not discuss in the book (I believe the arguments in the first two sections 
of MD are exhaustively and conclusively dealt with by Wolff 1995). So 
to be more precise, contrary to the standard reading, my claim was that 
in TD Kant derives the categories from the discursivity of the human 
mind, or, from the capacity to think, thus confirming the validity of the 
Leitfaden provided in MD, which argues that the table of judgement, or 
more precisely the table of the discursive functions of thought in judge-
ment, and the table of categories neatly correspond. (Notice that the 
derivation starting with the factual premise of our discursivity does not 
make it therefore empirical. The derivation takes place a priori from the 
laws of our discursive capacity for thinking, given that we have such a 
capacity, and no other.)
This is why Kant, in §16 of TD, starts with the famous proposi-
tion “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations”, 
which is the principle of discursive thought, or indeed the principle of 
apperception.3 The dense, some might say convoluted, argument that 
ensues in the next paragraphs in §§16 and 17 contains, in my view, the 
argument for the logical derivation of the twelve categories, from apper-
ception, which are thus shown to be the necessary and formally suffi-
cient conditions for the possibility of discursive thought in general and 
hence also of the thought of an object, that is, of what enables us, as 
discursive minds, to think or conceive of an object at all. By showing 
exactly how each and every category is effectively derivable from the 
‘I think’-proposition, and thus constitutes the capacity for discursive 
thought, Kant, so I argued, can show that these subjective conditions of 
thought have objective validity (A89/B122); in other words, the deriva-
tion argument shows that the same set of conditions, or functions of 
thought, governs the possibility of both subjective thought and thought 
of an object—these functions being the categories, when specifically 
referring to the objects of thought.
Put succinctly, my claim is that TD demonstrates, by way of the deri-
vation argument—which is an ostensive proof in the sense that Kant 
indicates at A789/B817—that there is no discrepancy between what 
makes it possible to think in general and what makes it possible to think 
of an object. In fact, I believe it is only if we read TD in terms of the 
derivation argument that we can really understand how Kant is able to 
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show that thought itself is intrinsically objectively valid, that subjectiv-
ity itself is constitutive of objectivity, and that therefore the categories 
apply to the objects of experience. By showing that Kant’s argument 
for what, following Henry Allison, I call the ‘reciprocity thesis’, stands 
up to scrutiny, I go against persistent strands of criticism of the valid-
ity of this thesis, which is the central thesis of the ‘first step’ of the 
B-Deduction, and I would argue of the Deduction as a whole.4 The 
criticism namely is that Kant does not account, among other things, 
for the difference between a claim that says that self-consciousness, 
and so the subjective conditions or functions of thought, are neces-
sary for the thought of an object, and the ostensibly different claim that 
self-consciousness is sufficient for such a thought of an object. Hence, 
it is argued that there is an unbridgeable gap between the two claims 
that invalidates the main claim of there being an entailment relation 
between the subjective conditions of thought and the categories as the 
objective conditions of experience, which Kant proposes in §§16 and 
17. In KDA, I explained, in great detail, that this criticism is based on a 
false, i.e. psychological, reading of transcendental self-consciousness, an 
inflated interpretation of the scope of the analyticity of apperception, 
and a misapprehension of the relation between the analytic unity of 
consciousness and the original-synthetic unity of apperception.
These are complex issues, which of course I cannot rehearse here in 
the detail with which I addressed them in KDA. But they are clearly 
important for evaluating the success of TD. I go over the main points 
concerning the scope of the principle of apperception in Chap. 4, when 
I rebut the charges of a gap in Kant’s central argument about the rela-
tion between self-consciousness and objectivity. If Kant’s critics, regard-
ing the reciprocity thesis, are right, TD must be considered a failure, 
given how central this claim is to TD. One might perhaps want to 
argue that in TD Kant does not argue for the sufficient conditions of 
objective thought (and, if we take in the ‘second step’ as well, the con-
ditions of objective experience), but merely for the very general thesis 
that the categories are the necessary conditions of objective experience, 
that is, that the categories are necessarily applicable to objective expe-
rience.5 But these commentators—if not the majority of readers of 
TD—confuse Kant’s argument in the Analogies with the one in TD 
2.1 Introduction     55
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(hence, they often hastily turn to the Analogies for the specifics regard-
ing what constitutes categorially determined experience).6 In TD, Kant 
must show how and not just that the categories are necessarily applicable 
to objects of experience. The ‘how’ provides insight into the manner in 
which the subject of thought and the object of thought are necessarily a 
priori linked, and how each of the twelve categories is an a priori con-
stitutive element in and of this connection. A detailed account of the 
mutual implicatedness, or what I called the ‘rigorous coextensivity’, of 
the synthetic and analytic aspects of transcendental apperception shows 
this. The exposition of the a priori grounds of experience in TD is phil-
osophically more fundamental, and thus more general, than the account 
of the principles of experience offered in the Analogies. To  suggest that 
we need the Analogies to understand TD thus rests on a misunder-
standing of the order of fundamentality of the different sections in the 
Critique.
In KDA, I also assessed the question of the sense in which we must 
read Kant’s distinction, in §13 of TD, between the quid juris and 
a quid facti, and what Kant in fact means by a transcendental deduc-
tion of the categories. I looked at arguments provided in this context by 
Henrich (1989), Longuenesse (1998), Proops (2003), Seeberg (2006), 
and most recently Callanan (2011). I particularly criticised Longuenesse 
and Callanan for blurring the distinction between the transcendental 
and empirical orders in Kant’s reasoning. I also considered the vexed 
interpretative issue whether the structure of the argument of TD is 
either regressive or progressive. Most commentators hold either of the 
two possibilities to reflect accurately the structure of Kant’s argument in 
the B-Deduction. I argued that the argument of TD (either in the A- or 
B-version) is both, and necessarily so7; this view ties in seamlessly with 
my claim concerning the a priori derivation of the categories from the 
‘I think’.
In the present chapter, I consider critical arguments levelled against 
central elements of my book, in particular, my claim that TD is a 
logical deduction or derivation from apperception. My critics raise 
several key points in regard to my reading of TD in KDA.8 But, as I 
shall argue, some of these criticisms also betray persistent miscon-
ceptions about TD. In responding, I shall try and address the diverse 
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objections in as much detail as I can within the space available. This 
will also give me the opportunity to spell out again the main planks of 
my interpretation in KDA. In response to Dyck (2014), I explain that 
there are good reasons to believe that the deduction of the categories 
must indeed be seen as a logical derivation from the unity of appercep-
tion, and also why this view of TD does not make MD redundant, as 
Dyck contends (Sect. 2.2). Furthermore, I maintain that the analytic 
unity of consciousness is crucially important to the argument of §16 of 
TD (Sect. 2.3). Thirdly, I argue that the categories are more intimately 
related to the functions of judgement than some interpreters, such as 
Dyck, make them out to be. I discuss the example that Dyck takes, i.e. 
the category of substance (Sect. 2.4).
In response to Stephenson (2014), I address his criticism of how 
I construe the reciprocity thesis, and reply to his charge that I did not 
properly tackle the problem of the so-called gap that some authors have 
argued weakens Kant’s argument in the ‘first step’ of TD (Sects. 2.5, 2.6). 
I also defend my claim that the derivation of the categories is a proper 
deduction, by answering Stephenson’s critique of a level confusion in my 
argument and by pointing out why he is mistaken in thinking that show-
ing that the categories apply to objects of experience is not entailed by 
showing that the categories are instantiated in the experience of objects 
(Sect. 2.7), a topic I take up again in Chap. 4.
Quarfood (2014) raises a genuine problem for my interpretation of 
how contingency, the negative counterpart of the modal category of 
necessity, and something that represents what is utterly a posteriori, is to 
be derived a priori from apperception. I attempt to formulate the begin-
ning of an answer to this dilemma regarding contingency in Sect. 2.8.
First, however, I should like to make a general comment. Both Dyck 
and Stephenson characterise the progressive argument of TD as having 
to do with refuting the sceptic, in contrast to a regressive construal of 
TD that is not going to cajole the sceptic into accepting defeat. And 
they appear to think that I read the progressive argument as such. 
However, I never claim that the progressive argument in TD is meant to 
refute the sceptic and nor do I believe that it should. On the contrary, I 
argue that on my reading the progressive argument concerns the need, 
for Kant, to provide a ‘dogmatic’ proof of sorts of the epistemological 
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58     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
claims that he is making in TD, something that a mere regressive argu-
ment cannot accomplish. As I pointed out in KDA (Chap. 4), the pro-
gressive argument is indeed often construed in terms of an anti-sceptical 
argument, but, as I also made it clear, I agree with Ameriks (1978, 
2003, 2005) that Kant does not intend with TD to provide a knock-
down argument against the sceptic.
While I would not deny that in some global sense Kant is respond-
ing to (Humean) scepticism, it is striking that some commentators con-
tinue to read TD as if Kant were exclusively or primarily formulating a 
response to the sceptic. However, the central argument in TD, on my 
interpretation, is not an argument against the sceptic but rather a dem-
onstration of how a priori concepts, the stock-in-trade of metaphys-
ics, can be seen to justifiably apply to experience (and to the objects of 
experience). This involves primarily a response to, and critique of, the 
rationalists, who failed to ask the question of whether metaphysical con-
cepts are indeed used justifiably. Only by extension does it counter or 
invalidate, more by implication than intention, Hume’s sceptical claims 
about the objective validity of our beliefs about objects (see in particular 
§26 of the B-Deduction), notwithstanding the paragraph on Locke and 
Hume that Kant added to §14 (the Transition to the Transcendental 
Deduction) in the B-edition (see B127–8), which might seem to bolster 
the idea that TD is designed as a response to the sceptic. I shall again 
clarify my position on the supposed anti-sceptical thrust of TD in my 
response to Stephenson (Sect. 2.5), who dwells on the issue of scepti-
cism in connection with the so-called reciprocity thesis, which is central 
to what, borrowing a phrase from Pereboom (2001), I called the “mas-
ter argument” of TD in KDA.
2.2  Why the Deduction Is a Logical Derivation 
from Apperception
Dyck raises the following specific objections to central elements of my 
interpretation: (1) He (a) questions the “textual basis” of my claim, 
based on B142, that Kant indeed means to literally ‘derive’ the categories 
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from the unity of apperception, and (b) asks whether my account of 
the derivation of the categories does not threaten to “replace” or “make 
redundant” “any effort to derive the categories by means of the forms of 
judgment” (Dyck 2014:69, 71); (2) he objects that I do not sufficiently 
distinguish between “the consciousness of the single, identical subject of 
thought” (Dyck 2014:73) and the analytical unity of consciousness or 
apperception, and, by implication, questions the tenability of my claim 
about the ‘rigorous coextensivity’ between the synthetic and analytic 
unities of apperception; and (3) by raising some doubts about the deri-
vation of the category ‘substance’ in particular, he questions whether the 
derivation from apperception can indeed be of the categories, rather than 
merely of the logical functions of thought. Let me address these points 
in turn. I address point 1 in Sects. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 and points 2 and 3 in 
Sects. 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.
2.2.1  Why the Deduction Is a Logical Derivation 
from Apperception: The Rationale for My 
Interpretation
Dyck questions my interpretation of B142 as a basis for the idea—one 
of the central theses of my book—that the categories are derived from 
the unity of apperception or thought in the sense that the categories can 
be deduced (strictly) logically from the unity of thought as a premise in 
an argument (ad 1a). He believes that I should have considered alterna-
tive readings, readings that take ‘derivation’ in a looser sense, that is, in 
a sense different from logical deduction, because Kant himself uses the 
term in different senses at e.g. B238/A193, B140, and B127–8, where 
it seems clear that ‘derivation’ cannot be taken to mean (strict) logical 
derivation from a premise in an argument.9
First, my thesis that the categories are derivable from apperception 
does not hinge on the correct interpretation of B142 as such, or the 
correct interpretation of the term ‘derive’ or its cognate ‘derivation’ 
(Kant’s ableiten and Ableitung respectively). B142 textually supports 
my reading. Evidently, the term ‘derivation’ can have variant meanings 
in different contexts, but mostly Kant just means ‘deduction’ in the 
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60     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
standard sense (see further the discussion in KDA, Chap. 3). Secondly, 
a parallel passage in Prolegomena §39 (Prol, 4:322), where Kant 
expounds on “the system of categories” and its deduction, pretty clearly 
leaves no other reasonable option than to read ‘derivation’ in purely log-
ical terms, especially if we take the context of §39 into account—basi-
cally, this section is the Prolegomena’s version of MD. Notice that, a bit 
later in that section, Kant in fact equates Ableitung and Deduktion (Prol, 
4:324.31–2; cf. KDA, pp. 226–227n.5). In the passage in §39, Kant 
writes:
Nothing can be more desirable to a philosopher than to be able to derive, 
a priori from one principle, the multiplicity of concepts or basic princi-
ples that previously had exhibited themselves to him piecemeal in the use 
he had made of them in concreto, and in this way to be able to unite them 
all in one cognition. (Prol, 4:322 [Kant 2002:114])
Here, Kant contrasts two ways of exhibiting the pure concepts: either by 
a priori derivation from a principle, or by a posteriori gradual aggrega-
tion. The latter is not a viable way to proceed for Kant. Kant further 
explains, in this section, that the functions of the understanding can be 
“fully surveyed”, and that the “pure concepts” “arise” from them, “deter-
mined exhaustively and with precision” (Prol, 4:323 [Kant 2002:115]; 
emphasis added). What Kant means by this is that the “kind of cog-
nition” that we are after in an analysis of pure concepts is not a loose 
“aggregate” of concepts, but a “division” whose “necessity” we compre-
hend, as in a “system” (Prol, 4:322 [Kant 2002:114]), “founded on a 
universal principle”, and which “forms a closed circle” (Prol, 4:325–326 
[Kant 2002:117]), in which each and every part is reciprocally inte-
grated.10 In the introduction to the Clue sections in the Critique, Kant 
similarly writes:
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to 
seek its concepts in accordance with a principle, since they spring pure 
and unmixed from the understanding, as absolute unity, and must there-
fore be connected among themselves in accordance with a concept or 
idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of which the 
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place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of 
all of them together can be determined a priori, which would otherwise 
depend upon whim or chance. (A67/B92; emphasis added)
This rule for the a priori determination of each of the pure concepts lies 
in the act of the understanding as a capacity to judge (see Prol, 4:323). 
The derivation consists in a step-by-step demonstration—by virtue 
of an “analysis of the faculty of understanding” (A65/B90)—of the way 
in which each single pure concept, or category, forms an integral part 
of the nature of the discursive understanding, and how they all hang 
together systematically as jointly constituting the capacity to think, 
which for Kant is a capacity to judge. Each of the twelve categories cor-
responds to or is identical to each of the twelve functions of the under-
standing (or judgement), and so each category “analytically pertains”, 
as I put it in KDA, to the unity of thought (on the identity relation 
between function of thought and category, see further below in response 
to Dyck’s third objection).
It is in this way that I claim, as I did in KDA, that the categories can 
all be derived from the ‘I think’, from apperception as being the capac-
ity to think, since together they constitute the unity of thought, which 
Kant claims is intrinsically objectively valid. A different way to describe 
the close relation between the categories and the unity of thought 
or the unity of apperception would be to emphasise the “conform-
ity” between the categories and the subjective conditions of thought, 
which are their grounds, precisely as Kant asserts this in his later essay 
On a Discovery, where he says that the original acquisition of the cat-
egories “presupposes nothing innate save the subjective conditions of 
the spontaneity of thought (conformity with the unity of appercep-
tion [Gemäßheit mit der Einheit der Apperzeption])” (ÜE, 8:223 [Kant 
2002:313; trans. emended]). I take this to confirm my view that the 
categories are a priori derivable from, or “analytically pertain to”, 
apperception.
Ironically, this way of reading the derivation of the categories is not 
necessarily at odds with what Dyck suggests, at the end of his account, 
is an alternative reading of the derivation question, namely that “the 
categories might be understood to be ‘derived’ from apperception only 
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62     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
insofar as they find the original source of their unity in the identity of 
the thinking subject” (2014:75). It is not clear though how Dyck him-
self envisages how such a derivation would work and how categories 
“find” their source of unity in the identity of the subject, if not in the 
sense in which I take it to be, namely in terms of a logical, a priori deri-
vation from apperception. Notice the connotation of arbitrariness con-
veyed by the term ‘find’ that Dyck employs, as if the categories come 
together haphazardly, quite clearly the contrary of what Kant is aim-
ing for.11 As I explained in detail in Chap. 3 of KDA, where I delineate 
in which sense Kant’s deduction is not merely a justification modelled 
after a Deduktionsschrift, Kant’s philosophical notion of deduction is 
primarily one for which ostensive proof is the model. Ostensive proofs 
are genetic proofs, which reveal “not only truth but also at the same 
time its genesis, its generative source” (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24:233 [Kant 
1992:186]), and transcendental proofs are such ostensive proofs (A794/
B822) (see further KDA, pp. 26–27). I cannot see how on Dyck’s 
alternative, looser reading of derivation, Kant’s deduction could be 
seen indeed to show, ostensively, how the categories “spring pure and 
unmixed from the understanding” (A67/B92).12
Thus, thirdly, it is a fortiori unclear how Dyck thinks that by 
 ‘derivation’ Kant does not mean a logical derivation, but rather, by 
using the term “assert[s] that the categories are merely dependent on 
the ‘I think’ as, for instance, the original source of their unity” (2014: 
70–71; emphasis added). What can be meant by mere dependence? In 
what sense do the categories depend on the ‘I think’? Are they logi-
cally dependent on it? Well, apparently not, given the “merely” that 
Dyck adds. Or are they psychologically, empirically dependent? It is 
not clear. Moreover, how does Dyck think the relation between the 
categories and the original source of their unity (which, moreover, is 
what on his view?) can be demonstrated or shown if not by way of 
an ostensive proof? At least some sort of reasoning from premises is 
required to show the dependence. The categories cannot be plucked 
out of thin air!13 Dyck’s proposal is not really a viable alternative read-
ing of B142, but seems rather to stem from the fact that he is at a loss 
to explain Kant’s claim here.
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Such a lack of clarity in regard to the derivation question is quite 
standard in the literature. No single scholar of Kant has been able to 
explain how precisely the account of self-consciousness hangs together 
with the categories as the transcendental conditions of experience, 
 precisely because nobody—excepting perhaps Henrich (1976),14 and 
to an extent Fichte and Kant’s early commentator J.H. Tieftrunk, as 
I explain in KDA—has been able to explain the putative dependency 
relation between self-consciousness and the categories. Only by explain-
ing this relation—and not just stipulating that there is one—between, 
on the one hand, self-consciousness, or apperception, which is the prin-
ciple of discursive thought, and, on the other, the categories as the ena-
bling conditions of the object of experience as well as the experience of 
the object, can one explain how and why, and not just that, the catego-
ries apply to experience.
2.2.2  Does My Reading of TD “Threaten to Replace” 
MD?
There is another apparent issue concerning the derivation question 
that bothers Dyck (ad 1b). He thinks that, contrary to what I declare 
in KDA, my reading of the derivation of the categories from appercep-
tion “threatens to replace” or “make redundant” “any effort to derive the 
categories by means of the forms of judgment” (Dyck 2014:71), that 
is, on my reading of TD there would no longer be a need for MD. I 
am unclear about what he means by a derivation of the categories “by 
means of” the forms of judgement. One would think that in MD, in 
§10 (the Third Clue section), the categories are derived from the forms 
of judgement, or more precisely, from the functions of thought in judge-
ment. But at any rate, by no means is the metaphysical deduction of 
the categories from the functions of judgement made redundant on my 
reading of the derivation of the categories from apperception, which is 
the project of TD (or at least its first part in the B-version). And I made 
this quite clear in KDA. I argued that MD is merely the first step in the 
overall proof of the deduction of the categories from the functions of 
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64     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
thought. (Some have argued that MD addresses the quid facti, whereas 
TD is concerned with the quid juris, but I do not think this is right.15)
What Kant does in MD, especially in the first two sections (the 
introductory section and §9), which are the two sections that Reich 
(2001) and Wolff (1995) concentrate on, is just to classify, in a prelimi-
nary fashion, the elementary functions of thought in a table of judge-
ment based on the idea that the capacity to think, and thus to know, is 
identical to the capacity to judge, i.e. the understanding. There is a rea-
son why Kant talks, in these sections in MD, about clues to finding the 
categories. There is no (ostensive) proof yet of the intimate link between 
the functions of thought and the categories, also not in §10, where he 
provides the table of the categories, based on the table of judgement. It 
is first in TD that Kant shows, non-question-beggingly, how the capac-
ity for thinking is a capacity for objectively valid judging by means of 
the categories, by deriving the categories and the general form of judge-
ment from apperception, thus proving the correspondence between the 
table of judgement and the table of the categories. In contrast to MD, 
where Kant just says that the understanding is a capacity for judging, 
in TD he shows it (whether he does so successfully is of course another 
question).
Hence, as I made it quite clear in KDA, my reading of TD does not 
conflict with Reich’s, Wolff ’s, and also Longuenesse’s (2006) reading of 
MD, who in contrast to my focus concentrate on the logical derivation 
of the functions of judgement in the First Clue section (A67–9/B92–4), 
culminating in the table of judgement in the Second Clue section (§9). 
When I talk about a “reappraisal” of the famous Leitfaden passage in 
the Third Clue section, at B104–5 (KDA, p. 3), I do not mean to say—
Dyck misreads this—that Kant’s account of TD is a “reappraisal” of MD, 
as if it needed revising, but rather that on my reading of TD a “reap-
praisal” of the Leitfaden is warranted in light of the fact that, in my 
view, the standard reading does not fully appreciate what is at stake (and 
I provide such a reappraisal in Chap. 5 of KDA). The derivation of the 
categories of TD is thus certainly not “an alternative to Kant’s analy-
sis in §§9–10” (Dyck 2014:71, corrected16), and I did not portray it as 
such.
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2.3  The Role of the Analytic Unity 
of Consciousness
Let me now get to Dyck’s second central objection (ad 2). He believes 
that I “overlook important differences between the analytic unity of 
apperception as evinced in common concepts and the consciousness 
of the unity or identity of the subject” (Dyck 2014:72). According to 
Dyck, unlike the consciousness that accompanies the analytic unity of a 
common concept, of the concept <red>, say, that is attributed to a man-
ifold of representations of red objects, the consciousness of “the identity 
of the subject as such is clearly not an element in the content of the 
manifold of representations (i.e. a partial representation); it is, as Kant 
stresses, that to which the entire manifold of representations belongs 
(B131–132)” (2014:72). Therefore, Dyck believes that “the conscious-
ness of the single, identical subject of thought is not aptly character-
ized in terms of an analytical unity of consciousness” (2014:73). This 
strikes me as an odd take on Kant’s argument in §16, for several rea-
sons, not least because it threatens to undermine the central claim of the 
Deduction, namely that the same function of the understanding unites 
both concepts, by means of an analytic unity, and intuition, by means of 
a synthetic unity, in a judgement (B104–5), which I take to refer to the 
analytic and synthetic unities of apperception respectively underpinning 
the one function of the understanding. It also dissents from the major-
ity view on this central issue.
The passage in B134 directly following the passage at issue here 
(namely, the passage to which the footnote concerning the conscious-
ness of an analytic unity in conceptual representations is appended, i.e. 
B13317) makes it clear that the belonging of representations “to me”, 
i.e. to me as identical subject, comes down to nothing but an act of the 
unification of one’s representations “in a self-consciousness”, that is, 
only by “comprehend[ing] their manifold in a consciousness do I call 
them all together my representations” (B134). Representations belong to 
me in that I take them together as belonging to me. And it is the syn-
thetic unity that results from this act of comprehending that first estab-
lishes, or, is “the ground of the identity of apperception itself ” (B134). 
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66     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
The identical subject across the representations that are accompanied by 
the ‘I think’ is thus established in the act of synthesis. I do not see how 
Dyck can argue that a strict distinction should be heeded between, on 
the one hand, the analytic unity of consciousness—that is, the identi-
cal representation contained in the manifold of representations that I 
regard as mine, all of the different representations <tomato>, <bus 93 to 
Putney> and <Labour>, say, which I represent when I think of the con-
cept <red>, the identical representation here being the indexical ‘I’ that, 
as common mark, is contained in all of my representations, qua their 
being my representations, as much as the partial representation <red> 
that is contained in all of those representations <tomato> etc.—and, on 
the other hand, the identity “to which”, as Dyck emphasises, these rep-
resentations belong.18 Are the ‘I’, to which my representations belong, 
and my representations themselves, as collective manifold in which an 
identical indexical ‘I’ is contained that they all share in order to be my 
representations, to be seen as distinct, as Dyck seems to be saying? In 
which sense? And on the basis of what? And if so, what connects my 
collective representations to the ‘I’ if it is not through the a priori syn-
thesis by means of which I synthesise my representations as first belong-
ing to me?
Of course, I am not logically compelled to represent representations 
that are conceptually analytically related: I can think a manifold of rep-
resentations that other than being concepts have nothing (prima facie 
at least) in common, <hoarfrost>, <Heidegger> and <haggis>, say. 
However, whatever the case may be, as represented concepts they would 
still share the one partial representation that they must have in common 
in order to be represented by me at all, namely the partial representation 
‘I’, which is the same in all representations that I (conjointly or not) 
represent. As Kant puts it, “concepts [are] possible through appercep-
tion […] [i]n that I represent to myself the identity of my appercep-
tion in many representations” (V-Met/Mron, 29:889 [Kant 2001:257]; 
emphasis added).19 This holds in the first instance for how single con-
cepts are formed, but also for the representation of series of concepts 
or the representation of relations between concepts, such as the relation 
between <hoarfrost>, <Heidegger>, and <haggis> in e.g. my judgement 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
 O
nly
“Heidegger ate haggis while gazing in astonishment at the hoarfrost 
around his cabin” (suppose that I was invited to Todtnauberg).
The analytic unity of consciousness, which for its ground rests on 
the act of (synthetically) comprehending a manifold of representations, 
thus constitutes the identity of my subject as the subject of that complex 
thought, which consists of the multifarious representations <hoarfrost>, 
<Heidegger> and <haggis> (among others) in the judgement “Heidegger 
ate haggis…”. The ‘I’ here is the partial representation that is formally 
contained in all of those representations that I conjointly represent, to 
the extent and to the extent only that they are my representations, namely 
to the extent that I am the judger of that judgement. No identity of 
subject exists without an analytic unity of consciousness comprising all 
of the representations that I represent to the extent that those represen-
tations share the common mark ‘I think’ by being accompanied by it, 
and there is no analytic unity of consciousness which does not entail an 
identical subject of thought. As Allison (1996:58)  correctly says with 
reference to A108, the “mind can think its identity only insofar as it can 
become conscious of the identity of its function or act”, namely, the act 
of synthesis, which underlies any analytic unity of consciousness (B133). 
The question could then arise as to whether there is something more 
about the identity of the subject over above the  analytic unity of con-
sciousness, which is constituted by the identity of the mind’s function 
of synthesis. I suspect that Dyck believes that there is, but it goes against 
Kantian doctrine. I concur fully with Allison’s position on this point:
Kant’s view is not that we require a distinct capacity to become conscious 
of our identity as thinking subject in order to be able to think the neces-
sary unity of appearances; it is rather that to think such a unity is, at the 
same time, to think one’s identity. […] I must in the very same act [of 
representing to myself an objective connection] take myself as an identical 
thinking subject. (Allison 1996:60)
Dyck’s (2014:73) claim that the analytic unity of apperception is 
 inessential (!) to the argument of §16 of TD also throws a monkey-
wrench into the debate on the self-ascription of representations that has 
2.3 The Role of the Analytic Unity of Consciousness     67
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 P
rp
os
es
O
y
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evolved from a crucial reading of Kant’s principle of apperception, namely 
the austere interpretation of apperception espoused by P.F. Strawson 
(1968) and his acolytes, which wants to do away with synthesis alto-
gether. Abstracting here from his (Strawson’s) unfounded criticism against 
a priori synthesis as a piece of unwarranted psychology, I think that one 
of the strong aspects of Strawson’s interpretation, and which certainly has 
been very influential in Anglophone Kant scholarship, precisely concerns 
how he regards the principle of apperception as an analytic principle of 
self-ascription of one’s own representations that states that a reflexive, 
analytical relation (“a direct analytical connexion”, as Strawson [1968:96] 
puts it) obtains between an identical ‘I’ and all of its (my) own representa-
tions that are self-ascribed by that ‘I’. For all that Strawson is wrong about 
a priori synthesis, he is certainly right (pace Dyck) that the principle of 
apperception that is central to the argument of §16 is an analytic principle 
that expresses an analytic unity between representations insofar as they are 
self-ascribed by the self-same, identical subject. (In Chap. 4, in particu-
lar Sects. 4.8 and 4.9, I elaborate on the analysis of the analytic unity of 
apperception.)
2.4  The Intimacy Between the Categories 
and the Functions of Thought
Lastly, Dyck criticises my claim that categories are the functions of 
thought and that they therefore can be derived from the ‘I’ (ad 3). He 
takes ‘substance’ as an example. That “the category of substance should 
have its source in pure apperception”, Dyck (2014:74) acknowledges, is 
indeed claimed by Kant in his pre-Critical work, but, as Dyck counters, 
this view does not survive the Critical turn. Incidentally, Dyck falsely 
states that I do not cite pre-Critical texts in my account of the relation 
between substance and apperception. It appears that he overlooked the 
passage in Sect. 7.1 of KDA, where I explicitly quote and briefly dis-
cuss Reflexionen 4674 and 4676 from the Duisburg Nachlass (KDA, 
pp. 127–128). Furthermore, in a note to the passage in which I explic-
itly claim that the concept of substance is conveyed by the very notion 
of the ‘I think’ as the original representation that accompanies all my 
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representations but cannot itself be represented by an even more origi-
nal representation (KDA, p. 135), I, too, quote the very Reflexion that 
Dyck suggests is representative of the pre-Critical view I defend, namely 
Reflexion 3921 (see KDA, pp. 261–262n.12). In this Reflexion, Kant 
says that the “idea of substance actually comes from the repraesentatione 
sui ipsius [representation of oneself ]” (Refl, 17:346 [Kant 2005:95]), 
and it indeed supports, as Dyck notes, my reading of the intimate con-
nection between the category of substance and apperception.
More important, though not nearly as significant as he thinks, is 
Dyck’s criticism that in the Critique, as a result of the paralogisms, Kant 
is no longer licensed to make the claim that substance is directly deriv-
able from the ‘I’. Only the logical function, “not yet (or no longer) the 
full-fledged category of substance”, says Dyck, “might be derived from 
the ‘I think’” (2014:74). Quoting from the A-Paralogisms, Dyck points 
out that “the concept of substance is used only as a function of synthe-
sis” (A356) if it is not related to an empirical intuition; I would add 
to this that the mere concept of substance, sans empirical intuition, is 
used only as a function of intellectual synthesis (cf. B150; A401; KDA, 
pp. 93, 95). Dyck argues that since, for the Critical Kant, the self is 
no longer immediately given (in intuition) as an object, something the 
pre-Critical Kant putatively still believed, the basis for claiming, as I do, 
that the concept of substance can be derived from the ‘I’ is removed. I 
do not see why this would follow. The fact that, for the Critical Kant, 
the self can no longer be seen to be given as an object, or substance, 
in empirical intuition, leaves untouched the view that the concept or 
category of substance can be derived from the ‘I’, precisely because it 
represents the mere logical function of the subject that must be repre-
sented as original and “unchanging” (A107), as one of the functions of 
intellectual synthesis. And this is in fact what Kant says himself: it is 
perfectly legitimate to call the ‘I’ a substance, and hence to grant the 
“pure category” subjective significance, while at the same time denying 
it “objective significance” (A348–9; cf. A350–1; B343/A287; see further 
KDA, pp. 131–132).20 I am not clear about what Dyck means by “full-
fledged category” (2014:74), but I suppose he means ‘category under 
which an empirical intuition is subsumed’, a category which refers to 
an actually existing spatiotemporal object, in other words, a schematised 
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70     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
or ‘objectively significant’ category; if so, his criticism begs the ques-
tion against my claim that the category is derivable from the ‘I’, since I 
clearly do not claim that the ‘category under which an empirical intui-
tion is subsumed’, let alone a categorially determined spatiotemporal 
object, is so derivable.
As I argued in my book (KDA, p. 135), one way to look at the dif-
ference between the pre-Critical and Critical accounts of the relation 
between substance (and mutatis mutandis any one category) and the 
subject is to note that in the Paralogisms Kant specifically argues, as part 
of his general argument against the rationalist, that any possible claim 
to the substantiality of the ‘I’ always already presupposes the ‘I’ as the 
vehicle of my thoughts, and eo ipso also presupposes the applicability of 
the concept of substance, as one of the elementary characteristics of the 
subject of thought, which the rationalist then (illicitly) translates into 
the ‘I’ as being a really subsisting thing. In other words, regardless of 
the view one holds on the soul’s substantiality, the concept of substance 
is prior to any application of it to a putatively enduring object, be it an 
empirical spatiotemporal object, for which an additional sensible intui-
tion is needed, or indeed a noumenal subsisting self ! Hence, the cat-
egory as pure concept pertains to thought itself, as one of the elementary 
concepts that constitute it21; for the concept of substance is nothing but 
the function of how a subsisting subject relates to its changing predi-
cates as its accidents, regardless of the question whether this subject is in 
fact a noumenal substance (cf. V-Met/Volck, 28:429; V-Met-L1/Pölitz, 
28:239–240).
It is important to be mindful of the fact that, in Kant’s view, the 
rationalist is not at all mistaken to associate the concept of substance 
with the (ultimate) subject of thought,22 but rather to conclude from 
their logical correspondence (and the given empirical experience of 
the self )23 that we have indeed knowledge of the subject as a noume-
nal substance, as a noumenally enduring object (cf. B407). I think this 
insight is crucial for a proper, nuanced understanding of the relation 
between the pre-Critical and Critical Kant, not least with regard to the 
paralogisms that played a crucial role in the transition to the Critical 
account.24
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Furthermore, Kant does explicitly assert that, notwithstanding their 
formal differentiation, the categories are nothing but logical functions, 
i.e. “moments of the understanding” in judgements, and “will come out 
exactly parallel to them” (Prol, 4:302 [Kant 2002:96]; trans. emended; 
cf. Prol 4:305, 324; ÜE, 8:223; Refl 5854, 18:369–370). Certainly, the 
categories and the logical functions of thought are formally differenti-
ated for the purposes of expounding the transcendental logic, but they 
are not distinct functions of the understanding. If they were distinct 
functions, this would run counter to the central claim of the Leitfaden, 
namely that the categories are the functions of thought under a differ-
ent aspect, namely insofar as thought is about objects. Therefore, Kant 
concludes the ‘first step’ of TD by saying that “the categories are nothing 
other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a 
given intuition is determined with regard to them” (B143).
Not coincidentally, Dyck’s denial that the categories are in fact the log-
ical functions of thought, sans the intuition that synthetically connects 
them to real objects (cf. ÜE, 8:223), coincides with his aforementioned 
denial of what in KDA I labelled the “rigorous coextensivity” between 
the analytic and synthetic unities of apperception. However, with-
out that coextensivity, not much of Kant’s main claim in the Leitfaden 
about the parallelism of the logical functions of thought which com-
bine concepts by means of analytic unity and the categories as the con-
cepts providing the synthetic a priori content of judgement—which 
is in fact the main claim behind the entire project of TD—remains 
intelligible, inasmuch as the logical functions of thought are purely 
analytical rules for thought, which like intuitions of objects rest on an 
original synthetic unity of apperception. To say that those logical func-
tions of thought, as analytical rules for combining representations into 
concepts “by means of analytic unity”, are not central to the argument of 
TD, as Dyck appears to claim, seems to me to miss the pivotal point of 
Kant’s deduction project.
All things considered, Dyck’s concluding assertion that “any puta-
tive derivation of the category of substance (as opposed to the mere 
logical function) from pure apperception is doomed to be unsuccessful” 
(2014:74) is rather exaggerated, to say the least.
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72     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
2.5  The Reciprocity Thesis and the Progressive 
Argument
Fortunately, Stephenson (2014) agrees with my take on TD as (a) con-
cerning the ‘en bloc’ applicability of the categories to experience, which 
should not be confused with the mistaken, but popular, view that in 
TD Kant argues ‘en bloc’, as it were, that the categories necessarily 
apply to experience, rather than argues for each of the categories as so 
applicable; and as (b) pivoting on what Allison has called ‘the reciproc-
ity thesis’, namely the claim that the “unity of consciousness is necessary 
and sufficient for objectivity” (KDA, p. 53), which is often disputed, 
since it is not prima facie clear why one would agree with the claim 
that in addition to being the necessary condition of the experience of 
objects, the unity of consciousness is also sufficient for the experience of 
objects, let alone for the existence of the objects of experience.
However, Stephenson criticises the way I have argued for these claims. 
His incisive critique gives me the opportunity to clarify my position 
and meanwhile point out why I think Stephenson’s own construal of 
TD is mistaken. It turns out that he endorses the reciprocity thesis in 
a way fundamentally different from how I read it, so it remains to be 
seen how much agreement between our interpretations there in fact is. 
This difference hinges on how we interpret the meaning of Kant’s term 
‘knowledge’ (Erkenntnis) and, relatedly, ‘object’ and ‘objectivity’, differ-
ently (see further below); but also, how we regard the relation between 
the subject or self-consciousness and object or object-consciousness, 
which Stephenson appears to see in a way that I would say looks like 
too short an argument to reciprocity. The reason why I suspect he sees 
problems with my reading is because he appears to take a traditionally 
‘realist’ conception of object and of knowledge for granted when inter-
preting TD, which of course should not be taken for granted, given the 
nature of Kant’s Critical turn in philosophy. Let me address Stephenson’s 
criticisms in the order he raises them: (1) the reciprocity thesis and 
Stephenson’s criticisms of my construal of it, and (2) his claim that my 
proposed derivation of the categories is not actually a deduction at all, 
and fails to show how the categories are applied to objects.
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Ad 1: Stephenson portrays a progressive argument, in the standard 
sense, in terms of an argument that works against the sceptic, namely an 
“argument a […] in the face of sceptic s”, which meets the two condi-
tions, as Stephenson says, that “the basic premise of a is accepted by s” 
and “the conclusion of a is rejected by s” (2014:78). That is undoubt-
edly true on one reading of what a progressive argument amounts to, 
such as is the case for example in Strawson’s take on TD. And I agree 
with Stephenson’s general account of how such anti-sceptical or transcen-
dental arguments work. But as I argued in KDA (Chap. 4), that is cer-
tainly not the only way to construe a progressive argument and nor, I 
believe, the way that Kant wants his argument in TD to be understood. 
Stephenson suggests that on the progressive construal a “transcendental 
argument” can be seen as “refut[ing] the sceptic who denies the existence 
of the external world” (2014:78) through showing that the latter is in 
fact the necessary condition of having a unitary consciousness at all. But 
this looks more like the concern of the Refutation of Idealism,25 not of 
TD, which operates on a much abstracter level, where the argument is 
about what it means to have a conception of objectivity in the most gen-
eral terms. External world problems are the least of Kant’s worries in TD.
Nevertheless, to argue that it is a general conception of objectiv-
ity that is at stake, as I do in my book, does not imply, as Stephenson 
suggests, that on such a reading Kant would only be committed to a 
theory that argues that “experience at least seems to present us with an 
independent world of causally interacting objects”, but that experience 
does not “necessarily [represent objects] veridically” (2014:79). The gen-
eral conception of objectivity at stake in TD is not merely about how 
we conceive of or experience objects, but also about how, given the con-
straints of discursive cognition, objects can be veridically represented at 
all, and so how empirical objects are constituted qua their being objects 
(cf. B138), given that there are such objects, and that we make knowl-
edge claims about them.
So in what sense do I think that TD is still a progressive argument if 
it is not construed in the standard sceptic-refuting sense? Stephenson’s 
reconstruction of my take on the dual progressive- regressive 
nature of TD, though splendidly succinct, is formally to the point. 
2.5 The Reciprocity Thesis and the Progressive Argument     73
Fo
r S
ch
ol
rly
 Pu
rp
se
s O
nly
74     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
The progressive argument on my reading starts from the unity of con-
sciousness and moves to objective experience, or to be more precise, to 
possible experience, since the argument is entirely a priori and does not 
concern questions of how we actually have instantiations of experience 
(quaestiones facti, which lie outside the remit of TD). Stephenson then 
asks: “But who is the sceptical target here?” (2014:78). Answer: Nobody 
is! Or at least, there is no explicit sceptical target. The progressive argu-
ment in TD as I construe it is just to show, in a priori manner, how it 
is possible that we have knowledge of the object given that we do make 
claims about it and that there are such objects as we make claims about. 
This kind of progressive argument is not in the least meant to refute 
the sceptic. The progressive nature of the argument has merely to do 
with the a priori nature of the proof that delineates the how-possible 
question.
2.6  Putative Gaps in Kant’s Argument:  
A Preliminary Account
Stephenson’s reading of the progressive argument as anti-sceptical ties 
in with how he reads the reciprocity thesis and the supposed gap in 
Kant’s reasoning. However, in KDA, I’m talking about a different gap 
from Stephenson’s. It is not the gap between, on the one hand, how we 
think about objects and, on the other hand, really existing objects out 
there. Kant is not worried about the fact that our experience is about 
such objects, nor is he worried about whether there are such objects 
in the first place. His question concerns how it is possible that we can 
have knowledge of them, which means how we can have a priori knowl-
edge of them, if the knowledge is to be more than accumulated empiri-
cal knowledge—put differently, the main question concerns the way or 
ways in which we understand something to be an object for us, what 
constitutes an object’s objectivity. It may be of course that some readers 
of TD think that Kant needs first to prove that there are objects or that 
our experience is about those objects; but I’d say those readers are fun-
damentally mistaken about Kant’s epistemic confidence. The gap that 
F
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
I discuss in KDA (in Chap. 4) is the perceived gap that Guyer (1992), 
Mohr (1991), Pereboom (2001), Carl (1989a, b) and others26 talk 
about, namely the gap between the principle of apperception, which 
is analytic, and the objective unity of apperception, which clearly is not 
analytic. Let’s call this Gap1. Stephenson does not appear to see a prob-
lem there. And he is right, there isn’t, as I indeed argue against Guyer 
et al.
By contrast, Stephenson’s gap concerns the (perceived) gap between 
what we experience of objects, or that we make claims about them, and 
the objects we veridically experience, the things that we make claims 
about (presumably Stroud’s problem).27 Let’s call this Gap2. Of course, 
Gap1 and Gap2 are in some way related. They both concern the way 
the reciprocity thesis should be understood: does the unity of conscious-
ness constitute a necessary and a sufficient condition of experience of 
objects? But Stephenson’s gap, Gap2, concerns an additional claim that 
the reciprocity thesis entails, which Stephenson does not spell out as 
such, namely, that the unity of consciousness is not just sufficient for 
the experience of objects but also sufficient for the objects of experience, 
that is, sufficient for the existence of objects (in some sense) (see KDA, 
pp. 50–51). Stephenson himself talks in terms of the following fourfold 
gap: “(i) truths about the structure of our conceptual scheme are not 
necessarily truths about the world, (ii) constraints on what set of beliefs 
is rationally coherent do not necessarily tell us anything about what 
set of beliefs is true; (iii) that we must apply the categories to objects 
does not obviously entail that the categories must apply to objects; (iv) 
that we must apply the categories does not mean that we are justified 
in doing so” (2014:79). And Stephenson claims that I have not tried to 
bridge this fourfold gap.
It seems to me that, in his characterisation of the gap that Kant pre-
sumably must bridge, Stephenson here misses Kant’s central point, in 
the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction, about the objective unity of apper-
ception as defining the objective validity of a judgement, which is not 
just the truth value of a judgement—the truth value is merely a surface 
aspect of a proposition that expresses an assertion, which can be either 
false or true. Rather, objective validity concerns the way a judgement, 
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as the manner in which cognitions are brought to the objective unity of 
apperception, is always already intimately connected with, and so truly 
corresponds to, the object it is about (see further Chap. 3). There is no 
fundamental gap between a claim about the object and the object itself 
to be bridged. So it seems to me that by defining object as “that in the 
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (B137), 
and given that the “synthetic unity of consciousness is […] an objective 
condition of all cognition, not merely something I myself need in order 
to cognize an object but rather something under which every intuition 
must stand in order to become an object for me” (B138; boldface mine), 
Kant asserts that the unity of consciousness is not just a necessary and 
(formally) sufficient condition of our experience of an object, but also 
the necessary and (formally) sufficient condition of the object itself, 
that is, of its existence (qua object of experience). In §19, Kant then 
asserts that a judgement’s objective validity, the condition of its truth, 
lies in the objective unity of apperception.28 Kant has thus made clear 
that our conceptual scheme corresponds to the world, and that there 
is no worry about whether the truth of our conceptual scheme is true 
about the world or not: there is no ‘outside’ of our conceptual scheme, 
for the object that we represent as over against our representations is 
nothing but the unity of apperception (cf. A104–5, 107). This deals with 
the first two prongs of Stephenson’s description of the gap. The third 
prong mistakenly supposes that the categories are merely necessary con-
ditions of the experience of objects and not the necessary conditions of 
the objects of experience, but Kant of course claims that the categories 
are both (A111; B197/A158).
All of these claims of Kant I have dealt with in my book, so it seems 
to me that the above three prongs of Stephenson’s account of the gap 
have been sufficiently answered. As to the last prong: it is clear that the 
application of the categories is justified once we have shown that they 
are necessary for the experience of objects and for the objects’ existence, 
as objects for us (cf. A95–8; A128–30). Any further question about jus-
tification is irrelevant. With point (iv) Stephenson seems to postulate 
that the necessity for the application of the categories in separation from 
the justifiability of doing so concerns some sort of psychological neces-
sity, but this is of course not at issue in TD.
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Now Stephenson might insist: the problem here is that you have only 
claimed a reciprocity between apperception and an object in general. 
Gap2 still stands, for the gap between our experience and real, spatio-
temporal, empirical objects has not been bridged, so that it has still 
not been shown that our experience is veridically of those spatiotempo-
ral objects. I have admittedly not dealt specifically with that presumed 
gap in KDA, since the relation between apperception and spatiotempo-
rally located objects is the topic of the ‘second step’ of the B-Deduction, 
which did not fall within the remit of my book. Stephenson might have 
been misled by my differentiation of the terms ‘cognition’ and ‘knowl-
edge’ (see e.g. KDA, p. 60) into believing that I argue that Kant’s argu-
ment in TD as a whole is merely about the conditions of our beliefs or 
claims about objects, and not about (true) knowledge. But when I made 
that differentiation, which corresponds to Kant’s distinction between 
“thinking an object” and “knowing” (erkennen) one (B146), I was talk-
ing merely about the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction in contrast to the 
‘second step’, where Kant indeed expounds on the conditions of know-
ing a spatiotemporal object, rather than just about the conditions of 
cognising an object in general. Importantly, the unity of apperception, 
in its guise as the productive imagination, as an a priori effect of the 
understanding on sensibility itself (B151–2), is also the necessary and 
formally sufficient condition of empirical knowledge of spatiotemporal 
objects (I discuss this further in Chap. 7).
Notice that I say formally sufficient, for obviously Kant cannot claim 
that apperception, or the set of categories even in their schematised 
form, is the materially sufficient condition of empirical knowledge, since 
that would mean a conflation of the a priori and a posteriori conditions 
of knowledge. But there is no sense (for Kant, at least) in which there 
is a gap between what can be a priori determined and what is a poste-
riori given, which would have to be bridged to explain the possibility of 
empirical knowledge. Again, transcendental philosophy is not concerned 
with proving that there are objects that empirically affect us or that we 
have sensations that can be taken to refer to objects, nor would it be 
able to prove that. The a posteriori is just assumed as given: we just hap-
pen to have sensations, and we can be confident that there are objects 
out there of which these sensations are the causal effects. Hence, the 
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78     2 Kant’s Deduction From Apperception
premise of Kant’s argument on a regressive construal of TD is the given-
ness of the empirical objects that we experience.
There is debate as to whether Kant’s Erkenntnis should be translated 
as ‘cognition’ (as do Guyer/Wood) rather than as ‘knowledge’ (as does 
Kemp Smith). The fact that Kant allows false Erkenntnis (A58/B83) 
would seem to indicate that it cannot be translated as ‘knowledge’ (in 
our post-Gettier contemporary sense). Moreover, Kant himself appears 
to identify Erkenntnis with the Latin cognitio in the Stufenleiter (A320/
B376–7). However, we should be careful not to gloss Kant’s term 
Erkenntnis as if it signified merely being about the subjective conditions 
of cognition or a mental act or an epistemic attitude, and not also about 
the objective conditions under we can in fact know things or facts (in the 
contemporary sense). While strictly speaking knowledge (Erkenntnis) in 
Kant’s sense is, taken as such, not the same as knowledge in our con-
temporary sense, neither is it just cognition as a mere subjective capacity 
for knowing, which would rather be “to think of an object” on Kant’s 
account, in contrast to knowing one (B146).29 I employ, as I did in 
KDA, the terms ‘cognition’ and ‘knowledge’ as reflecting Kant’s distinc-
tion between ‘thinking an object’ and ‘knowing an object’ respectively 
(B146; B165). Notice that Kant’s Erkenntnis must be divided into its 
transcendental and empirical meanings, where the empirical meaning of 
Erkenntnis (i.e. empirische Erkenntnis) could be identified as knowledge 
in our contemporary sense (cf. B165–6). The transcendental meaning 
of Erkenntnis, as it is discussed in TD, concerns the transcendental or 
a priori conditions of such knowledge, but this should not be conflated 
with the psychological condition or capacity for knowing, nor with 
the merely conceptual capacity or the capacity to think or judge. The 
transcendental or a priori conditions of empirical knowledge, which 
includes pure intuition, is what makes empirical knowledge knowledge. 
It is these knowledge-making conditions that are at issue in TD. There 
is nothing beyond the knowledge-making conditions that would consti-
tute knowledge, in addition to those conditions and given sensible input 
(empirical intuitions).
Concluding my reply to Stephenson’s first objection, there is no 
ground for arguing that, given the additional argument of the  ‘second 
step’, Gap2 stands and needs resolving or that I was not aware of, or 
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tried to “move around” it or “put [it] to one side” (Stephenson 2014:80) 
in KDA. (In Chap. 4, this volume, I examine in detail further similar 
arguments about the putative Gap in TD, put forward by James Van 
Cleve and Anil Gomes.) Nor do I believe that Stephenson’s own recon-
struction of the reciprocity thesis is sufficient to close any putative 
Gap2. On his construal, “possible object-consciousness is a  necessary 
condition for possible self-consciousness”, since the latter is always 
a “consciousness of one’s consciousness of objects”. That is, “self- 
consciousness, as second-order consciousness, which can be represented 
as C(C(O)), thus requires not only the concept of a subject but also 
the concept of an object, since this is also one of the things inside the 
brackets” (Stephenson 2014:82). It looks like Stephenson helps him-
self to the reciprocity between object and subject by means of a short 
(i.e. merely conceptual) argument that leaves out the specific categories 
altogether. I do not think this is an adequate account of the progres-
sive argument of TD, and it certainly would not coax a sceptic into 
 accepting defeat.
Moreover, this construal will not help Stephenson establish the con-
nection between arguing that we must apply the categories and arguing 
that the categories apply to the objects of our experience, and not just 
to a concept of the object, the issue which he in fact accuses me of fudg-
ing (cf. his point iii in the aforementioned fourfold gap). This brings 
me to Stephenson’s second criticism, that is, that my attempted deriva-
tion of the categories from apperception is in fact not a deduction at all, 
for apparently it fails to answer the quid juris question. From the scant 
remark about this last point towards the end of his essay it is difficult 
to gather on what grounds Stephenson thinks that I fail to address the 
quid juris (despite devoting many pages and even a whole chapter to it 
in KDA), so I shall leave this particular criticism aside.
2.7  The Nature of Deduction
So to Stephenson’s criticism that my derivation is not a deduction at all 
(ad 2). He takes the derivation of ‘necessity’ as an example. But, unfor-
tunately, instead of commenting on the ten pages of extensive analysis 
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of the categories of modality in the context of TD that precede it, he 
goes straight to the schematic summaries I provide in the form of argu-
mentative steps in what I called the D-argument. Let me first note that 
these summary arguments are shorthand in order for me later, in the 
concluding Chap. 10 of KDA, to be able to expeditiously refer back to 
all of the D-steps; they do not replace the more extensive exposition, 
so they hardly present my real argument for the derivation. Secondly, 
Stephenson’s objection reveals an intrinsic problem with any attempt 
to formalise Kant’s transcendental proofs: on pain of loss of precision, 
one might end up with a formal proof that is even more unwieldy than 
the exposition it is supposed to translate. Perhaps, then, I should have 
steered clear of any quasi-formal schematisation (although I did note 
in a footnote that the schematisation was not meant to constitute a 
 “syllogistically modelled inferential link of premises”, but rather is just 
a “summary of the main arguments”; see KDA, p. 276n.46). Whatever 
the case may be, I find Stephenson somewhat uncharitable in attempt-
ing a bit of old school conceptual analysis in his critique of how I argue 
‘necessity’ is to be derived from apperception.
He asks first: “[W]hat does ‘pertains to’ mean?” (Stephenson 
2014:83). Well, exactly what The Concise Oxford Dictionary says it 
means (as one of three meanings provided): “belong to as a part or 
appendage or accessory”, where “belong to as a part” is the most appro-
priate description in this context. As I suggested above (Sect. 2.2), 
the phrase ‘pertaining to’ could also be read in terms of a  ‘conformity’ 
(Gemäßheit) between the categories and the unity of apperception, 
in line with Kant’s assertion in response to Eberhard in ÜE, 8:223. 
‘Necessity’ is a part of, or shows a conformity to, self-consciousness or 
transcendental apperception, and can thus be derived analytically from 
it. And so I argued with respect to all the categories.
Stephenson believes I commit an error in confusing two lev-
els, namely in arguing “from the fact that the concept of necessity is 
mobilized in the statement of the theory—the analytic principle of 
apperception—that it therefore ‘pertains to’ the object of the theory—
apperception itself ”. First, Stephenson assumes that there is a distinc-
tion, in the argument of TD, between the theory and the object of 
theory. But in TD the object of theory happens to be (also) the thinking 
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subject, who is also the subject of theorising, so that apperception itself 
occurs in accordance with the principle of apperception; the principle 
of apperception is not just a theory about apperception, rather, it is that 
by virtue of which apperception works. When interpretatively recon-
structing the argument, presented in TD, about this thinking subject 
and its constitutive characteristics (i.e. the logical functions of thought 
with which the categories correspond), we should be careful not to arti-
ficially introduce a distinction between two levels of discourse (theory 
and object) on pain of losing sight of the self-reflexive aspect of Kant’s 
reasoning. The reconstruction must retrace the cognitive steps of the 
apperceiving self from within the first-person perspective (much like 
Descartes exhorts us to do the same as the Meditator). Now, of course, 
the problem is that as interpreters we (as well as Kant himself ) need to 
put our theoretical thoughts about thinking into language, which might 
seem to create the (potential) level confusion that Stephenson describes.
This brings me to my second point in reply to his critique of a 
level confusion. Stephenson himself conflates language and thought. 
Contrary to what Stephenson’s caricature of it (“Newton’s Principia 
displays a Latin syntax; objects in motion do not” [2014:83]) suggests, 
my derivation of the categories is not a piece of mere language analy-
sis: it is evidently not because the term ‘necessity’ (or indeed ‘existence’) 
appears in the sentence that it pertains to thought. The sentence at issue 
is: “Necessarily, if the ‘I think’ exists, then the rule that all my repre-
sentations are accompanied by the ‘I think’ is satisfied” (premise D7 
in the schematisation of the argument; KDA, p. 123).30 But this sen-
tence is just a condensed form of the more extensive argument that the 
modal category of necessity is an integral element of discursive thought. 
However, as much as the term ‘I think’ used in the above-quoted sen-
tence is not to be interpreted as if the term pertained to the identity of 
discursive thought and could a fortiori be derived from it (well, yes, of 
course ‘I think’ belongs to discursive thought, because it is that; but it 
is not a category!), the term ‘necessity’ should not be seen as the ground 
for deriving necessity from apperception.
When, in his formulation of the third postulate, Kant writes that 
necessity applies to the thought of the object of experience because that 
“whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with 
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general conditions of experience is (exists) necessarily” (A218/B266), 
I take it that Stephenson would not similarly charge Kant with falla-
ciously inferring from the appearance of the term ‘necessarily’ in the 
above sentence that the category of necessity applies to objective experi-
ence. Kant just explains here the conditional necessity that lies in the 
claim that if anything is actually sensed in accordance with the material 
conditions of experience, and it agrees with the formal enabling condi-
tions of experience, then it exists; it is under these conditions that the 
category of necessity applies to the object of experience. Likewise, my 
sentence D7 just expresses, in perhaps irresponsibly condensed form, 
thought itself and its constitutive modal characteristics (possibility [if…
then], actuality [exists], and necessity [necessarily]). In fact, read carefully, 
the sentence encapsulates the conditional necessity that is expressed 
by the analytic principle of apperception (“The I think must be able to 
accompany all my representations”) rather well.
Stephenson concludes his exposé by alleging that, even if the worry 
about the level confusion described above could be allayed, my deduc-
tion would still not prove that the categories are applied “to the objects 
of experience”, but at most that they are “instantiated in the experi-
ence of objects” (2014:84). But again, it seems to me that Stephenson 
misguidedly introduces a distinction here that is not pertinent to TD: 
for if (a) the categories pertain to the unity of apperception, (b) the 
unity of apperception is an objective unity of apperception (B137), and, 
as per the arguments of B138, A111 and B197/A158 (and of course the 
full monty of the ‘second step’ of the B-Deduction), (c) the objective 
unity of apperception is a necessary and (formally) sufficient condition 
of both the experience of the object and the object of experience, then 
(d) the categories apply to the objects of experience (QED). Stephenson 
might object to premise (c) here, as we saw earlier in Sect. 2.6 and 
briefly again below in the conclusion to the current section—but it is 
clearly Kant’s view. In Kant’s theory of possible experience, there is no 
discrepancy between the instantiation of the categories in experience 
and the application of the categories to the objects of experience. And as 
I argued in KDA, the conclusion that the categories apply to the objects 
of experience can, by virtue of a step-by-step progressive derivation 
of the categories, be inferred from the very principle of thought, the 
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analytic principle of the apperception (a short version of the argument 
will be rehearsed below in Chap. 4).
In his critique of my stance, Stephenson shows himself to be a 
plain old realist, who assumes the existence of objects as distinct 
from, and outside of, our experience of them. For example, towards 
the end of his essay, Stephenson claims that one cannot argue that 
the derivation of the category of ‘cause-effect’ from apperception is in 
fact related to cause-effect relations between objects (in the real world). 
That “the categories must apply to the self and its manifold if it is to 
have objects, i.e., representations with objective purport, experience 
[…] says nothing about our categorization of objects”, Stephenson 
(2014:84) reasons. In other words, the “connection” that can be 
claimed to exist between the “synthetic unity of apperception and its 
manifold […] is not a connection that holds between distinct, condi-
tioned, spatiotemporal substances” (Stephenson 2014:84).31 But when 
we read e.g. in the A-Deduction that the “understanding […] is itself 
the legislation for nature, i.e., without understanding there would not 
be any nature at all, i.e.,  synthetic unity of the manifold of appear-
ances in accordance with rules; for appearances, as such, cannot occur 
outside us, but exist only in our sensibility” (A126–7) (see further 
Chap. 7), then Stephenson’s assertion of a disconnect between, on the 
one hand, the synthetic unity of the understanding that is required to 
experience connections between objects and, on the other, any causal 
connection between the objects themselves, or more precisely his 
denial that synthetic unity in the manifold is the connection among 
objects, seems flatly contradicted by Kant. It is Stephenson’s own real-
ist stance that prevents him from understanding the nub of Kant’s 
reciprocity thesis.
2.8  Can ‘Contingency’ Really Be Deduced 
from Apperception?
I am delighted that Quarfood finds much to agree with in KDA 
and that, unlike Dyck and Stephenson, he is on board with the gen-
eral idea of an a priori derivation of the categories from the principle 
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of apperception, even though he believes it might still reasonably be 
argued that the precise manner of such a derivation is ultimately “closed 
for our investigation” (Quarfood 2014:88), or, that such a derivation is 
reconstructed in a way different from the one I put forward in KDA. 
However, Quarfood raises an important objection to my reading of how 
the negative counterpart32 of necessity, namely contingency, and con-
comitantly perhaps also the negative counterparts of the other modal 
categories possibility (i.e. impossibility) and existence (i.e. non-exist-
ence) can be derived from the ‘I think’.
The problem he signals concerns the issue whether in the  derivation 
of the category of contingency (and mutatis mutandis impossibility 
and non-existence) the reference “to representations not belonging to 
those that I apperceive (my representations) is legitimate”, given that, 
as Quarfood correctly observes, the “idea of a derivation from apper-
ception is closely related to the idea of a first-person perspective” 
(2014:90), from within which the derivation should take place. So the 
natural question arises: from within such a first-person perspective, 
can one in fact describe an essential characteristic of representations 
that are by implication not effectively accompanied by a self-conscious 
‘I’? Representations that are not effectively accompanied by an ‘I think’ 
(in KDA, I called these P3- and P4-representations, the former of 
which are potentially taken up by apperception and the latter of which 
are representations that are barred from being so accompanied) are 
 representations that are neither necessarily related, nor accessible, to the 
‘I think’, but are just represented by some representer R. Thus it seems 
that any attempt to describe the nature of such unaccompanied repre-
sentations, representations that I do not presently accompany and so am 
not aware of existing, is purely speculative and, if at all possible, could 
only take place from a “third-person (external or metaphysical) perspec-
tive” (Quarfood 2014:91), that is, from the perspective of R.
As Quarfood rightly notes, “in conceiving of the non- apperceiving 
representer R, we are not reenacting the cognitive steps of a judg-
ing self ” (2014:91), so that it is debatable whether on the basis of the 
inferred possibility of having P3- or P4-representations the category 
of contingency can be deduced. So the dilemma appears to be: either 
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we proceed consistently from the first-person perspective, but then we 
cannot deduce contingency and a fortiori cannot determine the contin-
gent nature of P3/P4-representations, or we attempt to determine the 
contingent nature of P3/P4-representations by some external route and 
thus get a grasp of contingency, which means to give up on the strict 
derivation from apperception.
I am not sure whether I have an adequate answer to this dilemma, 
but here goes. In KDA (p. 106ff.), I argued that the necessary pos-
sibility of P3- and P4-representations can be inferred logically from 
the principle of apperception, so that the negative counterparts of the 
first two modal categories, namely impossibility and non-existence, 
are logically entailed by the positive modal categories of possibility 
and existence. Put succinctly, if it is necessarily possible that I accom-
pany all and only my representations, whereby the indexicals ‘I’ and 
‘my’ must be regarded as rigid designators, then it is logically implied 
that it is necessarily possible that representations are represented (in 
my head) that are not actually, or even potentially, accompanied by 
my thinking ‘I’. By implication, I have no access to these represen-
tations, for I only ever think my own representations (which I called 
P1-representations).
In KDA, I argued that P3-representations might or might not be 
accompanied in future, and that P4-representations are such that 
they are not even potentially accompanied. I should clarify that 
P3-representations are not to be seen as occurrent representations, unac-
companied by an ‘I think’, that are then potentially later apprehended 
by an ‘I think’. It now strikes me as too vague to speculate about a rep-
resentation’s mere disposition to being apperceived, not least because 
of the fact that once a representation is accompanied by an actual 
‘I think’, and so is a P1-representation, it can no longer be considered 
a P3-representation (more precisely, it could not ever have been a P3 
if what I can ever think are only my own representations). For that rea-
son, I no longer hold that P3-representations are even formally distin-
guishable from P4-representations. Either representations are (P1) or 
are not (P3/4) accompanied by an ‘I think’, which exhausts the logically 
possible implications of the ‘I think’-proposition at B131. The necessary 
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possibility that is implied in the principle of apperception concerns the 
fact that I should be able to thinkingly accompany all of my own repre-
sentations without being psychologically forced to always so accompany 
the representing (any representing) that is going on in my head.
But what bearing does this have on the negative counterpart of the 
third modal category, i.e. contingency? Can it be derived from the prin-
ciple of apperception? As Quarfood points out, in KDA I concluded 
that contingency concerns what is implied by the conditional that “nec-
essarily, if the ‘I think’ exists, then the rule that all my representations 
are accompanied by the ‘I think’ is satisfied”, namely the implication 
that “[i]t is contingent that for representations for which the rule that 
all my representations are accompanied by the ‘I think’ is not satisfied, 
the ‘I think’ is in fact instantiated” (KDA, p. 123). In other words, con-
tingency would have to do with the fact that for all those representa-
tions for which the conditions under which they would be apperceived 
by an ‘I think’ are not satisfied, it is not necessary that they are accom-
panied by an ‘I think’ in order to be represented.33 These representa-
tions are merely subjectively valid, in the sense of being nothing for 
the ‘I’ of transcendental self-consciousness (which does not necessar-
ily mean that those representations are not consciously apprehended 
in some subcognitive sense). Of course, from within the first-person 
perspective one could not have an explicit (reflective) awareness of 
these merely subjectively valid representations, since the very moment 
one would have such a reflective awareness one would accompany 
them with an ‘I think’. Contingency, then, is just the negation of the 
necessity—which is a conditional necessity—that is expressed by the 
principle of apperception. Contingency is the characteristic of all rep-
resentations that are not accompanied by the ‘I think’ of transcendental 
apperception, which first bestows necessity on representations, insofar as 
they have been united by this act of apperception.
In later sections of the B-Deduction, Kant characterises this con-
tingent aspect in terms of the merely subjectively valid relation of rep-
resentations in empirical apperception in contrast to the objectively 
valid relation of representations, which constitutes a necessary relation 
between representations, as is quintessentially expressed in a judgement 
(see in particular §18, B139–40, and §19, B141–2). The contingency 
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of P3/P4-representations concerns the way they are contingently related 
in an empirical unity of the mind, as they are prompted in accordance 
with empirical laws of association or in the manner in which a mind 
is neurologically wired. Again, here the specifically contingent nature 
of the way these representations are related can only be inferred from 
within the first-person perspective of the derivation of the modal cat-
egories, in the same way that their non-existence before the ‘I’ can only 
be inferred as a necessary possibility from the principle of appercep-
tion: from within the perspective of the derivation, contingency is the 
negation of what is objectively valid and necessarily related and as such 
determinable in conformity with the rules for such determination (i.e. 
the categories as a whole). From within the perspective of apperception, 
contingency is thus only determinable as a negative concept. We can of 
course not determine the very contingent, i.e. merely subjective, nature 
of representations themselves. For we have no metaphysical insight into 
the absolute constitution of our mind in terms of what really goes on 
at the subcognitive, subjective level, outside of our self-conscious, tran-
scendental perspective.
I am not sure whether Quarfood’s (2014:91) suggestion of looking 
to the categories of quality will greatly help in deriving the category 
of contingency, any more than just focusing on the modal categories 
themselves would. For here too, the intensive magnitude of a sensation, 
which any sensation, as the matter of a representation, must have, can 
only be anticipated to the extent that a sensation must be determined 
to have some degree of intensity as a mapping onto the interval [0,1]. 
As Quarfood is right to stress, it is wholly contingent, and so from an a 
priori (transcendental) perspective entirely unpredictable, which degree 
any arbitrary sensation happens to have. But I do not think that even if 
via this route the concept of contingency could be derived, it could be 
done in a way that would circumvent the conundrum that we encoun-
tered above with the modal categories, for any determination of the spe-
cific degree of intensity of some sensation x on the interval [0,1] could 
similarly only occur via third-person routes (by means of a neurophysi-
ological diagram, say), as indeed Quarfood himself admits: “[I]t too 
presupposes knowledge that would be transcendent for the apperceptive 
consciousness” (2014:92).
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I think what shows up here are the limits of the Kantian tran-
scendental perspective, or indeed the limits of transcendental self- 
consciousness as the a priori form of discursive knowledge. On such 
a notion of  self-consciousness as constitutive of objective knowledge, 
we are not transparent to ourselves, obviously not with regard to our 
putative noumenal selves, but nor even with regard to our phenom-
enal, empirically contingent, selves (cf. B157), since our very reflexive 
type of self-consciousness bars us from gaining knowledge of what goes 
on in the mind on a subcognitive, non-objective level (i.e. in terms of 
occurrent representations that are not accompanied by an ‘I think’). 
Ironically, on account of Kant’s radical subjectivism about the possibil-
ity of  knowledge we are thus at the same time barred from accessing 
what is truly merely subjectively valid, that is, our most intimate psycho-
logical experience, or self-consciousness as more commonly understood. 
This shows that Kant’s radical subjectivism is not a psychological sub-
jectivism. In this context, it seems quite reasonable that Kant’s earliest 
critics, Fichte in particular, found fault with his account—or more pre-
cisely the lack thereof—of the sui generis nature of self-consciousness.34  
But I think that the general prospects for a theory that purports to 
give us an insight into the subcognitive terrain of the mind from the 
 perspective of self-consciousness are rather slim.
Notes
 1. More precisely, Reich is concerned with deriving the functions of judge-
ments from the objective unity of apperception, for which he looks 
for textual support outside the Critique. In KDA, I claimed that the 
categories are derivable from the unity of apperception (the ‘I think’), 
but since the categories are the functions of judgement, insofar as they 
determine intuitions as objects, de facto my claim comes down to the 
same as Reich’s. Unlike Reich, however, I contend—and this was my 
novel claim—that the evidence for the derivation claim can be gathered 
from the arguments in TD itself.
 2. Well, of course Hegel is one who disputes that discursivity is the most 
basic fact about our thought. See KDA, pp. 8–12 and Chap. 8 (this 
volume).
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 3. On the constitutive features of discursivity, see further Chap. 3 (this 
volume), and KDA, Chap. 5.
 4. In the ‘second step’ of TD, which was not discussed in KDA, Kant 
further argues for the necessary connection between the thought of an 
object and the perception of an object; I expound on issues relating to 
the ‘second step’ in Chap. 7 (this volume).
 5. But even here, there is an ambiguity: does that more modest argu-
ment mean that the categories are necessarily applicable to experience 
of objects only, or also to the objects of experience? For an account of 
these issues, see further Chap. 4 (this volume).
 6. That is to say, often one complains that in TD Kant is not specific 
enough about what the categories are and how they are supposed to 
be applied to experience, or that the deduction of the categories is 
not “complete” until the Analogies, or even until the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Nature. Hence, commentators turn to the Analogies, 
because only there does Kant, so they argue, enter into detail about 
the particular categories and their application to experience. But this 
is to confuse the roles of the Analogies and TD. I agree with Michael 
Friedman that the Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations “have 
different yet complementary perspectives on [the] same phenom-
enal world, about which they establish different yet complemen-
tary conclusions” (2015:563–564). I disagree with Friedman’s overall 
stance though that the scientific laws addressed in the Metaphysical 
Foundations are entailed by the transcendental principles of experience 
addressed in the Critique, such that the superseding of those empirical 
laws post-Einstein has, as Friedman argues, a direct bearing on the sta-
tus of the transcendental principles of experience.
 7. In KDA, I concentrated on the B-Deduction, but the argument 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the A-Deduction as well.
 8. See Dyck (2014), Quarfood (2014) and Stephenson (2014).
 9. The passage at B127–8 seems less clear-cut in my opinion, as Kant here 
refers to the kind of derivation of the pure concepts of the understand-
ing (or ideas, in their case) that Locke and Hume had in mind, that 
is, “an empirical derivation” or a derivation from experience, namely 
in accordance with the psychological laws of association. This would 
appear to be an inductive derivation from experience as a premise, 
that is, one that is mutatis mutandis comparable to Kant’s deductive 
derivation from thought itself (Kant speaks of Locke’s “physiological 
derivation” [A86/B119], but also in terms of an “empirical deduction” 
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[B117/A85]; see further KDA, Chap. 3). In both the Lockean and 
Kantian cases, some sort of logical inference or reasoning is at work, 
albeit that in the one (Locke’s) case the inference is from a psycholog-
ical principle or empirical fact(s), and in the latter (Kant’s) case it is 
from a general principle (or logical facts) of thought.
 10. Cf. Kant’s letter of 7 August 1783 to Garve (Br, 10:340), which I 
quoted in KDA, p. 218n.1.
 11. There is some prima facie support for Dyck’s stance. Recently, 
Aportone (2009:169–171) has equally argued that indeed the functions 
of the understanding are just given, “and so discovered, not derived or 
produced”. Aportone points to A70/B95, where Kant writes: “If we 
abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to 
the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of 
thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which con-
tains under itself three moments” (emphasis added). I do not think 
though that Kant’s use of finden here is meant to exclude the logical 
derivability of the functions of thought, and instead proves that Kant 
thinks we merely come across them. Rather, I take the construction 
“find that…” to indicate a logical, ostensive procedure of seeing that if 
we do x, then y follows, or at least to indicate a sufficiently justified 
claim. Thanks to Wolfgang Ertl and Robert Hanna for discussion.
 12. In KDA, p. 10, I point out that it has of course been argued with 
reference to B145–6, by Krüger (1968), that Kant did not intend 
to derive the categories, or the functions of judgement for that mat-
ter, from apperception, but rested content with their de facto status, 
which appears to be what Kant suggests at B145–6, where he states that 
“a further ground” for the fact that the unity of apperception consists 
of “precisely this kind and number” of categories cannot be offered. 
But compare Wolff ’s (1995:180–181) reply to Krüger, in which he 
points out, correctly, that no further ground can be given, which does 
not of course mean no ground is provided; and in fact, this remark at 
B145–6 occurs in the first paragraph after the first part of the deduc-
tion’s account of how the categories “arise […] merely in the under-
standing” (B144) has been completed. Krüger’s point is raised again 
by Quarfood in his critique while suggesting it might still be a viable 
rival of my interpretation to argue “that the way [the categories] spring 
from apperception is impossible to elucidate, so that we must stop 
before the fact that they do, without demanding further explanation” 
(Quarfood 2014:87–88).
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 13. Even Locke and Hume believe that the ideas derive from certain dis-
positions of the mind, i.e. the way sensations are worked up into more 
complex representations, for which they present meticulous arguments 
about how this supposedly works, even if they do not believe that this 
can be shown in any purely a priori manner comparable to Kant’s 
method of proof. See again note 9 above.
 14. However, Henrich is rather elusive about what exactly the relation 
between the categories and self-consciousness consists in. See e.g. 
Henrich (1976:89).
 15. See e.g. Proops (2003:223–224). On Proops’s interpretation, see fur-
ther KDA, pp. 41–43.
 16. Dyck refers mistakenly to §§8–10.
 17. At B133, Kant writes: “Therefore it is only because I can combine a 
manifold of given representations in one consciousness that it is possible 
for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations 
itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under 
the presupposition of some synthetic one.”
 18. There is a similar view in especially the German literature that says that 
the analytic unity of the ‘I think’ in relation to the manifold representa-
tions that it accompanies is not yet the consciousness of the identity of 
the ‘I’. See e.g. Henrich (1976) and Cramer (1990:173–175). But the 
mistaken assumption here, explicitly so in Cramer, is that the ‘I think’ 
at B131–2, which accompanies the manifold conjointly (insgesamt is 
the term Kant uses in these passages), is the same empirical conscious-
ness that accompanies each single representation in the manifold, of 
which Kant speaks at B133 and about which he says that it does not 
thereby constitute a relation to the identity of the subject. But the two 
types of accompaniment are not the same. That this is not the case is 
argued in KDA, pp. 176–181.
 19. Here, Kant in fact identifies the identity of the self as an analytic unity 
of apperception of representations.
 20. Cf. Prol §47, 4:334: “This thinking self (the soul), as the ultimate sub-
ject of thinking, which cannot itself be represented as the predicate 
of another thing [cf. the same reasoning in B132], may now indeed be 
called substance” (Kant 2002:126; emphasis added); A400: “Now mere 
apperception (‘I’) is substance in concept, simple in concept, etc., and 
thus all these psychological theorems are indisputably correct.”
 21. See e.g. at B401/A343: “[T]he mere apperception ‘I think’, which 
even makes all transcendental concepts possible, which say ‘I think 
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substance, cause, etc.’ […].” I am of course aware of the passage at 
B406–7, which Dyck quotes as evidence against my view; I refer to it 
in KDA, p. 94.
 22. After all, the concept of subject (subiectum) is the translation of the 
Greek ὑποκείµενον, which in Latin is also translated as substantia. 
Aristotle defines ὑποκείµενον as “that of which the rest are predi-
cated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else [κατ’ οὗ τὰ 
ἄλλα λέγεται ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτο µηκέτι κατ’ ἄλλου]” (Metaphysics, 
1028b 36). Compare this with Kant’s definition of the ‘I’ as “the 
subject, in which thoughts inhere only as determinations, and [which] 
cannot be used as the determination of another thing”, which he then 
associates with the concept of substance (A349); and see also of course 
the description of self-consciousness or the representation ‘I think’ at 
B132 as that “which must be able to accompany all others [i.e., all 
other representations] and which in all consciousness is one and the 
same, [and] cannot be accompanied by any further representation”, 
in other words, as the ultimate subject. Cf. La Rocca (2003:28–29). 
La Rocca traces the development of Kant’s view on the relation between 
substance and the subject or the ‘I’. Notice that, as La Rocca points 
out, already for the medievals, subiectum and substantia can “coincide”, 
but need not be “equivalent”: every substantia is a subiectum, but not 
every subiectum is a substantia.
 23. See Schulting (2016).
 24. See again La Rocca (2003) for an important account of the grounds 
for Kant’s abandoning of the idea that the subject is a substance, which 
does not focus on the role of the paralogisms.
 25. And even there, Kant tries to “swat away”, as Pippin (2005:211n.6) 
aptly puts it, what can only be seen as a “garden-variety” modern scep-
ticism. The sceptical challenge that Kant is at most interested in is the 
Humean denial that our pure concepts are objectively valid in the sense 
that they tell us the truth about objects.
 26. Not Strawson (1968), Stroud (1968) and Rorty (1970), mind. They are 
participants in the transcendental argument debate that Stephenson is 
referring to, not the debate about the presumed gap that I discuss in 
KDA.
 27. See Stroud (1968).
 28. In KDA, my account of judgement is underdeveloped; I only pointed 
out how the definition of judgement is the direct corollary of the 
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 reciprocity thesis (cf. KDA, Sect. 10.2). But see further Chap. 3 (this 
volume), where I elaborate on the theme of the objective validity of a 
judgement.
 29. Some point to Kant’s term Wissen (B850ff.) as the ostensible Kantian 
equivalent of ‘knowledge’, as distinguished from Erkenntnis as the 
ostensible Kantian equivalent of ‘cognition’. However, Kant’s account 
of Wissen at A822/B850 cannot be read in such a way that the tran-
scendental conditions for Erkenntnis are not sufficient for Wissen, which 
Kant defines as a “taking something to be true” that is “both subjec-
tively and objectively sufficient”. Transcendental apperception as the 
transcendental ground of Erkenntnis and of truth, as argued in TD, is 
precisely concerned with a “taking something to be true” that is “both 
subjectively and objectively sufficient” (cf. A125–7). There is noth-
ing beyond what is known in terms of Erkenntnis, that would first be 
satisfied by Wissen. It is simply an anachronism to map a contempo-
rary distinction, which is moreover informed by an Anglophone ana-
lytic tradition that does not appreciate the Kantian distinction between 
the transcendental and the empirical, onto an ostensible distinction 
between Kant’s Erkenntnis and Wissen.
 30. Stephenson goes into exaggeration mode when he flippantly suggests 
that the concepts ‘rule’, ‘representation’, ‘accompaniment’, or ‘satisfac-
tion’ could likewise be derived, just because they appear in the language 
employed to expound Kant’s theory.
 31. It should be noted that Kant does of course affirm the existence of 
things in themselves as distinct from our minds, but not their qual-
ity as appearances, namely, as material objects, bodies, which is what 
Stephenson here assumes is the case. For further discussion, see 
Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
 32. In KDA, my use of the term ‘contrary’ was misleading, as Quarfood 
(2014:89n.2) rightly points out. It should strictly speaking be ‘contra-
dictory’, but I prefer to use the term ‘negative counterpart’ to suggest 
the complementarity between the two contradictories of each modal 
moment.
 33. To which I would now add that, strictly speaking, it is not even possible 
for these representations to be accompanied by an ‘I think’, given that 
the conditions under which ‘I think’-accompaniment takes place are 
not satisfied.
 34. See Schulting (2017).
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3.1  Introduction
The title of this chapter refers to a note taken by a student of Kant’s 
lectures on metaphysics, Graf Dohna von Wundlacken, recorded in 
1792–93, so rather late in Kant’s lecturing career. The full quote reads:
Das reine Bewustseyn kommt schon in der Logik vor.—(Alle Urtheile 
sind Vorstellungen von deren Einheit wir bewust sind). (V-Met/Dohna, 
28:671)
Pure consciousness is found already in logic.—(All judgments are repre-
sentations of whose unity we are conscious). (Kant 2001:372)
Kant’s point here is that there is a connection between the theory of 
pure consciousness, or also called transcendental apperception, and the 
theory of judgement, which concerns logic. This connection is a well-
known, if perhaps puzzling, aspect of Kant’s theory of cognition, and 
I want to explore it a bit more in what follows.1
First, in Sect. 3.2, I shall provide some general background of Kant’s 
theory of judgement. Next, in Sect. 3.3, I also look at an early account 
3
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98     3 “Pure Consciousness Is Found Already in Logic” …
of judgement in the 1762 essay The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogisms 
and I cite some striking passages in Kant’s lectures and Reflexionen, from 
the intermediate period between the A- and B-Deduction, where the 
connection between pure consciousness or apperception and judgement 
is first made explicit.
In Sects. 3.4 and 3.5, I then address the question as to why Kant 
makes this claim of an intimate connection between apperception and 
judgement, especially since he does not seem to place great emphasis 
on their interconnection in the A-Deduction—in fact, the term ‘judge-
ment’ itself is mentioned only once in the whole of the A-Deduction 
(at A126).
There are interesting historical things to say about why judge-
ment suddenly appears at the centre of Kant’s argument in §19 of the 
B-version of the Transcendental Deduction (TD) of 6 years later.2  
In this chapter, however, I am primarily interested in the connection 
between apperception and judgement from a systematic point of view, 
and shall discuss it against the backdrop of an important and highly 
interesting recent paper by Robert Pippin (2014). Pippin also stresses 
the intimate connection between apperception and judgement. Pippin 
rightly draws attention to a crucial element of Kant’s conception 
of judgement that has to do with, as he puts it, a judgement’s inher-
ent “self-relation” or “self-reference” (2014:154–155). In this paper, he 
recapitulates a topic he already broached in a well-known, and tremen-
dously illuminating article on Kant on the spontaneity of mind from 
1987 (which I quote from Pippin 1997), but now linked more explicitly 
to the context of what Pippin claims is Hegel’s essential Kantianism.3
But there are some apparent problems—at least seen from the 
Kantian perspective—with Pippin’s conception of what he calls the 
apperceptive nature of judgement, mainly relating to his imputation of 
absolute rather than relative spontaneity to Kant. This ties in with his 
almost exclusive focus on the self ’s role in judgement as a free rational 
agent, while passing over the issue of why according to Kant judge-
ment is an objective unity of apperception. Pippin—at least in the recent 
paper—thus appears to neglect what can be called the intrinsic objective 
purport of judgement, its inherent ‘intentionality’, or what Kant him-
self calls ‘objective validity’, which I shall argue is not the truth value 
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of a judgement. Pippin seems content with the Hegelian view that 
a conceptual unity of apperception sans phrase, that is, without a role 
for pure intuition, eo ipso “achieves the unity that says how things are” 
(2014:147). While I do not disagree with Pippin’s story about the nec-
essary self-conscious aspect of judgement, I think Kant is foremost con-
cerned with pointing out judgement’s essentially objective purport. Of 
course, in line with Hegel’s own reading of Kant (e.g. WL 12:23–24), 
Pippin points out the identity between self-consciousness and objectiv-
ity too (cf. 2014:147–148), but more emphasis needs to be put on the 
mediating role of intuition, by means of the act of synthesising one’s 
representations in a sensible manifold, than Pippin grants. This latter 
aspect relates to why I shall argue that the spontaneity of the appercep-
tive act is relative rather than absolute, as Pippin believes.
3.2  Discursivity and Unity of Thought
Let me first provide some general background to Kant’s theory of judge-
ment and the connection with (self-)consciousness. The best textual evi-
dence for the intimate relation between apperception and judgement is, 
as is well-known, given in §19 of the B-Deduction, where Kant practi-
cally defines judgement as the objective unity of apperception:
[A] judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to 
the objective unity of apperception. (B141; emphasis in original)
However, in the A-Deduction Kant is much less clear about the rela-
tion. There, he almost exclusively focuses on the aspect of the unity of 
consciousness as the necessary and formally sufficient condition of 
knowledge, and the a priori rules that are connected with it. He only 
explicitly mentions judgement once in all of the A-Deduction, at A126. 
In a well-known note in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 
he calls the lack of clarity regarding the relation with judgement the 
“deficiency” of the A-Deduction (MAN, 4:475–476n.). That does not 
necessarily mean that, in general, there is a huge difference in terms of 
argumentative purport between the accounts of the A- and B-Deduction. 
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After having expounded on the rules for thinking a unity in the 
manifold of intuition, which is pretty much in line with the later 
formulation of the argument of §§15–17 in the B-Deduction, Kant says 
at A126:
We have above explained the understanding in various ways—through a 
spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the sensibility),  
through a faculty for thinking, or a faculty of concepts, or also of  
judgments4—which explanations, if one looks at them properly, come 
down to the same thing. (emphasis added)
What Kant says here comports with the claim in the Metaphysical 
Deduction (MD), namely that “the understanding in general can be 
represented as a faculty for judging [Vermögen zu urteilen]” (A69/B94).5 
Indeed, as Kant says, “all actions of the understanding” can be traced 
back “to judgments”. The faculty for judging, or the capacity to judge, 
and the faculty for thinking—which is what the understanding is 
(A69/B94)—are one and the same faculty operating the same func-
tion. Kant also stresses, in MD, the fact that the faculty for thinking 
concerns a discursive mode of thinking, which means that to think is 
to cognise through concepts, which the understanding cannot employ 
otherwise than in judgements (A68/B93). This ties in with the fact 
that “[j]udgment is […] the mediate cognition of an object” (A68/B93; 
emphasis added), because cognition through concepts is effectively the 
“representation of a representation” of an object, never a direct, imme-
diate representation of an object. Kant illustrates this mediate type of 
cognition in judgement with the example “All bodies are divisible”, 
where the concept <divisible> is predicable of <body> as one of the 
many other concepts of which it can be predicated, and <body> is in its 
turn related to “certain appearances that come before us” (ibid.), and are 
thought under the concept <body>. The subject concept is the rule for 
the manifold of representations in intuition, by means of which intuited 
objects are subsumed under the predicate <divisible>.6 The very form of 
judgement, which consists in the subordination of concepts, thus con-
firms the discursive, mediate nature of our mode of cognition and the 
dependence on an immediate nonconceptual relation to given objects 
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by means of sensible intuition. (On the aspect of so-called nonconcep-
tual content, see further Chaps. 5 and 6.)
Another element of Kant’s discursive conception of judgement is the 
notion of the function of unity: the concepts in a judgement are united 
by means of a function, which Kant defines as “the unity of the action 
of ordering different representations under a common one” (A68/B93), 
demonstrating his basically extensional view of the relation between 
concepts, in contrast to the principally intensional view of judgement 
of his Leibnizian-Wolffian predecessors, who considered the predicate 
as analytically contained in the subject of judgement (praedicatum inest 
subjecto).
The third important element of his account of judgement is that the 
function of discursive thinking shows thought’s spontaneity, in con-
trast to the receptivity of human cognition that is characterised by the 
affective nature of intuition.7 Spontaneity is the element that Pippin 
focuses on, and which I shall address in the latter part of this chapter 
(Sect. 3.5).
The element of the function of unity plays a central role in the 
A-Deduction, as it does in the B-Deduction. Nevertheless, the account 
in A might seem radically different from the one in §19 of B, just 
because in A, apart from the one occurrence of the term ‘judgement’ in 
the passage I quoted above, Kant does not go on to expand on the clear 
association between judgement and the concepts of the understanding 
(the categories) that Kant had submitted in MD existed. This is in con-
trast to B, where he makes that link crystal clear in the conclusion of 
the ‘first step’ of B-Deduction (§20). Nor does he make the connection 
between apperception and judgement clear in A.
As I hinted earlier, there are historical reasons for Kant’s change 
of focus between A and B, the most important of which has got to 
do with the problematic conception of judgements of perception 
that Kant presented in the Prolegomena of 1783, and for which he 
was criticised by Johann Schultz. I agree with Pollok (2008, 2013) 
that Kant  abandoned this theory after 1786,8 but I do not want to 
dwell on this here. I contend that, apart from his short-lived theory 
of judgements of perception in the period around the Prolegomena, 
there is enough textual evidence of a continuity in Kant’s conception 
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of judgement, even if no such conception can be found directly in the 
A-Deduction and even if it is true that it is only with the definition 
in B that we have the clearest explanation of the connection between 
apperception and judgement. For an understanding of the impor-
tance and meaning of that connection it is useful first to look briefly 
at some background in Kant’s earlier pre-Critical work (so prior to 
the 1781 TD), in the Duisburg Nachlass from Kant’s silent decade in 
the 1770s, and in the lectures on metaphysics, specifically from the 
period between A and B, such as the Mrongovius (1782–83) and 
Volckmann (1784–85) lecture notes.
3.3  From Kant’s Early Conception 
of Judgement till After the A-Deduction
The first real indication of Kant’s interest in judgement in his published 
work is in his The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogisms (1762), an intri-
cate piece of work in logic, the focal argument of which I’m here not 
concerned with. But in that essay Kant also provides some clear state-
ments as to how judgement should be characterised. Here, Kant writes 
that to “compare something as a characteristic mark [Merkmal ] with 
a thing is to judge”, whereby the “thing itself is the subject” and “the 
 characteristic mark is the predicate”, and the “comparison is expressed 
by means of the copula is or are” (DfS, 2:47 [Kant 1992a:89]). This 
is consistent with Kant’s later Critical view insofar as, for Kant, con-
cepts are characteristic marks and are part of the cognition of a thing 
(cf. Log, 9:58–61), so that all discursive thinking is thinking by means 
of  characteristic marks, or partial representations (Log, 9:58; cf. Meier, 
Auszug zur Vernunftlehre §§292–293). Concepts are predicated of the 
thing and a further concept is mediately predicated of this thing: some 
thing x is determined as F (i.e. Fx) and G is a further determination of 
x (i.e. GF x, where GF stands for the determination G conditional upon 
the determination F ); note that G is not a partial concept of the subject 
predicate F or indeed a part of the thing itself, but rather part of the 
determinate conceptual representation of the thing x that is also repre-
sented as F (cf. Refl 3920–1 [1769], 17:345–346).
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In the conclusion to False Subtlety, Kant further says, in line with the 
Wolffian view, that a judgement consists in “clearly recognis[ing] some-
thing as a characteristic mark of a thing”, which constitutes what it is to 
have a “distinct concept”. That means—and this I contend  introduces 
the element of reflexivity that is so important to Kant in TD—that, 
when e.g. I have the concept of body, I must “clearly represent to myself 
impenetrability as a characteristic mark of it”, which amounts to a 
judgement. Such a clear representation is, as Kant says, “nothing other 
than the thought: a body is impenetrable”, where “thought” should be 
understood as “judgement”. Furthermore, the judgement is “the action 
by means of which the distinct concept is actualised” (all quotations 
DfS, 2:58 [Kant 1992a:102–103]; emphasis added).
What is also important is that Kant stresses the difference between 
differentiating things from each other, and recognising the difference 
between things. It is only the latter which amounts to judging, some-
thing animals cannot do, since they are not able to “differentiat[e] 
 logically” (i.e. recognise that “a thing A is not B”), though they have the 
capacity for “[p]hysically differentiating”. The capacity for physically dif-
ferentiating things “means being driven to different actions by different 
representations”, e.g. the ability of an ox to differentiate the stall from 
its door (DfS, 2:59–60 [Kant 1992a:103–104]). In a note, Kant makes 
the connection between consciousness and judging. It concerns a con-
sciousness of the second order, of the reflexive kind, namely to be capa-
ble of recognising differences or distinctions relative to each other, that 
e.g. something A is not B. Apart from the identification of the “power 
[…] which makes judging possible” as the faculty of “inner sense”—
which is still equated to self-consciousness in this early period9—in the 
same section of False Subtlety (DfS, 2:60 [Kant 1992a:104]) and a ref-
erence in the Inquiry (UD, 2:286), there are no further occurrences in 
Kant’s published pre-Critical work, where the epistemological role of 
consciousness, its connection to judgement, is foregrounded.
Of course, at this time (1762) Kant’s rudimentary view of judgement 
is still very much informed by a Wolffian conception of judgement as 
instantiated in being itself. For Wolff, the particular thing that in the 
proposition is posited as subject F and of which is predicated that it is 
G, say, is the thing itself (x), underlying the subject predicate; hence, 
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Kant writes that the “thing itself is the subject” (DfS, 2:47 [Kant 
1992a:89]). As the scholastic principle has it, the order of predicates fol-
lows the order of being (modus praedicandi sequi modum essendi).10 There 
is no ontological difference between the order of concepts and the realm 
of substances. This view of a direct mapping of concepts onto substances 
is later, from at least the mid-1770s, abandoned by Kant: the departure 
from an ontological view of judgement marks the transition to transcen-
dental logic—first explicitly mentioned in the Duisburg Nachlass (Refl 
4675, 17:651), which no longer follows the order of being. The object 
of judgement is no longer simply the thing in itself of which a concept F 
is predicated and of which a further concept G can be mediately predi-
cated etc. Rather, as Kant says in a Reflexion in the Duisburg Nachlass, 
the x of judgement is now a function of the thinking subject, a function 
of thought, that is, the “x is […] the determinable (object), which I think 
through the concept a, and b is its [a’s] determination […]” (Refl 4674, 
17:645 [Kant 2005:159]; emphasis added). Instead of being predicated 
of the thing directly, F is predicated of an x such that we get Fx (and 
subsequently GF x, etc.), through which I relate to the thing x.11 In the 
earlier, above-cited Reflexion 3920 the x is called “the possible concept 
of a thing” (Refl, 17:345). Of this x Kant writes further in the Duisburg 
Nachlass (1773–75), making the link to, indeed identifying it with, the 
representing or thinking subject:
In mathematics x is the construction of a, in experience it is the concretum 
[…]. This object can only be represented in accordance with its relations 
and is nothing other than the subjective representation of the subject itself, but 
made general, for I am the original of all objects. (Refl 4674, 17:646 [Kant 
2005:159–160]; emphasis added)
The explicit connection with the term ‘apperception’ is then made a 
bit later in the text of the Nachlass (Refl, 17:646–647). This is the first 
prominent indication of Kant’s subjective turn.
Here, we see a precursor of what in the A-Deduction Kant calls the 
“transcendental object”, the “something in general = X ” which corre-
sponds to our representations, but whose unity is “nothing other than 
the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold 
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of the representations” (A104–5), that is, the unity of the thinking sub-
ject or ‘I’. The direct object of representations is no longer an object 
existing (wholly) external to our representations, or as in the Wolffian 
case, a subsisting thing underlying our representations isomorphically 
corresponding to, or supervening on, it. Insofar as its necessary unity 
is concerned, the object is simply the necessary unity conferred on the 
manifold of representations by an act of synthesis.12 “Hence we say that 
we cognize the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold 
of intuition” (A105). The object qua object, the object’s objectivity, is a 
sheer product of the synthetic unity among our representations. It is in 
the way that we combine our representations that we are able to recog-
nise some existing thing as object. (The object of our judgement is not, 
or more precisely cannot be, simply a thing that exists in itself, but is 
rather something that is necessarily for us. If it merely existed in itself, 
it would by definition not be an object for us, an object that we could 
cognise.)13 The “as” here is important; it points to the necessary reflex-
ive or subjective element in the cognition of objects, which in a certain 
respect14 is also sufficient for it. There is an object only insofar as my 
representations are taken as constituting an object. This taking as cor-
relates with the unification of one’s representations in accordance with 
certain rules.
An object of representation is cognised insofar as the mind’s repre-
sentations are united according to definite rules which give those rep-
resentations unity and make them necessarily related. These rules or 
“exponents”, as Kant calls them in the Duisburg Nachlass, in accordance 
with which appearances are determined and which constitute the rela-
tion to an object, are of course the categories (cf. Refl 5854, 18:370: 
categories are “kinds of unity of consciousness”!). In the A-Deduction, 
Kant is quite clear as to the fact that transcendental apperception is the 
very original ground for the necessary unity of representations accord-
ing to the categories, which first constitutes the object of experience 
insofar as it is that something over against our representations which we 
perceive as an object.15
But, as said, in the A-Deduction, apart from that one mention at 
A126, Kant fails to link explicitly transcendental apperception as the 
ground of objective experience to judgement. It is first in B, in §19, that 
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this link is explicitly made. However, for the period between A and B 
textual evidence for the connection between apperception or conscious-
ness as a function of unity and judgement can be found in Kant’s lec-
tures on metaphysics, in the Prolegomena, and in Reflexionen from the 
intermediate period. For example, in the Metaphysik Volckmann, from 
1784–85, Kant says that a “judgement [is] […] the consciousness of the 
manifold representations of a unity in one consciousness […]” (V-Met/
Volckmann, 28:395; trans. mine), which is comparable to the definition 
given in the Prolegomena of 1783: “The unification of representations 
in a consciousness is judgment” (Prol, 4:304 [Kant 2002:98]).16 In the 
Mrongovius metaphysics lecture notes, which date from right after the 
first publication of the Critique (1782–83), the connection between 
apperception, unification of representations under a rule, and judge-
ment is even clearer. Similar to the A-Deduction account, the lecture 
note gives a clear insight into why Kant thinks that the topic of con-
sciousness or apperception is intimately related to the logic governing 
object cognition, but unlike in the A-Deduction, here, he also connects 
this explicitly to the composition of concepts through judgement and to 
the power of judgement. It is worthwhile to quote the passage from the 
Mrongovius at length. Kant is reported as having said the following:
A concept is the consciousness that the [same] is contained in one rep-
resentation as in another, or that in multiple representations one and 
the same features are contained. This thus presupposes consciousness or 
apperception.17 […] Whoever can make concepts for himself, thinks. 
All thinking is threefold: (1) through concepts, and the faculty for this 
is called understanding. (2) Through composition of two concepts, i.e., 
through judgments, i.e., the power of judgment. (3) Through derivation 
of a concept from another by inferences, i.e., reason. Understanding is the 
faculty for bringing various representations under a rule. It rests on apper-
ception. (It is the faculty for determining the particular by the general. 
With the higher cognitive power the cognitive faculty is considered not in 
relation to intuition, but rather to the unity of consciousness. This is the 
representation of one’s representations and therefore is also called apper-
ception. Without the consciousness of the sameness of a representation 
in many representations, no general rule would be possible. For a rule is a 
necessary unity of consciousness of a manifold of representations, relation 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
of the manifold of representations to one consciousness.) But how are 
concepts possible through apperception? In that I represent to myself the 
identity of my apperception in many representations. The concept is a 
common perception <perceptio communis>, e.g., the concept of body. This 
applies to metal, gold, stone, etc. In this I represent to myself a one in a 
manifold. The logical function of this consists in generality. This is the 
analytic unity of apperception, and many in one is its synthetic unity. The 
analytic unity of apperception represents nothing new to us, but rather 
is merely conscious of the manifold in one representation. The synthetic 
[unity] deals with many, insofar as it is contained in one. As long as the 
understanding judges according to this it is a pure understanding. The 
understanding makes rules. From the multiple representations it draws 
out the general, that which is met in all. It is consequently also called 
the faculty of rules. Experience presupposes understanding because it is 
a connection of perceptions according to rules. […] The power of judg-
ment brings objects under rules. […] The power of judgment sees under 
which rule each thing stands, and whether this thing is contained under 
this rule or not.18 (V-Met/Mron, 29:888–890 [Kant 2001:256–258])
All of the fundamental aspects of Kant’s mature theory of knowledge, 
specifically the pivotal role played by transcendental apperception, come 
out clearly in this passage. Consciousness or apperception is explicitly 
linked to the theory of concepts, namely to the idea that by means of a 
general rule many particular representations are united under a general 
or common one, and a fortiori to the capacity to judge about objects, 
thus to the possibility of experience. The grounding role of conscious-
ness is acknowledged in the sense that the activity of judging consists 
precisely in the consciousness of the unity among the manifold of one’s 
own representations.19
A series of Reflexionen (Refl 5854 [1783–84], 18:369–37020; Refl 
5923 [1783–84], 18:386–38721; Refl 5933 [1783–84], 18:39222) fur-
ther underline the fact that shortly after the publication of the first edi-
tion of the Critique or indeed already prior to it (Refl 3045 [1776–79], 
16:630–631)23,24 Kant mulled over the definition of judgement, as 
having to do with the consciousness of a unity constitutive of an object, 
which then first appears in its definite form in print in the B-edition 
Deduction (in §19), which we quoted at the start of Sect. 3.2.25 
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However, it should be observed that the 1783 Prolegomena’s variant def-
inition of judgement as the unity of representations in a consciousness 
is indifferent to the distinction between the subjective and objective 
unities of representations, only the latter of which is identifiable with 
judgement strictly speaking in the later definition of the B-Deduction.
3.4  Judgement, Apperception and Objectivity
We have seen that Kant defines human cognition or thought as 
 discursive, namely as cognition through concepts. The crucial implica-
tion of this conception of thought is that thinking is always mediate, 
that is, a conceptual representation is always only mediately related to 
the real object of intuition. This discursive aspect concerns the neces-
sary form of human thought (A77/B103). However, Kant’s main inter-
est, the interest of his transcendental logic in TD and also already in 
MD, explicitly so in the Third Clue section (§10), is to find a way to 
link our discursive mode of thinking to the object of thought, more pre-
cisely, to the immediate cognition, by means of intuition, of the object. 
In other words, the content of cognition, from which general logic 
abstracts (A76/B102), is the central focus of attention. As Kant points 
out at A69/B94, “[c]oncepts […], as predicates of possible judgments, 
are related to some representation of a still undetermined object”. What 
is paramount, for Kant, is how to be able to determine the manner in 
which the relation between, on the one hand, concepts in judgement 
and, on the other hand, this representation of an as yet undetermined 
object, which occurs by means of intuition, is determined such that we 
have a determinate conception of that object. The function of unity in 
a judgement that subordinates concepts, by means of an analytic unity, 
as Kant says (A79/B105), must somehow tie in with the immediate 
 representation of the object (x) in intuition. Only by explicating the 
link between the mediate, conceptual representation and an immediate, 
intuitional representation of the object are we able to answer the ques-
tion of what it means to judge that GF x.
Now in the so-called guiding thread (Leitfaden) passage in §10 
(B104–5/A79), Kant makes the prima facie startling claim that the 
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very same function of the understanding that subordinates and unites 
concepts “in a judgment”, insofar as the analytical form of conceptual 
relations or their logical unity (cf. A77/B103)—namely, the analytical 
subordination relation between concepts—is concerned, is also respon-
sible, by “the very same actions”, for the unification of the representa-
tions “in an intuition” of the object, that is, for the content of cognition. 
The latter unification occurs by means of a priori synthesis, and enables 
the determinate representation of an object. I take this to mean that the 
unification on the conceptual level of a judgement and the unification 
on the level of the intuition do not happen separately or independently 
from each other.26 Rather, the understanding itself fulfils this task for 
both concepts and intuition, form and content, within judgement.27  
A judgement is always a relation between concepts and intuition, which 
consists of the sensible representations that are subsumable under the 
subject concept of the judgement; the intuition of the object is repre-
sented by the x of judgement, and is the real condition of cognition. 
And since the understanding is the capacity to judge, the determina-
tion by the understanding of intuition must take place in judgement. 
Importantly, this does not imply that, necessarily, intuitions always and 
only occur within judgement. It means that the determination of intui-
tion must always and only occur in judgement. To have an intuition is 
not dependent on the activity of judging, for, as Kant says, “intuition by 
no means requires the functions of thinking” (A90–1/B123). (This last 
topic will be addressed at length in Chap. 5.)
The central remarkable claim that Kant makes in the Deduction, is 
that the understanding as a faculty for discursive thinking and judging 
is at the same time the faculty for determining objectively real things; in 
other words, the central claim that the subjective conditions of thought 
are also the objective conditions of knowledge (cf. A89–90/B122). This 
is why Kant claims that the categories, which are the a priori concepts by 
means of which objects are determined, exactly map onto the  functions 
of logical unity in judgement; the categories are those same functions of 
logical unity in respect of the content of judgement, namely in respect of 
how any judgement is intrinsically, by virtue of its very logical (discur-
sive) unity in conjunction with intuition, always already object-oriented 
or intentionally directed towards the object of knowledge.
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However, the fact that Kant’s discursive logic requires functions 
by means of which manifolds of representations in intuition must 
be united, and that such a necessary unity is required for objective 
knowledge, does not necessarily imply a role for self-consciousness. 
Functionalist theories of discursive cognition could be conceived that 
do not rely on a theory of self-consciousness or consciousness, so why 
does Kant insist on a role for apperception? It is striking that in MD 
itself Kant does not refer to the unity of apperception or consciousness 
at all, and speaks merely of the function of unity of the understanding 
in general, and in the Third Clue section, where he provides the actual 
guiding thread to discovering the categories, he talks about synthesis 
which yields the categories, but not about the synthetic unity of apper-
ception. So why does Kant closely associate, if not identify, judgement 
with the objective unity of apperception in §19 of TD? What reasons are 
there for correlating the function of unity by means of which the under-
standing unites concepts and intuition in a judgement with the unity of 
self-consciousness?
In TD, Kant must demonstrate that what, by way of a promissory 
note, in the guiding thread passage he only submits is the case—namely 
that the understanding performs two tasks simultaneously—is effec-
tively what happens in judgement by deriving the categories as the 
determinate a priori forms of objects from the unity of the understand-
ing, that is, from the faculty of thought itself without presupposing a 
definition of judgement. The functions of thought must be shown to be 
those categories necessary for cognition of objects. Self-consciousness is 
involved to the extent that thinking is, first of all, a spontaneous activity 
involving a subject, which is aware of her thinking activity. (This is the 
‘I’ which must be able to accompany all my representations introduced 
at the outset of §16.) Self-consciousness is thus an inextricable element 
of thinking as such, and given that unitary thought is definitional of 
the cognition of objects (as well as of objects of cognition) (B137), self-
consciousness is an inextricable element of the cognition of objects, and 
hence of judgement. This is shown by the argument of the first half of 
the B-Deduction, which runs from the unity of apperception (§16) to 
objective unity of consciousness as the definition for ‘object’ (§17), in 
contrast to a merely subjective unity of consciousness (§18), and from 
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thereon to the definition of judgement as the way representations are 
brought to this objective unity of apperception (§19).28
One of the systematic reasons why Kant introduces self-consciousness 
in the context of deriving the categories of experience is the element of 
recognition (see e.g. A103ff.). Only what is recognised to be united in 
the manifold of one’s representations counts as united in Kant’s strong 
sense, namely as necessarily united. Unity of representations does not 
concern a unity of contingently aggregated representations, which are 
conjointly prompted in the mind or are conjoined by means of con-
tingent, psychological laws of association. The unity of representations 
in objective experience concerns representations that must be united in 
such a way as for those representations to amount to objective experi-
ence; that is to say, a genuine claim about some object or objective state 
of affairs is at stake, and such a unity must be able to be recognised as 
objective for the claim to be an objectively valid one. Nothing counts as 
objective if it is not recognised as such. (The aspect of recognition will 
be discussed further in Chap. 6.)
Kant’s views in this regard can be traced back to his Wolffian back-
ground with respect to the link between consciousness and the ability 
to make distinctions. Wolff defines consciousness as the capacity to dis-
tinguish: we are conscious of things insofar as we are able to distinguish 
them.29 As we saw with Kant’s early account of judgement in the False 
Subtlety (Sect. 3.3 above), Kant builds on this Wolffian connection and 
specifies that our human cognition consists in being able to be conscious 
of the differentiation in the manifold representations of things that we 
perceive in contrast to animals, who differentiate between things with-
out being conscious of the differentiation itself. (The consciousness here 
is evidently not a case of self-consciousness in the sense of inner per-
ception or self-knowledge, but rather a consciousness “that” I perceive 
something else [cf. A103], i.e. a recognition of one’s perceiving some-
thing.)
That in §19 of the B-Deduction Kant speaks explicitly of an objective 
unity of apperception, which, in the preceding section he contrasted with 
a merely subjective unity of consciousness, is indicative of his intention 
to identify judgement, not with self-consciousness per se (in the standard 
psychological or introspective sense), but with the intentional stance of a 
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judger, who is aware of the combination of, or more particularly, of her 
act of combining, concepts and sensible representations in a judgement, 
which constitutes a relation to an object (objective reality). A judgement 
is always a claim made by a subject, about some objective state of affairs, 
regardless of what kind of object this concerns (indeed even oneself as 
object in acts of self-knowledge). Kant says that the copula in a judge-
ment indicates this contrast with a merely subjectively valid relation of 
representations, where for the latter there is not such a reciprocal rela-
tion between subject and object, but merely the indeterminable affective 
causal dependency relation of the subject upon whatever undetermined 
object (Gegenstand ), which causes the affective relation (the subject is 
passive with regard to this; its states are causal effects of external input). 
I shall come back to this modal aspect of the copula in judgement, and 
its relation to apperception, in the next section.
3.5  Judgement, Objectivity and Spontaneity
In a recent paper (Pippin 2014), Pippin elaborates on his familiar topic 
of the ineliminably apperceptive and spontaneous element of Kantian 
experience that he already spelled out in Pippin (1987), which he also 
argues is the common thread running through the thought of Fichte 
and Hegel as well as Kant’s. He relates spontaneity to a responsiveness 
to justification of one’s beliefs or reason- or “account-giving” (Pippin 
2014:149) in the making of assertions or judgements. The core of what 
Pippin claims is undoubtedly right, but it seems to me that, first, his 
reading of the spontaneity involved pulls it too much in the direction 
of some version of Hegelianism about the freedom that is alleged to be 
involved in our thought and action, and, secondly, he appears to down-
play the constitutive, i.e. synthetic, aspects of discursive thought that 
ground objective experience, in particular the role of transcendental 
apperception as a necessary and general rule to bestow synthetic unity 
on representations in intuition, which intuitions do not have by them-
selves. This neglect has of course to do with Pippin’s Hegelian motiva-
tion to demote the central role of pure intuition as one of the two sets 
of transcendental conditions of Kantian experience.30
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
n y
Such a strategy is also revealed by one casual, though striking 
remark that Pippin makes in his recent paper, when he says that a 
“properly conceived ” MD is “the only deduction we need” (2014:148), 
that is, a deduction that does not need to demonstrate a link between 
the unity of the concept, or the unity of apperception, and “inner 
sense” (2014:148), i.e. intuition—precisely the task of a TD.31 Apart 
from the fact that it is significant that Kant first introduces appercep-
tion in TD (so how could a mere MD involve a kind of apperception 
that is still sufficiently Kantian?), what Pippin appears to underestimate 
is the very guiding thread issue as the focal point of Kant’s deduction 
project, namely how to bridge the gap between the categories, the unity 
of apperception, and the objects of our experience, between what can 
be cognised by means of mediate conception and what can only be 
immediately intuited. (That there is such a gap is indicated by the very 
discursivity thesis that Kant sets out at the start of MD. Conceptuality 
relies on independently given sensible content in order to be objectively 
real, but since that content is independently given, a need arises as to 
bridge the gap between the given content and our conceptuality, which 
is where TD comes into the picture.)32
It appears that Pippin (following Hegel) rests content with the mere 
unity of apperception, the unity of judgement or what Hegel calls the 
unity of the Concept as such, as a sufficient guarantee for the objec-
tive reality of one’s assertions. This dovetails with Hegel’s claims con-
cerning the Concept’s objective reality, which does not require any kind 
of application to nonconceptual intuitional content (since, for Hegel, 
in the Science of Logic there is no gap to be bridged between the real-
ity of the Concept and some putative externality that has not already 
been determined from within the Concept).33 It is prima facie unclear 
how, without an account of the involvement of intuition, Pippin thinks 
that a focus upon the mere unity of apperception in terms of a unity 
of the concept will constitute the objective intentionality inherent to 
judgement, since any immediate relation to the object is removed once 
the constitutive role for a priori intuition is taken away.34 But as said, 
Pippin focuses more on the normative aspects of apperception by call-
ing attention to the aspect of spontaneity. Let me now spell this out a 
bit more.
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For Pippin, to say that apperception is an “ineliminable” or “insep-
arable” aspect of judging (1997:39–40), that “judging is appercep-
tive” (2014:153), means that “to judge is not only to be aware of what 
one is judging, but that one is judging, asserting, claiming  something” 
(2014:153; emphasis added). This awareness expresses a “taking 
 oneself ” to be doing something, judging, claiming, acting. Pippin 
says that “any φ-ing x” involves “My taking myself to be φ-ing x” 
(1997:42). This does not mean that I must identify myself as the agent 
of  judgement, but it means just that I’m aware of my asserting p while 
I’m making the assertion p, “by being the judger” (Pippin 2014:157, 
155–156)35; there is no φ-ing and a separate act of knowledge of my 
φ-ing, but in φ-ing I am simultaneously aware of myself as φ-ing.36 
Pippin (1997:43) also puts this by saying that the apperceptive act is 
“adverbial” to the act of judging, that is, one judges apperceptively.37 
There is no dyadic relation between the act of judging and a state of 
self-knowledge or knowledge of one’s action. Judging is apperception, 
and is thus “the expression of an identity”, as Pippin (2014:155) says. 
I think this is exactly right.
Although the notion of transcendental apperception as such is origi-
nal to Kant, the term ‘apperception’ is of course owed to Leibniz, and 
there are parallels especially to Wolff ’s idea of consciousness of self 
as derivative of object consciousness, as a kind of reflexive conscious-
ness that accompanies the consciousness of objects. For Wolff, a cen-
tral aspect of consciousness is that it expresses a two-way relation to 
objects: consciousness is not just consciousness of things but also, and 
at the same time, a consciousness of self. There is always a reflexive ele-
ment involved in the perception of an object, and this element is con-
sciousness or apperception (apperceptio), which points to the subject of 
representation or perception. Apperception is the consciousness of the 
self ’s own activity present in perceiving objects outside of herself. This idea 
of apperception is based on Wolff ’s definition of consciousness as the 
capacity to distinguish. In being conscious of things, one differentiates 
things from one another, but also from oneself as the agent of differenti-
ation. So the subject is differentiated from objects precisely in her being 
conscious of those various objects through differentiation. This funda-
mental and specifically non-psychological concept of self-consciousness 
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as reflexivity, which has its roots in Wolff, is to become central to Kant’s 
thought and that of the later German Idealists, not least Hegel’s. Kant’s 
view of self-consciousness is similar to Wolff ’s: the ‘derivative’ model of 
consciousness of Wolff (Thiel 2011:308) is mutatis mutandis applica-
ble to Kant’s view of transcendental consciousness as constitutive of the 
objective unity of representations as defining an object. While Kant’s 
view is much less explicitly characterised in terms of explicit subject-
object oppositions, as are later Fichte’s and Hegel’s, transcendental 
apperception must not be seen as prior to, and somehow independent 
of, the perception of objects, but, to put it in terms proposed by Pippin 
(1997), as “adverbial” to it. Transcendental consciousness and con-
sciousness of objects are, in some sense, equiprimordial. As Kant puts it 
at A108,
the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at 
the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the syn-
thesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts […] for the mind 
could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its 
representations, and indeed think this a priori, if it did not have before its 
eyes the identity of its action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension 
(which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible 
their connection in accordance with a priori rules. (boldface mine)
The “necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances” is—as 
explained in this section of the A-Deduction—what first constitutes a 
possible object of experience. However, this necessary unity is nothing 
but the necessary unity of the act of synthesis of representations that 
also, simultaneously, first constitutes one’s identity as self-consciousness. 
There is no discrepancy between the application of a priori rules that 
bring unity to one’s representations of an object and the a priori rules 
that unify one’s very representations as one’s own. They are the same set 
of rules. Both the representation of an object and self-consciousness 
rest on the very same act of synthesis, i.e. transcendental apperception. 
Transcendental apperception could then be said—similarly to Wolff ’s 
reflexive understanding of consciousness—to be that which lies at the 
origin of the differentiation between subject and object,38 and is, in a 
3.5 Judgement, Objectivity and Spontaneity     115
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
e
O
ly
116     3 “Pure Consciousness Is Found Already in Logic” …
sense, ‘derivative’ of, or adverbial to, the consciousness of objects, since 
it does not exist other than in the act of synthesis that enables the per-
ception of objects. The equiprimordiality of the synthesis that enables 
object perception and the consciousness of one’s identity in this very act 
explains Kant’s phrase “at the same time”.
But there are two issues on which I differ from Pippin, one concern-
ing the objectivity of judgement (Sect. 3.5.1) and the other concern-
ing the putatively absolute nature of spontaneity (Sect. 3.5.2). Possibly, 
they concern more a difference in emphasis than a fundamental dif-
ference between our takes on apperception and its role in cognition; 
but it should be noted that, although he is fundamentally right about 
the general purport of Kant’s aims in TD, Pippin takes the identity of 
judgement and apperception much more in a “Hegel-leaning” (Pippin 
2015:75) direction than I think is warranted, and this point is conveyed 
by focusing on the two aforementioned issues in what follows.39
3.5.1  Objectivity
First, one should note, against what most other interpreters, including 
Pippin,40 suggest, that the objective validity of judgement must not be 
seen in terms of the truth value of judgement, that is, that one’s judge-
ment is either true or false, where my claim or belief expressed by it com-
mits me in principle to giving reasons for my so claiming or believing, 
when asked. In the very act of my judging or claiming that GF x, I’m not 
just expressing a belief, justifiably or not, that some x is F, which is fur-
ther determined as G, a belief for which I can be asked to give reasons. 
There is a modal element involved as well. That is, I’m also and primarily 
staking a claim regarding x’s existence, that is, I eo ipso assert the determi-
nate, actual existence of x (by applying the modal category of existence), 
as well as its objective reality (by applying the categories of quality), 
regardless of the empirical properties F, G etc. that I attribute to it. Or 
in Kantian parlance, I posit x (more accurately GF x) as existing, which is 
not just an opinion I venture or a belief I formulate about it, and which 
might be true or not, but a definite, “objective holding-to-be-true” 
(objectives Fürwahrhalten) (V-Lo/Wiener, 24:852 [Kant 1992b:305])41 
Fo
r S
ch
lar
ly 
Pu
rp
os
es
On
y
that is embedded in an objective network of such objective “holdings-
to-be-true” which are expressions of a true state of affairs or true states 
of affairs for everyone.42 That is to say, my judgements are part and par-
cel of the domain of possible experience or knowledge; there is no fun-
damental discrepancy between all that I judge (experience, know) to be 
objectively true and what is objectively true.43
Hence, at B141–2 Kant mentions the copula (“is”) in a basic cate-
gorical judgement, which most explicitly expresses the general objective 
validity of a determinative judgement, or indeed the identity that lies 
between the unity of consciousness and the objective unity of appercep-
tion, and between the objective unity of apperception and the object 
itself. At B142 Kant says that the necessary unity in the categorical 
judgement “It, the body, is heavy” concerns the fact that these rep-
resentations are “combined in the object”. This is what marks out an 
objective unity of apperception in contrast to a merely subjective unity 
of representations. The copula “is” designates the objective reality of 
something that is a body and is heavy, a fact that is objectively true, 
independently of anyone’s particular belief. (In making any particular 
determinative, objectively valid judgement I may of course be mistaken 
if, say, the empirical evidence for my so judging is deficient, or my 
epistemic faculties are otherwise not properly functioning. See further 
below.)
That a modal element is involved in any objectively valid judgement is 
not to say that any judgement is eo ipso an explicit existential  judgement. 
Existential judgements are special cases of objectively valid judgements, in 
which predicates are not attributed to an object, but in which an object 
together with all its predicates is just posited as existing. But this does not 
detract from the fact that in any objectively valid judgement, a modal 
claim is made with regard to the actuality or existence of the object to 
which predicates are attributed, in the way that the modal category of 
‘existence’ must be applied. That is why Kant emphasises the role of the 
copula (“is”) in defining judgement in the strict sense as an objective 
unity of representations.
What Kant calls the objective validity of a judgement is therefore not its 
truth value per se—this one might think is the case given that Kant identi-
fies objective validity with the truth of an empirical cognition at A125. 
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Rather, the truth value of a judgement—that a judgement can be true or 
false—is, while certainly essential, merely a surface aspect of judgement 
(an aspect considered in general logic, not in transcendental logic); it is 
not what makes a judgement an objectively valid statement. I can obvi-
ously err in my believing or intending, because I might be mistaken about 
certain empirical facts or my empirical evidence might be deficient, but 
this is not a topic of transcendental logic. Hence, an analytic judgement 
is true or false solely on the basis of the principle of non-contradiction 
(B190/A151), without objective validity having anything to do with this. 
Truth here is logical truth in contrast to the “transcendental” or “mate-
rial  (objective)” truth that has Kant’s primary interest (see B269/A222 
and A60/B85), and which concerns the “determining ground of the 
truth of our cognition” (B191/A152), that is, the objective validity of 
our  empirical cognition (A125). Objective validity is not at issue in the 
 context of determining the truth (or falsity) of an analytic judgement, 
since here the reference to an object (objective reality; B194/A155) is 
 otiose (cf. A258–9); its truth can be determined solely through analysis of 
subject and predicate of such a judgement. But any true or false synthetic 
judgement is grounded on the possible reference to an object. This does 
not, however, imply that a judgement’s objective validity is its possibly 
being true or false (i.e. its truth value). For clearly non-objectively valid 
analytic judgements are also truth-apt (cf. Vanzo 2012).
But the important point is that saying that there is no fundamental 
discrepancy between all that I judge to be objectively true and what is 
objectively true is of course not the same as saying, absurdly, that a par-
ticular judgement “This easy chair is a Gispen” is always, and necessar-
ily, a true judgement. Of course, only if the easy chair is truly a Gispen, 
is my judgement “This easy chair is a Gispen” a true judgement. My 
judgment “This easy chair is a Gispen” can thus evidently be false, that 
is, when the easy chair is by a different designer and I am mistaken in 
my judging. But the crucial point here is, if I make such a categorical 
judgement for which I have sufficient empirical evidence, by way of an 
empirical intuition of something that has the appearance of a Gispen 
easy chair and given my background knowledge about furniture designed 
by Willem Hendrik Gispen, then there is no further question as to the 
truth of this judgement beyond my taking the perceptual evidence, which 
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should be intersubjectively available,44 as evidence for my claim. I thus 
cannot reach outside sensible intuition, and try and point, as it were, to 
the putative fact of the perceived object’s existence, its actuality, and see 
its properties in order to establish the truth of my judgement. The corre-
spondence between my judging (informed by my expertise) and the avail-
able perceptual evidence, received through sensible intuition, is all I have, 
and need, to establish the veridicality of my judgement (cf. the discus-
sion on McDowell and Sellars in Chap. 5). No amount of pointing to an 
actual object o (or intuition of object o) is going to show ‘more’ about the 
correspondence between my judging and the object o than is determined 
by means of the a priori necessary rules for making an objectively valid 
judgement about o, which establish this correspondence (one of these 
rules being the category of actuality45 or existence, which one applies 
to one’s empirical intuition of o). The a priori, transcendental rules for 
objectively valid judging just establish the correspondence with, and thus 
the true knowledge of, the object of my judgement.46 As Kant writes,
[o]bjective validity and necessary universal validity (for everyone) are 
therefore interchangeable concepts, and although we do not know the object 
in itself, nonetheless, if we regard a judgment as universally valid and 
hence necessary, objective validity is understood to be included. Through 
this judgment we know [erkennen] the object (even if beyond that it remains 
unknown as it may be in itself ) by means of the universally valid and neces-
sary connection of the given perceptions. (Prol §19, 4:298 [Kant 2002:93]; 
trans. emended and emphasis added)
To mistakenly judge that o is F (e.g. mistake a fake for an authentic 
Gispen easy chair) comes down to having the wrong, or lacking, empiri-
cal evidence. But falsehood or possible falsehood does not detract from 
the objective validity of my judgement. As said, any further epistemo-
logical question concerning the empirical properties of the object that 
I judge about, and whether or not I am right about them specifically, lies 
beyond transcendental logic. The possibility of falsehood is simply not a 
concern of transcendental logic.47
Objective validity, on the other hand, concerns, as the Prolegomena 
states, the universal validity and necessity inherent to any judgement 
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about an object, more in particular, the universal and necessary relation 
of the given representations or concepts of a judgement (Prol, 4:298); 
this relation is constituted by the categories of the understanding and 
the necessity of the unity of apperception (cf. B142), and in its turn 
establishes what it means to be related to an object.48 Any empirical 
judgement about a given object is true of the object, given that I have 
sufficient empirical evidence for making the judgement, that is, have the 
requisite empirical intuition of the object that I judge about, even if I 
were mistaken about the specific empirical properties of the object in ques-
tion. I can never be mistaken about the fact that, when I judge about a 
given object o, that my judgement is about that object o, namely, what is 
a relatively stable substance that stands in causal interaction with its sur-
roundings in a spatial continuum, unless my epistemic abilities are not 
functioning properly, for example, when I’m hallucinating, or dream-
ing, or when I am a patient with a cognitive disorder. (But, again, this 
last point is not a concern of Kant’s transcendental logic. Kant presumes 
that my epistemic abilities are working, under normal conditions.49)
Someone might object that there is not something that is not bloody 
when Macbeth judges, but that there is just no dagger, bloodied or 
 otherwise.50 In this case, it is not true—so the objection goes—that one 
cannot be mistaken about the fact that one’s judgement is about that 
object, however further mistaken one is about empirical properties, for 
in Macbeth’s soliloquy, there is no dagger, that is, no object, altogether. 
In other words, one can be mistaken about there being an object in the 
first place. But this objection confuses hallucination for a case of  judging, 
which, in Kant’s view, the example in this case is not. Strictly speak-
ing, determinative judgements are only claims about given objects; not 
even statements about noumenal entities, or indeed analytic judgements 
(see above), are determinative judgements of the kind of which Kant 
speaks in §19 of TD. It is also very doubtful whether quasi-experiential 
judgements, or judgements based on testimonial reports, such as 
“Tongues [...] sat upon each of them” (Acts 2:3), which are prima facie 
not based on objectively available empirical evidence, are determina-
tive judgements in Kant’s sense. Such judgements would fall under the 
category of opining, belief or a subjective “taking-to-be-true” (A820ff./
B848ff.). Also aesthetic judgements do not count as judgements as 
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defined in §19, for they are merely reflective judgements, and not deter-
minative ones (see Schulting 2012:31ff.). In neither of the aforemen-
tioned types of non-determinative judgements or statements is objective 
validity involved, or at least not directly.
Kant’s main point in §19 is a point concerning what he calls “tran-
scendental truth” (B185/A146),51 which is the necessary condition of 
what Kant calls “empirical truth”, that is, truth as accordance or cor-
respondence or agreement with reportable facts—transcendental truth 
is not a different truth, of course, but the ground of empirical truth. In 
judgement lies the transcendental condition of the correspondence or 
conformity between concept and object (which is the nominal defini-
tion of truth that Kant grants [A57–8/B82]), and by judging and thus 
making a claim to the truth of some state of affairs, in judgement, this 
transcendental condition is satisfied. The modality of the copula indi-
cates this. In any judging GF x, I thereby eo ipso both posit an object x 
as actually existing (in the phenomenal world) and as having the empir-
ical property F and having the further determining property G, even if 
I might be partly or wholly mistaken about these empirical properties. 
For example, in the judgement
My Logitech mouse is anthracite-coloured
I attribute to some object x the property of being a Logitech mouse and, 
further, the property of being anthracite-coloured. In a merely subjec-
tively valid statement or opinion (a belief ), which does not have the 
form of a judgement strictly speaking, e.g.
I believe he’s depressed
or,
I prefer Joseph Hammer to Dennis Duck
no (explicit) claim is made with regard to the objective reality of any 
putative object or its properties, expressed in a judgement. Kant’s cen-
tral point is that judgement strictly speaking—i.e. a determinative 
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judgement of which he speaks in the context of the First Critique—is 
always already intentional, directed towards the world of objects, that is, 
primordially connected to objects.
To put this more precisely still, and to underscore the difference 
between a Kantian view of judgement and ‘realist’ views of  judgement, 
a judgement is in fact not about objects, but is itself objective (Prol, 
4:299), in the sense of being constitutive of objectivity. On Kant’s view, 
it is not the case that there is a world of objects out there and that, inde-
pendently or separately, we are free to formulate judgements or make 
assertions about them, whereby the objects make our judgements true. 
My judgement ‘about’ a certain object x coincides with x’s existence as 
object of my experience (notice: not the existence of the putative thing 
in itself that necessarily appears as the object for my thought; only 
the determinate existence of the appearance is an object of my judge-
ment).52 If the transcendental conditions for my judgement GF x are 
 satisfied, then the transcendental truth conditions for x are satisfied, 
where x is the object with properties F and G belonging to the realm of 
possible experience (the totality of all appearances). (But notice that this 
does not imply that the empirical conditions for x specifically to have 
properties F and G have thereby been satisfied.) Both objects and judge-
ments ‘about’ objects belong to the same domain of possible experience 
governed by the categories. Hence, Kant says that the a priori condi-
tions of the experience of objects are the conditions of the objects of 
experience (A111). (This controversial claim will be addressed more for-
mally in Chap. 4.)
There is no fundamental discrepancy between the judgement and its 
object, and hence the transcendental truth conditions for a claim about 
object x are satisfied by the conditions for judging having been satis-
fied, i.e. the act of the unity of apperception, in tandem of course with 
the way apperception operates in sensibility by means of the productive 
imagination (this is to be discussed in Chap. 7). Because a judgement 
is nothing but the unity of concepts and intuition in accordance with 
the original-synthetic unity of apperception, and an object is defined 
as “that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is 
united” (B137), a judgement and its object coincide at the fundamental 
level. Pippin is therefore right to say that “unity of apperception […] is 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
On
ly
what establishes a possible relation to an object” and he is also right, in 
principle at least,53 that conceptual unity “achieves the unity that says 
how things are” (2014:147–148). More precisely, as Pippin says else-
where, “[t]he object just is ‘that in the concept of which the manifold is 
united’” and “representation of an object just is rule-governed unity of 
consciousness” (2015:71–72). In other words, the unity of apperception 
constitutes what an object is.
An objection to this might be that the earlier formulation “unity of 
apperception […] is what establishes a possible relation to an object” 
does not entail the strict identification of the unity of apperception with 
the object, what Pippin (2014) refers to, in Hegelian terms, as the iden-
tity between subject and object. For example, Allais (2015) thinks that 
“relation to an object” does not imply identification with the object, 
but this is based on a mistaken reading of what is entailed by the unity 
of apperception (see the discussion in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.9), and on the 
assumption that the object is something outside the relation. Of course, 
sensations as a result of the subject being affected by some thing still 
need to be presupposed as given independently, but there is no issue of 
our judgements having to correspond with external objects outside our 
representations or outside the unity among our representations, which 
constitutes the relation to an object (cf. A104–7) (see again Chap. 1). 
There is no ‘outside’, with which we could compare our representations 
and somehow ‘check’ whether they are really true of the object. The 
fundamental correspondence relation between concepts and objects is 
fully ‘internalised’, as it were, in the unity of apperception, and hence in 
judgement. Therefore, the identification of the object with the unity of 
apperception is fully warranted. As Kant says in the conclusion to TD 
in its A-version:
[A]s appearances they [a priori concepts] constitute an object that 
is merely in us, since a mere modification of our sensibility is not to be 
encountered outside us at all. Now even this representation—that all 
these appearances and thus all objects with which we can occupy our-
selves are all in me, i.e. determinations of my identical self—expresses a 
thoroughgoing unity of them in one and the same apperception as neces-
sary. (A129; emphasis added)54
3.5 Judgement, Objectivity and Spontaneity     123
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
124     3 “Pure Consciousness Is Found Already in Logic” …
Appearances are of course not literally, materially in us as psychologi-
cal subjects, but they are in us qua ‘judgers’, as agents that ourselves 
are part of the realm of possible experience. By contrast, the things in 
themselves, of whose intrinsic properties we have no knowledge, are 
neither in us materially nor in us qua ‘judgers’.
3.5.2  Spontaneity
This leaves the second aspect, which Pippin emphasises as probably the 
most central to apperception. It concerns the element of spontaneity. 
Pippin claims that the spontaneity involved in apperception is absolute, 
rather than relative. Relative spontaneity could mean that my mental 
states are “causally necessary consequences of antecedent states”, so that 
“relative to that antecedent state, it could not have been the case that 
the system did not come to be in its subsequent state” (Pippin 1997:46, 
quoting Sellars 1971:20 [§49]). Or, as Sellars puts it, the spontaneity 
at issue is one whereby “the inner development [of our mind] is set in 
motion by a foreign cause and follows a routine” (1971:23–24 [§59])—
the relative spontaneity of an automaton spirituale or Kant’s turnspit, say 
(KpV, 5:97). If this is all what relative spontaneity would mean, then 
Pippin would be correct to say that it is not the right kind for what 
Kant means by the spontaneity involved in apperception.55
By contrast, the absoluteness of spontaneity lies, for Pippin, in the 
irreducibility of self-awareness in any judging to the content of one’s 
judgement, where such content can be causally governed objects or 
events, or indeed incentives for action. He links this to the idea of free-
dom (as the early Kant also appears to do),56 an idea indispensable to 
the later Idealists. Pippin (1997:46) holds that even if it were the case 
that all my mental states are instantiated in a causal system, such mental 
states must “also be considered as known to a subject as caused”, where 
the subject cannot herself be part of the causal order. My judging that 
a state M1 and a state M2 are causally connected must itself be con-
sidered uncaused. If I were simply caused to represent M1 and M2 as 
causally connected I could not be said to judge that the statement that 
M1 and M2 are causally connected is objectively true, or know this 
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connection to be true (Pippin 1997:47). Thus, according to Pippin, 
since my taking myself to be φ-ing cannot itself be part of, or be instan-
tiated in, the same causal system as the content of my judgement (of my 
φ-ing), the φ-ing that I’m taking myself to be doing must be an act of 
absolute spontaneity.
I agree with Pippin that the judging self herself cannot be just 
another causally produced mind state in a series of mental states. And, 
as Pippin points out, even if the state of her φ-ing were part of the 
causal series, that is, “A causes both the representation B and my rep-
resentation that A caused B” (1997:48)—a possibility which on the 
noumenal level is not excluded by Kant (see A803/B831; cf. A545–6/
B573–4)—the judging self would still be taking herself to be represent-
ing the causal connection between A and B. This is also why, in §19, 
Kant criticises the rationalist definition of judgement as just a relation 
between concepts, since that leaves completely unexplained the activity 
that lies in the objective intentionality that is intrinsic to judgement, 
as making an assertion, by some agent, about some objective state of 
affairs. For making an assertion about objects, and their causal relation, 
say, is only explained by the unity of apperception as a spontaneously 
taking concepts F and G, say, to be related and to be true of some exist-
ing object x, i.e. a judging GFx, and not just the way that concepts hap-
pen to be conjoined to one another, either synthetically or analytically. 
Concepts do not just happen to be conjoined, nor are judgements mere 
bundles of concepts.57
Kant of course indeed suggests that apperception involves “self-activity”, 
a primordial case of causal activity that is itself uncaused (B130; cf. 
B132, B158n. and B278).58 However, I do not see any reason that in 
the context of theoretical knowledge—i.e. for determinative judgements 
about objects of experience—Kant means this self-activity to amount 
to absolute spontaneity.59 Pippin objects against the spontaneity of the 
mind being regarded in terms of one’s occurrent mental state being 
merely relative to antecedent mental states as being part of the same 
causal system (as on Sellars’s reading), but I do not believe that agree-
ing with Pippin on this point forces one to accept absolute  spontaneity. 
Rather, the spontaneity that is involved in determinative judge-
ment concerns the determining self relative to the determinable given 
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in receptivity in general; spontaneity and receptivity are two mutually 
implicative faculties for discursive thought. In other words, there is no 
spontaneity of thought sans receptivity of material mental content, i.e. 
intuition, without the cause of that spontaneity, however, again being 
ultimately part of the antecedent causal order (contra Sellars’s concep-
tion of relative spontaneity) (cf. GMS, 4:452).
The justified reason why Pippin emphasises the absoluteness of 
spontaneity in judgement is because he insists on the irreducibility 
of spontaneity to the causal laws governing the ‘determinable’ in the 
given manifold of one’s intuition. Pippin is right that the reasons one 
has for a particular belief that one has, or for the judgement that one 
makes, cannot be reduced to the causes that condition that belief or 
judgement, even if it is true that the content of my belief (e.g. that I 
believe that p) is necessarily causally conditioned by some prior mental 
or belief-state. Even if the possibility that ultimately we are not at all 
spontaneous beings were granted, we could never be, as Henry Allison 
puts it, “in a position (say as the result of scientific developments) to 
deny our spontaneity while still affirming our status as genuine cog-
nizers and agents”, for “the notion of spontaneity is built into, indeed, 
constitutive of, the first-person standpoint itself ” (1996:64). Or, judg-
ing is in and of itself always already an act of spontaneity.
But it seems to me that in order to emphasise this central point rela-
tive spontaneity, understood in a non-Sellarsian sense, serves as well. 
We do not need absolute spontaneity in the context of determinative 
judgements of empirical objects. And, as we shall see further below, 
there is at least one good reason for not seeing the spontaneity in judge-
ment as absolute: For if we can define a relative spontaneity that does 
the job of Pippin’s absolute spontaneity, we can also honour the strict 
distinction that Kant makes between the spontaneity in judgement and 
the spontaneity involved in the moral context, the latter concerning 
indeed an absolute freedom from causal determination. The relativity 
of spontaneity in judgement concerns, not a turnspit-like automaton, 
but a spontaneity that is characteristic of our human discursive mode of 
thinking, which requires external input (sense impressions) in order to 
be able to think at all—without the act of thought itself being  reducible 
to it. The spontaneity is after all nothing but a function that the subject 
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of judging necessarily operates to unite a given manifold of repre-
sentations in empirical intuition (cf. B132, B145). As Kant says, the 
spontaneity of discursive thought is “merely the logical function and 
hence the sheer spontaneity [lauter Spontaneität] of combining the 
manifold of a merely possible intuition” (B428).60 It does not refer to a 
noumenal substance (hence, noumenal ignorance or at least noumenal 
neutrality), but merely to the subject combining the manifold that is 
‘before’ her. Pippin agrees with the noumenal neutrality with respect to 
the apperceptive self (1997:30–31, 38–39), but he still insists on the 
 absoluteness of the spontaneity, and thus the implication of freedom, 
involved in thinking, without providing incontestable textual evidence 
for this. (It is clear that Hegel and Fichte claim absolute spontaneity 
and relate this to the idea of freedom, but Pippin wants to trace this 
back to Kant.)
Likewise, Allison has argued that since the act of cognition “requires 
conceptual recognition or taking reasons as reasons”, which “the sub-
ject must perform for itself (self-consciously)”, “it follows that we must 
assume an absolute and not merely a relative spontaneity in order to 
conceive of its possibility” (1996:64). I do not see that this must follow, 
unless relative spontaneity is interpreted strictly in terms of a turnspit-
like automaton or “an internal causal connection” (Allison 1996:63) 
between mental or cognitive states. But, as I argued above, I believe that 
spontaneity is best seen in terms of a spontaneity that necessarily coop-
erates with, and so is always relative (but not reducible) to, the necessary 
receptivity of sensible content—in other words, a non-reductive form of 
relative spontaneity, rather than an absolute one. (Below, I make a ten-
tative proposal as to how relative spontaneity could be construed non-
reductively.)
There is a further way in which our spontaneity would be merely 
relative. That is, I could be noumenally caused to represent myself as 
having the power of spontaneous agency (cf. Sellars 1971:20 [§46]). 
That is to say, the spontaneity that I must assume for the possibility of 
φ-ing would thus be relative to the noumenal cause of my spontaneous 
agency, in such a way that I could be part of a “noumenal mechanism” 
that runs parallel to the phenomenal one of natural causal mechanisms 
(see Sellars 1971:23–24 [§59]). In other words, the spontaneous ‘I’, 
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who takes herself as φ-ing, might just be a noumenal ‘it’, an automaton 
spirituale. But this reading would appear to be in conflict with A546/
B574, where Kant asserts that through apperception I know myself as a 
purely intelligible object, so that the noumenal ground of my spontane-
ity is identical to the spontaneity of my apperception. And it still leaves 
untouched the basic idea that I must always take myself to be spontane-
ously judging in any case of judging, and that this taking oneself to be 
judging is irreducible to both the content and cause of one’s judging.
Whatever the case may be with regard to the noumenal cause of 
my spontaneity in apperception, the textual evidence in Kant appears 
to point to a merely relative spontaneity for the theoretical context of 
empirical determinative judgements, in contrast to absolute spontane-
ity, which plays a central role in our transcendental freedom to will an 
action (KpV, 5:48), even if Kant does not think that there is a theo-
retical proof that we possess such freedom (cf. Ameriks 1991:472–473). 
Transcendental freedom concerns a “pure self-activity” of reason, by 
means of which the agent “distinguishes himself from all other things, 
even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects” (GMS, 4:452 [Kant 
1999:99]; emphasis added). The self-activity involved in freely willing 
an action is different from the self-activity involved in the understand-
ing, of which Kant speaks in B130 in TD and which is thus at issue 
in the theoretical context of empirical determinative judgements. This 
latter self-activity, while not based on affections by things, cannot “pro-
duce from its activity […] other concepts than those which serve merely 
to bring sensible representations under rules […]” (GMS, 4:452 [Kant 
1999:99]). This, to me, appears to limit the spontaneity in discursive 
empirical cognition to a spontaneity that is relative in the sense that it 
characterises the act of combining of what must be passively received.61 
The self that combines the manifold is spontaneous, but only relative to 
the required given manifold in intuition, since unlike an intuitive intel-
lect or a transcendentally free agent, the self here is a discursive knower 
who is dependent on external mental content, sense impressions (cf. 
TD, §23). In this regard, unlike the autonomous moral self, which is 
free from determination by sensory inclinations, the combining self of 
the understanding is not entirely voluntary: its act is a response to invol-
untary sense impressions.62
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This does not mean that the relative spontaneity is one that merely 
concerns conceptualisations in response to causal impingements, “in 
ways which […] realize set dispositions” (Sellars 1971:25 [§65]), 
thereby disregarding the active aspect of the ‘taking as’ of one’s φ-ing. 
The ‘taking as’ aspect expressed by the notion of spontaneity, which 
Pippin and Allison rightly emphasise, is, though necessarily bound to 
independently given sense content, irreducible to causal mechanisms. 
Moreover, there must be an element to the spontaneity of the epistemic 
agent that is not a mere responsiveness to causal mechanisms, since Kant 
explicitly associates the spontaneity of the mind with the combinatory 
activity that first enables a combination of a manifold of representations 
that is not already contained in the sensible manifold (B130), and so 
also first constitutes causal connections in the sense of a necessary rela-
tion between a cause and its effect. In that sense, the spontaneity of the 
apperceptive agent initiates or grounds a cause that does not lie in the 
manifold—namely the cause of the necessary connection of the mani-
fold that constitutes an objective connection—and is itself uncaused 
by anything other than itself (hence Kant speaks of “self-activity”); 
therefore, since the spontaneity at issue is uncaused and first initi-
ates, and is thus the a priori foundation of, the causal mechanism 
of objective connections, it ex hypothesi cannot qua spontaneity be 
merely responsive to causal impingements, let alone be reducible to 
causal mechanisms.63 On Kant’s theory, the spontaneity or self-activ-
ity of apperception is thus what a priori grounds any objective causal 
mechanism in the phenomenal realm, hence cannot be reduced to it, 
nor merely be a posteriori responsive to it. The objectivity and hence causal 
connection of any manifold of representations is rather directly depend-
ent on the spontaneity of the apperceptive agent.
This should of course not be read as if, on account of her self-activity, 
any individual epistemic agent created her own private, distinct phe-
nomenal realm of causally connected appearances. All human epistemic 
agents are endowed with the same spontaneity at issue and thus share 
the same rational capacity that applies the same categorial structure to 
the manifold of representations in any particular case of judging about 
objects; it is the a priori categorial structure that constitutes the causal 
mechanism of objective connections among my representations, which 
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defines a shared objective world of appearances. That the spontaneity of 
an epistemic agent first initiates the causal mechanism of objective con-
nections is thus tantamount to saying that the a priori categorial struc-
ture of our mode of knowledge first constitutes the causal mechanism. 
There is nothing solipsistic about this.
The way to construe the spontaneity involved in a self ’s φ-ing in rela-
tion to her response to involuntary sense impressions is by seeing that 
relation in terms of the concurrence thesis, which Ameriks (1991) has 
proposed. The idea of “concurrence” between a sense impression and an 
imputable act can be found in a late lecture note:
[T]he coeffecting stimuli can never determine it [i.e., the human power 
of choice], but rather merely affect it sensibly, and in order to determine 
it there remains necessary the concurrence of the understanding: but one 
can never say that stimuli should not have affected it […] but it is like-
wise just as true that it is never stimuli alone that determine me to the 
action: a representation, even if unclear, of the law of duty is always con-
curring alongside […]. (V-Met/Vigil, 29:1015 [Kant 2001:484–485])
This relates in the first instance to the moral context, but as Ameriks 
(1991:476) observes, in various lecture notes it becomes clear that “a 
freedom common to all activity” is concerned, so apparently including 
judgements about empirical objects. But abstracting from the question of 
how we should read this remark against the background of Kant’s Critical 
view that the two kinds of spontaneity for the theoretical and practi-
cal domains respectively should not be conflated, as was argued above, 
what Kant means by “concurrence” is that in order for something to be 
an imputable, ‘intentional’ act, it is necessary but not enough that some-
thing, a representation or impression, just occurred; as Ameriks writes, 
“one needs not only to have the representation but to ‘take it up’ in one’s 
life, rather than simply to behave in a way that corresponds to the idea” 
(1991:477). The idea of concurrence is that we need both receptivity of 
sensory input and the spontaneity of action. Ameriks writes:
To say that we concur is to say that there is something there for us to con-
cur with, something that affects us, even if in the end it is not the affecting 
but rather we who determine what is to be done. (1991:477–478)
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This exactly ties in with the idea of relative spontaneity, as I have been 
advancing for the theoretical context of judgemental activity: the spon-
taneous action of a judger, an apperceptive self, is a free, irreducible 
response to given sensible manifolds with which she “concurs”, a sensible 
content which is a necessary but not a sufficient ground of this action. In 
this way, Pippin’s and Allison’s idea of an irreducible spontaneity involved 
in a determinative empirical judgement can be readily admitted without 
identifying this spontaneity with the kind of freedom—absolute sponta-
neity—that Kant reserves strictly for the self-legislating moral will.
Notes
 1. In Schulting (2012), I addressed the topic of judgement only obliquely, 
in the context of the Leitfaden passage at B104–5, insofar as the capac-
ity to judge is concerned (Chap. 5), and briefly in terms of the way 
the definition of judgement is the immediate corollary of the derivation 
of the categories from apperception (Chap. 10). The present chapter 
hopefully remedies the obvious shortcomings of that earlier account.
 2. See esp. Pollok (2008:335ff., 2013); cf. MAN, 4:475–476. See further 
Sect. 3.2.
 3. Cf. Pippin (1989). See also my account of Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s 
Kantianism in Schulting (2016a, b).
 4. It is not clear to what passage in the A-Deduction Kant is here refer-
ring, as judgement has not been mentioned up to A126. Perhaps he 
refers to MD?
 5. Longuenesse (1998) translates Vermögen zu urteilen more aptly as 
“capacity to judge”.
 6. All objects thought under the concept <body> are subsumed under the 
concept <divisible>: All bodies are divisible; x is a body; so x is divisible.
 7. Intuition is not based on functions. See Schulting (2012:246n.4).
 8. Cf. however the late Reflexion 3145, 16:678–679.
 9. See Schulting (2015).
 10. Cf. Wolff, Psychologia rationalis, §219.
 11. F and G are substituted for Kant’s a and b, respectively.
 12. Cf. A104–5; there is a direct correlation between the concept of an 
object and the necessary, non-contingent unity among one’s representa-
tions. On this topic, see further Chaps. 4 and 7.
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 13. Cf. Kant’s use of the phrase “for me” at B138. See also again Chap. 1.
 14. The qualification here will be explained in Chap. 4.
 15. The idealist implications of this position are discussed further in 
Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
 16. Cf. the Jäsche Logic definition: “A judgment is the representation of 
the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the rep-
resentation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept” (Log, 
9:101 [Kant 1992b:597]). But compare by way of contrast a slightly 
different definition in the Vienna Logic of 1780–82: “A judgment is 
the representation of the way that concepts belong to one conscious-
ness universally[,] objectively. If one thinks two representations as they 
are combined together and together constitute one cognition, this 
is a judgment. In every judgment, then, there is a certain relation of 
different representations insofar as they belong to one cognition” 
(V-Lo/Wiener, 24:928 [Kant 1992b:369]; emphasis added).
 17. Cf. B133–4n.
 18. Cf. A132/B171: “If the understanding in general is explained as the 
faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of subsum-
ing under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a 
given rule (casus datae legis) or not.”
 19. Cf. V-Met/Vigil 29:978ff.
 20. “A category is the concept by means of which an object in general is 
regarded as determined with regard to a logical function of judgments 
in general (i.e., of the objective unity in the consciousness of the mani-
fold)” (Kant 2005:300; cf. B128, 143).
 21. “The form of every judgment […] consists in the objective unity of the 
given concepts, i.e., in the consciousness that these must belong to one 
another, and thereby designate an object in whose (complete) represen-
tations they are always to be found together. […] This unity of con-
sciousness is contained in the moments of the understanding in judging, 
and only that is an object in relation to which unity of consciousness of 
the manifold representations is thought a priori” (Kant 2005:306).
 22. “The unity of the consciousness of […] the manifold in the representation 
of an object in general is the judgment” (Kant 2005:310).
 23. “A judgment is the representation of the unity of the relation of the 
ground of cognition to the possible cognition of an object. Thus it is 
the clear representation of the unity of the consciousness of different 
representations./N.B. To judge is to represent one concept as contained 
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in another or as excluded from it: 1. a subject under a predicate. 
2. a consequence under its ground. 3. parts of a sphere under the 
whole” (Kant 2005:59).
 24. This is a remarkable passage from the period prior to the Prolegomena, 
as it appears to give a definition of judgement that aligns it with an 
objective unity, that is, a relation “to a possible cognition of an object”, 
just as in the B-edition Critique, in contrast to the definition in the 
Prolegomena, where the definition of judgement is indifferent to the 
distinction between the objective and subjective unities of conscious-
ness. But see also V-Lo/Wiener, 24:928 (quoted above in note 16), 
which is from the period right before the Prolegomena.
 25. In the somewhat later Metaphysik von Schön, this conception is con-
firmed: “Now judgement is the consciousness of the objective unity 
of various representations. Consequently [all the actions of the under-
standing] contain the ways in which representations can be universally 
connected in one consciousness” (V-Met/Schön 28:472; trans. mine), 
and accordingly, the unity corresponds with the categories, i.e. “all 
pure concepts of the understanding [are] nothing […] but concepts of 
the unification of the manifold in one consciousness” (V-Met/Schön 
28:482; trans. mine). See also V-Met/Schön 28:471: “Everything which 
we call knowledge corresponds with the fact that it is a unity and a con-
nection of the manifold of representations. That is, many representa-
tions must be connected in one consciousness. The universality must 
concern the unity of consciousness in the synthesis, and this now is the 
thought of an object, for I am only able to think by means of the fact 
that I bring unity of consciousness into the manifold of my representa-
tions […]” (trans. mine).
 26. However, at A78/B104 Kant writes that the synthesis of imagination is 
prior to bringing the synthesis “to concepts”, which is “a function that 
pertains to the understanding”, which suggests that the synthesis of the 
imagination in intuition operates separately from the latter function 
(for discussion, see Schulting 2012:87, 246–247n.8). That this is not in 
fact the case, see Chap. 7 (this volume).
 27. See by contrast Land (2015).
 28. I have expounded this argument in Schulting (2012, Chap. 10).
 29. See C. Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der 
Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, §§729–730, §732, 
pp. 454–456, 457. See further Schulting (2015).
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 30. Take e.g. the following claim of Pippin’s: “Hegel does not rely on the 
subjective form of inner sense […] and argued […] that if we under-
stand correctly that the unity of any concept is the unity of appercep-
tion, and that such a unity is what establishes a possible relation to an 
object, then the categories, as the moments of any such possible unify-
ing power, will thereby be shown to be actual, to make possible repre-
sentation of objects” (Pippin 2014:148).
 31. In Pippin (1989:38), it is still only the second half of TD that, accord-
ing to Pippin, is no longer required on Hegel’s alternative account of 
objective determination. But now Pippin seems to think we can do 
without the whole of TD.
 32. Pippin might argue that there is no real gap between the categories 
and the objects of intuition and hence no need to bridge it, and to an 
extent he is right of course, because insofar as possible knowledge is 
concerned the objects do conform to the categories. But Kant cannot 
presume from the outset that the categories correspond to the objects 
of experience, and that any putative gap between them is only appar-
ent. He must first show that they indeed so correspond and, impor-
tantly, to which extent, and thus show that the gap is only apparent 
insofar as possible knowledge is concerned, and this is where the role of 
an indispensable, separate TD lies. See also Schulting (2016b).
 33. See again Schulting (2016b).
 34. See further my critique of Pippin’s view on the relation between con-
cept and intuition in Schulting (2016a).
 35. Or to put it like Allison (1996:62) does, I must be aware of “what 
I am doing” when I judge, but I need not reflect on the fact that I, 
Dennis Schulting, judge. By contrast, Ginsborg (2015) appears to be 
arguing that the spontaneous ‘I’ of apperception must be able to iden-
tify, by means of the faculty of judgement, herself with the spatiotem-
porally located empirical person that does the apperceiving (“HG”, in 
her case). I do not believe that the spontaneous activity of a judger is 
dependent on such an identification, nor that such an identification is 
germane to the purport of what the judger does and is aware of doing. 
The ‘I’ with which the transcendental subject identifies is just the ‘I’ 
of judging qua being the judger, whereby the fact of the embodiedness 
or personality of the judging ‘I’, or that the ‘I’ is Dennis Schulting or 
“HG”, is irrelevant. See further Schulting (2017).
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 36. The awareness involved here is indicated by Kant to be an intellectual 
representation, not an intuition (B278). Apperception is, as Pippin 
(1997:42) puts it, “non-isolatable”.
 37. This means that in apperception self-knowledge or empirical 
 self-consciousness is not at issue—I do not experience the world as 
specifically experienced by me, as this particular person. Cf. Allison 
(1996:62, 95–96). See again note 35 above.
 38. This is an element of Kantian apperception that is picked up by Hegel 
in his account in Faith and Knowledge. I discuss Hegel’s reading of tran-
scendental apperception in Chap. 8.
 39. I am aware that Pippin is more interested in Hegel’s own systematic 
interest in Kant rather than in ‘correctly’ interpreting Kant, or in the 
question whether Hegel interprets Kant correctly. But I do want to 
note that Hegel’s reconstruction of Kant lacks a firm basis in Kant (see 
further Chap. 8), which I believe is important for weighing up Hegel’s 
Kantianism. Nevertheless, in a certain respect Pippin’s Hegelian con-
strual of Kant is more faithful to Kant than a lot of, so-called, analytical 
Kantian readings, which completely ignore Kant’s stress on the neces-
sary reflexive nature of cognition. See Schulting (2016b).
 40. Cf. Pippin (1997:42, 2014:153, 159). See also, very recently, Kreis 
(2015:202).
 41. V-Lo/Wiener, 24:852: “Believing is a subjectively sufficient but objec-
tively insufficient holding-to-be-true. […] Knowing is an objective 
holding-to-be-true, with consciousness” (Kant 1992b:305); Log 9:70: 
“Knowing. Holding-to-be-true based on a ground of cognition that is 
objectively as well as subjectively sufficient, or certainty […]” (Kant 
1992b:574).
 42. See A821–2/B849–50: “I cannot assert anything, i.e., pronounce it to 
be a judgment necessarily valid for everyone, except that which pro-
duces conviction [Überzeugung].”
 43. It should be kept in mind that, for Kant, there is no distinction 
between experience and knowledge (cf. B147; B165–6). Attempts in 
the literature to differentiate ‘cognition’ (as a translation of Kant’s term 
Erkenntnis) from ‘knowledge’ strictly speaking are therefore misleading 
and anachronistic (see Chap. 2).
 44. A private judgement, which rests on intuitional evidence that is avail-
able only to me, does not count as an objectively valid judgement or 
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even as a judgement at all—although, according to the Prolegomena 
account, such a judgement could be called “a judgement of perception”.
 45. Kant speaks of ‘actuality’ at V-Met/Volckmann, 28:397, A219/B267 
and A233/B286.
 46. Of course, intuitions provide the alethic modal condition for cogni-
tion, i.e. actuality, that mere conceptuality cannot provide; there must 
be a real object for there to be a possible cognition. But it is the under-
standing itself, by means of the application of the modal categories, in 
particular that of existence/actuality, which determines truth, not intui-
tion or sensibility or the sheer fact of there being a real object. In other 
words, to put it anachronistically in contemporary jargon, the truth-
maker is the understanding that judges about x, not x’s existence, nor 
the mere intuition of x.
 47. The possibility of falsely claiming that there is an object at all is dis-
cussed further below.
 48. Motta (2012:191) is therefore right to observe that judgement always 
has a modal component, in that its objective validity depends on a 
necessity that is more than a logical necessity. To judge means to con-
nect perceptions in such a way that they are connected as necessar-
ily belonging together and relating to an actual object, given further 
empirical constraints. This necessity is established by virtue of the act of 
apperception, which accompanies my judging.
 49. Kant considers the possibility of it not working in the Anthropology, when 
he addresses the non-objective systematicity in lunacy (Anth, 7:215–216). 
To be mistakenly judging that there is an object altogether does not 
amount to judging at all. It is speculating at best.
 50. I thank an anonymous reviewer for the example.
 51. Cf. A221–2/B269, where objective reality is identified with transcen-
dental truth. On this topic, see further Motta (2012:98ff.).
 52. This ties in with a two-aspect reading of Kant’s idealism concerning 
objects: only the phenomenal aspect of the underlying thing in itself 
appears as the determined object of judgement, and to this extent is 
the object a function of the judgement. But notice that such a reading 
does not necessarily imply a one-object reading of idealism. See further 
Chaps. 4 (Sect. 4.10) and 9.
 53. I say “in principle”, for one must also address the question of how the 
unity of apperception is seen to operate in a sensible manifold, namely 
in the guise of the productive imagination, which first establishes the 
determinate perception of spatiotemporal objects. Pippin pays scant 
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attention to the need for an account of this aspect of Kant’s argument 
in the so-called ‘second step’ of the B-Deduction. See further Chap. 7.
 54. Cf. B310/A255: “[T]he domain outside of the sphere of appearances 
is empty (for us), i.e., we have an understanding that extends farther 
than sensibility problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even the 
concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside of the 
field of sensibility could be given, and about which the understanding 
could be employed assertorically” (boldface mine).
 55. According to Grüne (2013), Sellars’s reading of spontaneity is the 
wrong conception of relative spontaneity attributed to Kant. However, 
my assessment of which spontaneity is at issue in apperception does not 
hinge on the problems that Grüne flags with regard to the proper kind 
of relative spontaneity.
 56. Cf. Refl 4904, 18:24.
 57. Cf. Allison (1996:95).
 58. See further Schulting (2012:135ff.).
 59. It should be noted though that in early lectures Kant does indeed 
claim that self-activity involves absolute spontaneity or freedom (cf. 
V-Met-L1/Pölitz, 28:268–269). Kant is reported to have claimed even 
that the subject has “libertatem absolutam […] because it is conscious 
of it” (V-Met-L1/Pölitz, 28:268–269; trans. mine and emphasis added). 
Cf. Refl 4758, 17:707. But this claim should be seen in the context of 
Kant’s pre-Critical view that in inner sense (self-consciousness) I have 
a consciousness of myself as a substantial soul (see Schulting 2015). 
In the early Pölitz lectures, Kant does not yet distinguish between the 
spontaneity involved in free moral action and in theoretical thoughts 
that are constrained by sense experience, as he does in the Critical 
period (see further below). Cf. Düsing (2013:157–159).
 60. See also Keller (2001:158–159) on this passage. Keller points out that 
here Kant “allows for a kind of pure or absolute spontaneity when I 
think of myself as a thinker in general, a merely possible thinker, and 
analyze the analytic entailments of this notion of myself as a thinker 
without appealing to any facts that depend on experience”. But, as 
Keller writes, when I make an existential judgement, inner sense, i.e. 
a sensible intuition, is already called upon. Hence, in the proposition 
“I exist thinking”, “there is already no longer merely spontaneity of 
thinking, but also receptivity of intuition” (B429–30). The same holds 
mutatis mutandis for any determinative judgement about an actual, 
empirical object.
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 61. See further Schulting (2012:137–140). See also Düsing (2013: 
157–159).
 62. Cf. Hurley (1994:157ff.).
 63. This is analogous to “an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself 
a series of appearances that runs according to natural laws”, which is a 
“transcendental freedom” (A446/B474). But, as pointed out above, this 
freedom cannot simply be equated, as Pippin (1997:31) seems to sug-
gest, with the “self-activity” involved in judging about appearances of 
nature.
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4.1  Introduction
In some Anglophone Kant literature (Van Cleve 1999; Gomes 2010; 
Stephenson 2014; cf. Shaddock 2015), the problem has been raised of 
an alleged ‘gap’ in Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction 
(TD) for the necessary application of the categories to objects of experi-
ence, hereafter called ‘the Gap’.1 The Gap is construed in terms of the 
difference between arguing that we must apply categories in order to be 
able to think of, experience, or perceive objects and arguing that the cat-
egories must so apply, or in other words, that the categories are exempli-
fied by the objects that we think of, experience, or perceive. The first 
argument does not imply the second one. Kant appears to claim it does. 
Hence the Gap.
If this is indeed the case, there is a serious problem with Kant’s claim 
that by means of showing that the categories are derived from the 
subjective functions of thought we are able to tell how knowledge of 
objects is possible. At most, Kant will have shown that there are cer-
tain necessary ways in which we think of, experience, or perceive objects, 
but not that the objects of thought, experience, or perception necessarily 
4
Gap? What Gap?—On the Transcendental 
Unity of Apperception and the Necessary 
Application of the Categories
© The Author(s) 2017 
D. Schulting, Kant’s Radical Subjectivism,  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43877-1_4
141
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
142     4 Gap? What Gap?—On the Transcendental Unity …
conform to our necessary ways of thinking, experiencing, or perceiving, 
that is, that the categories that we need to think of, experience, or per-
ceive objects in fact apply to the objects themselves. This would mean 
that Kant’s Copernican hypothesis that we take objects to conform to 
the forms of our understanding, rather than that our concepts conform 
to the objects (Bxvii), is false.2
I contend that a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the ana-
lytic principle of apperception and the notion of objective validity, and 
what this entails for Kant’s concept of objectivity, underlies this criti-
cism of a supposed gap in Kant’s argument. In the following, I address 
these issues, and shall argue that there is in fact no Gap in Kant’s argu-
ment. To show that there is no gap between the analytic principle of 
apperception and the notion of object that Kant espouses, and that 
Kant indeed shows how subjectivity is constitutive of objectivity, I 
rehearse central arguments regarding the scope of transcendental apper-
ception as a principle governing representations from my previous book 
(Schulting 2012b). In the last section (Sect. 4.10), I argue that a suit-
ably amended version of the phenomenalist reading of Kant’s transcen-
dental idealism helps us understand the intimate relation between the 
unity of apperception and the concept of an object, and why there is no 
gap between the necessary application of the categories and their exem-
plification in the object of experience.
4.2  The Gap Dissected
So what precisely is the Gap? The main point that is raised is an appar-
ent confusion regarding the necessary application of the categories to 
experience. It is argued (Stephenson 2014:79) that the fact that
(A) we must apply the categories to experience
does not imply that
(B) we are justified in applying the categories to experience;
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alternatively, it is argued (Van Cleve 1999:89; Gomes 2010) that (A) 
does not imply that
(C) the categories are instantiated in experience, or indeed apply to 
objects.3
The objection is thus that A implies neither B nor C. This constitutes a 
Gap, for Kant does appear to claim that there is an entailment relation 
between A and B and/or between A and C.
The arguments (A → B) and (A → C) may not at first sight be seen 
to come down to the same thing. There is prima facie good reason to 
distinguish between them. Behind the objection against the entail-
ment between A and B appears to be the assumption that some sort 
of psychological necessity is involved in believing that p, without there 
being necessarily any objective justification for believing that p. But the 
objection seems misplaced, for categories have got nothing to do with 
psychological necessity, or subjective necessity, as Kant calls it at B168, 
where he dismisses the preformation theory of the necessary principles 
of experience.4 If it is the case that we must apply the categories, then 
as per Kant’s argument we are justified in doing so, because according 
to Kant the justified employment of the categories in experience is pre-
cisely concerned with the dual fact that the categories are the necessary 
objective conditions of experience of objects and that experience is pos-
sible only if the categories are instantiated in experience. The modal 
condition is not about the putative psychological unavoidability of the 
categories.
This brings us to the objection against (A → C) as the only seri-
ous one, which according to James Van Cleve is often overlooked 
because of the “easy verbal slide from ‘we must apply categories’ to 
‘categories must apply’” (1999:89). This objection goes something 
like this: It might be that the categories are necessary for the concep-
tion of objects so that they tell us how we truly conceive of objects, 
but that says nothing about whether our conception has any applica-
tion in reality, in other words, that our conception truly corresponds 
to the objects. The truth of our conceptual scheme does not imply the 
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truth about objects. The first concerns an epistemological ‘fact’ and the 
second an ontological one, and the realm of epistemological ‘fact’ and 
that of ontological facts should not be conflated, or so the objection 
goes.5 The claim here is that Kant argues for the necessary conditions 
of our conceptual scheme only, but fails to show that the categories 
are actually existentially exemplified by the objects of our experience or 
conception. If true, this would pose a real problem for Kant, because 
it undermines the main claim behind the Copernican hypothesis, 
namely that the objects themselves conform to our conceptual scheme, 
rather than that we should see our concepts as conforming to pre-
given objects (Bxvi–xvii).
The objection of the Gap is of course a serious charge against Kant, as 
the very goal of TD is to prove that the categories have justified appli-
cability to objects in reality, a project Kant specifically positions over 
against the unjustified trust the rationalists placed in the applicability 
of pure concepts to real objects without investigating the warrant for 
such trust. In other words, implicit in the charge of the Gap is that 
Kant’s argument would appear to be as deficient as that mounted by the 
rationalist in securing a connection between concepts and objective real-
ity, and that since Kant does not succeed in improving on the rational-
ists’ attempts, his TD must be considered a failure.
In earlier literature (Carl 1989a, b; Guyer 1987, 1992; Mohr 1991; 
cf. Hoppe 1983) the Gap has been construed in terms of a non-
sequitur between, on the one hand, Kant’s argument for the princi-
ple of the transcendental unity of apperception (henceforth TUA), in 
§16 of the B-edition of TD, and on the other hand, his argument for 
the objective unity of apperception (henceforth OUA) in §17 of the 
B-Deduction.6 The objection in this case is that TUA does not imply 
OUA, against Kant’s claim that it does (§18), because the conditions 
for self-consciousness are not ipso facto the conditions of consciousness 
of objects.
I believe that the underlying reason for both construals of the Gap is 
the same, and that both reveal a misunderstanding of the analyticity of 
the principle of apperception, its scope, and its primary role in the con-
stitution of objective knowledge.
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4.3  From TUA to the Necessary Application 
of the Categories
If we look at Kant’s preliminary conclusion to the first half of the 
B-Deduction in §20 (B143), it is prima facie clear that Kant indeed 
claims to have shown that the argument for the necessity of TUA for 
any unitary manifold of representations implies that any such manifold 
is subject to the categories, and that, given that categories are concepts 
of objects in general (B128), the very unity of apperception (TUA) 
implies the objective unity of consciousness or apperception (i.e. OUA), 
which is identical to the concept of an object in general (B137–8). This 
ties in with the main claim of TD, namely to prove that the subjective 
conditions of thought are in fact also the objective conditions of pos-
sible knowledge (A89–90/B122), that is, to prove that our representa-
tions are objectively valid, or, genuinely refer and apply to objects.
Thus the simple implication of Kant’s argument here appears to be 
that, given that the rules for unitary representations are the categories 
(cf. heading B143), and given that the categories define objects in gen-
eral (B128), the rules for unitary representation—i.e. the combined set of 
rules of synthesis underlying the principle of apperception—are the rules 
for the conception of an object in general (cf. A106, A103), but also the 
rules for objects to be objects (B138); in other words, that the principle 
of apperception is in fact the principle of objective knowledge. But why 
would this follow? Does this not come down to confusing the necessary 
rules for the conception of objects and the sufficient grounds for objective 
knowledge?
4.4  Categories, Necessity and Objective 
Validity
Before answering these questions, it is important first to note that there 
is an additional apparent problem or at least confusion concerning the 
very aspect of necessity in Kant’s argument. Kant says that categories are 
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necessary conditions of experience (B126; B161; B168; A111). But, as 
Van Cleve asks, “[w]hat about the categories is necessary—their exist-
ence, their being used by us, their being instantiated by objects, or 
what?” (1999:89). Kant says repeatedly that the categories concern 
objective validity, that they relate to objects, and that we need the cat-
egories to think an object. Thus the categories are necessary conditions 
of thinking and of experiencing an object.
[Categories] are related necessarily and a priori to [beziehen … zu] objects 
of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience 
be thought at all. (A93/B126)
Notice that the emphasis here should be placed not on the ‘thinking’ 
but on ‘object’. As I noted above, categories are not psychological condi-
tions. They concern the question of what it means to think of an object 
at all, that is, what it means to first conceive of an object. This means 
that one cannot even speak of there being an object without the involve-
ment of the categories, regardless of any question about the rules for 
experiencing (in the psychological sense) objects. The relation of catego-
ries to objects, then, includes saying something about how the object is, 
or, is constituted such that I can think it, as indeed Kant writes:
The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of 
all cognition, not merely something I myself need in order to cognize an 
object but rather something under which every intuition must stand in 
order to become an object for me […]. (B138; emphasis added)
There is, Kant appears to be claiming, no discrepancy between how, by 
virtue of the synthetic unity of consciousness, I necessarily conceive of 
the object and the object as so conceived. So, given that categories are 
the set of rules that constitute the synthetic unity of consciousness that 
is the condition of all cognition, categories are not only necessary for 
objective experience, but also, formally at least,7 sufficient for it. That 
is, categories are not only necessary conditions of the subjective experi-
ence of an object, of how we experience or represent an object at all, but 
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they are also the necessary conditions of the objects that we experience. 
Hence, Kant famously writes:
The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time 
conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience […]. (B197/A158)
This conspicuous claim about the entailment relation between the con-
ditions of experience and the conditions of the objects of experience is 
confirmed by the following passage in one of the metaphysics lecture 
notes from the late 1780s:
All objects of knowledge are objects of experience. Now what is not an 
object of experience, or what has not been given to us through the senses, 
is also not an object for us. Hence, experience is the sum total [Inbegriff ] 
of all our objects. (V-Met/Schön, 28:476–477; trans. mine)8
Kant here suggests that without the categories as conditions of possible 
experience there would not be objects for us to experience, which makes 
the categories also ‘ontological’ conditions of objects, but, importantly, 
not the conditions of “the possibility of things in themselves” (Refl 
5184, 18:112 [Kant 2005:218]). In the quoted lecture note, Kant in 
fact expresses his doctrine of idealism about the objects of experience: 
experience itself contains all of the objects that can be experienced, 
none of which can be found outside of experience (on the relation to 
idealism see further Sect. 4.10 in this chapter). It is perhaps confusing 
to speak of the categories as ontological conditions of objects, which are 
not conditions of the possibility of things in themselves, when ‘onto-
logical’ is usually understood as having to do with precisely the things in 
themselves (die Sachen selbst, in Kant’s terms). But ‘ontological’ should 
in the first instance be understood as having to do with what instanti-
ates the objects as being objects, i.e. as being the intentional accusatives 
of objectively valid experience that are perceived as existing external to 
oneself. (That the categories are not the ontological conditions of things 
in themselves turns out to be an important qualification for understand-
ing the Gap, or rather, why there is no Gap.)
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4.5  Van Cleve’s Objection
Van Cleve thinks here lies the problem. Kant is said to confuse or con-
flate into one the following three different modal claims: 
(N1) Necessarily, we apply the categories to our judgement about, experi-
ence or perception of, objects.
(N2) Necessarily, the categories apply to, or are instantiated in, our judge-
ment about, experience or perception of, objects.
(N3) Necessarily, the categories are exemplified by the objects of our 
judgement, experience, or perception.
Taken at face value, N1 does not imply N2, nor is N3 entailed by N2 or 
N1. It is not clear though on what grounds N1 and N2 are indeed val-
idly separable claims, if we consider that, for Kant, there is no meaningful 
distinction between the use of categories in judgement, which are in fact 
nothing but functions of our capacity to judge (B143), and their instanti-
ation at least in judgements about objects, if not in experience or percep-
tion.9 While Gomes (2010:121) differentiates between the fact that “we 
must apply the categories to experience in order to explain the unity of 
consciousness” and the fact that the “categories are actually instantiated in 
experience”—which appears to map onto the distinction above between 
N1 and N2—he does not at first seem to make the distinction between 
instantiation of the categories in experience and exemplification of the cat-
egories in the objects of experience, that is, he appears to run together N2 
and N3. That Gomes does not in fact run the two together is shown by 
his proposed solution to the Gap (see Sect. 4.7 below).
Van Cleve, on the other hand, seems more straightforward in mak-
ing the distinction between employing the categories in judgement and 
the categories being exemplified in the objects judged about—hence, 
although the wording, used by Gomes (2010:122, et passim), of the dis-
tinction “we must apply the categories”/“the categories must apply” is 
his, Van Cleve does not appear to distinguish between N1 and N2, but 
rather between N1 and N3.
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Regarding differentiating between N1 and N2: I pointed out above 
that if we must apply the categories to our experience of objects (N1), 
this is not because of some psychological requirement on our part, but 
because categories are the necessary ingredients of any possible thought 
or judging about, or experience of, objects (N2). On Kant’s defini-
tion of experience, the necessary conditions of experience are recipro-
cal with our application of those conditions to experience; if we did 
not apply the categories to experience of objects, there would not just 
be no categorial experience of objects, but in fact no experience at 
all. It would thus appear that if we must apply the categories to the 
experience of objects, then the categories must apply to, or are instan-
tiated in, the experience of objects. Thus, N1 and N2 are not really 
distinct arguments. Integrating N1 and N2, the amended modal claim 
becomes: 
(N1*) Necessarily, the categories are applied (by us), and are thus instanti-
ated, in any judgement about, experience, or perception of, objects.
This leaves the putative conflation of N1* and N3, the conflation that 
Van Cleve is worried about and concerns the real contentious issue of 
the Gap. As these modal claims concern, at first sight, an epistemo-
logical claim and an ontological one, respectively, one would think that 
N1* and N3 should surely not be confused. For it is not, or at least not 
prima facie, necessarily true that if categories are applied and instanti-
ated in our experience, they are also applied to, or instantiated in, the 
objects of our experience. By claiming, however, that “the conditions of 
the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of 
the possibility of the objects of experience” (B197/A158; boldface mine), 
does Kant not confuse epistemological and ontological conditions after 
all, namely, the conditions of experiencing objects and the conditions 
for objects to be objects for us to experience? It may be that we require 
categories to form rationally coherent beliefs or judgements about 
objects. As such, categories would be necessary conditions for forming 
such beliefs or judgements, and that such judgements are always cat-
egorially structured. But that categories are also objectively valid, and so 
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are necessary conditions of the objects of experience (and not just the 
experience of objects), as Kant claims, requires the additional premise 
that “any categories used in judging are actually exemplified by the items 
judged about” (Van Cleve 1999:89).
It appears Van Cleve sees the application of categories as analogous to 
the application of empirical concepts in a judgement about objects. The 
problem that he calls attention to is at any rate pertinent in the case of 
the application of empirical concepts in a judgement. For example, to 
judge, say,
This easy chair is a Gispen 407
does not imply that the chair judged about is actually a Gispen 407—in 
other words, that the property of being a Gispen 407 is exemplified by 
the chair that I see in front of me and about which I judge that it is a 
Gispen 407, “for my judgment may not be true” (Van Cleve 1999:89). 
I might be fully justified in believing that the cantilevered chair I see in 
front of me is a Gispen 407. But being justified in believing that p does 
not imply that p is true. It could be that for all that I believe p to be true 
I am still mistaken. The easy chair I perceive might in fact be another 
Gispen—a 405, or 412, say—or indeed it might be another type of can-
tilevered chair altogether, a Brno chair, say. Possibly, a deficiency in my 
background knowledge of design chairs prevents me from knowing the 
truth about the chair I perceive.
So, if we grant the analogy with the application of empirical concepts 
in a judgement, it seems that mutatis mutandis the necessity of applying 
categories in judgements or in experience cannot mean that they are eo 
ipso objectively valid, that is, that they are exemplified by the objects of 
our experience, for the simple reason that a judgement may not be true. 
Of course, one could reasonably object that the application of categories 
is not analogous to applying empirical concepts, since categories do not 
feature in the content of a judgement as do empirical concepts, and are 
not like properties that can be attributed to, and thus be exemplified by, 
objects. This may be true, but is beside Van Cleve’s valid point, namely, 
the critical objection that not every judgement (about an object)—in 
which to be sure categories are necessarily instantiated, in some sense—is 
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ipso facto a true judgement, which our example above made amply 
clear. In other words, on Van Cleve’s view the fact that every judgement 
requires the instantiation of the categories does not make the judgement 
thereby true, so that the categories are also exemplified in the object 
of my judgement. The analogy with the application of empirical con-
cepts is thus apt insofar as the necessary employment of categories in 
our judgements does not imply their exemplification in the objects of 
our judgements—in the same way as that the predicative use of empiri-
cal concepts in our judgements does not entail their exemplification in 
the objects that our judgements are about—and insofar as categories are 
indeed kinds of property attributed to objects, namely, in the way that 
any empirical object is an instantiation of the concept of an object in 
general, whose intension consists of the set of twelve categories.
Clearly, any judgement cannot be true just by definition. Van Cleve 
(1999:89–90) considers whether modifying Kant’s claim as instead 
meaning by the objective validity of judgements that only categories 
used in true judgements are true of objects could save Kant’s argument 
from the criticism that application of the categories in judgements 
does not imply their objective validity. At any rate, categories as epis-
temological conditions of objective experience cannot be ontological  
conditions of objective experience, that is, conditions that are 
 constitutive of the objects of experience, as a matter of course. However, 
against this suggestion of Van Cleve’s it should be pointed out that if it 
were the case that only categories used in true judgements are true of 
objects, and that this is what objective validity means, then if I made 
a false judgement, I would not be able to know that I made a false 
judgement, because it would not be clear by means of which crite-
rion I could differentiate a false judgement from a true (or objectively 
valid) judgement.
All in all, it seems fair to say that categories do not guarantee the 
truth of my empirical judgements, and thus that making judgements 
does not mean that they are eo ipso objectively valid. But equally, it 
seems, the objective validity of a judgement is, in fact, not the same 
as a judgement having a truth value, i.e. of being either true or false 
(see Chap. 3). In other words, contrary to what Van Cleve appears to 
assume, the objective validity of the categories must not be confused 
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with truth value or indeed truth per se. And by the same token, that 
a judgement can be true or false does not tell us anything about why 
a judgement is by definition objectively valid if objective validity is 
indeed the intrinsic character of a judgement, as Kant claims (B142). 
Take for instance the analytic judgement
Gold is a metal.
This judgement is true independently of the question of objective valid-
ity, that is, the question that would be germane in the case of a puta-
tive judgement about a given golden object, a gold bar, say, to which 
a property (‘metalness’) is attributed. The truth of the analytic judge-
ment “Gold is a metal” entirely depends on the analysis of the concepts 
<gold> and <metal> and on understanding what it means that concepts 
have extensions (and perhaps on having some basic knowledge of metal-
lurgy10). Reference to an actual golden object is otiose. The same could 
mutatis mutandis be said about the false judgement
A table is a chair.
Objective validity is not going to help in determining why this judge-
ment is surely false—or in fact, that it is false. Knowing that to judge 
or state “A table is a chair” is to make a false judgement or statement11 
merely and entirely depends on the principle of non-contradiction and 
on understanding the concepts employed in it: the judgement or state-
ment “A table is a chair” shows a failure to understand the very meaning 
of the concepts <table> and <chair>. The question of objective validity 
is irrelevant here.
Conversely, an objectively valid judgement can equally be false, e.g. 
the judgement “This easy chair is a Gispen 407”, when it is plain for 
all to see that the chair perceptually presented to one, and about which 
one judges that it is a Gispen 407, is in fact not a Gispen 407—that is, 
the judgement contradicts what to all intents and purposes should be 
clear from perception. The falsity of the judgement does not lie in a lack 
of objective validity though. For if this false judgement were not objec-
tively valid, I would not even know that my judgement, which turns 
F
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
out to be false, is about the very chair perceptually presented to me and 
about which I mistakenly judge that it is a Gispen 407. Moreover, my 
judgement about this chair would then not just be false, but it would 
not in fact be about any object at all. To put it succinctly, without objec-
tive validity, I would not be judging sensu stricto in the first place (I 
might be hallucinating, dreaming, or fantasising, at best).12 Objective 
validity is thus neither the truth value of a judgement, for analytic 
judgements, which are not objectively valid, have a truth value; nor is it 
about merely true judgements, since objectively valid judgements can be 
false. Objective validity, then, appears to be a more fundamental feature 
of judgement than its truth value. It hasn’t got to do just with a judge-
ment being true or false, in contrast to what appears to be the majority 
view among Kantians.13
With this in mind, it is not germane to ask the question whether I 
can be mistaken about the application of the categories or indeed if the 
application could be “inapt” (Gomes 2010:125). The application of the 
categories is not an empirical question, dependent on my background 
knowledge of, as in the particular aforementioned case, design chairs, so 
that I could indeed be mistaken about certain properties of the object 
of my perception. In the case of the categories—which are a priori con-
cepts after all—we are, as it were, immune to error through misapplica-
tion, to vary a well-known phrase in the philosophy of mind. Categories 
either apply or they do not; I cannot be mistaken about my application. 
That is, when I make a judgement about some object o, the categories 
must apply to o, even if I am factually wrong about the empirical content 
of my judgement. This has to do with the fact that categories establish 
the necessary unity (OUA) that is constitutive of a judgement p, regard-
less of the question whether p is empirically true or false. Kant reasons 
at B141–2 that OUA concerns a necessary unity of representations in a 
judgement, whereas the content of judgement is empirical, “hence con-
tingent [mithin zufällig]”. The content of a judgement can be true or 
false, but for any determinative judgement p about o OUA is an essen-
tial, non-contingent, alethically invariant element of judgement. It is 
this necessary unity, which is the same for all judgements about objects 
regardless of empirical content, that establishes the objective validity of 
a judgement.
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So objective validity is not a merely logical condition in the sense of a 
judgement’s being either true or false (i.e. its having a truth value); that 
is, it does not, in and of itself, concern the truth or falsity of empirical 
propositions. Rather, objective validity concerns what Kant calls tran-
scendental truth (B185/A146), which is about the transcendental-logical 
‘fact’ that, whenever I judge, either falsely or truly, about some object o 
that it has property F, I am primordially connected with the object of 
my judgement. (Notice that transcendental truth is not a distinct truth 
from empirical truth, as if there were two kinds of truth. Transcendental 
truth is the necessary, but not the sufficient, condition of empirical 
truth.) Categories are transcendental conditions of objective experience, 
they are by definition designators of object-intentionality or objectiv-
ity—as Kant says, the “objective reality” of the categories, that is to say, 
that they have applicability to my perceptions as pertaining to things, 
the demonstration of which is the very concern of TD, is their “tran-
scendental truth” (A221–2/B269). Categories are not logical condi-
tions of ‘mere’ experience (or ‘mere’ thinking). It appears that Van Cleve 
and Gomes mistake the categories for such logical conditions of ‘mere’ 
experience (or ‘mere’ thinking), as if categories were ‘merely’ subjective 
conditions of experience. However, notwithstanding his dismissal of 
Kant’s claim that TUA and the concept of object are intimately related, 
Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism provides a way 
to avoid the aforementioned ostensible problems with conflating epis-
temological and ontological conditions of the experience of objects. I 
discuss this in Sect. 4.10.
4.6  A Different Construal of the Gap
In earlier literature, mentioned at the close of Sect. 4.2, there is a 
slightly different take on the putative gap in Kant’s argument. This con-
cerns a reading of the Gap in terms of a gap between TUA and OUA. 
The argument is that there is a gap because TUA does not logically 
imply OUA, contrary to what Kant appears to claim. For TUA is a 
necessary condition of OUA, but not sufficient for it. The unity that is 
necessary for the connection among my representations to count as my 
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representations conjointly is not eo ipso the unity that is necessary for 
the connection among objective representations, that is, for representa-
tions to count as of an object (cf. B234–5).
Wolfgang Carl, Paul Guyer and others have noted this (alleged) prob-
lem. A prima facie valid objection against Kant’s claim that the sub-
jective conditions of representations are also objective conditions of 
knowledge, i.e. the claim that TUA entails or is OUA, is that if TUA 
is not only necessary but also sufficient for objective experience, as we 
have seen Kant indeed claim (B138), it would seem impossible to have 
merely subjective experience that is not already objective experience. 
As Carl (1989a:96–97) for example has claimed, for Kant to make the 
claim that TUA entails or is OUA he would have had to signal a way 
in which ‘mere’ subjective conditions of experience are “changed” into 
conditions of objective experience. And to all appearances, Kant fails 
to do that. TUA neither is OUA, nor does TUA imply OUA. So there 
remains a gap between TUA and OUA.
Let me expand on this a bit. Kant’s claim is that there is an inherent 
connection between TUA and OUA, and hence between subjectivity 
and objectivity, or between the subjective conditions of experience (the 
functions of thought) and the objective conditions of experience (the 
categories), and, as we have seen earlier, that there is an intimate con-
nection between the conditions of experience and the conditions of the 
objects of experience. That is, the rules for unitary representation or the 
categories imply that they are applied to the representation of objects 
and hence, given the definition of object, are exemplified by objects.
In fact, it seems, Kant defines TUA as OUA. Both in the A- and 
B-edition, Kant closely links the unity of consciousness, which unites
a manifold of representations by means of synthesis, with the very pos-
sibility of having a concept of something at all (A103). Hence, at B137
he says that object, as “something in general”, is precisely that in whose
concept the manifold has been united in consciousness, hence is an
objective unity of apperception (OUA), and whose concept expresses a
necessity of synthesis. So the necessity of synthesis that unites a mani-
fold of representations is the concept of an object, which is defined by
OUA, and this is the same necessary synthesis that unites all my repre-
sentations as mine, and so also grounds TUA. Therefore, TUA is OUA
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because they reduce to the same function of unity, based on the same 
necessary synthesis. This is specifically confirmed by Kant at B139:
The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all 
of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. 
It is called objective on that account, and must be distinguished from the 
subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense, 
through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given for such a 
combination.
As is clear from this passage, TUA is not the subjective unity of con-
sciousness, as some may be inclined to infer from the argument of §16 
of TD. For the subjective unity of consciousness is rather contrasted 
with the transcendental unity, and is itself merely an empirical, con-
tingent, unity, which rests on associations. Lest one think that Kant 
means by the subjective unity of consciousness the analytic unity of 
consciousness of §16, which is established by the ‘I think’ accompany-
ing one’s own representations, in contrast to the transcendental unity 
of consciousness, which is an a priori synthetic unity, from B140 it is 
amply clear that the ‘I think’ does not concern the subjective unity of 
consciousness but is rather “the original unity of consciousness”, or the 
“pure synthesis ” which  relates  the manifold  of representations  “to the 
one I think [zum Einen: Ich denke]”, in other words, the very transcen-
dental unity of consciousness . The unity referred to in the phrase “That 
unity  alone  is objectively  valid  [ Jene Einheit  ist allein  objektiv  gültig ]” 
refers back to the original -synthetic  unity of consciousness  that relates 
the manifold “to the one I think [zum Einen: Ich denke]”, and must be 
contrasted with the “empirical unity of apperception, which we are not 
assessing  here” (B140) and has only subjective  validity . The subjective 
unity  of consciousness , which  is this empirical  unity  of apperception , 
has therefore  nothing  to do with the universal  and necessary  unity  of 
the ‘I think’ of the analytic  unity of consciousness , which is central  to 
the argument of the sections of which the current section (§18) is a pre-
liminary conclusion.
To recapitulate: the claim that the transcendental unity of conscious-
ness (TUA) is an objective unity of consciousness (OUA) has led to 
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criticism, with commentators mostly charging Kant with confusing the 
necessary condition of transcendental apperception for objective repre-
sentation or the representation of objects with a sufficient condition of 
such representation. The reasoning behind the criticism is that, surely, 
it cannot be the case that the principle that is responsible for the pos-
sibility for a subject to have representations, or to represent (TUA), is 
sufficient to ground the objective unity of one’s representations (OUA), 
rather than just the subjective unity of consciousness, for it cannot be 
true that all of my representations are ipso facto objective ones.
But this criticism is, I contend, based on a faulty reading of the ana-
lyticity of TUA (I analyse this in Sect. 4.8 below). Most commentators 
read TUA in such a way that it might seem that indeed all represen-
tations that one has necessarily entail at least the possibility of being 
accompanied by the ‘I think’ and that they are thus united with all 
other representations so accompanied or possibly so accompanied. In 
that case, if indeed Kant were to claim that TUA is OUA, then all pos-
sible representations a subject has are at least potentially already objec-
tive, and consequently, he would contradict himself, in §18, by saying 
that the objective unity of consciousness is not a subjective unity of con-
sciousness, which concerns representations that are merely subjectively 
valid, and accidental, hence have nothing to do with a necessary unity of 
representations.
Now one could claim—as some, such as Strawson (1968) and appar-
ently Shaddock (2015), indeed do—that the subjective unity of con-
sciousness is possible only because of an objective unity or that the 
former is dependent on the latter, which is itself again dependent on the 
knowledge of the objective unity among spatiotemporal objects them-
selves.14 But that is not what Kant is claiming in §18, where he simply 
and clearly contrasts the two unities, whereby—contrary to Strawson’s 
perspective—the subjective unity of consciousness is merely to do with 
empirical factors, whereas the objective unity is in fact the transcenden-
tal unity of consciousness, i.e. the self-consciousness of apperception, 
that is first constitutive of objective knowledge.
At any rate, Kant does not claim that any subjective unity of repre-
sentations is governed by an objective or transcendental unity of con-
sciousness, as it would be on a Strawsonian reading, even though it 
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would be right to claim that if any manifold of subjective representa-
tions were to amount to objective cognition, it would be amenable to 
being brought under TUA. But these are two modally different claims, 
which Kant definitely does not confuse. I shall come back to this 
important aspect below (Sect. 4.8).
To return to Kant’s apparent identification of TUA and OUA: if, as I 
argued before, Kant equates having a concept of an object and grasping 
the necessity of an a priori synthesis that unites a manifold of repre-
sentations, which also constitutes the existence of an object insofar as 
its objectivity is concerned—notice: not its contingent empirical con-
stitution, which cannot be determined a priori—then the supposed 
gap between the categories as concepts of an object in general and their 
exemplification by objects seems to vanish, at least to the extent that 
the connection between categories as constitutive conditions of objec-
tivity is concerned. But Van Cleve is not so convinced, and neither is 
Gomes, who agrees with Van Cleve but has come up with a possible 
rejoinder to Van Cleve’s objection to Kant’s entailment claim, namely 
by resorting to the second half of the B-Deduction. This proposal will 
now be considered.
4.7  Gomes’s Strategy for Bridging the Gap
Gomes (2010) argues that the Gap is first closed by the fact that catego-
ries are the very rules by means of which objects are given in space, so 
that in order to perceive objects in space, the objects themselves necessitate 
the exemplification of the categories. This would mean that there is in 
fact no gap between the application of the categories (N1*) and their 
exemplification in the objects (N3). The objects themselves are already 
given as categorially governed particulars in a spatial continuum and are 
as such apprehended by the experiencing and category-applying subject. 
That objects themselves are given as categorially governed particulars is 
first argued in the so-called ‘second step’ of the B-Deduction, hence, in 
Gomes’s view, it is only there that Kant is able to close the Gap still left 
open by the argument of the ‘first step’.
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Gomes’s proposal might seem to allay Van Cleve’s worries. But there 
are several problems with his approach. First, there is an interpretative 
problem for Gomes’s proposal. On Kant’s view, objects do not neces-
sitate the instantiation of the categories, as if they were somehow dis-
posed to do so. If categories are the necessary rules for the unity of 
representations, and for the synthesis of them, then objects cannot 
necessitate the instantiation of the categories, for, as Kant says, combi-
nation or synthesis is not given “through objects” but can only be car-
ried out by the subject (B130). Combination cannot be derived from 
the objects, but is an act of the subject only (B134–5). Thus, if the 
objects themselves necessitated the exemplification that the subject of 
experience cannot achieve by itself—namely by applying the categories, 
and the exemplification of the categories concerned the necessary and 
sufficient unification and combination of the objects by these objects 
themselves rather than the necessary way in which a subject unites and 
combines representations of objects in a judgement, then this would 
conflict starkly with Kant’s own thesis that the combination of objects is 
not a function of the objects themselves but exclusively of the subject of 
experience, and thus of judgement. Now this is of course precisely the 
thesis against which Van Cleve and Gomes object: a necessary combina-
tion by the subject does not suffice for a necessary combination in and 
among objects (cf. Stephenson 2014:84). But their criticism just begs 
the question against Kant!
Secondly—and this is not just an interpretative issue, but poses 
a philosophical problem that goes to the heart of the Kantian revolu-
tion of thought—if indeed the objects themselves necessitated their 
exemplification and it is not the subject that establishes the exempli-
fication, how could I know that the categories are exemplified in an 
object? For if, as Kant says at B138, “an object (a determinate space)” 
is first recognised by the unity of the act of apperception or the unity 
of consciousness (i.e. TUA), then if TUA cannot a priori establish the 
exemplification of the categories in the object (i.e. on account of the 
Gap), I cannot recognise the exemplification that is presumably neces-
sitated in the given spatiotemporal object, unless I simply apprehend 
the categorially structured object a posteriori by means of perception or 
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there is another kind of a priori form of apperception than TUA. But 
there is no other a priori form of apperception and that the apprehen-
sion occurs a posteriori is also clearly denied by Kant, for necessary con-
nections cannot be just recognised a posteriori:
Combination does not lie in the objects, however, and cannot as it were be 
borrowed from them through perception and by that means first taken up into 
the understanding, but is rather only an operation of the understanding, 
which is itself nothing further than the faculty of combining a priori and 
bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of appercep-
tion, which principle is the supreme one in the whole of human cogni-
tion. (B134–5; emphasis added)
It is, as Kant says in the ‘second step’ of the B-Deduction, TUA itself, 
by means of the figurative synthesis, and not the object or that which is 
given in sensibility, that ensures that the categories are applied in sensi-
bility (B151–2). This does not obviate Kant’s claim, made in the ‘first 
step’, that TUA implies OUA, but rather confirms it. At any rate, the 
approach Gomes proposes to allay the worry about the Gap would 
contravene Kant’s Critical turn away from transcendental realism: true 
knowledge of necessary connections in objects is not based on any puta-
tive correspondence of the understanding to how things are necessarily 
structured in themselves or how things necessitate their categorialisation, 
but on how the things necessarily are taken to conform to the under-
standing and its a priori necessary concepts in order for knowledge of 
them to be possible (Bxvi–xvii). This concerns not just their possible 
knowledge, but also their ontological constitution as objects of possible 
knowledge (in the aforementioned sense of ‘ontological’).
Thirdly, there is a structural problem with Gomes’s proposal: Given 
that the chief argument of the ‘second step’ of the B-Deduction is logi-
cally dependent on the argument of the ‘first step’, if there is a funda-
mental problem with the ‘first step’, namely the Gap in the arguments 
(A → B) or (A → C)—more specifically: the gap between (N1*) and
(N3), then the ‘second step’ cannot solve it. Whereas the ‘first step’ is 
concerned with the analysis of a general mode of discursive catego-
rial cognition dependent on any arbitrary type of sensible manifold, 
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the argument of the ‘second step’ concerns a specific application of the 
categories to sensible manifolds that are spatiotemporal, which is char-
acteristic of human modes of perception. This is of course not to say 
that the two-step argument of the B-Deduction consists just in arguing 
that the more specific mode of cognition treated in the ‘second step’ is 
simply analytically inferred from the more general mode of cognition 
discussed in the ‘first step’. Kant must of course show how the catego-
ries are applied in spatiotemporal sensibility, and this requires an addi-
tional argument that is not already provided by the ‘first step’ of the 
B-Deduction, namely, how the synthesis of the understanding operates 
in sensibility itself. My point here though is merely that Gomes can-
not help himself to a solution to a putatively fundamental problem 
encountered in the ‘first step’, which allegedly invalidates its main claim 
(namely, that TUA entails or is OUA), by resorting to the ‘second step’, 
the chief argument of which relies precisely on that claim for its suc-
cess—for, as Kant argues in the ‘second step’, the figurative synthe-
sis that enables the cognition of “a determinate space” (B138), i.e. an 
empirical object, is nothing but the “effect” of the understanding itself 
in the realm of sensibility (§24), and not any effect of the exemplifica-
tion of the categories by the object itself, by merely being given. In other 
words, the fundamental synthetic connection to objects, which bridges 
the putative Gap, should already have been proved in the ‘first step’, 
with the ‘second step’ only explicating how this synthetic a priori con-
nection—the original-synthetic unity of apperception—has purchase in 
sensibility itself.
4.8  The Scope of TUA
To return to Van Cleve’s objection (addressed in Sect. 4.5), as I sug-
gested earlier I think that the main problem lies in how Van Cleve (and 
following him, Gomes) reads TUA. It is a very common reading, which 
commits one to a particularly strong modal interpretation of the princi-
ple of apperception. I contend that the principle of apperception should 
be taken in a different, modally more moderate sense. The strong modal 
reading of the principle of the unity of apperception says, roughly:
4.8 The Scope of TUA     161
Fo
r S
ch
ol
rly
 Pu
r
os
s O
nly
162     4 Gap? What Gap?—On the Transcendental Unity …
TUA = Necessarily, all representations of which I am conscious are sub-
ject to the unifying act of apperception.
This definition of TUA is problematic, for it glosses over salient aspects 
of the principle of apperception. More bluntly, it reads too much into 
the principle.
The principle of apperception, i.e. the principle expressed in the prop-
osition “the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations”, 
advanced at the start of §16, does specifically not state that necessarily, 
for every instance of a representation r there is an actual or potential 
instance of self-consciousness or a self-aware agent S, so that r is eo ipso 
unified with all other representations represented, potentially or actu-
ally, by S. That would be a rather immodest claim, but it would also 
contravene several of Kant’s statements regarding the possibility of rep-
resentations or even instances of consciousness which any arbitrary rep-
resenter R is not reflexively aware of having (e.g. the representations had 
by infants, who are not yet able to employ the very concept of ‘I’; cf. 
Anth §1). It would be odd to claim that on the grounds of occurrent 
representations not being accompanied by the ‘I think’ (that is, repre-
sented by S), by implication R does not represent, or, is not in some 
non-transcendentally-conscious sense minimally aware of the representa-
tions it has. Stressing the necessary potentiality of apperception does not 
help here, for infants represent without ever apperceiving their represent-
ing, so that for them there is not even a potentiality of apperception.
On a more moderate reading, the principle of apperception states 
that for any representation r to be part of the set of all my representa-
tions, it must be part of the set of representations that are conjointly 
accompanied by my identical self as the agent of representing, by means 
of an analytic unity of consciousness, which is common to all the repre-
sentations accompanied by the same self. This reading is in line with the 
criterial principle expressed at B138:
[A]ll my representations in any given intuition must stand under the condi-
tion under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my repre-
sentations, and thus can grasp them together, as synthetically combined in
an apperception, through the general expression ‘I think’. (Kant’s emphasis)
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Notice that Kant puts emphasis on the indexical ‘my’. The reciprocity, 
or analytic unity, that is expressed by the principle of apperception lies 
between the indexical ‘I’ of the act of apperception and the ‘my’ as the 
indexical contained in the accompanied manifold of representations. 
This makes sense, as the only representations that ‘I’ ever accompany 
will be ‘my’ representations, not yours, hers, or x’s, not even those that 
happen to be occurrent in my head, but to which I do not currently 
direct my attention.15 The moderate reading of apperception can be 
defined thus:
TUA* = A representation r is accompanied by subject S if and only if r 
is analytically united with all representations that have the same relation 
to S and S accompanies these representations conjointly, for which a cer-
tain condition of combining must be fulfilled.
The condition of combining mentioned in the above definition, as well 
as in the earlier quoted passage at B138, is the condition of a priori syn-
thesis, which is the explaining ground of the analytic principle TUA* 
(cf. B135). For the purpose of this chapter, it is not necessary to expand 
on the contentious topic of a priori synthesis here,16 and at any rate Van 
Cleve and Gomes are not oblivious of its importance.
What needs emphasising here, is that TUA* is not to be considered a 
principle governing all the representing that is going on in one’s mind 
at any one time, for it is not a psychological principle. Nor is it the case 
that there is a relation of necessary entailment between any given repre-
sentation and transcendental apperception, so that any representation is 
at least potentially accompanied by transcendental apperception.17 This 
last approach seems perhaps the most natural reading of apperception—
or at least, it seems to best capture the phrase “must be able” in the ‘I 
think’-proposition. However, it runs up against multiple interpretative 
and philosophical problems. For one thing, it makes the rather intem-
perate metaphysical claim that representations, qua representations, 
have built into them some sort of disposition to being accompanied by 
the ‘I think’, or can be analysed conceptually to have an intrinsic ele-
ment of transcendental apperception. But Kant never claims that TD is 
concerned with a principle of representation or mere consciousness or 
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tries to argue for some sort of teleological conatus pervading the mind’s 
representational capacity. This is crucial to be mindful of, as it helps us 
understand Kant’s central claim that transcendental apperception is an 
objectively valid condition of experience, and not a principle of mere 
experience (taken in a psychological sense of mere representing or mere 
consciousness).
That transcendental apperception is not a principle of first-order rep-
resenting or consciousness is, I believe, also borne out by Kant’s distinc-
tion between transcendental (TUA*) and empirical apperception (EA). 
EA, which he also calls inner sense (A107), is intrinsically variable—
inner sense is the natural human psychological disposition in which the 
representations prompted in the mind vary across the time in which 
they are prompted. Inner sense cannot provide the subsistence on the 
basis of which the cognition of something substantial and stable, an 
object (a phaenomenon substantiatum; Refl 4421, 4422 [17:540])18 that 
is represented as external to my consciousness, is possible. Only tran-
scendental apperception provides the invariance that is necessary for 
objectively valid cognition of an object as a phaenomenon substantiatum. 
Often it is thought that transcendental apperception just is the neces-
sary principle of EA, but that does not make sense: if transcendental 
apperception is the criterion for stability and EA signals precisely the 
opposite, i.e. a flux of representations that is in itself unstable (A107), 
then transcendental apperception cannot be the necessary condition of 
EA simpliciter. Something that secures stability cannot be the necessary 
condition of something that is essentially instability.
But of course Kant does not at all claim that just any manifold of rep-
resentations is governed by transcendental apperception, even though 
it would be right to claim that if any given manifold of representations 
(accompanied by EA) were to amount to objectively valid cognition, it 
would be amenable to being brought under TUA*, and so under that 
condition EA would be governed or conditioned by TUA*. The modality 
of the ‘I think’ proposition lies in the hypothetical condition under which 
representations are accompanied by the ‘I think’, which avoids intemper-
ate modal claims such as expressed by TUA. In contrast to TUA, TUA* 
allows that some representations are ‘merely’ subjective, do not refer to 
objects (either inner or outer objects), and hence are not objectively valid. 
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TUA* must be distinguished strictly from the “subjective unity of con-
sciousness” (B139). Hence, TUA* has a much smaller scope than TUA.
TUA* is the principle governing manifolds of representations that 
are accompanied jointly by an identical ‘I’ and only if an ‘I’ accompa-
nies them. The identity of the accompanying ‘I’ and the unity of the 
accompanied manifold are reciprocal, in the sense of the occurrent rep-
resenter R being the representer of that manifold only which it actually 
accompanies (cf. B132; see further below Sect. 4.9). This does not mean 
that representations, just any, must be accompanied by the ‘I think’, or 
even must be able to be accompanied by the ‘I think’—not all Rs are S’s. 
Indeed this is what distinguishes TUA* from TUA, which does make 
that intemperate claim. Instead, the ‘I think’ proposition states that the 
‘I think’ must be able to accompany “all my representations” (as a uni-
fied manifold), implying that if and only if “all my representations” are 
accompanied, they are accompanied by an actual ‘I think’. The distinc-
tion between TUA and TUA* is one between claiming, respectively, that
(R) All representations must be accompanied by an ‘I think’
or, alternatively, to stress, not the necessity, but the necessary potential-
ity of being apperceived:
(R*) All representations must be able to be accompanied by an ‘I think’
and claiming that
(T) The ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations
or more clearly stated
(T*) Necessarily, if there is an ‘I think’, then it accompanies all my repre-
sentations.
Only (T/T*) is true. Notice again that Kant does not state
(T**) The ‘I think’ must accompany all my representations
4.8 The Scope of TUA     165
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
e
On
ly
166     4 Gap? What Gap?—On the Transcendental Unity …
that is,
(T***) Necessarily, the ‘I think’ accompanies all my representations
for this suggests that the ‘I think’ is necessarily existentially instantiated, 
which is of course not the case.
From the above, it is clear, then, that I am not always already reflec-
tively aware of all the possible representations that I have (are “in 
me”19), implying that it is not necessarily the case that for all possible 
representations that one has (are “in one”) an ‘I think’ is existentially 
instantiated, and nor is it true that the ‘I think’ is necessarily instanti-
ated at all—think of someone who is in a permanent near vegetative or 
at the most subcognitive minimally conscious comatose state, for whom 
the ‘I think’ is never existentially instantiated. By writing “must be able” 
Kant indicates that a modal condition is concerned which signals a con-
ditional necessity (strictly speaking, it concerns a bi-conditional): if and 
only if there is an ‘I think’, an ‘I’ reflecting on her representations, then 
she accompanies her representations (i.e. “all my representations” con-
jointly).20
4.9  From TUA* to OUA to the Concept of an 
Object
TUA* is thus not a principle of mere representation, i.e. of representing 
any given discrete manifold of representations. The scope of TUA* is 
limited to “all my representations”, and does not range over all possible 
representations. This means that I am aware only of my representations 
as unified by my actually accompanying them for each possible existen-
tial instantiation of ‘I’ thought; I am not ipso facto aware of all possible 
representations severally as they occur or might occur in the mind (“in 
me”), since my ‘I think’ is not ipso facto instantiated for each instance 
of representing (representing and thinking are not the same thing, nor 
does the former necessarily entail the latter). That is, TUA* asserts the 
principle of the self taking a manifold of representations as a unity of 
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representations “for” herself (B132). There is a necessary reciprocity 
between the self taking her representations as hers and those representa-
tions as so represented, that is, taken as hers, by the same identical self. 
This ‘taking as’ is transcendental apperception. Transcendental apper-
ception is not about representations being apperceived as a matter of 
course, just by sheer representing. The reciprocity between the self tak-
ing her representations as hers and those representations as so represented 
is asserted by Kant in the first paragraph of §16:
Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in 
the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. (B132; empha-
sis added)
Furthermore, TUA* is not a principle merely of thought, but of think-
ing the content of thought, the content minimally being the unitary 
manifold that is accompanied by the ‘I think’. This is what one could 
call the inherent ‘aboutness’ of thought. Thought is not merely occur-
rent representing or just mental stuff that supervenes on the brain, or 
indeed some internal, mental muttering to oneself. Thought is intrinsi-
cally about something, at least a unitary determinate manifold in gen-
eral (the “all my representations” conjointly), which I take to be ‘my’ 
content, whatever the content may be in empirical terms.21 This is what 
Kant means by OUA. The objective unity of my representations con-
cerns the unitary manifold of representations that I take, apperceive, to 
be my representations, my thought content.
But the objective unity of representations (i.e. OUA) is not just my 
thought content, as if it concerned the mere grasping of a subjective, 
accidental array of whatever goes on in my head without any reference 
to something outside the standpoint of my thought, outside my per-
spective. The content of my thought is taken by me to be something 
for me: that is, it is an object of some kind for me. The ‘object’ here is 
the relatum of one’s taking one’s representations as one’s own, namely 
the manifold of representations as so represented. It is in this sense that 
the determinate relations in which representations stand to each other 
by virtue of the categories as rules of synthesis among them,22 which 
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constitute what it means to apperceive one’s representations as one’s 
own (TUA*), are constitutive of the concept of an object in gen-
eral, where concept, for Kant, is a function defined as “the unity of 
the action of ordering different representations under a common one” 
(B93/A68; cf. A103) and object is “that in the concept of which the 
manifold of a given intuition is united ” (B137). This object can be an 
internal object (in cases of self-knowledge),23 but for Kant’s purposes in 
the Critique, it predominantly concerns an external object.
The ‘subjective’ conditions under which I apperceive representa-
tions as “all my representations” conjointly are thus at the same time 
the objective conditions of thought, namely the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for something to be an object for me (assuming something 
is given in sensibility), in abstraction from what that ‘something’ is 
further determined to be empirically (cf. B158 [3:123.16–19]). This 
conception of an object is of course only a very general concept of an 
object, of how I take something to be an object for me, whatever fur-
ther properties are ascribable to it. OUA is therefore only constitutive of 
the most general predicates of objects (their substantiality, causal rela-
tions, etc.), not of their empirical properties. It concerns the transcen-
dental truth conditions of knowledge of objects, which are not merely 
logical or epistemological conditions of knowledge, but just as much 
the ontological conditions of knowledge, that is, the constitutive condi-
tions of the objects of knowledge (though, it should be noted again, not 
the ontological conditions of things in themselves; see Chap. 9).
The generality of the concept of an object is often also expressed by 
Kant in terms of “relation to an object” (A109; A197/B242; cf. A104 
and Br, 11:314), which is “nothing beyond making the combination 
of representations necessary in a certain way, and subjecting them to 
a rule”; it provides our representations with “objective significance” 
(A197/B242–3). But, again, it is important to note that Kant here does 
not mean just an epistemological principle that governs our experience of 
objects. Lucy Allais (2011) suggests this. With reference to B142, where 
Kant asserts that only in virtue of a necessary unity does an objectively 
valid relation of representations constituting a judgement come about, 
she writes:
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The claim is not that a certain kind of unity of consciousness is necessary 
for there to be an object, or that it constitutes the object, but that it consti-
tutes the relation of representations to an object. It is necessary for me to 
experience something as an object. […] So saying that a certain kind of 
unity of the consciousness of the synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
constitutes the relation of representations to an object need not be seen 
as a metaphysical claim about what it is for the object to exist, but rather 
an epistemological claim about what it is to have a determinate referential 
thought about an object. (Allais 2011:105–106; emphasis added)
Allais thinks that Kant’s central claim here, at the heart of TD, namely 
that the “a priori concepts determine what counts as an object for us”, 
is one that “a realist could accept”, and is not necessarily a “clear expres-
sion of a kind of idealism” (Allais 2011:104). This reading assumes 
that Kant’s notion of “relation to an object” concerns merely refer-
ential thought about an object that is externally given to it. This is in 
line with Allais’s nonconceptualist reading of the separable role that 
intuition plays in cognition (see Chap. 5). But it would be a mistake to 
think that the “relation to an object” signifies a relation of our repre-
sentations to the thing in itself, which exists extra-mentally, even if, as 
on Allais’s reading of Kant’s idealism, the relation is only to the thing’s 
appearance (and not to its intrinsic properties).24 The notion “rela-
tion to an object” is rather what is expressed by the “pure concept of 
[a] transcendental object (which in all of our cognitions is really always 
one and the same = X )” (A109), and does not refer literally to a real 
object outside our representations, outside our thought content—since 
we do not have access to an object which is supposedly outside our 
thought that must correspond to it. Of course, on the empirical level 
the object of any empirical judgement is not identical to the judgement 
itself, but is rather that to which such a particular judgement is related. 
However, on the transcendental level, the level that establishes the rela-
tion to the object, the object is not to be seen as external to the act of 
judging, for it is the latter which first constitutes the former—i.e. the 
object—by means of the act of synthesising the manifold of representa-
tions, which according to Kant first defines an object (B137; cf. Kreis 
2015:201–202). The objective reality of our representations is solely 
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and first established by applying this a priori concept of a transcendental 
object, namely, the concept of an object standing over against our repre-
sentations, which provides them the necessary unity that first constitutes 
an object.
This transcendental object is not a real object, but a concept of what 
we represent as an object; but, at the same time, this concept is not just 
any concept, but first constitutes what it means for there to be an object 
that we represent, given that we have nothing to go on but manifolds of 
representations and cannot, as it were, go beyond our representation to 
point, as it were, to the object (see again Chap. 1). Allais is right to sug-
gest that the ‘relation to an object’ does not concern the existence con-
ditions per se of empirical objects (particular things), but she is wrong 
to believe that it does not involve a metaphysical claim about what it 
means for an object to be an object in the first place. In fact, Kant explic-
itly identifies the ‘relation to the object’ as itself the object in a letter to 
Beck (Br, 11:314). The concept of a transcendental object is an onto-
logical concept par excellence, because it is first constitutive of an object; 
it denotes that which can be conceived as object in the first place. Apart 
from the application of the concept of a transcendental object—which is 
basically the application of the categories by means of a priori synthesis, 
i.e. transcendental apperception—there simply is no conceivable object,
only things in themselves of which we do not have the slightest knowl-
edge. In other words, outside the context of the use of the transcenden-
tal concept of an object or the categories, the concept of an object is an
empty concept. Therefore, the application of the pure concept of a tran-
scendental object, and thus the categories, is not just necessary for the
experience or thinking of “object as objects” by “ascri[bing] […] properties
to particulars” (Allais 2011:106), but also for objects to be objects, for
us, that is, for a certain manifold of representations first to constitute an
object of possible knowledge, thus making Kant’s central claim here at
A109 and A197/B242 an ontological or metaphysical, not just an epis-
temological claim (cf. B138; see above Sect. 4.4). As we shall see in the
next section, this does point to a certain kind of idealism about objects.
This does not imply that, in the absence of the categories, there can-
not be a nonconceptual intuition of particulars, e.g. when an animal or 
an infant sees a spatially located thing, which it is able to discriminate 
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from among other things, and which it can track (see e.g. Allais 
2011:103). The animal or infant does not need to think the thing “as 
a persisting and causally unitary substance” in order to perceive a rela-
tively distinct particular. This is just because animals or infants have no 
conception of objects in the strict Kantian sense of persisting and caus-
ally related substances. And mere perception is not dependent on the 
employment of the categories, or indeed the application of empirical 
concepts or ascription of properties. I concur with Allais on this (see 
Chap. 5). But it would be wrong to conclude from this—it being con-
trary to the specific goal of TD—that for adults with properly func-
tioning cognitive abilities, who do employ concepts in judgements, 
categories would merely be conditions for thinking about objects, by vir-
tue of “apply[ing] empirical concepts to objects in judgments” (Allais 
2011:103). Rather, the goal of TD is precisely to explain how catego-
ries, not only enable the application of empirical concepts to given 
objects, but also first determine manifolds of representations in an intui-
tion as objects, namely, as determinate appearances. The categories must 
thus be seen as also establishing the necessary conditions under which 
there can be said first to be objects, to which then empirical concepts 
can be applied.25 This explains why the function of a priori synthesis 
in a judgement, as the Leitfaden indicates, operates simultaneously on 
both the conceptual and intuitional level. For the synthesis of represen-
tations is moored in sensibility, by means of the figurative synthesis of 
the imagination, which accounts for the correspondence between con-
cepts and the empirical object to which they are applied. (The topic of 
figurative synthesis will be addressed in Part II.)
On Allais’s reading, it is not clear how one of the chief goals of TD 
can be achieved, namely, how the categories in fact can be seen to estab-
lish the correspondence relation between our conceptual representation of 
an object and the object itself, not just one half of that correspondence 
relation. For if, on Allais’s reading, the categories are just the necessary 
conditions under which we think objects, then it remains unclear how 
we can explain that, on Kant’s account, they must also be seen as the 
conditions under which the representations in empirical intuition are 
unified, by virtue of the a priori synthesis of imagination, such that they 
first constitute an object of our cognition—the mere forms of intuition 
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are clearly not sufficient conditions for perceiving determinate spatio-
temporal objects, as Allais will agree, but if categories are only con-
ditions of thinking objects, then what makes that there are first such 
objects that can be determinately thought about? It appears that Allais 
assumes that objects are just given, independently of their possibly being 
thought about, and subsequently become determinate by actually being 
thought about (see also the critique by Onof 2016). This makes it diffi-
cult to understand how the categories effectively apply to given objects. 
At any rate, she fails to explain how the categories are constitutive of 
the very objective structure of objects, indeed how the categories can 
be seen to be exemplified in the objects themselves by first constitut-
ing them. Allais’s (direct) realist perspective still assumes that the cor-
respondence relation can be established across the representational 
boundary, whereas Kant seeks the solution to the problem of corre-
spondence representation-internally, fully aware that it is representations 
that we have to go on, beyond which we cannot reach to the putative 
real thing.
There is an additional systematic problem with Allais’s reading of 
the categories taken as concerning merely the conditions of thinking 
objects. That is to say, her reading is vulnerable to the objection that, 
if we focus on the B-Deduction, it only accounts for the ‘first step’ of 
TD, where Kant considers the requirements for the thinking of a possi-
ble object, whereas the ‘second step’ addresses the cognition (Erkenntnis) 
of the object (B146). Clearly, the categories must be seen as involved 
in enabling the cognition or knowledge of the object, not just in the 
thinking of the object. Now Allais would not deny that the categories 
are so involved in any case of actual judgement, but it is unclear how on 
her account we get from categories-as-conditions-of-the-thinking-of-an 
object to categories-as-conditions-of-knowledge-of-that-object.
It is ironic that the likes of Gomes and Van Cleve—and, by implica-
tion, Allais, who as we have seen believes that the categories are only 
conditions for the thought about objects, and not for their perception—
criticise Kant for confusing, at least prima facie, the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions of the application of the categories, because in their 
view, as we have seen in the foregoing sections, the fact that we must 
apply the categories to objects in order for us to be able to experience 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
 O
nly
objects does not entail that the categories do apply to, or are instanti-
ated by, them. In thus accusing Kant of subjectivism (namely, of eliding 
one set of conditions into quite a different set of conditions), they in 
fact themselves assume a subjectivist (in the bad, psychologistic sense) 
Humean scepticism that says that the necessary subjective instruments 
with which we can know objects do not reflect the independent struc-
ture of the objects themselves, and they impose this subjectivism on 
Kant.
They fundamentally fail to acknowledge Kant’s revolutionary thought 
that the subjective forms of thought must themselves be taken to be also 
the objective conditions of the content of our thought, namely, of the 
objects that are thought about in judgements. The objective conditions 
of objects are not additional conditions to the subjective conditions 
of thinking about them (bar of course the a posteriori, independently 
given sensory input, which connects us directly to reality); if they were, 
then this would beg the question which other conditions would then 
connect up the objective conditions with the subjective conditions, and 
so on ad infinitum—precisely the fundamental worry that TD is meant 
to allay by having recourse to the idea of an original a priori synthesis 
that binds concepts and intuitions at the fundamental level.
Here we encounter Kant’s radical subjectivism, which incorporates 
objectivity rather than retreating from it, as does Hume—Kant’s is not a 
psychological subjectivism, for which the objects remain wholly external 
to thought and which cannot explain how thought hooks up with the 
world in a necessary way such that we can think about the world at all, 
but a transcendental subjectivism, for which it holds that space and all 
that is contained in it, the whole of empirical nature, is encountered 
in thought (A375; A126–7; cf. B165). It is striking that the assumption 
of Humean realism about the independent existence of objects is still 
haunting many interpretations of TD. This has probably got to do with 
a persistent general antipathy to idealism among Anglophone readers 
of Kant, even implicitly among those commentators willing to defend 
some form of mind-dependence seen as the appearance property of the 
thing in itself. In the next section, I shall address in more detail the con-
nection of idealism to Kant’s claims about the intimate relation between 
TUA* and the object.
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I think it is clear on the basis of the analysis in the preceding sec-
tions that, against the view of Van Cleve, Gomes and others, it can 
be asserted that there is no ‘in principle’ gap between the subject of 
thought or the categories of experience or TUA*, on the one hand, 
and OUA, or the exemplification of the categories in the object, on the 
other. Hence, there is no Gap in the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction that 
requires bridging, by for example having recourse to the ‘second step’, as 
Gomes (2010) proposes.
4.10  Objectivity and Idealism
An additional argument that helps us understand the intimate rela-
tion between TUA and the concept of an object, and the claim that 
there is no gap between the necessary application of the categories and 
their exemplification in the object of experience, can be gleaned from 
Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism. In the previous section, we 
already saw the problems facing a direct realist reading of Kant’s claims 
such as that of Allais. It appears that, suitably amended, Van Cleve’s 
own phenomenalist interpretation of the Kantian concept of an object 
facilitates an understanding of the intimate relation between the appli-
cation of the categories and their exemplification in the object.
In a letter to J.S. Beck, Kant makes it clear that his idealism, which 
he also calls “formal” idealism (Prol, 4:337, 375), is quite different from 
Berkeley’s material idealism, for unlike Berkeley, transcendental idealism 
only concerns the “form of representation”, not “the matter [...] of the 
object and its existence” (Br, 11:395 [Kant 1999:445]). Material ideal-
ism regards not just the form of the object, but also the matter of the 
object, its existence, as ideal. Oddly, Van Cleve appears, at first sight 
at least, to read Kant’s idealism precisely in terms of material idealism. 
Two-worlders or quasi-two-worlders (such as Van Cleve) tend to reduce 
objects of experience to representations as mental states, whereby they 
interpret Kant’s talk of appearances as “mere representations” (B518–
19/A490–1; cf. A30/B45, A101, A104, A129, A250, Prol, 4:293) lit-
erally in terms of their material content (cf. Strawson 1968:237–238), 
as if empirically real objects consisted of mental states as their parts.26 
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Van Cleve makes the prima facie implausible claim that “objects owe 
their very existence to being cognized by us” (Van Cleve 1999:5), which 
seems to express the Berkeleian esse est percipi principle. Ameriks (2006) 
notes that such a view in fact conflicts with a two-world interpreta-
tion of Kant’s idealism, which takes non-empirical things in them-
selves seriously, as does Van Cleve. Now to concede, Ameriks (2006:77) 
argues, that things in themselves exist which are non-empirical means 
to concede that these things are not dependent on our representations 
or minds; ergo their existence is not owed to us, contrary to what van 
Cleve appears to say.
However, Van Cleve might also be taken to argue that it is not the 
things in themselves, or Being in general, that are dependent on our 
representation, but rather the object as appearance only that is depend-
ent on our representation for its existence insofar as it concerns an object, 
an appearance (so not as a thing in itself ). Van Cleve writes indeed that 
things in themselves “do not depend on human beings either for their 
existence or for their being the way they are” (1999:134). He is thus, 
rightly, careful to distinguish between the Kantian notions ‘object’ and 
‘thing in itself ’, when making the claim about objects being dependent 
on us for their existence. To be accurate, the only ontological dependence 
relation is the relation between appearances and their underlying things 
in themselves. To say that objects as appearances depend on our minds 
does not imply an ontological dependence, but indicates an ontologi-
cal identification of appearances and representations, just as Kant claims 
when he says that appearances are mere representations (cf. e.g. A30/
B45).
If any reference to the esse est percipi principle should be made in this 
context (Van Cleve 1999:9), we should heed that it holds for appear-
ances as objects of possible experience, not for things in themselves, 
whose being is not at all dependent on us perceivers.27 This would be 
in line with Kant’s main claim in TD that it is not just our experience 
of an object that is constrained by certain subjective conditions, namely, 
the categories, but the very fact that there is an object for me (B137). 
This need not conflict with the aforementioned distinction between 
form and matter that Kant makes in his letter to Beck, since what is 
dependent on our representation is the fact of the existence of the object 
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as object (for me), not the material object’s de re existence (as a thing in 
itself ).28 To the extent that objects strictly speaking are always objects 
for us, Van Cleve may thus well be right about empirical objects being 
but “clusters of empirical determinations” (Ameriks 2006:79). This 
appears to be borne out by Kant’s assertion at B527/A499 that “the 
appearances, in their apprehension, are themselves nothing other than 
an empirical synthesis (in space and time) and thus are given only in 
this synthesis” (Kant’s emphasis). So empirical objects (as appearances) 
are dependent on, and indeed reducible to, the subject’s synthesis of her 
mental states for their determination as empirical objects, but they are 
not reducible to the material content of a subject’s mental states.
Ameriks elaborates on Van Cleve’s (1999:71) instructive distinction 
between ontological phenomenalism, which appears to be Van Cleve’s 
own preferred interpretative route (but see 1999:93), and analytical 
phenomenalism. If at all phenomenalism were an appropriate epithet 
for Kantian idealism, analytical phenomenalism would be best suited. 
The ontological, strong version of phenomenalism asserts that, to take 
Ameriks’s example, the existence of a tree “is just the existence of a set 
of actual tree representings in some subject” (Ameriks 2006:80). On 
the other hand, analytical phenomenalism merely asserts that “it is true 
that a tree exists even if there are no such actual representings as long as 
it is still the case that some subject would have appropriate tree repre-
sentings if its experience were simply extended in various natural ways” 
(Ameriks 2006:80). Van Cleve (1999:123–124) believes that Kant, in 
most cases, seems to be committed to ontological phenomenalism: for 
example, at A191/B236, Kant suggests that a house, being “only an 
appearance, i.e., a representation”, is “nothing more than a sum of […] 
representations”. Ameriks’s response to Van Cleve’s use of the example 
is not entirely adequate, for it seems to me that “sum” (Inbegriff ) just 
means sum or totality here, not “quintessence” or purport as Ameriks 
suggests (though this is the usual meaning of Inbegriff, what could Kant 
mean on that reading?).29 In a way, Van Cleve is right to infer from the 
above passage that an empirical object is nothing outside the whole 
of representations as unified under a necessary rule of apprehension. 
It is important to note, however, that this need not be worrisome for 
Ameriks’s interpretation, as this sum of representations still only refers 
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to a set of representations within possible experience, governed by tran-
scendental apperception, which is a general feature of unitary experi-
ence that is objectively valid, and so it cannot mean the (arbitrary or 
even objectively determined) sum of someone’s actual psychological, 
private mental states (even though for such unitary experience to take 
place, some apperceiving subject needs to be involved).
If we look more closely at the context of the passage that Van Cleve 
quotes (A191/B236), it is clear that the object, i.e. “the appearance of 
a house that stands before me” (A190/B235), which is not a thing in 
itself, is not strictly speaking reducible to the manifold of representa-
tions per se. Rather the appearance, “in contradistinction to the repre-
sentations of apprehension”, is represented as an object “that is distinct 
from them”, only “if it stands under a rule that distinguishes it from 
every other apprehension”. The object, then, is “[t]hat in the appearance 
which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension” 
(A191/B236). So, in effect, when Kant says that the object house, as 
appearance, “is nothing more than a sum of these representations”, this 
should be understood in the sense that the determinate appearance that 
is the house in front of me is to be identified with the synthetic unity in 
the manifold of representations. And this is exactly what Kant says in 
the above-quoted passage at B527/A499.
Nevertheless, even if we agree with Van Cleve that an object as 
appearance is nothing but the synthesis in the representations, Van 
Cleve’s ungainly talk of “virtual objects” (1999:8) does not make a phe-
nomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism any more appealing, as it threat-
ens to undermine Kant’s emphatic empirical realism about objects of 
experience. The use of the term “virtual object” suggests that the object 
as appearance is a mere mental object, which would make Kant’s theory 
of knowledge sound unduly psychological. Determinate appearances 
are real, not virtual, objects that are the public spatiotemporal empiri-
cal objects of outer sense and so are not literally “in us” (A370, 375) 
in an empirical sense, namely, reducible to the material content of my or 
your mental states. In fact, as Kant emphasises, it is precisely the claim 
of transcendental idealism that by means of the form of space, I repre-
sent an object as that which is “outside me” (A23/B38; cf. B69), and 
that the form of space that enables this representation is not a property 
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of things in themselves, but rather the form of our receptivity, “the 
form of all appearances of outer sense” (A26/B42; cf. Prol, 4:375). The 
object so represented is a real object, because “it is immediately given 
through empirical intuition” (A375). At the same time, appearances 
as represented are dependent on our minds’ (cognitive) representings 
and so, as appearances, strictly speaking they exist only if we (cogni-
tively) represent them, or to put it more precisely, appearances are only 
objects of possible experience and do not occur outside it. By contrast, 
things in themselves are not so dependent and hence exist distinctly 
from our representations and thus wholly outside of possible experi-
ence (cf. A374–6; Prol §52c, 4:341–342; Prol, 4:289; see also A493ff./
B522ff.).30
A properly conceived phenomenalist interpretation of Kant’s ideal-
ism holds that the empirical object, that is, the object as appearance, 
only exists as construction out of representations, so exists only when 
and if it can be represented by a subject, any subject, in the realm of 
possible experience. Unlike ontological phenomenalism, which reduces 
material three-dimensional objects to mental states, Kant’s version of 
phenomenalism sees an object in terms of an object of possible experi-
ence, and explicitly differentiates between outer and inner experience: 
outer objects, bodies, are represented as outside my synthetically united 
representations (cf. A106) and as fully empirically real (A375), but do 
not as such exist outside them de re (Prol §49, 4:337; Anm. 2, 4:289). 
It is only things in themselves, underlying the appearances, that exist 
wholly independently of minds. By distinguishing between appearances 
and things in themselves, Kant avoids the problem of Berkeleian ide-
alism, which says that things are wholly reducible to representations 
simpliciter, with the result that things lose their mind-independence 
or externality. For Kant, things in themselves exist and continue exist-
ing even if no subject has representations of them. But empirically real 
objects, that is, spatiotemporal bodies, are only actual in us, in per-
ception (A376), namely, in space as the necessary form of perception, 
outside of which nothing empirically real can be represented.31 Only 
a (broadly analytical) phenomenalist interpretation of Kant’s transcen-
dental idealism is strictly compatible with empirical realism (in Kant’s 
sense), which regards anything represented in space, which itself is 
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“nothing other than a mere representation”, as ex hypothesi (transcen-
dentally) “in me”, for “space itself with all its appearances, as representa-
tions, is only in me” (A374–5; emphasis added). In the Aesthetic, Kant 
writes that
what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations 
of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlate, i.e., the 
thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them, but is also 
never asked after in experience. (A30/B45)
Any interpretation that regards appearances as existing outside the sub-
ject’s mind (as the mind-dependent properties of things, say)32 cannot 
make sense of passages like these.33
Van Cleve says that “[o]bjects1 are internal accusatives or intentional 
objects that have no being outside being represented or intuited”, which 
makes them “virtual objects” (1999:91). According to Van Cleve, these 
objects can be outer, that is, spatial, as well as inner, or merely temporal 
objects, as they have both intensive and extensive magnitudes. He dif-
ferentiates these from objects2, which are “material things like houses 
and ships and perhaps also empirical selves” (1999:91). But this seems 
to indicate that Van Cleve thinks that objects2 must be things in them-
selves, given that he believes that objects1 can both be internal and 
external, “spatial” objects, and spatial objects are, for Kant, equivalent to 
material medium-sized objects, which can only be appearances, hence, 
objects “that have no being outside being represented or intuited”. If 
indeed Van Cleve believes that objects2 are things in themselves, that 
cannot be true, since no thing in itself is material in the sense Kant 
means. If this is not what Van Cleve believes, then I do not see a mean-
ingful difference between a spatial object1 and an object2. Perhaps, he 
wants to emphasise that real empirical objects like houses and ships 
surely are not internal accusatives or mere intentional objects. But, on 
Kant’s view, any material, i.e. bodily, object, as much as a mental object, 
is an internal accusative or an intentional object that has no existence 
outside the mind, in the transcendental sense, i.e. outside our objec-
tively valid thoughts (Prol §49, 4:337.22–4; B518–19; A383; cf. Prol, 
4:288 and Refl 4536, 17:586).34
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At A104, insofar as appearances are “nothing but sensible representa-
tions”, and cannot be seen as existing outside the power of represen-
tation, Kant poses the question: “What does one mean, then, if one 
speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from 
the cognition [Erkenntnis]?” (see again Chap. 1). If the object which 
we represent outside of ourselves, and so represent as distinct from our 
cognition of it (A105), is nonetheless nothing but a representation and 
not something external to our cognition with which it would somehow 
correspond, what, then, is the object? Clearly, it is not just reducible to 
our cognition or representation of the object in the sense of it being 
reducible to a mental state, such that the object is a mere private mental 
entity of which I have cognition. The objects that I represent as outer 
cannot be also representations which are objects of my representation. 
This would make nonsense of Kant’s distinction between inner and 
outer sense, which is precisely designed to differentiate the representa-
tion of outer, spatial objects from the representation of inner private, 
non-spatial objects, my own inner states (Praussian objects, say). The 
mere reductive analysis of the concept of object will not do here.
Kant says, somewhat baldly: “It is easy to see that this object must be 
thought of only as something in general = X” (A104). The object of our
representations is merely a “transcendental object” (A109), and “is that 
which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to 
an object, i.e., objective reality” (A109; emphasis added). To know an 
object means to “have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intui-
tion” (A105). And this constitutes not just the knowledge of an object, 
but the very object itself, because “[t]hat in the appearance [dasjenige 
an der Erscheinung] which contains the condition of this necessary rule 
of apprehension is the object” (B236/A191; emphasis added). The object 
to which our empirical concepts are related is a projected or intentional 
object35; it is not a thing in itself, but neither is it reducible to mere 
mental states, since it is “that something, the concept of which expresses 
[...] a necessity of synthesis” (A106; trans. emended), which cannot be 
found in the mere manifold of representations (B129–30). An object is 
thus a necessary synthetic unity among my representations and noth-
ing outside this unity, neither some thing in itself that exists outside my 
mind, nor just an aggregate of mental states forming its parts. ‘Object’ 
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is defined by its role in possible experience. Our understanding of what 
it means to talk about an object and make judgements about it is ena-
bled by the way our representations are related in certain necessary ways 
such that the representations acquire objective reality (cf. A197/B242). 
Van Cleve rightly says that “what it is for representations to have ‘rela-
tion to an object’ just is for them to stand in certain relations to one 
another” (1999:93) and, quite appropriately, he calls objects logical con-
structions out of representations (1999:93). Indeed, Kant says, at A494/
B522, that objects are defined by the way in which representations are 
related to each other in space and time (as pure intuitions) and are com-
bined and determined in accordance with laws of unitary experience. It 
is perhaps in this sense that Van Cleve calls Kantian empirical objects as 
appearances “virtual objects”, as qua appearances they do not exist de re 
as separate entities, neither as mental states (which would mean that the 
phenomenalism at issue is ontological, implying that objects are identi-
cal to mental states or have them as their material parts), nor as things 
in themselves.
Fittingly, Van Cleve connects this analysis of the concept of an object 
with the Copernican hypothesis that says that objects must conform to 
the forms of the understanding, meaning that the categories, as forms 
of the understanding, are not just the conditions of their being known, 
but also the conditions of their being objects of knowledge, because 
“their existence is constituted by the occurrence of representations in 
certain patterns, patterns prescribed […] in large part by the categories” 
(1999:93–94). So, in effect, Van Cleve agrees that when Kant argues 
that the categories are the conditions of experience of objects and the 
conditions of the objects of experience (A111; B197/B158), he makes 
both an epistemological and, insofar as objects as appearances are con-
cerned, ontological claim, the argument I expounded and defended 
above in Sect. 4.4.
But Van Cleve denies that the relation to an object as constituted by 
the unity of representations corresponds to the “very relations in vir-
tue of which representations have unity of apperception” (1999:94), 
by which I take it he means TUA. In other words, he rejects the valid-
ity of Kant’s argument that the unity that grounds the concept of 
object, on the one hand, and TUA, on the other, are the same unity, 
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the contentious claim under investigation in this chapter. But this is 
because Van Cleve believes that Kant’s view is that “any collection of 
representations, no matter how chaotic or phantasmagorical, have unity 
of apperception just in virtue of being cognized together” (1999:94), 
which commits him to a metaphysically intemperate reading of apper-
ception (i.e. TUA rather than TUA*). Further, Van Cleve seems to 
believe that since the categories are both “(i) necessary for our being 
conscious of representations and (ii) sufficient for our having objec-
tive experience—experience in which our representations ‘relate to an 
object’”, “it follows that there is no stretch of conscious experience that 
is not object-related experience” (1999:97); a very unwelcome con-
clusion indeed. But this conclusion is valid only if both premises are 
true, but, as I have shown in Sect. 4.8, premise (i) is strictly speaking 
false. Van Cleve thinks that the only way to avoid the aforementioned 
conclusion, is either by denying (i) or by weakening (ii), and since he 
appears to maintain that categories are required for conscious experi-
ence, the only route available to him remains a weakening of (ii) with 
the alleged consequence that the anti-sceptical heft of TD is diminished 
as well. But on my reading of apperception (TUA*), (ii) need not at all 
be weakened. Thesis (ii) is fully compatible with TUA*, and Van Cleve’s 
inference that “no stretch of conscious experience is not object-related 
experience” thus has no valid basis in a proper reading of Kant’s claims 
for transcendental apperception.
Notes
1. In the Kant literature, there are two other, different, discussions about
a putative gap in Kant. Hanna (2011) argues that there is a gap in
Kant’s B-Deduction, because he believes that the argument of the
B-Deduction is true only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-
conceptualist. This, according to Hanna, creates a fundamental gap.
Further, there is the discussion surrounding a so-called gap in the
Critical philosophy as a whole between transcendental philosophy and
empirical science, which concerns a ‘transition’ from the metaphysical
foundations of natural science to physics proper, addressed by Kant
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in his Opus postumum (see Förster 2000). I am concerned with nei-
ther of these gaps in this chapter. For a discussion of Hanna’s gap, see 
Schulting (2015).
2. It seems that the objection against Kant’s argument simply begs the
question against the Copernican hypothesis, for the latter specifically
stipulates that the objects must be seen as conforming to our under-
standing, so that our conception of objects is also, in some sense, con-
stitutive of the ‘ontological’ form of objects, i.e. what makes objects be
objects. The claim that Kant’s argument that the categories are both
necessary and sufficient for the knowledge of objects is false thus rests
on the assumption that the Copernican hypothesis is false. But for the
sake of delineating the grounds for the Gap, let’s assume the validity of
the objection.
3. That the categories are instantiated in experience and that they apply to
objects is prima facie not the same. I discuss this apparent discrepancy
further in Sects. 4.4 and 4.5.
4. Shaddock (2015) precisely appears to confuse the necessary role of sub-
jectivity in knowledge with subjective necessity in the psychological
sense. His critique of subjectivist interpretations of TD rests on this mis-
taken assumption. In his dismissal of putatively “subjectivist” readings
such as that of Henry Allison, he himself attempts to prove that the cat-
egories are objectively valid and not just subjectively necessary—that is,
to defuse the apparent problem of the Gap—by disregarding altogether
the constitutive role of the subject, i.e. transcendental apperception or
the synthetic unity of consciousness, for establishing the objectively
validity of the categories. Shaddock’s case for the argument that, rather
than objects being constitutively dependent on us, our cognitive faculty
is dependent on objects of our judgement, and that this shows that there
is no Gap to worry about, is wholly unconvincing. His short argument
to the objective validity of the categories appears to invert the direction
of Kant’s argument in TD from apperception to an argument from the
objects. The argument in TD is not that our cognitive faculty, or tran-
scendental apperception, is dependent on objects, but rather that the
object is dependent on transcendental apperception for its objectivity
(A106–7). Shaddock entirely misses the main point of TD.
5. Allais (2015:208) argues that the argument of TD chiefly concerns an
“epistemological” argument, that is, an argument about how we con-
ceive or think about already given objects (given in intuition). But this
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makes Kant’s argument in TD too trivial or easily vulnerable to the 
Gap. Kant must show not just why it is necessary that we employ cat-
egories in thinking about given objects (already given in intuition), but 
also that objects, or at least their intuitions, themselves must correspond 
to the categories. TD is not just a global epistemological story or a 
story about the requirements of referential thought, as Allais believes, 
but also concerns ontological or quasi-ontological aspects, elements 
that first constitute the very concept of an object, and so the ‘existence’ 
of an object qua object (cf. by contrast Allais 2015:285).
6. For discussion of this debate, see further Schulting (2012b, Chap. 4).
7. Of course, sensory input is still required, so categories are not materially
sufficient conditions of experience.
8. See also Br, 11:314.
9. Of course, the fact that categories are instantiated in judgement does
not automatically imply that they are instantiated in experience or in
the perception of objects. This is why Kant deems it necessary to carry
out a twofold analysis in the B-Deduction, i.e. mount a so-called ‘two-
step’ argument. But the conclusion of Kant’s argument is that instantia-
tion in judgement means instantiation in the experience or perception
of objects.
 10. It could be argued, along Kantian lines, that even the capacity to for-
mulate (and understand) analytic judgements ultimately relies on pos-
sible experience and empirical knowledge, and thus on the categories.
But knowing the truth of an analytic judgement p in and of itself does
not depend on experience or its conditions.
 11. Maybe the term ‘statement’ would be more appropriate here, but that
makes it even clearer that the objective validity of a judgement can-
not be identified with its truth value, since also statements that are not
judgements strictly speaking have a truth value. See below. At B148,
Kant writes that without an accompanying empirical intuition, the
employment of the categories as “merely empty concepts of objects”
does not even amount to a “judg[ing] whether the latter [i.e., objects]
are possible or not”, suggesting that strictly speaking the term ‘judge-
ment’ should be reserved for claims about empirical objects, for which
there is evidence from empirical intuition.
 12. There is a problem for Kant, as in the Critique of Judgement Kant
appears to want to make a clear distinction between reflective judge-
ments and determinative judgements, whereby the former are not
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objectively valid judgements at all. This would appear to conflict with 
his claim in the B-Deduction that objective validity is an intrinsic ele-
ment of judgement per se. There is also the issue of his Prolegomena 
distinction between merely subjectively valid judgements of perception 
and objectively valid judgements of experience. In my view, since judge-
ments of perception lack objective validity, and given Kant’s definition 
for judgement in the B-Deduction (§19), they are not really judge-
ments. I cannot elaborate on these important interpretative issues here.
 13. But see Vanzo (2012).
 14. See Schulting (2008).
 15. Cramer (1990:179) points to a potential ambiguity regarding the
indexical ‘my’ here: does Kant mean by “all my representations” those
representations that I represent as mine by first accompanying them
(by means of the ‘I think’) or those representations “in me”, which I
do not yet represent as mine? It seems that Cramer reads the “in me”
possessively in contrast to an epistemic reading of ‘my’ (the possessive/
epistemic terminology is owed to Ameriks 2000). However, despite
Kant’s own misleading use of the verb gehören at B134, I believe that
the possessive reading is inapposite in regard to the indexical “my” of
“all my representations”, since the mineness of representations “in me”
cannot be determined before accompanying them, as Kant himself
indeed affirms (B134). No representation is “mine” sensu stricto and
so belongs to me strictly speaking, before I accompany it as mine.
The fact that representations are “in me” (whereby “me” should here
be taken sensu latiori) does not eo ipso make them “my” representa-
tions—in the strict sense which I take Kant to mean here in §16 of the
B-Deduction—unless I so take them. By implication, it is not necessary
that all representations that are “in me” are therefore accompanied or
even be able to be accompanied by me (the ‘I think’).
 16. For extensive analysis, see Schulting (2012b).
 17. In Schulting (2012a) I called this reading of apperception the
Necessary Entailment Reading (NER or the variant NER′).
 18. See Langton (1998:55, 59).
 19. See again note 15 above.
 20. For a more expansive account of transcendental apperception, see
Schulting (2012b); with respect to the modal aspects of the ‘I think’
proposition, see especially Schulting (2012b, Chap. 6). See also
Schulting (2017b).
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186     4 Gap? What Gap?—On the Transcendental Unity …
 21. One might believe that to think a concept is to think something merely
general, the concept <red>, say, but even here there is content, i.e.
the content being the logical content of what constitutes the concept
<red>, namely, <the colour at the end of the spectrum next to orange
and opposite violet>. The content of my thought is then the logical
content of the concept that I think.
 22. Notice that categories are nothing but “kinds of unity of conscious-
ness” (Refl 5854, 18:370 [Kant 2005:300]). Cf. V-Met/Schön, 28:472,
482; V-Met/Vigil, 29:978–979 and Prol §22, 4:305. For discussion, see
Schulting (2012b:83ff.).
 23. See Schulting (2017b).
 24. See Allais (2015). Cf. my review of Allais’s book in Schulting (2017a).
 25. Cf. Kreis (2015:203–204). He writes: “Jedes Individuum, das sich der
Kategorien bedient, um ein empirisches Urteil zu fällen, fällt ein objek-
tiv gültiges Urteil. Auf diese Weise wird das sinnlich Mannigfaltige in
empirischen Urteilen aber auch zwangsläufig in genau jenen Strukturen
als Objekt gedacht, die die Kategorien selbst vorgeben. Deshalb sind
diese nicht nur die Strukturen des Denkens, sondern auch die Strukturen
der Gegenstände der Wirklichkeit” (emphasis added). Kreis quite rightly
emphasises the fact that Kant’s transcendental philosophy is a neo-
Aristotelian ontology; as in the case of Aristotle, for Kant, mutatis
mutandis, the categories are nothing less than ontological predicates
of the objects themselves. Against Humean scepticism about objec-
tive truth, Kant shows that “[d]ie streng allgemeingültigen katego-
rialen Ordnungsregeln, die den Inbegriff der Subjektivität darstellen,
sind zugleich der Inbegriff aller Objektivität […]” (Kreis 2015:204).
This means that the concept of an object is a “leerer Begriff ” outside
the context of objectively valid judgements, “weil Gegenstände über-
haupt erst in objektiv gültigen Urteilen im Blick sein können” (Kreis
2015:205).
 26. Kant’s claim, in the letter to Beck, that “the matter [...] of the object
and its existence” is not ideal might seem to clash with his view that
the empirical matter of which spatiotemporal objects consist is tran-
scendentally ideal insofar as space, in which alone an object can exist,
is transcendentally ideal. In other words, spatiotemporal objects are not
only formally ideal, but also ideal insofar as their matter is concerned;
empirical matter is surely not a property of things in themselves.
Indeed, Kant writes: “[M]atter […] is nothing other than a mere form,
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or a certain mode of representation of an unknown object, through 
that intuition that one calls outer sense” (A385; cf. A360). But I think 
Kant’s remark here in the letter should be read as concentrating on the 
aspect of the material object’s existence (de re), which is indeed not as 
such dependent on the subject’s capacities (though the determination 
of the object’s existence is of course dependent on the application of 
the category of existence). What Kant wants to emphasise is that the 
material object’s existence is not reducible to the material content (sen-
sations) of my mental states, although it is exclusively by way of our sen-
sations in sensibility (form of outer sense) that we have a sense of an 
object’s material nature.
 27. See A92/B125. Our representations do not generate the object “as far 
as its existence is concerned [dem Dasein nach]”.
 28. It might seem odd to say that appearances depend on our minds for 
their existence, while it is also the case that, in Kant’s view, appearances 
ex hypothesi depend on things in themselves, so that the dependence 
relation goes in two directions. However, it is not the case that there 
is a two-way dependence relation. More accurately, appearances are 
identified with our representations and thus the states of our minds, 
while they depend on things in themselves, that is, on reality as such 
(which is not empirical reality but Being simpliciter; see Chap. 9). I 
thank Christian Onof for pointing out the problematic issue of double 
dependence. When below I speak of the appearance’s dependence, as a 
represented, on the mind’s representings, this dependence must be read 
as a conceptual relation.
 29. Cf. A114. See also Kant in the same letter to J.S. Beck quoted earlier, 
where he quotes Beck: “The union [Inbegriff ] of representations is itself 
the object, and the activity of the mind whereby this union [Inbegriff ] 
of representations is represented is what we mean by ‘relating them to 
the object’” (Br, 11:314 [Kant 1999:399]). Inbegriff is translated here 
as “union”, but the translator’s use of “uniting” for Zusammensetzen, to 
which Kant adds ‘synthesis’ in brackets, is not quite correct; further on, 
Kant makes clear that the synthetic unity of consciousness is meant (see 
also Kant 1999:399 note).
 30. Cf. A385, where Kant says that the appearance, as the material object 
in space, is “as appearance […] not outside us, but is merely as a 
thought in us”. This might be seen to contradict the earlier-quoted 
statement at A23/B38. But here, in A385, the “outside us” must be 
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188     4 Gap? What Gap?—On the Transcendental Unity …
interpreted transcendentally, whereas the “outside us” of A23/B38 must 
be interpreted empirically. An appearance in the general sense of that of 
the thing in itself which appears to us is never “outside us” transcenden-
tally, whereas a spatiotemporal object, an ‘appearance’ in the more spe-
cific sense of a determinate object within possible experience, is always 
“outside us” empirically. This does not, however, imply a realist stance 
sans phrase, to the extent that the object literally is outside us as a third 
kind of object between a thing in itself and a mental state, rather it 
is that which “thought, through [outer sense] represents […] as being 
found outside us” (A385; emphasis added). An appearance is after all 
a mere representation, more precisely, a represented. So an appearance 
that is “outside us” empirically is a represented outside us. See also the 
discussion in Schulting (2016).
 31. Cf. Sellars (1992:48): “Kant remains in another sense [than the 
Berkeleian] a ‘phenomenalist’ […]. Kant’s phenomenalism can be put, 
in first approximation, by saying that physical objects and events exist 
only ‘in’ certain actual and obtainable conceptual representings, the 
intuitive representings synthesized by the productive imagination in 
response to the impressions of sense. I say exist only ‘in’ such represent-
ings, for no res extensa exists simpliciter or in itself. A phenomenalism 
which construes the physical world as a system of available contents in 
this sense differs radically from a phenomenalism which construes the 
world as a system of available sense impressions, for it construes physi-
cal appearances as irreducibly physical.”
 32. Kanterian quite rightly says that “[p]roperties of appearances may be 
construed as relational properties, but only insofar as appearances are 
mere modifications of our sensibility […]. This does not make them 
relational properties of those things unknown in themselves which 
affect our sensibility” (2013:184; boldface mine). Indeed, Kant states 
that “regarding all appearances in general, I have only shown that they 
are neither things (but are mere modes of representations) nor are they 
determinations belonging to things in themselves” (Prol, 4:293 [Kant 
1977:37]; emphasis added).
 33. But does a phenomenalist reading imply that only objects that exist 
concurrently with human existence and human sensibility, or are actu-
ally perceived by us, are capable of being represented and cognised? 
No, because also possible future objects or objects that existed prior to 
human existence, or objects for which our sensibility is not sufficiently 
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fine-grained, can be represented as objects of possible experience, as long 
as they are subject to the same rules or laws of the unity of experience 
that govern the experience of any object that exists actually and is sen-
sibly perceived or perceivable (see A495–6/B523–4; B237; A218/B266; 
A225/B266; A376; A493/B521).
 34. Cf. note 30 above.
 35. Kant himself does not talk in terms of intentionality, but that an 
intentional object is at issue is, I believe, confirmed by passages such 
as where Kant says that “in its character of appearance it [i.e., some 
object] is not, however, outside us, but is only a thought in us, although 
this thought, through the above-mentioned outer sense, represents it as 
existing outside us” (A385; trans. Kemp Smith and emphasis and bold-
face added).
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Part II
Nonconceptual Content,  
Space and A Priori Synthesis
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5.1  Introduction
At a crucial juncture in the B-Deduction, Kant makes an important 
distinction. He writes:
To think an object and to know [erkennen] an object are thus not the 
same. For two components belong to knowledge [zum Erkenntnisse]: first, 
the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category),1 
and second, the intuition, through which it is given; for if an intuition 
corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then it would be a 
thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, and by its 
means no knowledge of anything at all [keine Erkenntnis von irgendeinem 
Dinge] would be possible, since, as far as I would know [wüßte], noth-
ing would be given nor could be given to which my thought could be 
applied. (B146; trans. emended)
Here, Kant indicates that there is still important work to be done after 
completing the so-called ‘first step’ of deducing the categories from the 
principle of apperception,2 which concerned the necessary form of con-
ceiving of an object in general, since that deduction is incomplete if it 
5
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196     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
cannot be shown how the categories apply to objects of  human sensible 
intuition. As Kant writes, “the categories do not afford us  knowledge 
[Erkenntniß ] of things by means of intuition except through their 
 possible application to empirical intuition, i.e., they serve only for the 
possibility of empirical knowledge” (B147; trans. emended). Only by 
showing the manner in which this application comes about will Kant 
have explained fully the possibility of empirical knowledge, which he 
defines as “experience” (B147; cf. B165–6). There has been much dis-
cussion in the Kant literature about the role and structure of the second 
part, the so-called ‘second step’, of the B-Deduction. However, I am not 
going to engage with it here directly (see Chap. 7). In this chapter, I am 
interested more broadly in the extent to which the discussion around 
Kantian nonconceptualism captures an important, structural aspect of 
the general argument in, and goal of, the B-Deduction. Most commen-
tators believe that in the second part of the Transcendental Deduction 
(TD) Kant in fact wants to exclude the possibility that there would be 
intuitions, perceptions or sensory content to which the categories are 
not applied or applicable, thus excluding the possibility of so-called 
‘nonconceptual content’. This is what Kant already appears to suggest 
at B136 and in the conclusion of the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction, at 
B143, and certainly in the conclusion of the ‘second step’ at B159ff., 
in §26, where Kant appears to assert that simply everything that comes 
before our senses is subsumable under the categories. This last position is 
roughly called ‘conceptualism’.
Conceptualism can be defined as the thesis that (1) any conscious, 
representational content, intuition or appearance is determined by 
our conceptual capacity and that conscious, representational content, 
or an intuition or appearance can only refer to objects if and when it 
is subsumed under concepts, and that (2) non-human (lower animal) 
beings do not possess such conceptual capacities, by means of which 
they perceive, and thus refer to, objects in the strict sense. I shall here 
treat ‘intuition’, ‘appearance’, ‘representational content’ or also ‘sen-
sory content’ as roughly equivalent expressions, although the latter 
two are, generally speaking, broader in meaning than the former, and 
have the infelicitous connotation that the term ‘content’ might sug-
gest that it is intrinsically ‘about’ something, i.e. something intentional, 
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thus putatively excluding the possibility of nonconceptual content. But 
since the term has been in use in the debate on nonconceptual content, 
I shall continue referring to sensory or representational content as sig-
nifying material content that is representationally significant in some 
(subjectively valid) sense, but not necessarily cognitively significant in 
the demanding sense that Kant associates with objective validity, that is, 
being about a definite object. On this definition, the term ‘nonconcep-
tual content’ is thus not an oxymoron.3
Conceptualism can be differentiated into strong and weak concep-
tualism, whereby, if we translate this to the strictly Kantian context, 
strong conceptualism holds that the understanding, i.e. our conceptual 
capacity (A68ff./B93ff.), is not only the determining ground of any 
cognitive judgement, but also of sensibility itself. Weak conceptualism 
means that, whereas the understanding determines all cognitive empiri-
cal judgements, which are based on empirical intuitions, sensibility 
itself is independent of the capacity of the understanding, and not all 
conceptual activity (e.g. demonstrative reference) need take place exclu-
sively in the context of explicit cognitive judgements.4
By contrast, Kantian nonconceptualists want to argue that Kant does 
leave open the possibility of intuitions or perceptions that are not sub-
sumed or even subsumable under the categories.5 Nonconceptualism 
is roughly the thesis that (1) not every conscious, objective representa-
tional content is merely or at all determined by our conceptual capacity, 
and that intuitions immediately and independently of concepts percep-
tually “present” (Allais 2009:384, 386, 389)6 objects or particulars to 
us; that (2) at least some human, objective conscious content occurs 
independently of our conceptual capacity and is not determined by it7; 
and that (3) at least some non-human beings (i.e. animals)8 have an 
awareness of some sort of, and are not merely responding mechanically 
to, their surroundings.9
I want to argue that Kantian nonconceptualists are right insofar as 
the possibility of intuitions that are not subsumed (or subsumable) 
under the categories is concerned, but that they are wrong to claim 
(1) that such intuitions are or can be considered synthesised  content 
independently of the understanding or judgement, and (2) that 
these intuitions are objectively valid cognitions or refer to objects. 
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Some Kantian nonconceptualists argue that nonconceptual content 
is still synthesised content in the sense that it is synthesised by means 
of figurative synthesis, which Kant distinguishes from intellectual 
 synthesis, which nonconceptualists identify as uniquely characteristic 
of conceptual content. I argue that, although formally distinguishable, 
figurative synthesis (a.k.a. the productive imagination) is not possible 
without intellectual synthesis.
In Sect. 5.2, I discuss the conceptualist position of John McDowell, 
against which Lucy Allais argues and defends a nonconceptualist read-
ing of Kant; her position is discussed in Sect. 5.4. But before that, in 
Sect. 5.3, I first discuss the nonconceptualist position of Robert Hanna. 
Both Allais and Hanna spearheaded the discussion of Kantian non-
conceptualism in the mid- to late noughties. I therefore focus on their 
interpretations.10 In Sect. 5.5, I address some conceptualist interpre-
tations of a crucial passage in the run-up to TD, at A89–90/B122–3, 
which is the best evidence for a nonconceptualist interpretation of 
Kant. Against these interpretations, both conceptualist and nonconcep-
tualist, I make a case for a moderately conceptualist reading of Kant, 
which leaves room for nonconceptual mental content in some mini-
mal sense (Sect. 5.6); my reading is different from the aforementioned 
weak conceptualism in the way that I stress the modally moderate sense 
in which concept and intuition are related. Additional problems for the 
nonconceptualist readings of TD are flagged in due course.
5.2  McDowell on the Relation Between 
Concept and Intuition
McDowell (1996, 2009a) presents a view of the relation of concepts to 
sensory content, to which concepts must in some epistemically relevant 
way be answerable, that is in an important sense close to Kant’s view. 
Very globally put, the central problem that he is interested in concerns 
the foundation of empirical knowledge, or indeed, in more Kantian 
terms, the possibility of such knowledge. In McDowell’s view, Kant’s 
epea pteroënta “thoughts without content are empty, [and] intuitions 
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without concepts are blind” (A51/B75) hint at the solution to the prob-
lem. As Kant asserts, only in the connection of thoughts and intuitions 
is knowledge possible. This in itself does not give us much in terms of a 
solution to the problem of the possibility of knowledge. In some sense, 
we must be able to indicate what makes the connection work and to 
what extent thoughts and intuitions are effectively connected such that 
knowledge ensues or is made possible. The unifying element which con-
nects two distinguishable and irreducible items or “two stems of human 
knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding” (B29) into a unity 
concerns what Kant calls synthesis, or as McDowell (2009a:30–33) puts 
it, “togetherness”. I shall say more about this below.11
At B151–2, Kant speaks of a connection or combination of repre-
sentations that is non-intellectual—precisely what McDowell believes 
is necessary for having empirically contentual thoughts, that is, knowl-
edge that amounts to more than empty thoughts that, to put it in 
McDowell’s terms, “spin in a void”, in contrast to concepts that are 
answerable to the world. Kant calls this non-intellectual connection fig-
urative synthesis (synthesis speciosa) or also the transcendental synthesis 
of the imagination. This power of the imagination belongs to sensibility 
and combines the sensible representational material in an intuition into 
a unity. However, because according to Kant every synthesis is an act 
of spontaneity, an act of determination (cf. B129–30),12 and is not, as 
with sensibility, that which is determinable or being determined, tran-
scendental synthesis of the imagination is an a priori power that is the 
effect of the understanding itself on sensibility. After having differenti-
ated figurative from intellectual synthesis in the preceding section, Kant 
writes:
Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is 
not itself present. Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, 
owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the 
concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibil-
ity. But inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is 
determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely [bloß bestimmbar], 
and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in respect of its 
form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that 
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extent a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthe-
sis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories [den Kategorien 
gemäß ] must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. This 
synthesis is an action [Wirkung] of the understanding on the sensibility; 
and is the first application [of the understanding] to the objects of our 
 possible intuition. (B151–2; trans. Kemp Smith)
This passage is of central importance for answering the question 
regarding the relation between sensibility and the understanding, 
between intuition and concept. I believe that Hegel already saw clearly 
the relevance of Kant’s discussion of the productive imagination for 
addressing the issue concerning the relation between concept and sen-
sible content. In his early, formative essay Faith and Knowledge, which 
contains one of his earliest and most sustained expositions of Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy, Hegel points out that with the notion of the 
productive imagination Kant shows the way in transcending the epis-
temological dead ends of what Hegel calls “reflective philosophy”, 
which puts up barriers in terms of absolute distinctions between the 
elements of cognition, of which he accuses Kant too. Hegel interprets 
Kant’s notion of the productive imagination as the power of reason 
itself, of which the understanding and sensibility are mere derivative 
forms. In Hegel’s view, it is the productive imagination which forms 
the original-synthetic unity, from which the discursive understanding 
and sensibility first spring as differentiable elements. In this way, the 
productive imagination is to be seen as the ground of both sensibility 
and the understanding (GuW, 4:327): sensibility and the understand-
ing can first be differentiated, because they are different modifications 
of the same productive imagination. Productive imagination is what 
primordially unites concepts and sensory content, which thus solves 
the problem regarding the foundation of knowledge in sensibility, of 
how the understanding comes to determine sensible content. For pro-
ductive imagination is the synthetic a priori, rational principle which 
is operative in “extension” itself, as Hegel writes (GuW, 4:329, 341), 
in other words, it is operative in sensibility or intuition itself—it is the 
very principle of sensibility, as Hegel says (GuW, 4:327). (Hegel’s cri-
tique of Kant will be explored in detail in Chap. 8.)
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One can detect a similar Hegelian inspired reading of productive 
imagination as the combinatory factor between concept and intuition, 
the ‘togetherness’ of conceptuality and sensible content, in McDowell, 
who argues that conceptuality is already, in some sense, operative in sen-
sibility. Let me expand. Following Wilfrid Sellars, McDowell believes 
that “judging is not the only mode of actualization of conceptual 
capacities” (2009a:5). McDowell takes “judging” to be an act by virtue 
of our freedom, something for whose content we take responsibility, 
and for which we are held responsible and must give reasons if asked 
(cf. Chap. 3, this volume). If we make a claim to knowledge, that is, 
if there is a “knowing”, then we place that which we claim to know in 
the “logical space of reasons” in contrast to a merely sensible percep-
tion, or, being sensibly affected by an object, which as natural fact we 
place in the logical “space of nature” (McDowell 2009a:4–5).13 Judging 
as such a “knowing” is a typical epistemic fact which must be placed in 
the space of reasons. In his earlier book (McDowell 1996), McDowell 
outlined the explanatory problem with which the two classical episte-
mological theories, foundationalism and coherentism, are faced when 
trying to explain the justificatory basis of knowledge claims. What is 
interesting in this context is that in order to get out of this epistemo-
logical cul-de-sac McDowell appeals to Kant’s above-quoted adage that 
thoughts without intuition are empty and intuition without concepts 
blind. To guarantee a critical naturalism or empiricism which is not a 
reductive physicalism, our conceptuality, and hence our claim to true 
knowledge, must somehow eventually be grounded in what Sellars 
(1997:68–73) calls “observation reports”, and these, in turn, in sensi-
ble intuition or perception. Sensible perception must provide the justi-
ficatory ground of our knowledge claims, albeit that such “observation 
reports” themselves in turn necessarily rest on a perspective on the world 
(McDowell 2009a:6–7).
What McDowell picks up from Kant, partly following Sellars, is the 
belief that the manner in which our knowledge claims are grounded in 
sensibility, in such “observation reports”, is not one of being grounded in 
a purely given sensory content,14 such as sense data or factual objects in 
the world. The crucial point is that whatever necessary sensible content 
must be presupposed for knowledge, it will not as merely ‘given’ provide 
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the justificatory ground of knowledge. In the above-quoted passage at 
B151, Kant makes clear that the productive imagination, which bridges 
the gap between concept and intuition and so presumably provides the 
justificatory ground of knowledge, is not sensibility itself, which must be 
determined; rather, it is the determinative or determining element that 
provides this ground, since it is an “exercise of spontaneity” (Ausübung 
der Spontaneität) that alone can provide justifications for our beliefs.15 
Despite this, the productive imagination belongs to sensibility, which 
makes it properly answerable to the world of sensible objects.
Herein, McDowell sees the solution to the problem concerning the 
correspondence between concept and intuition, between judgement 
and perception. Perception itself, by virtue of this spontaneity in sen-
sibility, provides us with the justificatory basis of knowledge, which is, 
however, only first explicitly articulated conceptually in judgements. The 
sensible episodes of a perceptual experience “contain” already “a claim”, 
as McDowell (2009a:10–12)16 contends following Sellars. A percep-
tual experience is not merely an observation report, but is itself already 
intentionally directed towards the world. Perceptual experiences are not 
merely episodes of sensible content or even consciousness or awareness 
but already “actualizations of conceptual capacities” (2009a:10), if not 
yet fully-fledged judgements. In this way, however, the Kantian distinc-
tion between concept and intuition is not sublated, for—as McDowell 
(2009a:11) makes it clear—it being the case that we judge that things 
are as they appear to us in the way that they are, the fact that they 
appear to us in a certain way is not the same as judging that they so 
appear. The epistemic fact of judging is not reducible to the natural 
fact of the sensory affection, nor is the latter reducible to the former. 
Formally, concept and intuition, or, judgings and percepts, are separa-
ble. But in an actual episode of perceptual experience they are always 
already inextricably connected. In McDowell’s view, the intuition of an 
empirically given object is already a proto-judgement, which pre-forms, 
as it were, the objective predicative locution proper in an actual judge-
ment that has the predicative form S is P.
Also apparently important here is heeding the distinction between 
a singular representation or sensation and a self-standing  intuition, 
whereby Kant’s singularity criterion for intuition is emphasised 
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(see B41; B47; A19/B33; B377). Presumably, an intuition is by defini-
tion always already a perceptual experience of an object or a particular, 
not just an aggregate of representations (I believe that the distinction 
is not as clear-cut as some would make it out to be, for in Kant’s view 
sensations are just the empirical content of any empirical intuition, 
which connects it to objects; see A19–20/B34). As a demonstrative ‘this 
here’, such an experience is already conceptual. This narrow definition 
of intuition, as separable from sensations, plays a significant role in the 
debate surrounding nonconceptual content (I shall return to this aspect 
further below). According to both McDowell and Sellars, intuitions are 
thus already conceptual, in some sense. In contrast to McDowell, Sellars 
(1992:8) wants to retain though the idea of “sheer receptivity”, namely 
the purely being receptive to impressions or impingements of the exter-
nal world which as such are not conceptual. McDowell (2009a:16) sees 
no epistemically explanatory or transcendental role for “sheer recep-
tivity”. At first blush, it is indeed difficult to see what transcendental 
function “sheer receptivity” can fulfil for the explanation of epistemi-
cally relevant perception,17 in addition to acknowledging, as we saw 
McDowell do, that the fact that things appear to us (are “received” by 
us) is not the same as judging that they so appear.
For McDowell, the inseparability of concept and intuition is impor-
tant for understanding the way in which we orient ourselves in the 
world, are directed towards the world, as well as the manner in which 
the world is as it were preformed for our actual judgements about the 
world. McDowell insists, time and again, on the fact that knowledge 
is grounded in the connection between concept and intuition and 
that without this connection no knowledge is possible. This reveals 
his Kantian credentials. McDowell (2009a) demonstrates how Kant’s 
Leitfaden in the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) provides the key to the 
solution to the question of the justificatory ground of our knowledge 
claims. Kant writes:
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations 
in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of 
the understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by 
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means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form 
of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings 
a transcendental content into its representations by means of the syn-
thetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which 
they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects 
a priori […]. (A79/B104–5)
The Leitfaden indicates—and let me put this in the slightly misleading 
terms McDowell (2009a:33–35) uses—that the “togetherness” of items 
in judgements and between inferentially linked series of judgements, 
that is, a conceptual or logical “togetherness”, is also actualised on the 
level of sensibility. McDowell’s (2009a:29ff.) understanding of the 
Leitfaden shows that he has in any case understood well that the same 
conceptual operationalisation—Kant speaks of “the same function”—is 
active on two formally distinguishable levels, on the sensory as well as 
the conceptual level, within an actual empirical judgement.18 The role 
that perceptual experience plays is not a question of the putative given-
ness of sense data or some blind intuition on which judgement only 
post hoc imposes its conceptual structure. On the other hand, accord-
ing to McDowell perceptual experience is also not an act of free agency, 
as is the case in judgement proper. It is formally distinguishable from a 
judgement and at the same time it contributes to knowledge inseparably 
from judgement.
This last point concerning the distinguishability of a perceptual expe-
rience appears to contradict Kant’s own idea of productive imagination 
as an act of spontaneity, because for Kant any conceptual operationali-
sation can only be a spontaneous act of the understanding. McDowell 
exploits Kant’s distinction between receptivity and spontaneity with-
out granting an epistemic role to Sellars’s “sheer receptivity”. According 
to McDowell, a perceptual experience, which is a conceptual episode 
and not merely a sense impression or a mental state that is prompted 
by a sense impression, already “contains a claim”, whose content pre-
cisely corresponds to the content of a judgement. The difference, how-
ever, between perceptual experience and an actual judgement lies in 
the fact that the “actualization of conceptual capacities” in a perceptual 
experience is “involuntary” (McDowell 2009a:12). This is the reason 
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why McDowell wishes to talk about “actualization” and not about an 
“exercise” of “conceptual capacities” in sensibility (see e.g. McDowell 
1996:10).19 Free exercise, as spontaneity, is in McDowell’s view 
restricted to an actual judging, which is eo ipso predicative in nature, 
and not merely a perceptual experience. Conversely, a perceptual experi-
ence is not predicative.
This is an ingenious way of reading Kant’s account of the concept-
intuition relation. However, it is problematic both systematically and 
interpretatively. McDowell regards the act of judgement very much 
as an effective control one has over “one’s cognitive life” (2009a:11), 
in contrast to perception, in which logically there is an at least partly 
involuntary reaction to an external object which affects me from the 
outside and over which I thus have no control. McDowell (2009a:12) 
refers to an enunciation of Sellars’s, who expresses the conceptual in a 
perceptual experience in terms of a “claim [which] is, so to speak, evoked 
or wrung from the perceiver by the object perceived” (Sellars 1997:40; 
emphasis added). In contrast to “knowings”, “seeings”—i.e. “epistemic 
seeings” in Dretke’s sense20—contain claims and thus are conceptual 
episodes in such a way that these claims are “necessitated ” (McDowell 
2009a:12) by the object of perception. Sellars appears to exploit the 
English term ‘impression’ by pointing out that that which a perceptual 
experience contains in terms of a claim is ‘impressed’, as it were, upon 
the subject of perception.
In the context of McDowell’s as well as Sellars’s qualified empiricism, 
it is understandable that a strict distinction is maintained between pas-
sive sensibility and the judging subject, who actively ‘directs herself ’ 
intentionally to the object of perception. At the same time, McDowell 
wants to stress the fact that there is already, inchoately, a sense of inten-
tionality present in perceptual experience itself. A perceptual experience, 
as sensible awareness, is itself already intentionally directed at the world, 
as McDowell argues. Significantly, McDowell says that the German 
Anschauung would be best translated as “a having in view” (2009a:260), 
rather than as ‘intuition’. The key question is how the actualisation of 
conceptual capacities in perceptual experience is effectively achieved if it 
does not occur by means of an exercise of spontaneity, that is, an act 
of the understanding. There is nothing conceptual about sensible states 
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as such—something that is underscored by Sellars’s distinction between, 
on the one hand, “sheer receptivity”, the de facto receiving of sensations, 
and perceptual experience, on the other. For McDowell, however, it can-
not be the case that a perceptual episode is not in principle an item for 
judgement (2009a:19, 21n.32, 264). This makes McDowell’s position 
quintessentially conceptualist. That is, for McDowell perceptual episodes 
are conceptually laden or permeated and have always already intentional-
ity, even if independently of an effective act of the understanding (that 
is, independently of an actual judgement). They always already have the 
world in view, even though it is true to say that sensations qua sensations 
have that intentionality only “vestigially” (McDowell 2009a:121). The 
unity that is realised by the productive imagination is not “an amalgam, 
however intimately bound together, of components that belong severally 
to sensibility and understanding” (McDowell 2009a:124); on the con-
trary, as Hegel emphasised (GuW, 4:329), it is a unity which already lies 
in perceptual experience, it is as it were ‘immersed’ in sensibility itself. 
Hence, the directedness to the world must also already be contained in 
sensibility itself, by virtue of the productive imagination’s “actualization 
of conceptual capacities” in intuition. As McDowell observes, “the unity 
of intuitions is not prior to and independent of the unifying capacities of 
the understanding” (2009a:101).
But where does that leave the activity of the apperceiving subject who 
is conscious of her manifold sensations as her own and is a fortiori con-
scious of the unity which she herself puts into the manifold in intuition 
that she regards as her own? What is the role of self-consciousness in 
the actualisation of conceptual capacities in intuition? McDowell con-
siders his reading of the relation between conceptuality and intuitions 
as authentically Kantian. It is unclear, however, how McDowell visual-
ises the effective “actualization of conceptual capacities” in sensibility 
if it is not achieved by means of the understanding; furthermore, such 
a view of productive imagination contradicts Kant’s view that produc-
tive imagination is an “exercise of spontaneity” by the understanding, a 
legislative power or activity, and precisely not an “involuntary” neces-
sitation by the external object that affects me. As I argued in Chap. 3, 
Kant’s conception of spontaneity in the context of making judgements 
about empirical objects is such that it must be seen as a spontaneity 
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that is necessarily linked to receptivity of sense impressions; hence, it 
is a relative spontaneity, unlike the absolute spontaneity of our moral 
will. However, it is nonetheless the spontaneity of the understanding, by 
way of the imagination, which alone conceptually determines intuitions 
given in sensibility; receptivity only plays the role of providing sense 
impressions.
There is nothing involuntary about the imagination’s conceptual 
capacity in sensibility that determines our apprehension of impressions 
of objects. As Robert Pippin, reflecting on Sellars’s views, rightly notes, 
it is not the case that “some sort of mental activity is merely triggered 
into operation, or let us say, occurs non-apperceptively”, in other words, 
“the ‘evoking’ by a red object in sunlight of ‘this is red’ from a person 
who knows the language to which this sentence belongs is ‘no mere con-
ditioned response’” (2013:381–382). McDowell would probably agree 
on this last point, because we have seen him argue that in sensibility 
there is an actualisation of conceptual capacities that is not due to just 
the mere reception of impressions, but it is unclear to me what role, if 
any, McDowell accords the apperceptive spontaneous subject in such 
actualisation. What for Kant is clearly an act by the apperceptive subject, 
McDowell wants to prise apart from any active role on the subject’s part.
It is thus not surprising that McDowell talks about “togetherness” 
instead of “synthesis”, a term he anxiously avoids, as it might imply the 
activity of synthesising. “Togetherness”, by contrast, conveniently lacks 
the connotation of activity. McDowell even asserts, when he does mention 
synthesis, that “[m]ere synthesis just happens, it is not our doing, unlike 
making judgments, deciding what to think about something” (2009a:35). 
Synthesis is however not something that just happens. According to Kant, 
at least in the B-Deduction,21 the productive imagination or figurative 
synthesis is “an action [Wirkung] of the understanding on the sensibility” 
(B152; trans. Kemp Smith22), and synthesis is always “an act of [the sub-
ject’s] self-activity” (B130). The synthesis of the imagination is not a syn-
thesis that is distinct from the synthesis of the understanding, but is rather 
the effect of the synthesis of the understanding in sensibility itself; it is in 
sensibility that the understanding’s synthesis manifests itself as the synthe-
sis of the productive imagination, as a figurative rather than a merely intel-
lectual synthesis (cf. again B151–2) (see further Chap. 7).
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The unity that lies in perceptual experience is the unity that is put 
into the sensory content by an active subject, who is conscious of 
her act of judgement.23 The knowledge which the perceptual expe-
rience yields is not knowledge that merely results from the “together-
ness” of sensibility and understanding that is subsequently expressed 
propositionally in a judgement. Such “togetherness” would always be a 
merely contingent connection and not the necessary connection that is 
required for knowledge, and, importantly, must be recognised as such 
by the agent of judgement. An act of recognition must lie at the foun-
dation of a necessary connection (cf. B130; Chap. 6, this volume); how-
ever, such an act is not, as McDowell believes, a mere control over one’s 
cognitive life. What Kant means by a synthesis which is active on the 
level of sensibility itself is the subject’s own act of consciously taking 
responsibility for her conscious life, for all of her sensations and per-
ceptual experiences as her own. Of course, McDowell (2009a:72n.8) 
is right that it cannot be the case that the subject is continuously self-
reflective or inspecting herself. However, by construing ‘activity’ too 
reflectively (2009a:71) or indeed psychologically, as if some ‘muttering 
to oneself ’ were at issue (which is not at all what Kantian subjectivity is 
about), McDowell underestimates the fact that for Kant the justificatory 
ground of our knowledge claims lies, not in sensibility itself, no matter 
how conceptually loaded, but in the apperceiving act of the understand-
ing, in the act of judgement, alone (cf. A106–7) (see again Chap. 3).24
I believe that McDowell is thus wrong in claiming that “[n]ot all 
instances of that kind of unity [he means the ‘togetherness’ which lies in 
perceptual experience] need to be seen as resulting from free cognitive 
activity” (2009a:72). It may be obvious that certain kinds of connec-
tion—e.g. purely subjective associations of representations, or indeed 
the contingent arrays in which an arbitrary series of representations are 
prompted in the mind and isomorphically correspond to physiological 
sensations in the brain, which in their turn are physiologically linked 
up with the body—are not strictly speaking the product of spontane-
ous cognitive activity in the sense of Kantian apperception or a priori 
synthesis. A Kantian argument can be formulated to the effect that such 
contingent connections are in fact not due to the spontaneous activ-
ity of the understanding (see Schulting 2012a). However, Kant is clear 
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as to the fact that the combination at issue, combination in the strict 
sense of a priori synthesis, “can never come to us through the senses, 
and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intui-
tion” (B129; emphasis added). This is so, “for it is an act of the spon-
taneity of the power of representation” and “all combination […] is an 
action of the understanding”, which “we would designate with the gen-
eral title ‘synthesis’” (B129–30).25 Kant means a specific, a priori, neces-
sary and hence a priori intelligible necessary connection and not just any 
causal connection that just results from being contingently, a posteriori 
affected by or being impressed with sensory content (on these issues see 
again Chap. 3). In contrast to McDowell, Kant thus stresses that it is 
the subject who a priori puts the combination into the object, and so 
into the manifold of intuition. The combination or “togetherness” is 
therefore a result of the activity of the cognising subject, not something 
that is encountered as already contained in the sensible manifold, in any 
mere perceptual episode.
In a later essay (McDowell 2009b:264–265), however, McDowell 
abandons the language of “togetherness” and advances a somewhat dif-
ferent reading of the relation between the unity of intuition and the 
unity of judgement, which there he regards as more intimate. With 
 reference to the Leitfaden passage, he asserts that both the unity of intu-
ition and the unity of judgements are grounded in “an operation of the 
same unifying function”, just as Kant says. The unity of intuition might 
be said even to be due to the power to judge, but McDowell is adamant 
that it still not be seen as a conscious discursive activity, in the way that 
connecting concepts in a judgement is—even though he stresses that 
it is neither a “pre-discursive” activity. To put the point differently, in 
McDowell’s own words, “even though the unity-providing function is 
a faculty for discursive activity, it is not in discursive activity that these 
[conceptual] capacities are operative in intuitions” (2009b:265; empha-
sis added). So while McDowell is more aware of the one single ground 
of both unities, he still prises the activity in intuition apart from the 
discursive activity of explicit conceptual utterances. As with the earlier 
expounded views of McDowell, this reading is faced with the difficulty 
of how to account for the way in which the “actualisations of concep-
tual capacities” in intuitions effectively do become explicitly propositional 
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content in judgements, and so fails to explain Kant’s central question 
about the possibility of knowledge, which for Kant is allied to the ques-
tion of synthetic a priori judgements.26
This problem is exemplified by McDowell’s emphasising that the con-
ceptual content of an intuition is “in the intuition in a form in which 
one could make it, that very content, figure in discursive activity”—he 
speaks of a “potential for discursive activity” (2009b:265). In this way, 
McDowell introduces a modal element, which makes it difficult to 
understand what makes the unity of intuition subsequently become an 
actual judgement if it is the same function, by means of the same actions, 
that operates both in intuition and at the level of judgement.27 On 
McDowell’s reading, it appears that either there are—despite his insist-
ence to the contrary—in effect two functions, which operate separately 
at distinct stages of the cognitive process—in perceptual experiences 
and in judgings, or there is indeed one function, but which operates 
in separable contexts and under different conditions, namely, either 
as non-discursive activity in an intuition or as discursive activity in an 
actual judgement—which begs the question as to what binds the two 
functions or, if there is still one function, its distinct operations or activ-
ities, in cases where there is in fact a genuine judgement about a per-
ceived object, which “redeploys some of the content of the intuition” 
(2009b:266), to use McDowell’s phrase. McDowell (2009b:270) talks 
about a potentiality of the intuitional content being actualised in a dis-
cursive “tak[ing] to be so”; but it is unclear how McDowell envisages by 
what means the potential is actualised or realised. The modal talk about 
the potential for conceptual content (in intuition) becoming actual-
ised stands in tension with the claim that the unity of intuition and the 
unity of judgement are due to the same conceptual capacities, even to 
the same capacity to judge; if the same function is the ground, both of 
the potential conceptual content of an intuition and of the actual con-
ceptual content of a discursive judgement, then the actualisation of the 
potential in an intuition cannot rest on that same function, but requires 
another, additional function.28
But of course, for Kant, the “same function” of synthesis is precisely 
intended to be the single original function that already binds con-
cepts and intuitions at the most fundamental level, beyond which there 
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is no further, even more fundamental function, by means of which 
the content of intuition “could […] figure in [the] discursive activity” 
(McDowell 2009b:265) of a judgement. It seems that McDowell misap-
prehends the a priori nature of the synthesis of concept and intuition 
that is at issue in TD. If a priori synthesis is supposed to ground the rela-
tion between intuition and concept at the fundamental level, then there 
is no more original function, by virtue of which the content of intuition 
can, in a (possible) subsequent stage of cognition, become, or “enable” 
(McDowell 2009b:266), the content of explicitly discursive activity. The 
intuitional content either is or is not the content of such discursive activ-
ity, as that activity is operative in judgement. Intuition does not enable a 
judgement, it is the content of a judgement, or it is not.
McDowell acknowledges that “much of the content of an ordinary 
visual intuition, the capacities that are in play in one’s having it as part 
of the content of one’s intuition are not even susceptible of discursive 
exercise”—he mentions the “finely discriminable shapes and shades of 
colour that visual experience presents to one” (2009b:265; emphasis 
added). Such content is clearly not content that figures in judgements. 
But this stands in tension with his other claim that “an intuition’s con-
tent is all conceptual”, in the sense that it has the disposition to be 
made to “figure in discursive activity” (McDowell 2009b:265), that is, 
in judgements. Such a view begs the question against the (essential) 
nonconceptualist, who denies that intuitional content is conceptual, 
let alone must figure in judgements (although it could)—a position we 
shall consider in the following sections.
Concluding my exposition on McDowell, it becomes apparent that 
McDowell’s more phenomenologically inclined view on the intentional-
ity towards objects and Kant’s transcendental analysis of the possibility 
of synthetic a priori knowledge claims articulated in judgements, given 
the actuality of such knowledge claims, constitute two different perspec-
tives. In Kant’s account the perspective is consistently from the vantage 
point of the judging subject that makes empirical claims about objects 
and is aware of so judging, whereas McDowell’s view shows more a kind 
of two-stage bottom-up analysis from perception, in which the self-
conscious subject does not (yet) figure; indeed, he makes it clear that 
non-propositional experience, that is, the non-discursively “bringing 
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our surroundings into view” in intuition, “is not taking things to be so” 
(McDowell 2009b:269; emphasis added), which is what we first do in 
judgements. On this reading, although McDowell contends that both 
intuition and judgement have the same conceptual content, one can 
have an intuition of an object as red, say, entitling one to judge that 
the thing perceived is so, without in fact having to explicitly judge that 
the object is so; only the latter activity entails the possibility of explicit 
rational reflection.29
The deflationary reading of the role of subjectivity for the actu-
alisation of the connection in the representational material or sensory 
content of an intuition, and the failure to heed the a priori nature of 
synthesis, is also characteristic for an interpretation that is at least in 
one important sense diametrically opposed to McDowell’s conceptual-
ist construal of the relation between concepts and intuition. In the next 
two sections I expand on that reading.
5.3  Hanna’s Nonconceptualism
Against the traditionally conceptualist reading of Kant’s argument about 
the relation between concept and intuition, Hanna (2005, 2008)30 
defends the existence of non-conceptual content. According to Hanna, 
the thesis of the nonconceptuality of mental content (hereafter noncon-
ceptualism for short) rests on the idea
that representational content is neither solely nor wholly determined by 
our conceptual capacities, and that at least some contents are both solely 
and wholly determined by nonconceptual capacities and can be shared by 
human and non-human animals alike. (2008:42)
Hanna pits this thesis against the thesis of conceptualism, which says that 
mental content is wholly determined by conceptual capacities and that 
the psychological states of non-human beings (animals) lack mental (rep-
resentational) content.31 Hanna (2008:44) asserts that perceptual states 
exist whose representational content is not, not even in principle, concep-
tual. This does not imply that such states lack representational content. 
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Hanna provides philosophical evidence independently of the Kantian 
context, but he also contends that the existence of such states can 
be proven by virtue of the very passage from the Critique quoted by 
McDowell in support of his conceptualism, viz. that “[t]houghts without 
content are empty [and] intuitions without concepts are blind” (B75). On 
the basis of this and other passages (e.g. B122–3; see further below the 
discussion in Sect. 5.5), Hanna regards Kant not only, like most interpret-
ers of Kant, as the founder of conceptualism, but also and foremost as the 
founder of nonconceptualism. According to nonconceptualism, intuitions 
can indeed be given without concepts being required, just as concepts are 
thinkable without (sensible) intuition.
Hanna (2008:45–46) aims at a “bottom-up” theory of human ration-
ality. That is to say, he has in mind an analysis of the
two-way ladder by which the world is consciously delivered up from 
embodied animal experience to self-conscious thought and action- 
oriented deliberation, and then is downwardly transformed by our think-
ing and action under universal a priori norms. (Hanna 2008:62–63)
To this end, he distinguishes between first-person information 
 processing and subpersonal information processing. Although it is 
nonconceptual and non-self-conscious, subpersonal information pro-
cessing takes place from the first-person perspective and involves 
consciousness (Hanna 2008:59). Hanna argues for the distinction 
between self-consciousness and “sensorimotor subjectivity” (2008:59), 
which is the primitive capacity of conscious, neurobiological beings 
and which is based on primitive bodily consciousness, such as proprio-
ception, kinaesthesia, orientation, feeling of pain, etc. The central, and 
valid, philosophical point that Hanna makes concerns the fact that 
“self-consciousness or self-reflection requires sensorimotor subjectiv-
ity, but sensorimotor subjectivity does not require self-consciousness or 
 self-reflection” (2008:59).
Confirmation of this viewpoint is provided by the famous case of 
blind-sight patients who are able to perform acts of which they are at 
the same time not self-aware of performing them. It would be very 
implausible to assume that such patients “are mere robots in the blind 
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areas of their self-conscious visual fields” (Hanna 2008:60–61). Hanna 
associates this with Kant’s notion of blind intuition (B75–6). An intui-
tion is blind if a self-conscious, conceptual processing of information 
does not take place, but at the same time such an intuition is repre-
sentational content which involves sensorimotor subjectivity in what 
Kant calls inner sense. According to Hanna, an intuition is always 
conscious mental content and also directly refers to an object. Blind 
intuition is “essentially non-conceptual content” (Hanna 2008:62).32 
Nonconceptual content is characterised by its own “lower-level sponta-
neity” (Hanna 2008:62), which Hanna associates with Kant’s synthesis 
speciosa or figurative synthesis. Hanna emphasises that the “lower-level 
spontaneity” is irreducible to “higher-level spontaneity”, the synthe-
sis performed by the understanding or the synthesis intellectualis. Also, 
Hanna argues that “lower-level spontaneity”, which knows its own nor-
mativity, is the “necessary ground” for the rational spontaneity of the 
higher level, and that both nonconceptual and conceptual content “are 
complementary to one another in the constitution of atomic or basic 
perceptual judgments, or what Kant calls ‘judgments of experience’” 
(2008:62).
Hanna’s arguments for the existence of nonconceptual content—one 
of them is a very illuminating account of Kant’s early argument about 
incongruent counterparts (2008:53ff.)—are sound and in my view 
convincing. However, his more specific views on Kant in respect of the 
issues at stake, especially the alleged distinction between “lower-level” 
and “higher-level” spontaneity, is seriously problematic, both philo-
sophically and as an interpretation of Kant. Interpretatively, it would be 
difficult, on Hanna’s reading, to explain why Kant says that it is “one 
and the same spontaneity that, there under the name of imagination and 
here under the name of understanding, brings combination into the 
manifold of intuition” (B162n.; emphasis added). Hanna postulates the 
idea that the Sellarsian space of reasons is nothing but “a discursive—
that is, a conceptual, judgment-driven, and linguistic—and a priori 
normative superstructure built on the platform of essentially non-concep-
tual embodied animal experience” (2008:63; emphasis added). If this 
were indeed the case—and the language used is significant—then, as 
Hanna effectively claims, “essentially non-conceptual embodied animal 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
se
s O
nly
experience” would be the epistemically relevant, foundational ground of 
all rational experience and knowledge; put differently, essentially non-
conceptual content would be the exogenous normative constraint of 
conceptuality.
This is in stark contrast to McDowell’s view, who as we have seen 
maintains that the role of intuition or receptivity cannot be regarded as 
exercising a normative constraint on our rational claims from the outside. 
Intuition does not play a constraining role on our conceptuality exog-
enously, supposedly in a non-conceptual way. The philosophically more 
pertinent question is how something nonconceptual can in fact be the 
explanatory, let alone the justificatory ground of the conceptual without 
falling back into an unwelcome foundationalism, which invites all kinds 
of vicious infinite regress. McDowell’s conceptualist reading does not 
suffer from this problem, even if it is true that he misapprehends Kant’s 
emphasis on the activity of our rational capacities which connect con-
cepts with intuition, that is, the ineliminable role of subjective agency.
Hanna cannot explain what it is that connects two irreducible and 
essentially different things, namely, the essentially nonconceptual—i.e. 
“embodied animal experience”—with what is essentially conceptual—
i.e. rational thought and “action-oriented deliberation”—in such a 
way that together they yield objective knowledge. The main philo-
sophical problem comes down to being able to explain how the two 
 irreducibly separable constituents of knowledge, nonconceptual sensi-
ble  content and the conceptual, do link up so that knowledge can arise 
from it. This is especially pertinent when the Kantian terminology of 
 figurative  synthesis and intellectual synthesis is employed, for regardless 
of their exact nature Kant at any rate means these differentiable forms 
of  synthesis clearly as operating only in their conjunction. If, as Hanna 
suggests, figurative synthesis as the lower-level spontaneity corresponds 
to the nonconceptual and intellectual synthesis as the higher-level spon-
taneity corresponds to the conceptual, and both are separable, then the 
operative question is: What connects the figurative synthesis with the 
intellectual synthesis such that a proper judgement ensues? Which fur-
ther synthesis is responsible for their synthesis? And how does the threat 
of an infinite regress here relate to Kant’s view that the synthesis at issue 
in TD is an a priori and transcendental synthesis, that is, an original 
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synthesis which grounds any other empirical synthesis and which itself 
does not depend on an even more original synthesis but should rather be 
seen as a regress-stopper?33
If Hanna were right that figurative synthesis is the necessary ground 
of intellectual synthesis (2008:62), then it would seem that the lower-
level spontaneity grounds the higher-level spontaneity, which given the 
specifics of spontaneity—namely, a self-activity (B130) or causality that 
is itself uncaused (cf. B430; A533/B561; A445ff./B473ff.)—seems odd 
to say the least. How does this work? This would surely be to reverse 
the order of what is ground and what is grounded. How can something 
that is not caused by anything except itself be grounded in something 
other that is in any case not more fundamental or original (and in fact, is 
rather less fundamental)?34 At any rate, it conflicts with Kant’s view that 
a priori synthesis is the spontaneous act or “self-activity” of the under-
standing (B130; B132; B150); there is nothing, certainly not a puta-
tive “lower-level” spontaneity, which can ground it, for if there were it 
would cancel out its very originality. If Hanna intends this grounding to 
mean that intellectual synthesis, or, the higher-level spontaneity simply 
latches onto the lower-level, more primitive spontaneity, which suppos-
edly grounds the former, then one can hardly speak of spontaneity in 
the proper sense of the term anymore (or it should be in terms of merely 
relative spontaneity; see again the discussion in Chap. 3).
A distinction between a priori synthesis and actual causal connec-
tions, a posteriori syntheses, must be heeded. The fact that essentially 
nonconceptual mental content exists does not eo ipso imply that this 
content is synthesised content in Kant’s sense—i.e. synthesised a priori, 
that is, synthesised by virtue of necessary synthesis. A proof of the exist-
ence of nonconceptual mental content follows analytically from Kant’s 
argument for the unity of self-consciousness. In accordance with the 
principle of apperception (B131–2), not all conscious content is ana-
lytically unified content, namely mental content that is something for 
me, I being the identical subject aware of my representations as my own. 
Hence, given that analytically unified mental content requires the cate-
gories, mental content that is not so unified is nonconceptual content.35 
But the same argument will also show that it logically follows that such 
mental content cannot be synthesised content (in Kant’s sense) either, 
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given the rigorous coextensivity of the analytic and synthetic unities of 
apperception (cf. B133).36 So nonconceptual content cannot be content 
synthesised by figurative synthesis. Hanna’s assertion that essentially 
nonconceptual mental content is characterised at least by figurative syn-
thesis is not based on Kant’s own argumentation. Although, given the 
two-step structure of the argument of TD, intellectual synthesis and fig-
urative synthesis are formally distinguishable, figurative synthesis is not 
really possible without intellectual synthesis having been satisfied, for 
the act of figurative synthesis is the act of the same understanding which 
operates both on the “intellectual” or conceptual level of a judgement 
and the level of “intuition” in a judgement (see A79/B104–5). A more 
in-depth defence of my claims is required than I can provide here,37 
but at any rate the passage we have been discussing in the preceding 
 sections, at B151–2, makes sufficiently clear that figurative synthesis 
does not come apart from intellectual synthesis, since  figurative synthe-
sis is the effect of the understanding’s own act of synthesis (intellectual 
synthesis). If you remove intellectual synthesis, you remove figurative 
synthesis.
One could argue that, in a formal analysis, it would be possible to 
have an intellectual synthesis that does not imply the instantiation of a 
figurative synthesis if, for example, one abstracts from the application 
of the categories to a spatiotemporal sensible manifold and considers 
discursive modes of cognition that make use of a different way of sche-
matising (cf. B148–9). But the reverse does not hold: one cannot have 
a figurative synthesis, even analyse it, without presupposing the  effective 
instantiation of an intellectual synthesis, since the latter is a necessary 
condition for the former. It should also be pointed out that—at any 
rate in Kant’s internalist perspective—such mental contents that are 
nonconceptual are as such epistemically irrelevant, as indeed McDowell 
maintains, because they are “nothing to” the self-conscious subject, the 
conscious ‘I’ (B131–2). McDowell rightly observes that “[w]ithout the 
higher faculty, sensibility can yield at most the representations, merely 
associatively ordered and so not amounting to cognitions, that Kant 
allows to non-rational animals” (2009a:119), although I should like to 
qualify this to the extent that such merely associatively ordered repre-
sentations occur, de facto and not just hypothetically, also in rational 
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animals, human beings. In other words, nonconceptual content has as 
such no epistemically or transcendentally relevant role to play whatso-
ever—although of course de facto given sensory content has such a role, 
just insofar as it must be assumed to be given on pain of there not being 
knowledge at all; but this requirement is of course not denied even by 
(strong) conceptualists.
5.4  Allais’s Nonconceptualism
In her original article on nonconceptual content in relation to the repre-
sentation of space (Allais 2009), Allais reacts against the standard read-
ing of Kant’s theory of the a priori forms of intuition as the condition of 
the representation of particular objects, and the way concepts are said to 
be involved in this. This reading amounts to believing that
we cannot be perceptually presented with, or represent, particular 
things independently of our applying, or having the ability to apply, 
 concepts, and in particular the categories, to these particulars […].  
(Allais 2009:384)
Like Hanna, Allais criticises the view that no mental representational 
content exists independently of concepts. Allais contends that for 
Kant it is not necessary to apply concepts to have external particular 
objects presented to one in intuition. She emphasises that the role of 
intuition consists precisely in presenting us with particular objects and 
that intuition plays this role independently of conceptuality. In this 
way, Allais (2009:384–385) goes against McDowell’s (1996:9) asser-
tion that intuition does not make an “even notionally separate contri-
bution to cognition”.
Similarly to Hanna, Allais argues for the existence of (relatively) non-
conceptual content.38 Allais’s thesis is that although it cannot be denied 
that actual intuitions must be conceptualised in order to yield knowl-
edge, it must be denied that intuitions must be conceptualised in order 
to present us with objects. To claim the latter, namely that intuitions 
must be conceptualised even to present us with objects, would be to 
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argue for “strong conceptualism” (Allais 2009:386). In opposition to 
McDowell, Allais argues that intuition does make a separable contribu-
tion to cognition, which consists in the fact that intuition perceptually 
provides us with individuals, particular objects, which concepts can-
not do. Allais emphasises Kant’s definition of intuition as that which, 
in contrast to a concept, refers immediately to a particular, singular 
object (cf. A320/B377; A68/B93; A19/B33; B47/A3239). The thesis 
of the blindness of intuition (A51/B75) does not mean, according to 
Allais (2009:393), that an intuition has no representational value or 
function. On the contrary, it belongs to the definition of an intuition 
that it gives us the object.40 Allais points out that for an intuition and 
hence for the perception of a particular object the use of concepts as 
general rules, as constituents of judgements and thus of the understand-
ing, is not required.41 Intuition provides or gives us the object about 
which we think and it is only in the second instance that the concept 
enables us to think about the object, or to make judgements about it 
(Allais 2009:390). This view is confirmed by what Kant writes in his 
later, unpublished Prize Essay:
By the intuition that accords with a concept the object is given; with-
out that it is merely thought. By this mere intuition without concept the 
object is given, indeed, but not thought; by the concept without corre-
sponding intuition it is thought but not given; thus in both cases it is not 
known. (FM, 20:325 [Kant 2002:406])
In contrast to McDowell and Sellars, Allais believes it is important to 
acknowledge that Kant understands the epistemic role of intuition as 
such not as merely causal or that intuition would only have an informa-
tion-processing role. Intuition, by “giving us objects”, enables, and so 
is partly responsible for, objectively valid knowledge (Allais 2009:391). 
However, although Kant sees intuition as an indispensable source for 
knowledge, I believe Allais, like Hanna, goes beyond Kant by suggesting 
that it is intuition that enables the objective reference for our knowledge 
claims, since objective validity, for Kant, is always and only a function 
of judgement, hence a function of our conceptuality, not of intuition. 
It is only in judgement that we achieve genuine reference to objects.42 
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In her defence, it should be pointed out though that Allais (2009:405) 
makes an important distinction between being presented with objects 
and the presentation of an object as object, which “the non- concept- 
having creature is arguably not in a position” to do (cf. Allais 2009: 
407, 413); the presentation with objects would then be a function of 
intuition, whereas the representation of an object as object would be a 
function solely of the understanding or conceptuality.
That intuition fulfils an epistemic role independently of conceptu-
ality implies, according to Allais (2009:394), that intuition itself must 
be attributed a nonconceptual mental processing function. Allais con-
nects this processing function with Kant’s synthesis (2009:395). Like 
Hanna, she associates intuition with figurative synthesis. She considers 
the possible objection that if intuition requires synthesis and synthesis is 
always governed by concepts, then intuition must itself also already be 
conceptual content, just as Kantian conceptualists argue. Allais’s reply 
is that synthesising is not yet or not the same as conceptualising and 
that “[a]lthough concepts always involve synthesis, it does not follow 
that synthesis always involves concepts” (2009:396n.35). According to 
Allais, then, intuition indeed requires synthesis, but synthesis itself is 
not already conceptual. Allais writes:
To say that we perform syntheses that are governed by the categories (and 
other concepts), and indeed that we must do this if we are to be able to 
apply the categories (and other concepts), is not to say that synthesis per 
se is governed by concepts […]. (2009:396)43
Allais is right that the fact that concepts always require synthesis does 
not imply that synthesis always requires concepts only if she means by 
the latter that synthesis per se requires “other concepts”, i.e. empirical 
concepts. However, I take it that Allais really means that synthesis does 
not require the categories, not just empirical concepts. Allais is ambigu-
ous here about which kind of ‘concept’ is at issue. (Also the oft-used 
but vague terminology of “governed by” is not helpful here.) If she 
means ‘empirical concept’ or just the ‘analytic unity of a common mark’ 
shared by a multiplicity of representations—the concept <red>, say, 
common to the empirical concepts <tomato>, <bus 93 to Putney>, and 
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<Labour>—then of course synthesis is not conceptual and so does not 
require concepts, for a synthetic unity is by definition not an analytic 
unity, let alone an empirical concept. However, in the context of TD 
Kant means ‘concept’ as ‘pure concept’ or as “consciousness of this unity 
of synthesis” (A103), hence as category.
The question regarding the use of empirical concepts, and whether 
or not they are necessary for the possibility of having an intuition, is 
not germane to the central question whether figurative synthesis is or 
is not amenable to categorial determination.44 However, the view that 
“synthesis per se” is not “governed” by, or does not require, the cate-
gories, as Allais thinks, must be considered mistaken. That according 
to Allais synthesis supposedly is not already conceptual would at least 
appear to be in conflict with Kant’s assertion in one of his Reflexionen 
from the 1780s, where transcendental synthesis of the imagination is 
said  minimally to involve “a concept of the object in general”:
The transcendental synthesis of the imagination pertains solely to the 
unity of apperception in the synthesis of the manifold in general through 
the imagination. Through that a concept of the object in general is con-
ceived in accordance with the different kinds of transcendental synthesis. 
(LBl, B 12, 23:18 [Kant 2005:258])45
That Allais does believe that synthesis and categories can come separate 
shows her misunderstanding regarding the intimate relation between a pri-
ori synthesis and the categories, as if a priori synthesis and categorial deter-
mination were, or rested on, two wholly separable functions. Rather, the 
set of categories just is the set of rules for synthesis. Take these Reflexionen:
Now the categories are nothing other than the representations of some-
thing (appearance) in general so far as it is represented through transcen-
dental synthesis of imagination […].
The manifold, however, cannot thoroughly belong to one apperception 
except by means of a thoroughgoing synthesis of imagination and its 
functions in one consciousness. This transcendental unity in the synthe-
sis of imagination is thus an a priori unity under which all appearances 
must stand. Those [i.e., den Functionen derselben = the functions of the 
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synthesis of imagination] however are the categories, thus the categories 
express the necessary unity of apperception under which all appearances 
belong insofar as they belong to one cognition a priori and necessarily. 
(LBl B 12, 23:19 [Kant 2005:259])
That the a priori synthesis of the imagination in sensibility and categorial 
determination are not separable is further made clear by the Leitfaden: a 
priori synthesis is precisely the way (“the same function”) in which catego-
rial determination takes place, on two levels simultaneously, conceptually 
(intellectual synthesis) and in the sensible content of intuition (figurative 
synthesis). In any given empirical judgement, a priori synthesis precisely 
is the ‘application’ or ‘schematisation’ of the categories to/in intuition, so 
that a priori synthesis and categorial determination are coextensive in all 
possible cases of such judgements. The standard reading is that synthesis 
is an activity that is separate or separable from the set of categories itself or 
indeed from categorial determination, but that makes it unintelligible how 
supposedly by virtue of synthesis the categories get ‘applied’ (if ‘applied’ is 
the proper term). If indeed synthesis and categorial determination were 
separable functions, which are not necessarily coextensive in all cases, as 
Allais suggests, the question arises as to which function other than synthe-
sis—and, lest we forget, we are talking a priori synthesis here, naturally—
would perform the unification of the synthesis (of the imagination) and 
the categories. This leads inevitably to an infinite regress. The categories 
being so many modes of synthesising pre-given manifolds in intuition 
(Prol, 4:305; LBl B 12, 23:19) and the act of synthesis being the com-
bined set of these modes of synthesising, by implication synthesis cannot 
be separate from, and so by definition always requires, the categories.46
Importantly, Kant’s procedure in the B-Deduction is such that the 
argument of the ‘second step’, which concerns the analysis of the possi-
bility of knowledge of spatiotemporal objects, is part of the overall argu-
ment about the constitutive elements of possible experience. In a certain 
respect, the argument of the ‘second step’ is of course independent of 
the argument of the ‘first step’, but the order of reasoning is clearly from 
the analysis of the intellectual synthesis in the ‘first step’ to the ‘second 
step’s argument about figurative synthesis.47 Intellectual synthesis is 
thus a necessary condition of figurative synthesis, but the latter is not 
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a necessary condition of the former. Therefore, there cannot be any 
figurative synthesis (in the sense of Kant’s a priori synthesis of the tran-
scendental imagination, which is at issue in the ‘second step’) that does 
not presuppose an intellectual synthesis.
Purely formally, in the context of the analysis of TD, there can be an 
intellectual synthesis without figurative synthesis, namely when we con-
sider forms of discursive synthesis that do not rely on the kind of sensibility 
the human understanding relies on (cf. B149–50), and so requires a differ-
ent given intuition to perform its act of synthesising, or indeed, when we 
study the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction in abstraction from the ‘second 
step’ (as I myself did in Schulting 2012b). However, a figurative synthesis 
always presupposes the intellectual synthesis, precisely because it is a more 
particular instantiation of the intellectual synthesis in human sensibility; as 
Kant puts it, figurative synthesis is “an effect of the understanding on sen-
sibility and its [desselben] first application […] to objects of the intuition 
that is possible for us” (B152; emphasis added). The figurative synthesis is 
as much an activity carried out by the understanding as is the intellectual 
synthesis, which is the Verstandesverbindung that is “thought in the mere 
category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general” (B151). In 
fact, given that the figurative synthesis is an effect of the understanding on 
sensibility, and given that the understanding is the intellectual synthesis in 
abstraction from empirical intuition (B152),48 the figurative synthesis is 
the intellectual synthesis, as carried out in sensibility, in the context of an 
actual empirical judgement. Therefore, a figurative synthesis that would be 
independent of the understanding is simply impossible. The putative inde-
pendence of figurative synthesis from the understanding is directly refuted 
by a passage in B164, where Kant affirms that, with respect to the unity of 
the intellectual synthesis of a sensible intuition, the imagination “depends 
on the understanding”.
Apart from interpretative questions, if figurative synthesis were to be 
something wholly different from categorial determination, that is, intel-
lectual synthesis, then the question would arise—the same question that 
arose with Hanna’s construal—as to how figurative synthesis is in its 
turn synthesised with categorial determination or intellectual synthesis, 
landing us in a vicious infinite regress, the regress that a priori, original 
synthesis was precisely designed to block.
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Although, as Allais acknowledges, Kant makes it clear at 
B129–30 that “all combination […] is an action of the understanding” 
(emphasis added),49 Allais relies on Kant’s account of synthesis in the 
A-Deduction, where Kant more explicitly differentiates the various 
forms of synthesis, ostensibly only one of which involves concepts, 
namely the synthesis of recognition; she takes this differentiation to 
confirm her understanding of intuitional or figurative synthesis, which 
is identical to the synthesis of the imagination, as nonconceptual. 
Allais also emphasises Kant’s remark in the run-up to TD, after Kant 
has defined ‘synthesis’, that synthesis is the effect of the imagination, “a 
blind though indispensable function of the soul” (B103/A78). (Notice, 
however, that in the margin of his own copy of the A-edition of the 
Critique Kant substituted “understanding” for “soul”, which is sig-
nificant to say the least and points to his refashioning of the argument 
in the B-edition, although it should be noted that he did not in fact 
replace “soul” in the parallel passage in the B-edition.) It might appear 
odd for Kant to make the distinction in B103 between synthesis in gen-
eral and “to bring this synthesis to concepts” if both were indeed to be 
seen as functions of the same understanding. Nevertheless, in conform-
ity with the Leitfaden, it is precisely Kant’s claim that one function of 
the understanding brings about two syntheses, on both the conceptual 
level and in intuition, and at the same time (not separately and con-
secutively). More decisively, as I argued above, in the B-Deduction Kant 
speaks explicitly of the productive imagination or figurative synthesis as 
an “effect of the understanding” (B152; emphasis added).
But also in the A-Deduction and before, there is evidence on the 
basis of which it is questionable to regard each element of the three-
fold synthesis as a separable source of knowledge. Take this striking 
passage from the Duisburg Nachlass, written some 6 years before the 
A-Deduction:
The synthesis contains the relation of appearances not in the perception 
but in the concept. That all relation in perception nevertheless presup-
poses a relation in the concept indicates that the mind contains in itself 
the universal and sufficient source of synthesis and all appearances are 
exponible in it. (Refl 4681, 17:667 [Kant 2005:174; emphasis added])
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
In the A-Deduction, Kant clearly aims at providing a regressive analysis 
of knowledge by explaining the “threefold synthesis, which is necessar-
ily found in all cognition” (A97), where knowledge is the explanandum 
and synthesis the explanans. Also, Kant argues that the synthesis of 
apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction of the imagination are 
“inseparably bound” (A102; trans. Kemp Smith) and that without rec-
ognition in the concept “all reproduction in the series of representations 
would be in vain” (A103). This suggests that neither syntheses can oper-
ate singly, in isolation from the others. However, A124 appears to lend 
support to Allais’s reading. There, Kant argues that it is first by means of 
the unity of apperception that “concepts that belong to the understand-
ing can come about, but only by means of the imagination in relation 
to the sensible intuition”, and that the unity of apperception “must be 
added to the pure imagination in order to make its function intel-
lectual”. He continues: “For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, 
although exercised a priori, is nevertheless always sensible, for it com-
bines the manifold only as it appears in intuition […]” (boldface mine). 
However, I contend that this passage must be read in the context of the 
regressive analysis of the possibility of knowledge, not as if the unity of 
apperception, and hence the categories, and the imagination were to be 
seen as separably instantiated (see further Chap. 6).
Understandably, Allais wants to keep both syntheses, intellectual and 
figurative, separate, since like Hanna she insists on two modes of synthe-
sising that are not necessarily coextensive or do not necessarily entail each 
other, and only one of which is due to the conceptual capacities of the 
understanding, which comports with the strict distinction that she empha-
sises between nonconceptual content, or the intuition of particulars, and 
concepts. In her and Hanna’s nonconceptual construal of intuition, intui-
tion must in and of itself contain a synthetic connection between the rep-
resentations that constitute its content (its object-reference) independently 
of the categories and hence independently of intellectual synthesis. This 
function of an independent synthetic connection in intuition is putatively 
carried out by figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis performs this func-
tion separably from the understanding and its synthetic activity.
In her most recent work (Allais 2015, 2016), it seems to me that Allais 
has not dramatically changed her view, although she now emphasises, 
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importantly, that not all forms of binding are forms of synthesis in Kant’s 
strong sense, so that intuition can be characterised by a kind of combina-
tion (“binding”, as Allais calls it, referring to cognitive or empirical psy-
chology) that is short of being a priori synthesis in Kant’s sense.50 But 
she still appears to insist that there are pre-conceptual forms of synthe-
sis in Kant’s sense, such as the synthesis of the imagination, that may be 
required for the unity of intuition, but do not involve the categories (Allais 
2015). This reading overly differentiates, as did her earlier reading (2009), 
between synthesis and the categories as applied to sensibility. However, 
Allais (2015:267) also acknowledges that categories just are rules of pure 
or a priori synthesis. But if this is true, it stands to reason to deny that, 
at least in the context of TD, rules of pure or a priori synthesis are sep-
arable from the categories, unless there are different kinds, or modes of 
application, of rules of pure or a priori synthesis; but if there are different 
kinds, or modes of application, of rules of pure or a priori synthesis, then 
another, higher kind of pure synthesis would be required to synthesise the 
different kinds, or modes of application, of rules of pure or a priori syn-
thesis, and so forth. An infinite regress threatens. Thus, a priori or pure 
synthesis cannot be considered separable from the categories.
In the next section, I look at a crucial passage in the run-up to the 
actual argument of TD, namely, a passage which is often viewed as 
strong evidence for a nonconceptualist reading of TD. I believe that 
there are good grounds for this view. But the passage is not uncon-
troversial. Whereas nonconceptualists point out that here Kant grants 
the real possibility of intuitions that are not subsumed or amenable to 
subsumption under the categories, conceptualists argue that Kant only 
entertains the hypothetical possibility of appearances (or intuitions) not 
conforming to the categories.
5.5  Reading A89–91/B122–3 Anew: 
Hypothetical or Real Possibility?
I concur with the central contention of Hanna’s and Allais’s argumenta-
tion that Kant is essentially a nonconceptualist and not a conceptualist 
about the intuition of particular objects. Intuition is itself not already 
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conceptual content, nor are conceptual capacities required for having 
an intuition of particulars (as long as these are seen as indeterminate 
objects). However, I object to the interpretation of intuition as in and 
of itself having objective validity, as Hanna (2005:257) and presumably 
Allais (2009:391, 393)51 believe, or that an intuition objectively refers, 
where reference implies designation of an individual or a particular. 
For Kant, although intuition indeed depends on an object being given 
(V-Met/Schön, 28:484; B72), objectivity or objective validity strictly 
speaking is solely a function of judgement (B141–2), and, importantly, 
the individuality or particularity of an object cannot be established prior 
to an act of judgement (by means of the rules of apperception). As I 
have argued above, I also differ from Hanna and Allais in that I do not 
believe that figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis can be shared 
out between intuition and concept such that intuition is by definition 
characterised by figurative synthesis, or that the synthesis of intuition 
can be seen as separable from the synthesis by means of concepts (i.e. 
the categories). Not all intuition is synthesised and only those intuitions 
are synthesised which are part of a judgement.52 Neither are figurative 
and intellectual synthesis two de re separable instances of syntheses or 
ways of synthesising. They are just formally distinguishable aspects of 
one instance of synthesising that ensues from an operation of the under-
standing, which manifests itself on both the sensible and intellectual 
levels of a judgement, in judgement. Figurative synthesis is not a dif-
ferent or distinct act of synthesising from intellectual synthesis. There 
is just one transcendental synthesis, which binds intuition and con-
cept together. For McDowell, this is not a problem as he believes that 
in principle each intuition already shows the same “togetherness” that 
is manifest in a conceptual episode, whose “togetherness” is shown in 
the propositional structure of judgement. Insofar as it concerns a case of 
objective knowledge, my own reading is closer to McDowell’s (notwith-
standing the problems with his reading flagged earlier in Sect. 5.3).
Nevertheless, I believe Allais is right to insist that the necessary 
“mutual dependence” (2009:399) of concept and intuition does not hold 
for the mere perception but only for the cognition of objects, whereby, 
unlike Allais, I understand cognition in terms of knowledge, not in 
terms of the mere thought of objects.53 The necessary conditions for the 
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perceptual presentation of particular objects are time and space, not the 
categories (Allais 2009:399–401). It should be observed though that 
space and time as forms of intuition are not the sufficient conditions for 
the presentation of particular objects in space and time. So the question 
is whether particular objects can be represented, or perceived, as distinct 
particulars objects in space and time by means of the forms of intuition 
alone, as Allais seems to believe (cf. Allais 2015). I would firmly negate 
that question (see Onof and Schulting 2015). The issue here is the differ-
ence between what are the conditions of intuition, which always depends 
on a given object in space, and the conditions of the perception of that 
given object as a spatially distinct object (I expand on this in Chap. 7).
Both Allais and Hanna rightly cite the passage at B122–3 in the 
Critique in support of their nonconceptualist reading of intuition. 
I believe this is indeed one of the most convincing passages in Kant’s 
work against strong conceptualism. Kant writes:
The categories of understanding […] do not represent the conditions under 
which objects are given in intuition. Objects may, therefore, appear to us 
without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of 
understanding; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori 
conditions. Thus a difficulty such as we did not meet with in the field of 
sensibility is here presented, namely, how subjective conditions of thought can 
have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all 
knowledge of objects. For appearances can certainly be given in intuition 
independently of functions of the understanding. […] That objects of sensi-
ble intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility which lie 
a priori in the mind is evident, because otherwise they would not be objects 
for us. But that they must likewise conform to the conditions which the 
understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought, is a conclusion 
the grounds of which are by no means so obvious. Appearances might very 
well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be 
in accordance with the conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such 
confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances nothing presented 
itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the concept of 
cause and effect. This concept would then be altogether empty, null, and 
meaningless. But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the func-
tions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our 
intuition. (A89–91/B122–3; trans. Kemp Smith)54
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Often the emphasis in this passage from §13 in the run-up to TD is 
put on the ostensible merely hypothetical nature of the thought that 
Kant puts forward here, namely that “in the series of appearances noth-
ing presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer 
to the concept of cause and effect”. Here, Kant would appear to argue 
that since in that case there can be no knowledge of an object it must be 
excluded that appearances would lie in disarray (cf. A111) and would 
not already show, at least in principle, the conceptual unity that is 
required for knowledge.
Hannah Ginsborg, who espouses a conceptualist reading of Kant, is 
typical in this respect. She writes in regard to B122–3:
If we abstract from the role of […] synthesis in perception then it does at 
least seem possible that appearances can be presented to us independently 
of the conditions of understanding, but once we have recognized the role 
of synthesis in perception, we are in a position to see that this apparent 
possibility is illusory. (Ginsborg 2008:71)55
Ginsborg believes that the possibility that Kant considers is merely 
hypothetical or counterfactual,56 and that he never considers this a real 
or metaphysical possibility, viz. that appearances would in fact be pre-
sented to us independently of the understanding and not structured by 
the understanding so as to yield knowledge. Perhaps Ginsborg means 
that appearances that have objective validity cannot be independent from 
the understanding, as it is the understanding which confers objective 
validity on them. And that is certainly right, because it is trivially true. 
But the way in which she puts it makes it appear as if she believes that 
all appearances whatever cannot be independent from the understand-
ing, regardless of the question about their objective validity. And that is 
clearly tantamount to an existential claim not licensed by Kant’s argu-
ment at B122–3.57 The existential claim underlying both weak and 
strong conceptualism comes down to the negative existential statement 
that sensory content that is in principle non-conceptualisable does not 
exist. Strong conceptualism, which states that sensory or conscious con-
tent must be conceptualised, must be distinguished from weak concep-
tualism, which states that although sensory or conscious content must 
be able to be conceptualised, it does not depend on conceptuality for its 
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existence. However defined, conceptualism in any case denies, in princi-
ple, that there could be sensory or conscious content (appearances) that 
is not conceptualisable; weak conceptualism only states that there could 
be de facto nonconceptualised content, but does not allow, in princi-
ple, that there could be content that is not conceptualisable or apt to 
conceptualisation. On weak conceptualism, any content at any rate nec-
essarily entails conceptualisation, even if there could be the occasional 
unconceptualised intuition. Both weak and strong conceptualism there-
fore conflict with essentialist content nonconceptualism, which argues 
that there are intuitions which resist conceptualisation in principle (that 
is, are not conceptualisable).
Conceptualism of both variants implies that we could somehow 
establish the sensory content’s or intuition’s disposition to being con-
ceptualised or being subsumable under concepts (categories), which 
on Kant’s Copernican hypothesis—that is, the hypothesis that we only 
know a priori of things “what we have put into them” (Bxviii)—we are 
in principle not able to do. On Kant’s account of what is possible to 
know, we cannot possibly know that there are not any sensory content 
or intuitions (any appearances) that elude conceptualisation, precisely 
because we only know of things what we have put into them before-
hand by virtue of a priori synthesis. And what cannot be determined 
by virtue of conceptualisation through a priori synthesis, can neither 
be known. The transcendental truth that the unity of understanding is 
necessary for a synthesis of causally linked appearances and hence for 
the possibility of knowledge does not imply the truth of the existen-
tial claim that all appearances necessarily conform to the unity of the 
understanding and synthetically hang together (in an a priori way). That 
we cannot make cognitive claims about objects but by employing con-
cepts and applying them to appearances does not in the least imply that 
appearances must be conceptualised (strong conceptualism) or even be 
subsumable under concepts (weak conceptualism).
But, in fact, Kant does not make the existential claim to the effect 
that the real possibility of appearances not conforming to the unity 
of the understanding would be excluded. (At least he does not here at 
B122–3; sometimes he does appear to make that claim, especially in 
the A-version of TD, e.g. at A111, A119, A123).58 First, towards the 
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end of the quoted passage at A89–91/B122–3, Kant clearly asserts that 
even if appearances were to lie in a chaos “[a]ppearances would none-
theless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires 
the functions of thinking” (A90–1/B123). As Carl (1992:124n.20) sug-
gests, Kant’s talk of “objects” here must be taken in the broad sense, 
namely in the sense that objective perceptions are representations of 
objects (Gegenstände). “Objects” here means “[a]ppearances”, which “to 
the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity 
of the categories, are called phaenomena” (A248–9; emphasis added). 
All phenomena are appearances, but not all appearances are phenom-
ena, for not all appearances are “thought in accordance with the unity of 
the categories”. Appearances insofar as they are not phenomena in the 
sense defined, are those objects (Gegenstände) of which Kant speaks here 
at B122–3, and which are in no need of the functions of the under-
standing (i.e. are not “thought in accordance with the unity of the cat-
egories”). This, by implication, excludes the possibility that there would 
be objects that are phenomena which are in no need of the functions of 
the understanding, as this amounts to a contradiction, but it strongly 
suggests the real possibility of appearances that just amount to noncon-
ceptual content or blind intuition.
At A111, in a passage similar to the one at B123, Kant hypothesises 
about the possibility that “a swarm of appearances […] fill[s] up our 
soul without experience ever being able to arise from it”, whereby “all 
relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appear-
ances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary 
laws” (cf. A122). In that case, “intuition without thought” ( gedanken-
lose Anschauung) would be possible, but it would “never [be] cognition 
[Erkenntniß ], and would therefore be as good as nothing for us”.59 
From the immediately preceding passage (A110), where he argues that 
“[t]here is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented 
as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection” (boldface mine), it appears 
that Kant excludes the possibility that one could have an epistemically 
relevant perception or intuition that does not belong to unitary experi-
ence grounded in “a transcendental ground of unity” (A111), but this 
does not imply that he excludes the real possibility of “intuition with-
out thought” (gedankenlose Anschauung). In fact, in the hypothetical 
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“swarm” case of a total lack of universal and necessary law-governedness, 
“intuition without thought” would still be really possible, but it would 
have no real relevance for us as cognisers.60
By contrast, with respect to the passage under discussion here (B122–
3), Brady Bowman has argued that Kant cannot rule out the logical 
possibility that appearances “appear to us without necessarily having a 
relation to the functions of the understanding”, but that he does rule 
out the “real” or “transcendental” possibility that “appearances and 
concepts come apart” (2011:422). That Kant cannot rule out the log-
ical possibility of them coming apart, is of course because objects are 
not analytically deducible from concepts: a world is conceivable, where 
objects do indeed come apart from the understanding. Likewise, Gomes 
(2014:6) argues that “we are not forced to treat the possibility expressed 
at A90/B123 as metaphysical”, i.e. as constituting a real possibility. 
According to Gomes, the indicative können in B122 (3:102.26) is com-
patible with “the three paragraphs which end that section (A89–92/
B122–4) operating under an assumed ‘for all we know’ operator”. In 
the text part that Gomes refers to (3:103.9–17), Kant employs the sub-
junctive.61 In light of the textual evidence, I believe that Bowman’s and 
Gomes’s interpretations are not compelling.
As we have seen with Ginsborg, it appears that some conceptual-
ists conflate <all appearances> and <all objects of possible experience> 
(see also Bowman 2011). On account of Kant’s theory of experience, 
it is analytically true that, necessarily, each and any object of possible 
experience is determined by the categories of the understanding, for 
an object is by definition a manifold of representations united by vir-
tue of the categories. However, ‘appearance’ and ‘object’ in the sense of 
its definition at B13762 are not equivalent terms. According to Kant’s 
definition at the outset of the Transcendental Aesthetic, an appear-
ance is an “undetermined” object of an empirical intuition (B34/A20), 
i.e. a manifold of an intuition that has not yet been united.63 Hence, 
an appearance, which is an intuition that has not yet been united, is 
not already objectively valid, against the view of Hanna (2008:258) 
and Allais (2009:391ff.), who claim that an intuition already by itself, 
intrinsically, refers objectively. The class of appearances is therefore 
much greater than the class of objects of possible experience. The former 
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class does not only contain all possible objects of experience, but also all 
those appearances which only have subjective validity and never attain 
to objectivity, ‘Praussian’ subjective objects, say (see Prauss 1971:16ff.), 
which thus do not belong to the latter class. Not all appearances are 
therefore from the outset, as mere empirical representations or “species 
of representation” (A372; trans. mine; cf. B242ff/A197ff.), related to 
the understanding, as the conceptualist believes. Or, not all appearances 
are phenomena.64
Secondly, the goal of TD concerns establishing the a priori rules 
under which our perceptions, which are not already by themselves cat-
egorially determined, stand under the categories so as to yield objec-
tive knowledge, that is, knowledge of a priori necessary law-governed 
connections. As Allais (2009:399) rightly insists, establishing the rules 
of intuition as such is not at issue in TD, since these had already been 
established in the Aesthetic. Therefore, a clear distinction must be 
heeded between the goal of the Aesthetic and that of TD, even if it is 
true that in the second half of TD, in the famous and much discussed 
note to B160–1, Kant seems to alter his view on the way in which time 
and space must be regarded.65 However, the argument there is that the 
unity of space, about which in the Aesthetic Kant still maintained that 
it belonged to sensibility, is first constituted by virtue of the synthetic act 
of the understanding insofar as an objective grasp of the unity of space 
is concerned. Space and time as such, as “forms of intuition”, them-
selves do not yet contain the synthetic unity which they only have as 
“formal intuitions” as a result of that synthetic act.66 This by no means 
implies that the a priori forms of space and time, which are the necessary 
forms of each and any intuition, are in and of themselves subject to the 
rules of the understanding or indeed show that synthetic unity which 
is required for objective knowledge of spatiotemporal objects.67 In other 
words, Kant’s goal in TD is precisely to show that despite the real gap 
between the forms of intuition and the functions of the understanding, intu-
itions or appearances are indeed subsumed under the functions of the 
understanding if and only if we apprehend, by means of our capacity to 
judge, appearances as objects for our understanding. That is, the claim is 
that intuitions or appearances are determined by the unifying functions 
of the understanding if and only if the understanding apprehends them 
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as determined by its functions; the understanding can only determine 
what it apprehends as determined by its functions.
The biconditional nature of the above-formulated claim evinces the 
radically subjectivist standpoint of Kant’s theory of knowledge that I 
have been stressing in the preceding chapters. Determination and thus 
conceptualisation of intuitions is conditional on an a priori subjec-
tive act of determination, which is the act of synthesis that is expressed 
by transcendental apperception. If there is no such act, no concep-
tual determination of intuitions takes place. But this, of course, does 
not imply the negative existential claim that there could not be intu-
itions that amount to a form of subcognitive mental content, that is, 
merely subjectively valid perception, or appearances in the broad sense. 
Conceptualists (bar McDowell) tend to overestimate the scope of the 
transcendental subjectivity involved in cognitive determination and to 
ignore the conditional nature underlying it, which restricts the scope of 
the determinative function of subjectivity (that is, the conditional that 
“intuitions are determined by the functions of the understanding if and 
only if the understanding apprehends them as determined by them”). 
Nonconceptualists, on the other hand, either ignore, underestimate, 
or dismiss68 the subjective/active element of conceptual determination 
which first constitutes cognition or knowledge, and hence fail to explain 
how intuition and conceptuality do in fact connect up in actual cases of 
knowledge. By not considering Kant’s subjectivism, as I have defined it, 
they thus vitally fail to address the central explanatory goal of TD.
It is of course not the case that in TD Kant backtracks on the abso-
lute distinction between sensibility and the understanding. Instead of 
showing how to bridge the gap between intuition and concept, as some 
conceptualists appear to believe,69 Kant rather wants to demonstrate 
how from their union knowledge first arises. There is nothing essential 
about intuitions that would make them subsumable under the catego-
ries or which shows that they have a certain disposition to being so sub-
sumed. Precisely because nothing in terms of essential connections or a 
pre-established harmony, say, binds sensibility and the understanding, 
Kant is presented with the problem that requires TD, namely, given 
their irreducible distinction, how do sensibility and understanding link 
up in an a priori way so as to yield knowledge?
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5.6  Conclusion: Kant’s Moderate 
Conceptualism
We have seen that the conceptualist position, both in its ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ variants, is committed to a modally intemperate claim regarding 
the necessary conceptualisability of intuitions (or appearances), which is 
not warranted by Kant’s text in A89–91/B122–3. The modally intem-
perate claim says that
(M) Necessarily, all intuitions are subject to the categories as the con-
ceptual conditions under which knowledge of objects is possible (that is, 
intuitions either are or must be able to be subsumed under the categories)
M is tantamount to conceptualism (in either variant), the view that 
Hanna and Allais argue against. The analysis of B122–3 in Sect. 5.5 
showed that M cannot be correct. It is not true that for any and all intu-
itions it holds that, necessarily, they correspond or conform to concepts 
to yield cognition and hence are subject to the a priori rules of synthe-
sis constraining such cognition. If true, M would imply that we would 
know that, necessarily, all sensory content would be conformable to the 
universal relations among them that enable their connectedness as intui-
tions by means of which we know objects. This would mean that, as 
Kant writes, “we would be able to determine antecedently everything 
that can be an object for us at all”, in other words, that “we had com-
plete insight into all of our sensitivity and form” (Refl 5262 [1776–78], 
18:135 [Kant 2005:223]). But clearly we do not have “complete insight 
into all of our sensitivity”, and hence we cannot know that, necessar-
ily, all sensory content is connected in accordance with rules that enable 
knowledge.
Also Kant’s famous adage at A51/B75, which seems to assert the 
absolute inseparability or correspondence of concept and intuition, 
shows on further analysis that M cannot be right. For Kant writes 
towards the end of that passage that “[o]nly from their unification 
[i.e. the understanding and the senses, D.S.] can knowledge arise” 
(trans. emended). This suggests a hidden antecedent in the argument: 
it does not concern an absolutely necessary unity between intuition 
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and concept, which in fact would contradict Kant’s insistence on their 
irreducible difference (cf. B29), but a conditionally necessary unity.70
That only a conditionally necessary unity between intuition and con-
cept is at issue is conveyed by M*, which states:
(M*) Necessarily, if intuitions are to be seen as contributing to possible 
knowledge of objects, then intuitions are subsumed under the catego-
ries as the conceptual conditions under which knowledge of objects is 
 possible.
Kant reasons that if we take there to be knowledge, and given that 
knowledge consists of both concepts and intuitions and of their syn-
thetic unity, then we must assume that our sensibility corresponds to 
our conceptuality in accordance with a priori rules, for knowledge is 
only explainable from that correspondence.71 Note that Kant’s argu-
ment in TD is not conditional in the sense that the categories do not 
necessarily apply to all spatiotemporal objects. Rather, the argument 
is conditional in the sense that if there is knowledge of spatiotemporal 
objects, and given that sensible intuition or sensibility is our immedi-
ate access to these objects and in that sense to be seen as a necessary 
contribution to knowledge, then sensible intuition or sensibility must 
be seen as subject to the categories to cooperate in the constitution of 
such knowledge. And given that there is knowledge, sensible intuition 
or sensibility is thus subject to the categories. Importantly, this does 
not imply that all sensible intuition is subject to the categories simplic-
iter, or that, necessarily, sensible intuition is subject to the categories, or 
that, necessarily, sensible intuition is amenable to being subsumed under 
the categories, which is what Kant’s argument would be on account of 
M. Nor of course does this in and of itself show how sensible intuition 
is seen to be subject to the categories (the how question will be the topic 
of Chap. 7).
The conditional structure of the argument about the intuition- 
concept relation (M*) is consistent with the globally regressive  character 
of TD.72 The regressive character of TD is shown in the way that its 
argument takes the fact of experience (or knowledge) as a premise 
and regresses to the necessary conditions of experience (or knowledge), 
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based on the idea that experience (or knowledge) is built up of two for-
mally separable elements, intuition and pure concepts, that constitute 
experience or knowledge to the extent that they are conjoined. Although 
Allais (2009:402) professes to base her reading on Ameriks’s (1978) 
regressive interpretation, her nonconceptualist reading of intuition as 
intrinsically characterised by figurative synthesis in sharp contrast to 
conceptuality as intrinsically characterised by intellectual synthesis, as 
we saw in Sect. 5.4, reveals a much too rigid view of Kant’s formal dis-
tinctions. By concentrating on the independence of intuition from the 
understanding, she skirts around the very crux of Kant’s theory of expe-
rience, namely, to explain how intuition and concepts together enable 
experience or knowledge, and how the formally separable elements are 
to be seen contributing to it together. The distinction between the dif-
ferent syntheses is not an ontological distinction between faculties or 
powers or ways of representing that either are or are not coextensive, 
whereby figurative synthesis (or any form of binding) is simply the syn-
thesis (or binding) of intuition in contrast to, and numerically distinct 
from, the intellectual synthesis of concepts through the understand-
ing. The differentiable syntheses are the joint necessary transcendental- 
logical conditions of knowledge which operate their functions integrally 
and cannot be shared out between intuition and the understanding. If 
we base our reading on the A-version of the threefold synthesis, no syn-
thesis performs its function separably from the other two syntheses for, 
as Kant indicates in the Leitfaden, that function is one and the same act 
of the understanding in judgement. Here lies the forte of Kant’s central 
argument for an original unity of the two stems of knowledge. At the 
same time, that argument is moderated by the fact that the conditional 
structure of M* precludes Kant from claiming that perception and 
intuition themselves are already conceptual or even proto-conceptual, 
or indeed amenable to being conceptualised, as Longuenesse appears to 
argue, when she says that a certain conatus, i.e. the capacity to judge, 
“pervades the totality of our sensible perceptions” (1998:196, 208). 
There is nothing about perception or intuition which shows that they 
have a conatus towards being conceptualised or judged about.
The central question in TD is and remains: What needs to be presup-
posed, in terms of a priori capacities, in order for knowledge to be possible? 
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Kant argues, on the basis of regressive analysis, that a synthesis of appre-
hension must at least be presupposed, but since such a synthesis of appre-
hension is inadequate for the constitution of knowledge, also a synthesis 
of reproduction is required, and since neither a synthesis of reproduction 
is sufficient, a further synthesis of recognition is required (for a detailed 
account of the argument of the threefold synthesis in A, see Chap. 6). Kant 
does not mean that each of these syntheses operates in separation from 
the others, or in abstraction from them, as if it concerned the consecu-
tive phases of an underlying psychological process that could either result 
or fail to result in knowledge, as McDowell and latterly Pippin appear to 
think (see Sect. 5.2). This would immediately produce an infinite regress 
problem. That is to say, if synthesis of apprehension were to be operated 
separately, what would see to it that it becomes a synthesis of reproduc-
tion? Which more originary synthesis would be responsible for the syn-
thesis of apprehension becoming a synthesis of reproduction? This surely 
cannot non-question-beggingly be the synthesis of reproduction itself. But 
perhaps it is the synthesis of recognition that is the more originary syn-
thesis that connects the two together. But what then is responsible for the 
synthesis of recognition effectively becoming a well-formed proposition 
that articulates a judgement rather than just being a reproduction of more 
or less ordered series of sensations? Or is the synthesis of recognition the 
 effective judgement?73
One may argue that the threat of a vicious regress still haunts the 
account in the A-Deduction. To remove any semblance of regress or 
misplaced psychology, I believe that in the B-Deduction Kant relin-
quishes the explicit threefold character of synthesis (but see Chap. 6 
for a reading of the threefold synthesis that is compatible with the 
B-Deduction account). In complete conformity with the Leitfaden 
(A79/B104–5) and confirming my thesis of Kant’s radical subjectiv-
ism, in the B-Deduction the act of synthesis is attributed entirely to 
the understanding, which by means of one function establishes both 
a connection, or an intellectual synthesis, on the level of concepts 
(as formal unities) “by virtue of the analytical unity” and a connection, 
or a figurative synthesis, on the level of the content of concepts “by vir-
tue of synthetic unity”.74 The synthesis of apprehension is the figurative 
synthesis in the domain of sensibility, whereas the figurative synthesis is 
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the effect of the intellectual synthesis of the understanding. Kant says 
that the imagination (a.k.a. figurative synthesis) is the mediating term 
between sensibility and the understanding (B164), which binds the 
two together (this will be argued in more detail in Chap. 7). But this 
does not mean that it has a separable intermediate status. McDowell 
comes closest to Kant’s meaning, when he asserts that the unity of the 
imagination is not “an amalgam, however intimately bound together, 
of components that belong severally to sensibility and understanding” 
(2009a:124).
However, unlike McDowell, Hanna and Allais are right in maintain-
ing that intuition as such is not necessarily or at least not yet categorially 
determined. There are intuitions that not only are not conceptualised de 
facto but also need not or indeed could not be conceptualised, because 
they are essentially nonconceptual and so resist conceptualisation. In 
line with Hanna’s and Allais’s nonconceptualism about intuition, it is 
also my view that intuition and concept are not, or at least need not 
be, coextensive; they are necessarily coextensive only in their connec-
tion in an actual judgement, in actual cases of knowledge, in conform-
ity with M*. It is the relation between intuition and concept which is 
conceptual, not intuition itself. That relation is established solely by a 
conceptual action that Kant calls the bringing to the concept of syn-
thesis (A78/B103–4), which results in judgement. McDowell’s unwar-
ranted quasi-Hegelian move is that he reads the capacity responsible for 
the possibility of judgement, which is a conceptual capacity, into sensi-
bility tout court.
However, contrary to what nonconceptualists such as Hanna (2008) 
believe, something that is essentially nonconceptual can hardly be 
seen as the a priori and necessary ground or basis of something that is 
essentially conceptual. Nor can nonconceptual content be seen as syn-
thesised content (in Kant’s sense) or indeed as objectively referring. 
Intuitions may be immediately related to a spatially given object, but 
they are not determinate perceptions of spatially distinct and distinguish-
able objects or particulars. No form of nonconceptualism can explain 
what is the a priori synthetic-unitary ground for two essentially differ-
ent elements, intuition and concept, for those instances in which intui-
tion and concepts are necessarily coextensive, namely when there is an 
5.6 Conclusion: Kant’s Moderate Conceptualism     239
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
240     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
effective claim to knowledge, a judgement. This shows the failure of 
Kantian nonconceptualists to recognise Kant’s radically subjectivist posi-
tion about the possibility of knowledge. But what is undoubtedly true 
about the nonconceptualist position is that intuition is in and of itself 
not already conceptual, or in McDowell’s words an “actualization of con-
ceptual capacities”. Only in relation to the concept, as part of an actual 
judgement, and from the perspective of an epistemic agent, is intuition 
brought to the concept through an act of pure synthesis, an act of the 
judging subject.
In conclusion, Kant may be called a conceptualist with respect to the 
possibility of knowledge with the proviso that intuition is not in and 
of itself conceptual or even proto-conceptual. Bridging the gap between 
the essentially non-conceptual, intuition, and the conceptual constitutes 
of course the heart of Kant’s project in TD.
Notes
 1. In German it says: “dadurch überhaupt ein Gegenstand gedacht wird 
(die Kategorie)”, translated by Kemp Smith as “through which an 
object in general is thought (the category)”, which is apt since Kant 
means to refer to the notion of the unity of apperception as defining 
the concept of an object in general (cf. A109–10; A104–5), whereas in 
the sections that follow the quoted one, Kant aims to account for the a 
priori possibility of particular objects, namely, spatiotemporal objects of 
human sensibility.
 2. See Schulting (2012b) for a detailed account of the ‘first step’ of TD. 
See also Chaps. 2, 3 and 4 (this volume).
 3. More specifically, the terms ‘intuition’, ‘appearance’ and ‘sensible con-
tent’ can be defined in the following way. Intuition is Kant’s des-
ignation for a sensible way of cognising (B33/A19), which relates 
“immediately to the object” (B376ff./A320ff.; cf. V-Met/Schön, 
28:482, 484; Prol, 4:281), whereas for Kant sensory content, as the 
label says, points more directly to the empirical content of such cog-
nising, what Kant calls “sensation” or the “material” in an “appear-
ance”, which is the unbestimmte Gegenstand of an “empirical intuition” 
(B34/A20). In the Stufenleiter (B376/A320), Kant says that “perception” 
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is “sensation” when it concerns a “modification of [one’s] state”, but 
cognition when it is a perception of something objective. And this is 
again subdivided into “intuition” and “concept”, so that it seems as if 
for Kant both “intuition” and “concept” are objective perceptions—
but see Wolff (1995:62–63), who asserts that “intuition” is not genu-
ine knowledge, which is confirmed by Kant’s position that only in their 
conjunction intuitions and concepts yield knowledge; cf. FM, 20:325: 
“Knowledge by means of concepts is called discursive, by means of intui-
tion, intuitive; in fact, knowledge requires the conjunction of the two, 
but each is named for the ground of determination to which I always 
primarily attend” (Kant 1983:181). See also V-Met/Volckmann, 28:404: 
“All our knowledge [Erkentniß ] consists of judgements and these must 
have an object, the mere intuition [bloße Anschauung] is not knowledge 
[Erkentniß ]” (trans. mine). As regards the term ‘appearance’, this can 
also be taken in two senses: either an appearance is just a “mere mode 
of representation [bloße Vorstellungsart]” (A372), i.e. an indeterminate 
object of an intuition, which as such is not distinguishable from the 
intuition, or an appearance is a phenomenon, namely, “to the extent 
that as object [it is] thought in accordance with the unity of the cat-
egories” (A248–9), i.e. an object as a unity of representations. All phe-
nomena are appearances in the first sense, but not all appearances are 
appearances in the second sense. I return to this latter aspect below, as 
the distinction is relevant to how one reads the conclusion of the ‘sec-
ond step’.
 4. See e.g. Pippin (2013:377, 381), who refers to Sellars (1967).
 5. A distinction should be made between, on the one hand, intui-
tions that are (or are not) subsumed under the categories and, on the 
other, intuitions that are (or are not) subsumable under the categories. 
For intuitions can, not only not de facto be subsumed under the cat-
egories, but also be incapable of being subsumed under the catego-
ries. Therefore, all subsumed intuitions are ipso facto subsumable, but 
not all intuitions are subsumable. This distinction is important for an 
understanding of the position of essentialist nonconceptualism and 
will be spelled out in the course of this chapter; moreover, the question 
of the subsumability of intuitions seems implied by the very starting 
point of TD. However, to differentiate between the effective applica-
tion and the applicability of the categories to intuition, as Grüne (2011) 
suggests, seems irrelevant, as the application of the categories is relevant 
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242     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
in cases of knowledge only (whereas it is not a matter of course that 
intuitions contribute to knowledge). The categories either apply, in the 
case of objectively valid representations, or they do not, in the case of 
subjectively valid representations or representations that fail to apply to 
empirical objects. The issue of applicability, then, concerns the question 
whether or not categories effectively apply to intuition in the various 
possible cases. The distinction between effective application and appli-
cability suggests that there is a possibility that categories are applicable 
to intuitions but are not effectively applied. This view, it seems to me, 
only leads to regress problems. For if categories are applicable to intui-
tions, but not yet effectively applied, then what makes it the case that 
they are so applied?
 6. (Strong) conceptualism is precisely the view that “we cannot be percep-
tually presented with a particular independently of the application of 
concepts” (Allais 2009:386).
 7. I.e. children have intuitions that occur independently of conceptual 
activity (see V-Anth/Collins, 25:10; V-Anth/Fried, 25:473).
 8. V-Lo/Wiener, 24:846; Log, 9:65; Anth, 7:196; DfS, 2:59ff.; cf. KU, 
5:464n.
 9. I want to abstract here from the standard distinction between ‘state 
nonconceptualism’ and ‘content nonconceptualism’. Content noncon-
ceptualism asserts that the content of intuitions and the content of 
concepts are different in kind, so that the intuitional content funda-
mentally exceeds our conceptual capacity, whereas state nonconceptu-
alism asserts that, although intuitions and conceptual assertions show 
the same content, a subject can be in a state in which she hasn’t got 
at her disposal concepts with which she can make assertions about the 
content of her intuitions. The distinction between content and state 
nonconceptualism seems irrelevant for the issue of the dependency of 
intuitions on the functions of thought or conceptual capacities, for 
the functions of thought or conceptual capacities concern the relation 
between intuitions and a priori concepts, which content nonconceptu-
alism by definition seems to foreclose. On the other hand, state non-
conceptualism seems to imply that, although a subject can be in a state 
in which she only has intuitions and hasn’t got at her disposal concepts 
with which to describe these intuitions, the mental content of those 
intuitions is always already conceptual. For this reason, one could argue 
that state nonconceptualism is only nonconceptualism in a very broad 
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sense (Hanna 2013a:5). Hanna believes that content nonconceptualism 
is the only legitimate form of nonconceptualism. In order however to 
avoid the aforementioned radical consequence of content nonconcep-
tualism, namely that it apparently forecloses the possibility of a relation 
between intuitions and concepts, one distinguishes between ‘absolute’ 
or ‘essentialist’ and ‘relative’ or ‘non-essentialist’, or ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
nonconceptualism. Relative (non-essentialist, weak) nonconceptual-
ism leaves open the possibility that despite the fundamental difference 
between intuitional content and conceptual content the content of 
intuitions is articulated in conceptual assertions (Allais 2009:386). See 
further Schulting (2015:564–565n.7, 569–570n.19).
 10. For more discussion of the debate that ensued after Allais (2009), see 
Allais (2016) and the new essays in Schulting (2016a).
 11. I provide a detailed analysis of Kant’s general notion of ‘synthesis’ in 
Schulting (2012b, Chaps. 6, 7). The role of synthesis in empirical intui-
tion in both the A- and B-Deduction will be discussed in Chaps. 6 and 7 
(this volume), respectively.
 12. For a detailed analysis of this passage, see Schulting (2012b:141ff.).
 13. For the origin of these terms, see Sellars (1997:76).
 14. Cf. Sellars (1997:33) about the ‘Myth of the Given’.
 15. Kemp Smith has “expression” for Ausübung, which unfortunately loses 
the active aspect meant here by Kant. This is relevant, since McDowell 
systematically wants to deflate any such activity on the level of sensibil-
ity. See further below.
 16. McDowell writes: “Visual experiences ‘make’ or ‘contain’ claims in that 
they are conceptual episodes, actualizations of conceptual capacities, 
and as such are to be understood on the model of linguistic perfor-
mances in which claims are literally made” (2009a:10).
 17. More recently, Cassam (2007) has argued something similar to what 
Sellars means. For Cassam, it likewise holds that an intuition is already 
conceptual but at the same time space must be made for what Dretske 
(1969) has labelled “simple seeings”, non-epistemic seeings or percepts 
which are not in itself conceptual and are tantamount to the sheer 
reception of sensory material without involvement of concepts; impor-
tantly, a simple seeing is not a perception. Cassam paraphrases Dretske’s 
account of the difference between “epistemic” and “non-epistemic” or 
“simple seeing”: “[S]imple seeing is concept-free, since it implies noth-
ing about the conceptual resources of the perceiver, and belief neutral 
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in the sense that simply seeing X is compatible with no beliefs about X. 
In both of these respects seeing X is like stepping on X; one can step on 
X without recognizing it as an X or having any beliefs about X. In con-
trast, perception is ‘(either by stipulation or common understanding) 
cognitively loaded’ since ‘some degree of recognition or categorization 
is essential to our perception of things’ […]. If this is right, then ‘it is 
by no means obvious that one must perceive something in order to see 
it’ […]. Not knowing what a cup is prevents one from perceiving a cup 
but not from seeing a cup” (2007:133).
 18. For a more detailed analysis of the Leitfaden, see Schulting (2012b, 
Chap. 5), and Longuenesse (2006).
 19. Cf. Kant’s use of the term Ausübung (B151), translated by Kemp Smith 
as “expression” and by Guyer/Wood, more appropriately and correctly, 
as “exercise”. In a later essay, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’ (2009b), 
McDowell has less qualms about employing the term ‘exercise’ in this 
context.
 20. See again above note 17.
 21. But see Chap. 6 for a conceptualist reading of the A-Deduction.
 22. The Guyer/Wood translation has “an effect of the understanding 
on sensibility”; this reflects Kant’s standard meaning for the word 
Wirkung as one half of the cause-effect (Ursache-Wirkung) relation; the 
causal effect, of some sort, of the understanding on sensibility is thus 
meant here, that is, the effect of the causality of the spontaneity of the 
understanding, being a special kind of causality (see Schulting 2012b, 
Chap. 7; see also Chap. 3, this volume).
 23. In a later essay (2009b:264), McDowell is though willing to countenance 
that the unity of intuition is due to a power to judge, but he also holds 
that the activity responsible for the unity of the intuition is “unconscious”.
 24. Cf. the debate between Pippin and McDowell on the issue of ‘subjec-
tivism’ in Pippin (2005a, b) and McDowell (2009a:185–203), and 
Pippin (2007, 2015) for Pippin’s last reply. I am in general agreement 
with Pippin’s criticisms against McDowell on the issue of subjectivity. 
However, in a later text (2013:382–383), Pippin seems to diverge from 
the position delineated here, and to agree with McDowell, in that, 
according to Pippin, in demonstrative reference, that is, in intuitive 
 representings, which, as Sellars put it, are nonetheless non-generally 
conceptual, we do not explicitly judge that S is P, that is, apply sor-
tal concepts to sensory material. But this raises at least the following 
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problem for Kant: if the apperceptive act in a perceptual taking is not yet 
the act that produces an explicit judgement of the subject-predicate form 
(a ‘judgemental taking’), then one wonders which other act makes it the 
case that we apperceptively judge that S is P, rather than there just being 
merely an apperceptive (non-generally conceptual) perceptual taking 
there to be a book on the table, say. It seems as if Pippin suggests that 
non-generally conceptual takings (in perception) and attribution of sor-
tal concepts in explicit judgements are two separately occurring possible 
instances of apperceptive taking, which is in tension with his other right-
ful claim that we should not take Kant to argue that conceptual form 
is somehow imposed on prior given nonconceptual sensory material. 
If, as Pippin claims, sensible content is always already a non-generally 
conceptually informed, i.e. an apperceived content, then the problem 
of the putative gap between nonconceptual content and conceptual 
form appears to have now, in his latest reading, been transposed to an 
 ostensible gap between the instantiation of the apperceptive act in a per-
ceptual taking and its instantiation in an actual judgement. In my view, 
for Kant, the actualisation of conceptual form in sensibility, by means 
of an act of apperception, happens solely in judgement, for any given 
empirical judgement. Pippin (and Sellars) seem to want to model, along 
 quasi-Kantian lines, a kind of bottom-up analysis of how perceptual 
 takings are already conceptually shaped, however inchoately, before they 
are articulated in judgements. But this kind of phenomenological speci-
fication is, to my mind, not available within the Kantian transcendental 
framework. Kant’s analysis of conceptual form as a necessary transcenden-
tal condition of perception is based on the assumption of the givenness 
of experience, in the strong Kantian sense of experience as equivalent to 
knowledge claims (judgements) (B147), from which he then regresses to 
its conditions of possibility. Kant does not, in my view, argue for the con-
ditions of possibility of the gradual generation of experience, as perceptual 
takings that may or may not result in judgemental takings.
 25. See further Schulting (2012b:141ff.).
 26. See also note 24.
 27. We can see a similar problem with Longuenesse’s (1998) account of the 
twofold application of the categories: categories are said to govern syn-
theses of the sensible manifold, in a pre-discursive mode, and are only 
then effectively “reflected concepts” in discursive judgements. For dis-
cussion, see Schulting (2012b:33–38).
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 28. McDowell tries to justify this potential/actual approach to the rela-
tion between intuitions and discursive intellectual activity by referring 
to Kant’s own use of the modality in the formulation of apperception 
in the ‘I think’-proposition at B131 (i.e. the verbal phrase “must be 
able”) (see McDowell 2009a:265–266, 271). Presumably, this expresses 
the necessary possibility that all my representations are accompanied 
by an ‘I think’, but need not actually be so accompanied. But this is 
based on a (common) misreading of that verbal phrase. See my analy-
sis in Schulting (2012a, b). See also Chap. 4 (this volume), specifically, 
Sect. 4.8.
 29. See Pippin (2015:68–69) and note 24 above.
 30. Here, I rely on the more succinct 2008 paper. See also Hanna (2011a, 
b, 2013b).
 31. In the literature various types of nonconceptualism are distinguished, 
i.e. state and content nonconceptualism and weak and strong vari-
ants of nonconceptualism. Roughly speaking, a Kantian conceptu-
alist regards the relation between intuition and concept such that no 
intuition exists without involving, at least in principle, conceptuality 
(broadly conceived). A Kantian nonconceptualist, by contrast, is some-
one who regards that relation in such a way that there is no necessary 
entailment between any arbitrary existing intuition (appearances, sensi-
ble content) and conceptuality (broadly conceived). See the definitions 
given at the outset of this chapter, and especially note 9.
 32. See also Grüne (2009) on blind intuition. Grüne’s richly documented 
book also deals with the discussion of nonconceptual content, but her 
own reading is not classifiable as nonconceptualist strictly speaking. See 
further Chap. 6.
 33. Cf. the discussion between Cassam (2008) and Longuenesse (2008) on 
the issue of a priori synthesis and regress.
 34. Kant’s spontaneous ‘I’ of transcendental apperception is of course, in a 
certain cognitively indeterminable sense, grounded in an ontologically 
more fundamental, but unknowable, noumenal substance. But this 
does not detract from the originality and spontaneity of transcendental 
apperception relative to empirical experience. Transcendental appercep-
tion, or what Hanna calls “higher level spontaneity”, is at any rate not 
grounded in sensory content, however much synthesised by a putative 
“lower level” spontaneity. See again Chap. 3.
 35. See Schulting (2012b, Chaps. 6, 8). See also Chap. 4 (this volume).
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 36. I argue for the rigorous coextensivity between the analytic and syn-
thetic unities of apperception in Schulting (2012b). See also Chap. 2 
(this volume).
 37. See further Schulting (2012b, 2015) and Chaps. 6 and 7 (this volume).
 38. In the literature a distinction is made between absolute and relative 
nonconceptualism. Absolute nonconceptualism means that percep-
tion and belief are essentially or intrinsically different, while relative 
nonconceptualism indicates that a subject has mental content with-
out possessing the relevant concepts to describe that content (see Allais 
2009:386). See above note 9. The main difference between Hanna 
and Allais is that Hanna thinks Kant is an essential nonconceptualist, 
whereas Allais believes Kant is a relative nonconceptualist.
 39. At B47/A32, Kant writes: “That representation […] which can only be 
given through a single object, is an intuition.” Thus, intuition could be 
seen as what in current language is considered a singular reference to an 
object or particular.
 40. Usually, two criteria for intuitions are mentioned: (1) the singularity 
criterion (A320/B377; A19/B33; B47/A32), and (2) the immediacy 
criterion (V-Met/Schön, 28:484; A68/B93). But a third criterion can 
be singled out: the dependency criterion (V-Met/Schön, 28:484; B72; 
Prol, 4:281), for an intuition is dependent on a prior given object. For 
an account of the potential problems that arise for nonconceptualists 
who rely on a strong reading of this criterion, see Stephenson (2015).
 41. See by contrast McDowell (2009a:32, 100–101). McDowell reads Kant’s 
assertion at B159, i.e. the assertion that categories apply to “whatever 
objects may present themselves to our senses”, such that even the present-
ing, in and through intuition, of objects does not happen “indepen-
dently of its cooperation with the understanding”. In the original Dutch 
article on which this chapter is based (see Schulting 2010:704n.76), I 
misquoted McDowell as referring to the passage following, at B160, 
where Kant writes that “everything that may ever come before the senses 
must stand under the laws that arise a priori from the understanding 
alone”, but, as I pointed out in the aforementioned earlier version, this 
must clearly be read in the light of the sentence quoted by McDowell; 
the “everything” means merely “objects” presenting themselves, not lit-
erally every and all representations (see further Chap. 7). Aaron Griffith 
advances a stronger conceptualist reading of this passage, by contend-
ing “that even sense perception without judgement stands under the 
Notes     247
Fo
r S
c
ola
rly
Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
248     5 Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism …
categories” (2012:207). This is a standard reading but it makes no sense. 
How can sense perception which is not a judgement, and hence not an 
inseparable component of a judgement, still stand under functions of 
judgement that give it, the judgement, objective validity, i.e. the catego-
ries? A perception is either an inseparable component of an actual judge-
ment, thus implying application of the categories, or it is not, which 
means that it is merely an intuition of an object. There is nothing essen-
tial about perception as such, “without judgement”, that makes it amena-
ble to standing under the categories, which are after all nothing but the 
logical functions of judgement (B143).
 42. In his pre-Critical philosophy, around 1769, Kant still held the view 
that intuition provides “immediate cognition of individual things”, but 
he also then believed in “intuitive concepts” (Refl 3957, 17:364 [Kant 
2005:104]). After the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), it seems plausible 
that, since he gave up on the idea of ‘intuitive concepts’ and sought to 
explain how the intellect and sensible intuition work together to yield 
knowledge, he also relinquished the idea that intuition provides imme-
diate cognition of individual things, separably from the intellect.
 43. Cf. by contrast McDowell, who writes: “Kant urges that objects do not 
count as present to intuition unless what is given to the senses has cat-
egorial unity, […] categories secure for intuitions a genuinely objective 
purport […]” (2009a:100).
 44. Compare Griffith (2012), who claims to argue for a less strong con-
ceptualism (than Allais’s), by holding the view that indeed categories are 
required for intuition, but not that one need employ empirical concepts 
for having intuitions. Strong conceptualism in his view would mean 
that empirical concepts are needed for intuition. It seems though that 
strong conceptualism for Allais just means the thesis that categories 
as general rules are required for the existence of an intuition (she also 
seems to conflate the two questions that Griffith wants separated; see 
further below). Griffith’s weak conceptualism thus is still stronger than 
Allais’s relative nonconceptualism (i.e. the view that intuition can but 
need not stand under the categories), so counts as strong conceptualism 
within Allais’s perspective. Furthermore, I believe Griffith’s strategy is 
not pertinent to Kant’s analysis in TD, since that analysis only concerns 
the use of pure concepts and not empirical concepts, and therefore the 
controversial claim regarding the absolute distinction of intuition and 
concept—the claim that is central to the debate on Kant and noncon-
ceptual content—only concerns the whether or no requirement of pure 
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concepts or the categories for the possibility of intuition. The question 
regarding the application of empirical concepts is of secondary rele-
vance, as their application requires at any rate the application of the cat-
egories, given that for Kant concepts are only employed in judgements 
and categories are nothing but the functions of judgement.
 45. One could of course concentrate on the A-account of synthesis, as 
Allais indeed does (2009:396–397n.37) (see further below), and con-
tend that only the synthesis of recognition involves concepts, not yet 
the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of the imagination. For 
a critique of such a reading of Kant’s account in the A-Deduction, see 
Chap. 6.
 46. See further Schulting (2012b:88–89, 247).
 47. Cf. Allison (2012:35–36).
 48. See also B154, where Kant identifies “the transcendental action of the 
imagination” with the “synthetic influence of the understanding on the 
inner sense” (emphasis added).
 49. For a detailed analysis of what kind of combination is at issue in this 
important passage at the outset of the B-Deduction, see Schulting 
(2012b:141ff.). There, I argue that not all kinds of combination or 
connection of the manifold in an intuition are due to an act of the 
understanding. The kind of combination that is at issue at B129–30 is 
a priori, necessary synthesis.
 50. This is not a novel thesis. See also Hoppe (1983) and my own account 
in Schulting (2012b:141ff.).
 51. Allais is more careful in her formulations than I suggest here. See again 
the discussion in the preceding section. At any rate, it seems to me that 
Allais believes that intuition in and of itself refers to an already given 
object, and in this sense provides the objective validity that concepts 
(categories) require to have true application. For Allais, objective valid-
ity does not lie solely in the function of judgement, as on my view.
 52. Compared to her earlier account in Allais (2009), in her book (Allais 
2015) Allais is more precise in saying that intuition per se is not by def-
inition characterised by synthesis, but she still believes that some form 
of a priori synthesis (i.e. productive imagination) does not require the 
categories. This contrasts with my view that all a priori syntheses are 
part of judgement, and only take place within it.
 53. For a good analysis of the potential problems that face Allais’s reading 
on this latter point, see Newton (2016). See also Chap. 4 (this volume), 
in particular Sect. 4.9.
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 54. Other passages in TD that support nonconceptualism regarding intui-
tion are B145 (“[T]he manifold for intuition must already be given 
prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from it”) 
and B132 (“That representation that can be given prior to all thinking 
is called intuition”).
 55. Also Allison (2001:38) thinks along those lines. Allison speaks of the 
“exorciz[ing]” of the “specter” of “transcendental chaos”, which at 
B122–3 Kant supposedly holds before us as a threatening possibility; 
according to Allison, this exorcism is the central goal of TD. See also 
Allison (1996:49–50), where Allison refers to “the Kantian analogue of 
the Cartesian ‘evil genius’, a spectre that must be exorcized if the pro-
ject of the Deduction is to succeed”. Cf. Allison (2012:48, 2015:54).
 56. Likewise, Grüne (2011:475) thinks the hypothesis in B122–3 has 
“only a didactic function”. Cf. Bowman (2011:423) and Anderson 
(2015:352n.28). Anderson reasons that B122 should be taken “to be a 
description not of how things are, but of how they appear to be—they 
frame the difficulty that the argument of the Deduction is meant to over-
come, and therefore indicate the very opposite of Kant’s settled view”. 
This view is hard to reconcile with the indicative mood of B122.
 57. At A111–12, however, Kant indeed appears to argue that “all possible 
appearances”, even “the entire sensibility”, are “necessarily in agreement 
with the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, 
i.e., must stand under universal functions of synthesis […]”, which 
would endorse Ginsborg’s reading. But compare the passage prior to 
this one, at A110: “[…] all appearances, insofar as objects are to be given 
to us through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic 
unity […]” (emphasis added), which points to a limiting condition on 
the relation between appearances and categories as “a priori rules of 
their synthetic unity”.
 58. See note 57 above.
 59. Cf. the early Reflexion that is contemporaneous with Kant’s letter 
to Herz from 1772, Refl 4636, 17:619–620: “(One can intuit some-
thing without thinking something thereby or thereunder.) All cognitions 
come to us through thinking, i.e., through concepts” (Kant 2005:151; 
emphasis added).
 60. Cf. Refl 5221, 18:122.25–123.02.
 61. For further discussion see Schulting (2015:571–572).
 62. “An object […] is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given 
intuition is united.”
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 63. At A108–9, Kant differentiates ‘appearance’ and ‘intuition’ thus: 
“Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, 
and that in them which is immediately related to the object is called 
intuition.”
 64. See A120, which makes it clear that appearances are the data given in 
inner sense, before any synthesis is carried out.
 65. That the projects of the Aesthetic and TD are naturally not completely 
separable is also suggested by Kant’s words, in a passage prior to the 
above-quoted, that hint at the necessity of a transcendental deduc-
tion not just of the concepts of the understanding but also of space as a 
result of the ambiguity in the concept of the latter (see B120/A88).
 66. See Onof and Schulting (2015).
 67. Indeed, Onof and Schulting (2015) show that the sui generis unity of 
space, i.e. what can be called the unicity of space, is irreducible to con-
ceptual unity. See further Chap. 7.
 68. Hanna (2011b) believes that if Kantian nonconceptualism is true, 
then Kantian conceptualism is false, and consequently TD, which is 
centrally based on a conceptualist claim, is a failure. But Hanna’s dis-
junctive reading is based on a failure to see the conditional structure of 
Kant’s argument for the necessary conceptualisation of intuitions, and 
thus a failure to respect the radically subjectivist nature of Kant’s con-
ceptualism.
 69. However, some conceptualists believe that there is no gap in the first 
place, hence their position that the possibility that Kant entertains at 
B122 is merely hypothetical.
 70. See also the more detailed discussion of this passage in Schulting 
(2016b).
 71. Cf. Refl 5221, 18:123.
 72. See my detailed account of the regressive nature of TD in Schulting 
(2012b:61–75).
 73. Hanna (2013b) has acknowledged this threat of a regress, if we read 
Kant’s distinction, as he does, between figurative and intellectual syn-
thesis as shared out between nonconceptual and conceptual content. 
(He aptly calls it the “the schmimagination vicious regress problem”). 
But it is unclear how he thinks it can be solved. See further Schulting 
(2015).
 74. On the argument of MD (the Leitfaden section), see further Schulting 
(2012b, Chap. 5).
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6.1  Introduction
Often the first version of the Transcendental Deduction (TD), in the 
first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781  (henceforth 
A-Deduction), is thought to be less conceptualist than the later 
B-version from 1787 (henceforth B-Deduction). Certainly, it seems that 
in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the under-
standing in determining the manifold of representations in intuition. 
It also appears that in the A-Deduction the seemingly pre-conceptual 
aspects of a priori synthesis, namely, of the synthesis of apprehension 
and the imagination, are foregrounded more than in the B-Deduction. 
And quite evidently, in the A-Deduction judgement appears not to 
play any significant role (see Chap. 3), bolstering the view of the 
A-Deduction as less strongly conceptualist.
This view has had an influential pedigree ever since Heidegger’s 
phenomenological/ontological reading of the Deduction (esp. Heidegger 
1995) with its focus on the central role of the imagination as a source of 
human cognition that is independent of, and more fundamental than, or 
even the primordial pre-logical ground of, the discursive understanding. 
6
Kant’s Threefold Synthesis  
on a Moderately Conceptualist 
Interpretation
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Also in more recent times, despite the majority among Kantians 
preferring the B-Deduction, there have been interpreters who prefer the 
A-Deduction precisely because of its putative nonconceptualist or non-
judgementalist nature (Allais 2009; Grüne 2009; Longuenesse 1998). 
For example, Stefanie Grüne (2009) has recently argued, on the basis 
of the arguments of the A-Deduction, for an independent set of rules 
governing the lower-level syntheses of apprehension and reproduction 
in the imagination, which are separate from the fully-fledged catego-
rial rules under which objects are subsumed in judgement. Moreover, 
on Grüne’s interpretation the application of the categories as “obscure 
concepts” is not eo ipso the fully-fledged application of the categories in 
judgement. Notice that she does not regard herself as a nonconceptual-
ist strictly speaking, since unlike nonconceptualists such as Hanna and 
Allais she believes that categories as obscure concepts, rather than the 
categories as presumably being clear concepts applied in judgements, 
are involved in the lower-level syntheses, and these obscure concepts 
do involve the understanding in some sense (Grüne 2009:172). Hence 
she calls her reading “obscurist-conceptualist”, to differentiate it from 
straightforward conceptualist (i.e. as involving the categories as clear 
concepts) and ‘judgement-based’ readings as well as from nonconceptu-
alist readings, which argue that the lower-level syntheses do not involve 
the categories at all (regardless of the question whether they are clear or 
obscure). However, Grüne’s reading can also be called nonconceptualist 
in a broader (weaker) sense, since standard Kantian  nonconceptualism 
argues that some mental content does not necessarily entail the 
subsumption of that content under the categories in a judgement, given 
that the main claim in the Deduction concerns the application of the 
categories as a priori concepts, not empirical concepts or rules, whether 
obscure or not.
But it is unclear to what extent, on Kant’s view, the application of 
the categories in judgement and the use of empirical concepts could be 
seen as separably possible—that is, for the employment of empirical con-
cepts categories are required, and given that categories are nothing but 
functions of judgements categories are applied only in judgements, a 
judgement effectively being the application of empirical concepts. So it 
seems that application of the categories and the employment of empirical 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 P
rp
os
es
 O
nly
concepts is not separably possible. Grüne furthermore consistently speaks 
of “sensory” synthesis (sinnliche Synthesis) rather than a priori synthesis—a 
term that to the best of my knowledge Kant never uses, although he does, 
confusingly, appear to make a distinction between empirical and a priori 
forms or uses of the threefold synthesis (e.g. A99–100; cf. A115), which 
then does not seem to play any significant role in the general argument. 
In my view, the kind of synthesis that is centrally at issue in the sections 
in the A-Deduction discussing the threefold synthesis is a priori synthe-
sis, which is the transcendental condition of knowledge or experience, not 
any mere “sensory” synthesis.
6.2  Kant as a Moderate Conceptualist
In this chapter I shall argue for a moderately conceptualist reading 
of the A-Deduction, specifically the second section (A95–115), the 
so-called subjective deduction.1 I argue that (1) despite appearances 
to the contrary all three levels of syntheses, including the synthesis of 
recognition in a concept, are interdependent and are not to be seen as 
operating separately from or independently of each other, and a forti-
ori of the categories; (2) mere apprehension, which is not a successive 
synthesis but “fills only an instant” (A167/B209), or mere intuition,2 
is not dependent on the understanding and the application of the cat-
egories and, (3) mere apprehension does not involve a priori synthesis 
of apprehension, and a fortiori synthesis of recognition, and hence is 
fully lawless in terms of Kantian a priori laws.
I believe, first, that Kant is a conceptualist in the A-Deduction in the 
sense that all syntheses involve the categories, or the understanding as 
the seat of the categories, and that insofar as the possibility of  knowledge 
is concerned, intuition is subject to determination by means of the 
categories. I shall here leave out a discussion of the extent to which 
judgement is involved (for an account of judgement, see Chap. 3), 
also since Kant himself does not elaborate on its involvement in the 
A-Deduction, although I think that all syntheses at issue here also 
eo ipso involve judgement given that the categories are nothing but 
the forms of a priori synthesis and that they are nothing but the logical 
6.2 Kant as a Moderate Conceptualist     259
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functions of judgement insofar as the subsumed intuitions involved in 
judging are determined, and thus form concepts of objects. Hence, I do 
not see how some interpreters (such as Longuenesse and Grüne) could 
argue that the categories but not judgement (at least not directly) are 
involved in the so-called “sensible” synthesis of the manifold in intui-
tion. (As said, the term “sensible” synthesis is not used by Kant; only a 
priori syntheses are at issue in TD [cf. B139–40].)
Secondly, I also submit that, despite some strong modal claims 
regarding apperception in subsection 3 of the first part of the 
A-Deduction,3 Kant is a moderate conceptualist in the sense that he 
allows room for the real possibility that some representations that one 
apprehends are not subsumed under the categories, or the understand-
ing as the seat of the categories, or even could not be subsumed under 
the categories, or the understanding as the seat of the categories. Some 
representations fail to be accompanied, either de facto or in principle, by 
an act of apperception that would otherwise make those representations 
subject to an act of synthesis, and hence to the categories. Instantaneous 
representation that is short of objectively valid representation is 
unsynthesised representation, since it is not synthesised with other 
representations, and therefore does not stand under the categories. So 
Kant is not a conceptualist in the sense of the thesis that even to have 
representations, or indeed intuitions, already involves the categories. 
Categories are only involved for the a priori synthesis among represen-
tations, and a priori synthesis is required only for possible cognition 
of objects (whether they be objects of inner or outer sense). Hence, 
categories are only involved in the possible cognition of objects.
One could argue, as does Grüne (2009:149ff.), that there is a differ-
ence between having representations or sensations (in mere sensibility) 
and having an intuition, whereby intuition is understood in the narrow 
sense, as being a qualitatively and quantitatively complex representation 
referring to an object and, according to the Stufenleiter (B376–7), is to 
be considered an objective cognition, which at least involves synthesis. 
Mere representation in sensibility would then not amount to  intuition, 
nor a fortiori require synthesis. But it seems impossible to me even 
to have a representation that is not also part of an intuition, since all 
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representations must have at least temporal form, and so be subject to 
time as the necessary form of intuition (A31/B47) or pure intuition 
(A124). Grüne (2009:151n.4) argues that intuitions, as quanta, are the 
representations that are first produced, by means of a priori synthesis, 
when sensations are brought under spatiotemporal form. But this sug-
gests that sensations are not even given under the form of time, which 
cannot be true, because anything in inner sense, including representa-
tions of outer sense or sensations, which are the result of being affected 
by outer objects, is given under the form of time (B50/A34).4
On my reading Kant is to a certain extent also a nonconceptualist, in 
the sense of allowing for the possibility of representations that, either de 
facto or in principle, are not synthesised and thus subsumed under the 
categories. If conceptualism means that necessarily, all representations 
are either determined or determinable by the categories, then Kant is 
not a conceptualist. Kant is then a nonconceptualist to the extent that 
he does not subscribe to such a strong modal claim with regard to the 
entailment relation between representations and the categories. But 
I think it is better to call Kant a moderate conceptualist, rather than a 
nonconceptualist, since Kantian nonconceptualism, commonly con-
strued, has features that I believe cannot be aligned with Kant’s core 
theory of cognition, two of these being (a) the claim that nonconceptual 
content, or intuition, is synthesised content to some extent (see above) 
and (b) the claim that intuition, based on a strong construal of intui-
tion delivering individuals in sensibility, yields objective cognition or ref-
erence independently of the categories (see Chap. 5). My view of Kant’s 
nonconceptualism departs from either Allais’s or Hanna’s, as they believe 
that at least some kind of synthesis, namely, the synthesis of imagina-
tion, is involved in nonconceptual content, i.e. in intuitions of spatial 
objects, whereas I do not (see Chap. 5).5 My view of Kant’s nonconcep-
tualism is also more minimalist than either of the others’, since on my 
view nonconceptual content merely amounts to sheer representations, 
without any objectively valid reference in the strict (Kantian) sense, i.e. 
mere sensations—so arguably, on my view there is not much content in 
such representations on a contemporary understanding of ‘content’, 
as being the object of an epistemic attitude, i.e. intentional content. 
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However, I disagree with Grüne’s (2009:185) view that the “run[ning] 
through” (A99) of the manifold merely concerns sensations and not 
intuition, since, on her reading, intuition is first produced by the taking 
together, reproducing and recognising of representations (sensations). 
On my view, having mere sensations amounts to the mere having of 
undifferentiated intuitions, for sensations are the material content of 
intuitions, of which space and time are the necessary a priori form. 
Intuitions, as such, are not different things than mere manifolds 
of sensations. So I agree with Allais’s (2015, 2016)  nonconceptualist 
view that the having of an intuition is wholly independent of any 
synthesis. It is in this sense that my interpretation may still be counted 
as nonconceptualist.
6.3  The Threefold Synthesis in the A-Deduction 
and the Analysis of Knowledge
While addressing the account of the threefold synthesis, we must 
keep in mind that the overall goal of TD is the analysis of the 
 possibility of objective experience, whereby experience should be 
understood as empirical knowledge (empirische Erkenntniß ) (B147–8). 
Indeed, the very heading of Section II of the A-Deduction, in which 
the theory of the threefold synthesis is  presented, is titled “On 
the a priori grounds for the possibility of experience [Erfahrung]”. 
This ties in with the inquiry into the  possibility of the applica-
tion of pure a priori concepts (the categories), that is, their  justified 
employment (A96–7), which Kant stresses at the  outset of the 
A-Deduction; showing the justified employment of the cate gories 
is to “prove that by means of them alone an object can be 
thought” (A97). Kant points out that for such an inquiry to take 
place,  “we  must first assess not the empirical but the  transcendental 
consti tution of the subjective sources that comprise the a  priori 
 foundations for the possibility of experience” (A97; emphasis added). 
These subjective sources are the three syntheses of  apprehension, 
reproduction and conceptual recognition. It is striking and important 
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to be reminded of the fact that the ground of this threefold  synthesis 
is spontaneity, as Kant says, and that this threefold synthesis is 
 “necessarily found in all cognition [Erkenntnis]” (A97).6 (On the topic 
of spontaneity, see again Chap. 3.) In other words, these subjective 
sources constitute the analytical elements of knowledge, which are dis-
sected in the Subsections 1–3 of the first part of the A-Deduction, 
where knowledge is to be understood, as Kant writes, as “a whole of 
compared and connected representations” (A97).
The account of the subjective sources of the three syntheses in the 
A-Deduction is thus meant to elucidate the a priori constitution of 
knowledge. They are the building blocks of knowledge, or, as the sub-
heading of the introduction of the first part of the A-Deduction7 says, 
they are “the a priori grounds for the possibility of experience” (A95). 
The argument of the A-Deduction as a whole is therefore regressively 
structured, where we start from the main premise of the possibility of 
empirical knowledge or experience and regress to the a priori condi-
tions which are the transcendentally enabling ground of this knowledge 
or experience. While it might seem that, at least in the first part of the 
A-Deduction, Kant proceeds rather in a progressive manner, which can 
make it seem as if some psychological-cognitive process consisting of 
different stages were concerned which progressively leads, or as it hap-
pens fails to lead, from mere representation to knowledge,8 I believe the 
A-Deduction account of the threefold synthesis is a step-by-step analy-
sis of what is contained in cognition in terms of its minimally required 
conditions, given the fact of knowledge. I thus agree with Anderson 
(2015:352ff.) that the “expository ordering” of the account of the three-
fold synthesis should not be mistaken for a “dependence ordering”, as 
if the syntheses were to be considered phases taking place in time, and 
either can or do not take place. ‘Bottom-up’ accounts get the depend-
ence relation between the three types of synthesis wrong. I do not agree 
with Anderson though that this implies a strongly conceptualist reading 
of the threefold synthesis. This will become clear in the course of my 
account. Let us now address the first subsection of the account of the 
threefold synthesis, concerning the synthesis of apprehension, and dis-
sect its argument.
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6.3.1  Synthesis of Apprehension
Kant starts out from the minimal assumption that we have a manifold 
of representations in sensibility, that is, from the assumption that our 
representational capacity is discursive rather than intuitive or based on 
direct perception of objects. Kant is a representationalist (rather than 
a direct realist sans phrase),9 where his representationalism is dualistic: 
representations are either conceptual and mediately related to the object 
of representation or sensibly intuitive and immediately related to the 
object, whatever this relation to an object consists in (see Chap. 1 and 
further below). The fact that, for Kant, the relation of an intuition to 
an object is immediate and the claim that Kant is not a direct realist 
are not in tension with one another: in fact, direct realism cannot be 
here presumed to be Kant’s position (even apart from the conflict with 
the assumed representationalism), as direct realism presupposes real-
ism about given objects, whereas at this point in the analysis the status 
of ‘object’ has not yet been established. As it turns out, in the conclu-
sion of Kant’s argument, Kant’s representationalism is in fact antitheti-
cal to direct realism, and is rather tantamount to an idealism, since the 
object is just a function of the unity among representations grounded 
in the unity of apperception. Many commentators believe that Kant’s 
empirical realism is a direct realism (e.g. Allais 2015), but I think that 
is a mistake; Kant’s empirical realism is grounded on his idealism, 
which is a form of representationalism that stipulates that an object is 
wholly a function of the unity of apperception of one’s representations, 
given sensations that are the effect of things in themselves (see again 
Chap. 4).10
The representationalist position endorsed by Kant means that a 
representing subject has multiple representations that she needs to 
run through and take together, never just one singular representation. 
So, “[e]very intuition contains a manifold in itself ” (A99). But this 
manifold is, in itself, nothing but an absolute unity, that is to say, it is 
undifferentiated, or more precisely, the manifold representations in the 
intuition are each “contained in one moment” and hence are nothing 
other than absolute unities, or, isolated instants (in time).11 This does 
not mean that there is an absence of unity of any kind in the manifold,12 
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but just that, in this case, the manifold consists of units or moments 
that have not been unified by an apprehending subject, and so are not 
recognised as unified. This recognition is associated by Kant with a priori 
or necessary unity, since it is the kind of unity that makes that repre-
sentations are united such that they first, non-arbitrarily constitute a 
relation to an object. Any intuition containing a manifold of represen-
tation is in itself nothing but a series of successive individual, isolated 
representations “entirely foreign” to each other (A97).13 For a manifold 
to be considered a manifold of connected representations, which first 
makes cognition possible, something needs to be added to the manifold. 
In fact, for the manifold to be regarded as a manifold, namely as a plu-
rality of representations rather than just a consecutive series of isolated 
absolute unities (instants or boundaries), something more than just a 
manifold of representations in an intuition is needed. For the series 
of successive representations to be seen as a manifold it must be con-
trasted with the representation of the successive representations as being 
so, which requires something in addition to the mere series of successive 
representations. Only the representation of the successive representations 
as being a manifold of representations makes that the successive repre-
sentations can be seen as a manifold of representations. In other words, 
a second-order representing is required for a manifold to be regarded 
as a manifold, that is, to see the manifoldness of the manifold, which 
involves the instantiation of the quantitative category ‘plurality’.14
Does Kant then rule out the possibility of a mere manifold in sen-
sibility, a mere succession of representations? No, he does not. Does it 
mean that the mere manifold is not a manifold, strictly speaking (i.e. 
not complex in some sense), just because the plurality of a manifold of 
representations can be regarded as a plurality only by representing the 
series as a manifold? No, it does not. Instantaneous apprehension of 
a representation is an apprehension that collapses into the representa-
tion apprehended.15 Such representations are mere sensations that fol-
low one after the other—i.e. the mere material content of an  arbitrary 
empirical intuition.16 In this case, the representations would be rep-
resented “without distinction, just as they fell together”, as Kant says 
(A121). A mere manifold is then just a series of such representations 
that “without distinction” fall together, consecutively over time. 
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(This does not imply that sensations cannot be had simultaneously, 
e.g. the smell of an espresso being brewed and the concurrent sound of 
the moka pot percolating. The simultaneity of sensations need not be 
noticed for the sensations to happen simultaneously.) A great part of our 
representations are like that, e.g. when one merely stares out the win-
dow, when one is driving one’s car etc.,17 and for infants or non-human 
animals this is probably the standard way of being aware of, or ‘coping 
with’, one’s environment.
The important point here is that intuition delivers a manifold of 
representations (cf. B160n.) but nothing beyond that in the sense of 
enabling a genuine perception or cognition of objects, or even a rec-
ognition of the manifold as manifold, as a plurality of representations 
in time, that is, as qualitatively or quantitatively complex.18 As Kant 
repeatedly says (e.g. B130, 134), the object itself is not generated in or 
through the manifold, nor do we just “find some sort of combination of 
the manifold already in inner sense” (B155). The manifold itself consists 
of “different perceptions” that “by themselves are encountered dispersed 
and separate in the mind”, and do not have “the combination” neces-
sary for cognition “in sense itself ” (A120).19 Hence, Kant says here in 
subsection 1 of the first part of the A-Deduction that
in order for [Damit] unity of intuition to come from this manifold  
(as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through 
and then to take together this manifoldness, which action I call synthesis 
of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be 
sure provides a manifold but can never effect this is as such [dieses … als 
ein solches … bewirken kann], and indeed as contained in one representa-
tion, without the occurrence of such a synthesis. (A99; boldface mine)
The last subordinate clause in this passage is tricky. What precisely does 
Kant mean by “effect” (bewirken)? And is what is effected, by means of 
synthesis, the manifold itself, or just its unity? From the added clause 
“und zwar in einer Vorstellung enthalten”, and the whole context of the 
passage, it is clear that the synthesis effects the unity of the manifold, 
not the manifold itself—what Kant means by the fact that synthesis 
effects the manifold “as such” (als ein solches), is that the representation 
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of the manifoldness of the manifold relies on the synthesis too, as I 
explained earlier. Also, the synthesis of apprehension is directed at the 
intuition, implying that the latter cannot be first generated by the for-
mer.20 At any rate, Kant makes a clear distinction between, on the one 
hand, the intuition that delivers or provides the manifold representa-
tions, since they are just “modifications of the mind” and “belong to 
inner sense”, as he says earlier at A98–9, and, on the other hand, unity 
of intuition. This unity is not already contained in the manifold of rep-
resentations as mere modifications of the mind, but must be added by 
means of an action “aimed at” the intuition (cf. B129–30). True, rep-
resentations, even as mere modifications of the mind, come in arrays 
or streams, they have a certain psychological structure or ordered 
arrangement—or, as I noted earlier, even a unity of sorts (e.g. a  synoptic 
unity; cf. A97)—as they are prompted in the mind over time.21 But 
this is not the unity that Kant means in this context. As becomes clear 
from a later passage (A104–5), he means necessary unity here, namely 
a unity insofar as cognition of an object, or indeed “the representation 
of space” (A99), arises from it; that is, a unity that is recognised, by the 
subject of representation, as a unity, and thus as having an objective 
validity, as representing a genuine object that contrasts with the arbitrary 
(psychological) make-up of a subject’s mental arrangement (cf. A104–5).
The passage at A99 that we have just read is similar to a passage in 
§26 in the B-Deduction, where in a notoriously convoluted note Kant 
writes:
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), con-
tains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension 
[Zusammenfassung] of the manifold given in accordance with the form 
of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition 
merely gives the manifold [bloß Mannigfaltiges … giebt], but the formal 
intuition gives unity of the representation. (B160n; boldface mine)
Space as form of intuition is the mere form in which representations of 
outer sense are represented (mutatis mutandis, this holds for time as 
well, namely, time being the mere form in which representations are 
contained in inner sense, including those of outer sense [A34/B50].) 
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We could not have representations of objects outside of us unless space 
were the necessary form of such representation, just as we could not have 
representations at all if they did not have the form of time as their a 
priori condition of being given. Space, as form of intuition—what else-
where Kant calls metaphysical space, which is an “originally, […] subjec-
tively given space”, rather than geometrical space (OKT, 20:420 [Kant 
2014:309])22—is the necessary condition of the possibility even of hav-
ing a manifold of representations of outer objects, as much as time is the 
necessary condition of the possibility of having a manifold of representa-
tions at all. Space is the minimal condition of the cognition of objects, 
though not sufficient for it. For the mere having of a manifold of rep-
resentations of an outer object does not give one a clear, that is, deter-
mined grasp of those representations as representing an outer object, a 
grasp of a determinate spatial object, which is constructible in geometric 
space. To put it succinctly, a mere given manifold of representations is 
not objectively valid, but only subjectively valid, even if those representa-
tions are in fact the result of the causal affection by outer objects.
The argument, here in subsection 1 of Section II of the A-Deduction, 
as well as the more elaborate parallel argument of §26 in the 
B-Deduction, is that in order to have a unified manifold in intuition, i.e. 
a unity of intuition, the manifold must be “run through” and “take[n] 
together” (A99). Only in that I perform this action of “running through” 
and “tak[ing] together” a manifold, will the manifold constitute a unity, 
a unitary representation of connected representations, which defines a 
cognition or experience. This action of, as it were, producing the unity 
is what Kant means by “effecting” (A99) a manifold as manifold in a 
unitary representation. (Again, both aspects of the representation of the 
manifoldness of the manifold and its unity are “effected” by synthesis. 
In producing the unity, also the manifold as manifold, as plurality, is 
grasped. Notice that synthesis does not generate the manifold itself, but 
rather enables a grasping of a manifold as a manifold. A manifold in itself, 
without it being represented as such, is just a consecution of separate 
“absolute unities”, discrete moments.) This action concerns the primor-
dial uncaused causality that lies in the act of the spontaneous agent of 
synthesis (cf. B130). Hence, Kant claims at the start of the account of 
the threefold synthesis that spontaneity is their ground (A97).
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It is important to note that Kant is not claiming that with the synthe-
sis of apprehension space itself is first produced, as the reference to space 
at A99 might suggest, and as the concluding paragraph of subsection 1 
appears to be saying, namely that
without [synthesis of apprehension] we could have a priori neither 
the representations of space nor of time, since these can be generated 
[erzeugt] only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its 
original receptivity provides. (A99–100)
We should be careful in reading such passages as the above. Kant 
appears to be saying that space itself (and time) is generated by the 
synthesis of apprehension, in conjunction with the synthesis of 
the imagination (see below). This is sometimes indeed argued to be the 
case by Kant’s commentators, such as by Longuenesse (1998:219, 223; 
2005:34) and Friedman (2012:248). And A99–100 provides the best 
textual evidence for such a reading. But neither space itself, nor the sui 
generis unity of space is dependent on the spontaneity of a synthesising 
subject, on an act of unification; for (1) there is clear textual evidence to 
the contrary and (2) phenomenologically it is impossible that the infi-
nite magnitude of space should be grasped as such by a finite subject, 
let alone be produced by a finite subject (for detailed analysis, see Onof 
and Schulting 2014, 2015).
It is precisely for this reason, among others, that Kant makes an abso-
lute distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, which though nec-
essarily linked insofar as knowledge should be possible, are irreducible 
to each other. An act of spontaneity cannot produce receptivity itself, 
and a fortiori produce the subjective forms of receptivity (space and 
time) under which manifolds of representations are necessarily received. 
The roles of receptivity and spontaneity should not be conflated, nor 
their distinction blurred.23 Receptivity is what “provides” (darbietet) 
(A99–100) the manifold, and hence the forms of such a mere manifold 
(cf. B160n.).24 What the synthesis of apprehension (and in conjunction 
with it, the synthesis of imagination) generates is the representation of 
space and time, which involves ordering and connecting the given man-
ifold, parts or instants, in space and in time respectively (cf. A98–9); 
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the synthesis does not generate the very forms of receptivity, or forms of 
intuition, space and time themselves, as if Kant collapsed the absolute 
distinction between intuition and concept after all. This is more clearly 
indicated when we look at the synthesis of reproduction in the imagina-
tion, with which the synthesis of apprehension, as Kant says, is insepa-
rably linked (A102).
6.3.2  Synthesis of Imagination
In subsection 2, which addresses the synthesis of reproduction in the 
imagination, the general background premise is again the possibility of 
object cognition or knowledge, and concomitant with it the justified 
employment of the pure concepts of the understanding, these being 
the a priori concepts of an object that are the necessary conditions of 
experience or knowledge. After the synthesis of apprehension, the syn-
thesis of reproduction in the imagination is the next elementary neces-
sary condition of the possibility of objective cognition. This synthesis 
is “inseparably combined” (A102) with the synthesis of apprehension, 
because only in tandem with the synthesis of reproduction does the syn-
thesis of apprehension enable a genuine connection of the manifold that 
is required in order to have an objective cognition.25
But there are some prima facie problems with the A-Deduction 
account of the imagination, which in the B-Deduction Kant has sought 
to eliminate, namely the suspicion that a mere power of empirical asso-
ciation or reproduction is at issue. It seems as if, here at A100–1, Kant 
were arguing that mere association—he talks about “a merely empiri-
cal law” of association or reproduction—already presupposes that the 
“appearances [i.e., objects] themselves are actually subject to […] a 
[constant] rule”, since without being subject to a constant rule, “our 
empirical imagination would never get to do anything suitable to its 
capacity, and would thus remain hidden in the interior of the mind, 
like a dead and to us unknown faculty”. The very subjective capacity for 
associative imagination would, on this view, be psychologically impossi-
ble if there were not a definite rule with which appearances themselves 
must accord, taking these appearances to be the objects of experience. 
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This, at first blush at any rate, appears indeed what Kant means, since 
the examples he adduces point to real objects of experience. I discuss 
these shortly.
By contrast, in the B-Deduction, Kant explicitly excludes such a psy-
chological reading of the imagination from the transcendental account 
of the possibility of knowledge. The imagination that is connected 
with an act of spontaneity, and which he therefore calls “productive”, is 
explicitly contradistinguished from the reproductive imagination,
whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of asso-
ciation, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the 
possibility of cognition a priori, and on that account belongs not in tran-
scendental philosophy but in psychology. (B152)
But the apparently psychological account of imagination in A should, 
I contend, also be read in a non-psychologistic manner. Also in A (at A118), 
Kant contradistinguishes the productive and reproductive forms of imagi-
nation, the former being the transcendental, a priori power that is the 
necessary condition of the latter. That the reproductive imagination, as 
it features in subsection 2, should not be read merely psychologically 
becomes clear if we analyse the examples Kant adduces.
We should keep in mind that the background premise in all of 
the examples is that there is some actual knowledge of, or a knowl-
edge claim about, the object at which the reproductive imagination is 
directed. Here is the passage with which the account of the reproductive 
synthesis of the imagination begins, and where Kant gives the examples 
that illustrate its functioning:
It is, to be sure, a merely empirical law in accordance with which rep-
resentations that have often followed or accompanied one another are 
finally associated with each other and thereby placed in a connection in 
accordance with which, even without the presence of the object, one of 
these representations brings about a transition of the mind to the other 
in accordance with a constant rule. This law of reproduction, however, 
presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually subject to such a 
rule, and that in the manifold of their representations an accompaniment 
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or succession takes place according to certain rules; for without that our 
empirical imagination would never get to do anything suitable to its 
capacity, and would thus remain hidden in the interior of the mind, like 
a dead and to us unknown faculty. If cinnabar were now red, now black, 
now light, now heavy, if a human being were now changed into this ani-
mal shape, now into that one, if on the longest day the land were covered 
now with fruits, now with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination 
would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the 
occasion of the representation of the color red; or if a certain word were 
attributed now to this thing, now to that, or if one and the same thing 
were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the governance of a 
certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected in themselves, 
then no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place. (A100–1)
I focus on one example. In the case of cinnabar (Zinnober), i.e. the 
red mineral ore mercury sulphide, it is not the contingent association 
of some arbitrary red-coloured object with a similar object which, by 
contrast, is black-coloured that is at issue here, as if indeed one could 
not have a chance encounter with a red-coloured piece of cinnabar, fol-
lowed by an encounter with black cinnabar, without indeed knowing 
what one has in front of one, assuming certain a priori enabling rules 
for so knowing—call this weak association. That is not the point of the 
illustration.26 I submit that Kant’s reasoning is rather the following.
I know, by means of my capacity for reproductive imagination, that 
if I were presented with a specific red-coloured object, it is heavy cin-
nabar that one looks at, and if, in a second instance, one were presented 
with a black object, it is light cinnabar that one looks at, if and only 
if I know what cinnabar is and thus know that red cinnabar blackens 
when exposed to light, i.e. that cinnabar is vulnerable to degradation. 
Only under the objective condition that red cinnabar blackens under 
exposure to light, and that one has knowledge of this condition, is one 
capable of knowing that, under normal, stable conditions, cinnabar is 
red-coloured.27 Thus, only on this objective condition is one a fortiori 
able to associate, in the strong sense, black with red cinnabar. Therefore, 
Kant says that “without the governance of a certain rule to which the 
appearances are already subjected in themselves, then no empirical 
synthesis of reproduction could take place” (A101; emphasis added). 
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Again, this does not mean that empirical reproductive imagination as 
such, i.e. weak association, is absolutely grounded on, or precisely maps 
onto, the order and stability of objects (as empirically given), but it 
means that empirical reproductive imagination is meaningfully about 
objects only under the assumption of a certain necessary a priori rule 
that governs those objects themselves, as objects of possible knowledge, 
and enables strong association or knowledge thereof. The possible associ-
ation is not dependent on the constitution, order and stability of objects 
existing independently of my faculty of association, but on the same 
rules to which those objects, such as cinnabar, themselves are subject in 
order to be possible objects of my association. This may sound ques-
tion-begging, but must be understood against the backdrop of Kant’s 
idealist claim that the “a priori conditions of a possible experience in 
general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects 
of experience” (A111). It is the one set of a priori conditions of possible 
experience that establishes both the experience (association) of objects 
and the objects so experienced (the associated appearances).
The necessary a priori rule governing both experience (association) 
and objects is provided by the “transcendental synthesis of this power” 
(A101), that is, by the transcendental productive imagination (A118), 
which grounds the empirical reproductive synthesis in the imagination, 
insofar as it should yield objective empirical knowledge. The reproduc-
tive synthesis basically consists in the retention of each successive part 
of the manifold in intuition, whether they be parts of a line that I draw 
in space, the preceding parts (instants) of time in the observation of an 
event (such as the exposure of cinnabar to light, which blackens it), or 
“the successively represented units” when counting numbers (A102; cf. 
A103).28 The synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of the imagi-
nation together enable a “whole representation”, which is not an abso-
lute, undifferentiated unity, but a unitary representation of a complex 
manifold of representations, whether this unitary representation be a 
single object or an objective event involving one or more objects, such 
as the exposure of cinnabar to light.
If we look at the B-Deduction, in particular §§24 and 26, where 
Kant expounds on the synthesis speciosa or figurative synthesis and the 
synthesis of apprehension respectively, it becomes clear that these 
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syntheses are responsible for the construction of particulars in geo-
metric space and the perception of empirical spatiotemporal objects 
in physical space respectively (see further Chap. 7). It should be noted 
again (cf. Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2), as Kant indeed points out in §24 of the 
B-Deduction, that transcendental imagination is the determining fac-
tor in sensibility, not that which is determined, i.e. the determinable. 
Nor does the determining factor produce or generate the determina-
ble, namely, what is received in sensibility. Even though transcendental 
imagination is said to belong to sensibility (B151), it cannot be equated 
with sensibility itself, in terms of that which is given in and through the 
senses, nor with the forms of sensibility as such (space and time), and 
nor is the imagination the principle of sensibility itself, as Hegel thinks 
it is (see Chap. 8).29 Transcendental imagination is “a faculty for deter-
mining the sensibility a priori”, and is “an effect of the understanding 
on sensibility and its first application […] to objects of […] intuition” 
(B152). Neither the understanding nor transcendental imagination, as 
an effect of the understanding, are constitutive of the forms of intuition, 
contrary to what commentators like Longuenesse suggest.30 Hence, 
despite what Kant might appear to say at the start of the ‘second step’ 
of the B-Deduction (§21), it is not merely how objects are first given in 
receptivity, or presented to us, which is at issue in the ‘second step’, but 
the way they are first constructed in sensibility, as complex particulars or 
singular objects.
Space, and also time, are first “made representable”, as Kant puts it 
(B156), by the act of the productive imagination, that is, as for time, 
“under the image of a line, insofar as we draw it”. Space can only be 
determined by the act of the productive imagination through deter-
mining spatial regions in space; space as such, as an infinite given 
magnitude, can never be determined (space itself is fundamentally 
under-determined31). Thus in constructing a geometrical object such as 
a triangle, a spatial region is determined in space, which itself is pre-
supposed as a given whole, or an infinitely divisible quantum, as back-
ground space. Now of course, in TD Kant is not primarily interested in 
the possibility of geometry or the construction of geometrical objects 
per se, but rather in the possibility of real spatiotemporal objects in 
experience (whether they be sensibly perceivable or perceivable only by 
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inferring their existence through the relations of my occurrent percep-
tions to sensibly perceivable objects). But the crucial claim, in TD, is 
that the possibility of objects is grounded on the objective determina-
tion of space into determinate spaces with definite boundaries, given 
that, as per the argument of the Aesthetic, objects that are accessible to 
human intuition must be spatial.
Indeed, as Kant suggests at B138, the claim is that the act of the syn-
thesis of imagination first generates an object as a determinate space 
itself within the larger space in which it is contained by delimiting or 
placing boundaries in unbounded space, in conformity with the con-
straints of the human forms of intuition under which such a construc-
tion is possible. The unity of the act of synthesis, by the imagination, 
which occurs by means of an act of constructing in accordance with 
a definite rule of the understanding (category) defines an object as an 
object of specifically human intuition; hence Kant calls it figurative syn-
thesis, to distinguish it from other possible forms of sensible synthesis. 
He writes:
Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not yet cogni-
tion at all; it only gives the manifold of intuition a priori for a possible 
cognition. But in order to cognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must 
draw it, and thus synthetically bring about a determinate combination of 
the given manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the 
unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and thereby is an object 
(a determinate space) first cognized. (B137–8; boldface mine)
Now the action of the synthesis of the imagination “exercised 
 immediately upon perceptions” is the synthesis of the apprehen-
sion, as Kant says in A120, which is also argued in the ‘second step’ 
of the B-Deduction, §26, which concerns the possibility of percep-
tual knowledge, and whose argument is directly entailed by the argu-
ment in §24 concerning figurative synthesis (see further Chap. 7). So, 
the synthesis of apprehension is in fact the figurative synthesis or the 
productive imagination, insofar as real empirically given spatial objects, 
rather than just geometric or imaged objects, are determined in physical 
space, rather than in geometrical space. The possibility of apprehending 
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or perceiving such objects in physical space is grounded on figura-
tive synthesis or the productive imagination. This argument is based 
on the argument that figurative synthesis generates geometric space 
(i.e. the representation of space; A99)32 in which any empirical deter-
minate object, a phenomenon, must be constructible as a spatial object 
with determinate boundaries in physical space.
6.3.3  Recognition in a Concept
Now how does all this tie in with Kantian nonconceptualism, where 
such nonconceptualism is defined as the dual thesis that some mental 
content is not subsumed or subsumable under the categories, and so not 
constrained by the understanding, and that such content is synthesised 
by a sui generis non-intellectual synthesis, that is, the presumably inde-
pendent syntheses of apprehension and of the imagination, which enable 
the representation of spatiotemporal objects?33 Well, it doesn’t. The thesis 
of Kantian nonconceptualism, so construed, conflicts with both the A- 
and B-accounts of how the imagination must be regarded as an act that 
is inseparable from the understanding’s role, and hence dependent on the 
involvement of pure concepts by virtue of the synthesis of  recognition. 
This last element is what Kant argues in subsection 3 of Section II of 
the A-Deduction. Some commentators (e.g. Allais 2009) have argued, 
on the basis of a passage at B104 in §10 of the Metaphysical Deduction 
(MD), that the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of imagina-
tion can be seen as operating independently of the application of con-
cepts (i.e. pure concepts of the understanding), that is, independently of 
the synthesis of recognition in a concept, to put it in the terms of the 
A-Deduction. Let us look at this passage. Kant writes at A78–9/B104:
Transcendental logic […] teaches how to bring under concepts not
the representations but the pure synthesis of representations. The first
thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects
is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by
means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yield
cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis unity, and that
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consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are 
the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before 
us, and they depend on the understanding.
In line with Kant’s observation, just prior to this passage, that “[s]ynthesis 
in general is […] the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though 
indispensable function of the soul” (cf. A124) and that “to bring this 
synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, 
and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense” 
(B103/A78), it is argued by Allais (and others) (1) that the synthesis of 
the imagination and the role of the understanding in conceptualising 
this synthesis are two separable acts, and (2) that the synthesis of imagi-
nation does not necessarily entail the conceptualising act by the under-
standing.34 I think this reading is mistaken. First, it misapprehends the 
primary dual goal of TD of proving the legitimacy of the application of 
the categories to experience and explaining the possibility of  objective 
experience (or knowledge), which occurs precisely by virtue of the 
synthesis of the imagination. Secondly, it conflicts directly with the 
claim of the guiding thread section, immediately following the quoted 
passage, at A79/B104–5. Thirdly, it misunderstands the regressive nature 
of the argument in the A-Deduction, where each element of the  analysis 
is equally and simultaneously constitutive of possible experience or 
knowledge (time is not involved in the analysis). And fourth, and most 
problematically, it leads to an infinite regress. For, as regards the last 
point, what makes that, on the separability reading, the pure synthesis 
of the imagination is, presumably in a subsequent act, in fact “brought 
under concepts” by the understanding so as to form judgements, given 
that the synthesis of the imagination is already the original a priori 
synthesis, a more original synthesis than which does not exist? Is this 
subsequent act of the bringing under concepts a different and separable 
act from the original synthesis of the imagination? (This concerns what 
Hanna [2013] has called the “schmimagination” problem.)35
In my view, transcendental imagination constructs objects in space 
in accordance with a rule of the understanding, i.e. a concept, which is 
argued in subsection 3; and since concepts are required for the action 
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of the imagination, nonconceptualists cannot argue that the synthesis 
of imagination operates independently of the categories and the under-
standing or, given that empirical as well as pure concepts are used only 
in judgements (A68/B93), that the synthesis of imagination occurs out-
side of judgement, which, I believe, also goes against Grüne’s ‘obscurist-
conceptualist’ reading of the relation between synthesis, categories and 
judgement. The construction takes place in tandem with the under-
standing (and hence judgement), as that which provides the rule in 
accordance with which the construction necessarily occurs in intuition. 
Without the understanding’s involvement, there simply is no construc-
tion. Let me expand.
I concentrate on the third aspect, concerning the regressive nature of 
the account of the threefold synthesis, which necessarily includes the 
synthesis of conceptual recognition. Let us turn to A103, with which 
the third subsection of Section II of the A-Deduction (A95–110), con-
cerning the synthesis of recognition in the concept, starts. Kant writes:
Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what 
we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of represen-
tations would be in vain. For it would be a new representation in our 
current state, which would not belong at all to the act through which it 
had been gradually generated, and its manifold would never constitute a 
whole, since it would lack the unity that only consciousness can obtain 
for it. If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my 
senses were successively added to each other by me, then I would not 
cognize the generation of the multitude [Menge] through this  successive 
addition of one to the other, and consequently I would not cognize the 
number; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this 
unity of the synthesis. / The word ‘concept’ itself could already lead us to 
this remark. For it is this one consciousness [dieses eine Bewußtsein] that 
unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also 
reproduced, into one representation. (A103)
The possible reproduction in the imagination of the successive parts in 
intuition, by means of which “a whole” or unitary (“one”) representation is 
first constituted rests on an additional condition apart from the syntheses 
of apprehension and of reproduction, namely, the condition of the agent 
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of reproduction being conscious of the necessary unity of her representa-
tions in the gradual bringing forth of them and reproducing them. The 
synthesis of the imagination in successively adding representations to one 
another, and, importantly, retaining these, so as to connect them as neces-
sarily belonging together, such as the representations of <heavy cinnabar> 
and <redness>, would not be possible without this unitary consciousness.36 
(Notice that, of course, <cinnabar>, <heaviness>, and <redness> do not as 
mere concepts belong together necessarily, but they belong together neces-
sarily in the synthetic judgement “Heavy cinnabar is red-coloured”, given 
that heavy cinnabar is red-coloured [cf. B142].) The reproduction in the 
imagination is made necessary if and only if there is this unitary conscious-
ness in a concept (A105; A108), which is the concept of an object (in gen-
eral) (A104) that corresponds to the “whole” that is produced as a result 
of the apprehension and reproduction of the manifold of representations. 
The “whole” that comprehends the representations <redness>, <heaviness>, 
and <cinnabar> as necessarily belonging together in the judgement “Heavy 
cinnabar is red-coloured” constitutes the concept of an object, in this par-
ticular case of the object ‘red-coloured, heavy cinnabar’, and is made possi-
ble by the unity of consciousness of all these representations so combined.
Grüne (2009:176–177) observes that the ‘thinking’ involved in the 
consciousness that the various representations belong together is not 
propositional or judgemental, in the sense that I need consciously judge 
that the representation <heavy cinnabar> must be connected with the 
representation <red-coloured>. I think this is right to the extent that 
Kant here explains how judgement, and thus discursive thought, is first 
made possible on the basis of a priori synthesis, so that what grounds 
it, i.e. the unitary consciousness, cannot itself be what it grounds, i.e. 
an explicit judging of the form S is P. However, I disagree with Grüne’s 
suggestion that the unity of consciousness is completely divorced from 
the unity of judgement. Although the consciousness that the various 
representations form a unity does not itself have the character of a judg-
ing, it does form an integral part of a judgement, that is, it is that which 
transcendental-logically grounds judgement and thus also only takes 
place in judgement; the unity of consciousness is as it were adverbial to 
the judgement (as was argued in Chap. 3). The grounding relation or 
ground does not lie outside judgement.
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Of course, Grüne wants to argue that for what she calls a 
Wahrnehmungserlebnis judgement is not required, and I agree. But, 
unlike Grüne, I would argue that such an event as the hearing of two 
tones as an interval and thus as a unity of sorts, to use her example, does 
not require any synthesis in Kant’s a priori sense either, nor a fortiori any 
judgement; only an explicit recognition of the specific intervallic width 
between two pitches requires an a priori synthesis, for this ability pre-
supposes at least some musical knowledge, and so by implication my 
capacity to judge is required. There is a clear difference between merely 
hearing different tones and specifically knowing and judging about 
what I hear, just as there is a clear difference between perceiving (and 
enjoying) sounds as noise and judging it to be music. (Grüne makes a 
distinction between a priori synthesis and “sensible” synthesis, and she 
argues that in the above case only “sensible” synthesis is at issue. But I 
do not see evidence of this distinction in Kant’s argument for the three-
fold synthesis , which is an a priori synthesis in a sensible manifold , not a 
“sensible” synthesis in contrast to or separable from a priori synthesis.)
Now this unitary consciousness, or what from subsequent passages 
turns out to be the unity of apperception (A119) or transcendental 
apperception (A107),37 is nothing but the recognition of the manifold 
of representations as unified in a concept, namely, of the manifold being 
subsumed under the set of pure concepts or the categories (A119), which 
first enables the genuine cognition of objects, such as red-coloured heavy 
cinnabar, or objective events, such as the degradation of cinnabar under 
exposure to light. The grounds or a priori rules of recognition are the 
categories and it is these categories that a priori ground the synthesis of 
the imagination (A125); so insofar as the pure productive imagination 
is concerned, the synthesis of conceptual recognition, by means of the 
categories, is necessarily involved.
For example, in order even to construct a triangle by means of the 
synthesis of imagination, I need to be “conscious of the composition of 
three straight lines in accordance with a rule according to which such 
an intuition can always be exhibited”, this rule being the concept of an 
object in general (some x), “which I think through those predicates of 
a triangle” (A105).38 The concept of an object in general is constituted 
of the set of pure concepts, that is, the categories, which first establish 
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what it is to conceive of an object. ‘Concept of an object in general’ 
is therefore shorthand for the set of twelve categories as the necessary 
conditions of objective experience or knowledge. I am able to construct 
a triangle in the imagination only because I connect the various lines 
in accordance with a rule or rules that prescribes how to construct a 
triangular object (either an imagined one or one drawn on the black-
board). Without this rule or, more precisely, set of rules that makes the 
connection of the manifold in an intuition a necessary one, there is no 
synthesis among the manifold perceptions (e.g. lines) that constitute the 
representation of an object (e.g. a triangle); no construction of an object 
in the imagination is possible without it and nor would the apprehen-
sion of a determinate empirical object in empirical intuition be possi-
ble without it, given that the synthesis of apprehension is the synthesis 
of the imagination in the domain of perceptions. (It might be argued 
that the synthesis of the imagination is just the condition of the syn-
thesis of apprehension, rather than that it is the synthesis of apprehen-
sion in the domain of perceptions, or in sensibility. But at A120 Kant 
writes: “There is thus an active faculty of synthesis of this manifold in 
us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately 
upon perceptions I call apprehension” [emphasis added]. Kant here 
identifies the synthesis of the imagination as the synthesis of apprehen-
sion, at least insofar as the former synthesis connects the manifold in 
sensible perception.)
The object of the intuition that is apprehended and successively syn-
thesised is nothing but “the concept of something in which [appear-
ances] are necessarily connected” (A108) (cf. the account of objectivity in 
Chap. 4). Without such a concept, one would be left with a mere “stream 
of inner appearances” that have some subjective validity at best (A107). 
A “swarm of appearances” could “fill up our soul”, as Kant writes 
(A111), but no experience would arise out of it, because “all relation 
of cognition to objects would also disappear” for lack of the necessary 
unity among the representations contained in it. We would have “intui-
tion without thought, but never cognition” (A111). This latter quote 
affirms Kant’s residual nonconceptualism.39 But importantly, against 
the standard nonconceptualists and the ‘obscurist’-conceptualists,40 who 
argue for the possibility of intuition that is independent of the capacity 
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to judge, such intuition without thought would also not be synthesised 
mental content, either by virtue of the synthesis of apprehension or of the 
imagination (or, as Grüne argues, by means of the synthesis of recognition 
through the application or guidance of categories as obscure concepts); nor 
would it refer strictly to an object, given that, as we have just seen, the 
idea of there being an object is dependent on their first being an act of 
synthesis that connects representations as necessarily belonging together in 
a conceptual unity, namely, the synthesis of recognition in a concept. An 
intuition without thought is a mere intuition, it just does not provide us 
with an objectively valid cognition, or, absent the necessary synthesis of 
recognition in a concept, with a reference to an object.
To recap, the threefold synthesis that is the necessary multi-aspect 
 element of the cognition of objects consists of the three necessarily inter-
twined syntheses that only together enable the cognition of objects. The 
synthesis of the imagination’s “action exercised immediately upon percep-
tions” is the synthesis of apprehension (A120). The imagination brings 
“the manifold of intuition into an image”, and “must therefore ante-
cedently take up the impressions into its activity, i.e., apprehend them” 
(A120). But this apprehension alone would not connect the apprehended 
impressions together if there were not some ground on the basis of which 
the apprehended impressions are considered to belong together necessar-
ily. This ground is provided by the reproductive imagination, which in 
its turn requires “a rule in accordance with which a representation enters 
into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than 
with any others” (A121), that is, the rule provided by the synthesis of 
 recognition in a concept and which ipso facto involves the categories.
6.4  ‘Mere’ Reproductive Imagination
There is one issue left standing regarding the A-Deduction account of 
imagination. As I hinted earlier, at A118 and further at A123, Kant 
talks about the productive imagination, which is the “transcendental 
function of the imagination” (A123), as distinct from the reproductive 
imagination, which rests on “conditions of experience” (A118), just like 
Fo
r S
ho
lar
ly 
Pu
rp
os
s O
nly
the account of the B-Deduction (B151–2). The reproductive faculty of 
imagination is “merely empirical” and also subjective (A121). The tran-
scendental productive imagination, on the other hand, is the pure a 
priori synthesis and “concerns nothing but the connection of the mani-
fold a priori” and is the “pure form of all possible cognition” (A118), 
which provides the element of necessity to the connection of represen-
tations in intuition that first constitutes the knowledge of objects; this 
pure form corresponds to the forms of the pure understanding, i.e. the 
categories (A119), and is the objective ground of the associative power 
of the imagination (A121).41 Of course, the reproductive synthesis is 
also thereby required, as it rests on the necessary material conditions of 
empirical experience and provides the matter of intuition, which consti-
tutes the empirical content of a judgement.
However, it appears that in A there is still a place for the mere repro-
ductive imagination in the analysis of possible objective knowledge, a role 
firmly rejected in the B-Deduction account (B152). The faculty for asso-
ciating perceptions, on purely subjective grounds, would then still be 
possible only on the assumption of the objective ground that is the unity 
of apperception, the latter providing the concept of an object and chang-
ing the associated perceptions into a necessary unity of perceptions.42 It 
might seem that the synthesis of the imagination in its empirical mode 
(rather than as transcendental power) is at work here, but on the other 
hand, Kant associates a merely subjective reproductive imagination with 
an act where the representations are reproduced “without distinction”, 
“just as they fell together”, which results in “merely unruly heaps” with-
out any cognition arising from it (A121); this does not comport with 
the synthesis of the imagination as an integral necessary element of 
possible cognition of necessary connections among representations as 
constitutive of objects, nor with a reproductive faculty that retains appre-
hended features so as to connect the manifold in an empirical intuition. 
There is a prima facie ambiguity about the role of the empirical repro-
ductive imagination in A.43 It is for this reason, one surmises, that this 
kind of merely subjective reproduction of causally affected representa-
tions is excised from the main argument in the B-Deduction: the mere 
association of perceptions only provides an “entirely undetermined and 
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contingent” (A122) unity or aggregate, a “stream of inner appearances” 
(A107), which fails to contribute to the cognition of objects as neces-
sary connections of manifolds. Such merely subjectively valid associative 
reproduction is simply the foil of rule-governed reproduction, which is 
grounded on the transcendental, productive imagination, and thus has 
no role in the transcendental analysis of possible experience, just as Kant 
says in the B-Deduction (B152).
6.5  Concluding Remarks
Let me conclude by saying something more on Kant’s putative noncon-
ceptualism. I have claimed that in the account of the threefold synthe-
sis Kant must be considered a moderate conceptualist in that all three 
syntheses of apprehension, imagination and conceptual recognition are 
intertwined and must be seen as only jointly grounding possible knowl-
edge, which contrasts with the view of standard Kantian nonconceptu-
alism which claims that some mental content is synthesised (by means 
of the syntheses of apprehension and imagination) without being syn-
thesised by means of the synthesis of conceptual recognition and a for-
tiori determined by the understanding. If by Kantian nonconceptualism 
the latter view is understood, then on my reading Kant is not a noncon-
ceptualist. But there is a sense in which Kant can be called a noncon-
ceptualist. He is a nonconceptualist in the sense that the receptivity of 
manifolds, and thus the having of intuitions (contra Grüne, e.g. Grüne 
2009:217n.41), is not a product of the understanding, nor of the imagi-
nation, nor of any form of necessary synthesis, i.e. synthesis understood 
in the sense of B129. This concerns the sense in which space and time, 
as pure forms of intuition with their sui generis nonconceptual phe-
nomenological characteristics, are not reducible to being the product of 
the imagination under a rule of the understanding.44
One might object that at A121–2 Kant seems to be denying that 
it would even be possible to have a sensibility, where representations, 
and thus consciousness would be separated, without it belonging to a 
unitary consciousness. In other words, Kant seems to be making the 
strong modal claim that, necessarily, all appearances in intuition already 
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have an objective affinity, which makes the associability by means of the 
imagination first possible (the subjective ground). All representations or 
intuitions are then by definition subject to the unity of apperception 
(A122), and a fortiori subject to the categories. Transcendental apper-
ception would be the necessary condition “even of all possible percep-
tion”, such that “all consciousness belongs to an all-embracing pure 
apperception” (A123). If anything, these claims would show Kant to be 
a super-conceptualist, rather than a nonconceptualist.45
However, if these prima facie strong modal claims are read in their 
proper context, namely the analysis of the possibility of cognition, 
thereby observing that Kant often adds qualifying phrases to these 
strong modal claims,46 then we see that he is only claiming that inso-
far as representations are to contribute to cognition are they necessarily 
subject to the principle of transcendental apperception (see Chap. 4). 
Hence, properly construed, the argument of the A-Deduction shows 
Kant to be a moderate conceptualist.
Notes
 1. On the localisation of the so-called subjective deduction, see Schulting 
(2012:279n.15).
 2. Grüne (2009) argues that all intuition is dependent on synthesis, and 
that any intuition is in fact first generated by synthesis, i.e. by the 
threefold synthesis (see esp. Grüne 2009, Chap. 3, e.g. p. 146). She dis-
putes the view that intuition as such, interpreted strictly, is equivalent 
with a manifold of mere sensations. I do not believe that the textual 
evidence that Grüne presents indeed backs up her view.
 3. At A121–2, Kant seems to be making the strong modal claim that, nec-
essarily, all appearances in intuition already have an objective affinity, 
which makes the associability by means of the imagination first pos-
sible (the subjective ground). All representations or intuitions are then 
by definition subject to the unity of apperception (A122), and a fortiori 
subject to the categories. Transcendental apperception would be the 
necessary condition “even of all possible perception”, such that “all con-
sciousness belongs to an all-embracing pure apperception” (A123). See 
the discussion in Schulting (2012, Chap. 6).
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 4. In a later article (2016), Grüne appears to have importantly modified 
her position as now saying that only intuitions of finite spaces and 
times, but not the pure intuitions of space and time, are generated by 
synthesis. This modified view implies that all representations of objects 
that are phenomenally present to a subject are subject to a synthesis. At 
the same time, it seems that Grüne still believes that any manifold in an 
empirical intuition is subject to the threefold synthesis for it to count as 
an intuition.
 5. I should note that Allais has changed her view somewhat in more 
recent work (Allais 2015, 2016), which brings her view closer to mine. 
Allais (2016) argues that synthesis of apprehension and reproduction is 
“what is required to represent an object as a unified subject of proper-
ties over time, and with the connection between this and representing 
a unified subject of properties at a time”, and “not with binding a mass 
of sensation to put us in a position to attend to a distinct particular”, 
and that this synthesis involves the categories, which are “rules gov-
erning ways we synthesize”. In other words, also for Allais the objects 
represented in accordance with this threefold synthesis are not the par-
ticulars we are merely presented with in intuition, i.e. in so-called non-
conceptual content.
 6. “Diese [i.e., referring to Spontaneität in the previous sentence] ist nun 
der Grund einer dreifachen Synthesis, die notwendiger Weise in allem 
Erkenntnis vorkommt […].”
 7. When I mention “first part of the A-Deduction”, I refer to what Kant 
himself labels the zweiter Abschnitt (Section II) of TD in its A-version. 
The erster Abschnitt of TD (§§13–14) is common to both the A- and 
B-versions.
 8. I agree with Grüne’s (2009:184–185) critique of Hanna and (early) 
Allais in this respect.
 9. See again Chap. 1 for an account of the sense in which Kant is to be 
considered a representationalist.
 10. See also Schulting (2016a).
 11. Obviously, Kant cannot mean here absolute unity in the sense of a 
metaphysical simple, as this would conflict with his stricture on abso-
lute metaphysical knowledge. Augenblick must here be seen in terms of 
‘instant’; see A169/B211, where Augenblick is translated as ‘instant’.
 12. For instance, the manifold representations come in arrays, in the way 
they are prompted in the mind. Any such array could be termed a unity 
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of sorts. Importantly, such a unity is epistemologically arbitrary, in the 
sense of wholly a posteriori causally dependent on the neurophysiologi-
cal patterns or make-up of the parts of the brain that are responsible for 
producing mental states.
 13. A mere manifold of isolated representations is not ipso facto qualita-
tively or quantitatively simple (Kant indeed denies the possibility of the 
quantitatively simple; A169/B211). Cf. Longuenesse (1998:38) and 
Thöle (1991:216). In fact, I believe that unsynthesised representations 
of outer sense are already quantitatively complex, but since synthesis 
first determines this complexity as complex, unsynthesised representa-
tions are ex hypothesi not recognised as complex. Grüne (2009:161) 
says, rightly, that sensibility “delivers complex representations, whose 
content is however not represented as something complex”.
 14. See further my earlier account in Schulting (2012:194–195).
 15. Carl (1992:153) writes: “Das momentane, auf einen Augenblick 
beschränkte Erleben ist nach Kant charakteristisch für die 
‘Apprehension bloß vermittelst der Empfindung’ (A167/B209).”
 16. Recall that, for Kant, the term ‘representation’ is the genus of which 
‘sensation’ is a species. A sensation is a “perception that refers to the sub-
ject as a modification of its state” (A320/B376). Often it is held, among 
Kant commentators, that sensations are not really representations, but 
this is mistaken, as the Stufenleiter makes plainly clear. Sensations are 
just the material content of an intuition (A19–20/B34; A42/B60).
 17. See Schulting (2015a:113).
 18. See Grüne (2009:70) for a definition of intuition as qualitatively and as 
quantitatively complex.
 19. Grüne (2009:156–158) points to a seeming contradiction between 
Kant’s account of sensations as the result of the affection by outer 
objects, and these sensations as being quantitatively simple, that is, 
they do not have extensive magnitude (B208), and on the other hand, 
Kant’s observation that the given manifold is “comprehended” (zusam-
mengefasst) in the form of intuition, as mere manifold, in B160n. But 
to my mind, the contradiction is only apparent, if we appreciate the 
fact that the sensations are the inner representations of what is outer, 
and do not (yet) reflect (‘represent’) the quantitative complexity of the 
manifold in outer sense as manifold. Only the synthesis of our sensa-
tions results in an awareness of the quantitative complexity of the man-
ifold of representations in outer sense, as Grüne also seems to suggest.
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 20. Incidentally, this disproves Grüne’s interpretation that the synthe-
sis of apprehension first generates the intuition (Grüne 2009:160, et 
passim)—i.e. not just “determinate” intuition but “all kinds of outer 
intuition” (Grüne 2009:181)—because here Kant says the former is 
directed at the latter, which presupposes that the latter already obtains 
or is given before it can be directed at. Grüne (2009:152) attempts to 
explain this apparent inconsistency of her reading by claiming that here 
Kant means intuition in a sense that deviates from its “official” mean-
ing (as given in the Stufenleiter).
 21. Cf. Allais (2016) and Schulting (2012:141–144).
 22. For discussion, see Onof and Schulting (2014). See also Chap. 7 (this 
volume).
 23. Hegelians tend to argue that the fixed separation of receptivity and 
spontaneity cannot be upheld. For a critical account of this view, see 
Schulting (2016b). See also Chap. 8 (this volume).
 24. Hence, Heidegger (1995:135) appropriately refers to a “syndotical” 
unity of space as form of intuition. It is the given unity of the mani-
fold in intuition, as opposed to the unity conferred on the manifold by 
the understanding (through the imagination). Cf. Onof and Schulting 
(2015:32–33n.42).
 25. This does not mean, as Anderson (2015:354) claims, that “intuitive 
representations cannot be given independently of the synthetic activity of 
the imagination”.
 26. The other examples, specifically the meteorological one, do appear to 
describe unalterable facts about objects or objective events themselves, 
upon which our capacity for reproductive imagination is grounded. 
The phrase in the last sentence, “a certain rule to which the appear-
ances are already subjected in themselves” (emphasis added) seems to 
confirm the impression that the constitution, order and stability of 
objects and objective events dictate our faculty of imagination, which 
means that our very capacity for freely associating representations is 
governed by the constitution, order and stability of objects and objec-
tive events. For example, it seems that I cannot but associate the longest 
day with a fruits-covered rather than a snow-covered land, since it is 
a fact in our actual world that the longest day is the summer solstice 
and in summer one does not normally expect snowfall (with climate 
change, one can never really exclude the unlikely possibility, in the 
Northern Hemisphere, of snow and ice on June 21st, or indeed 21 °C 
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at Christmas, as indeed happened on Heiligabend in 2012 in Munich). 
Also here, and with the example of the shape of a human being, Kant’s 
point is that under normal circumstances, we have come to expect that 
on the longest day of the year we do not see snow and ice covered land-
scapes.
 27. Cf. Robinson (1986:60n.24).
 28. For an account of the retention of representations and the constructive 
nature of quantitative synthesis in counting, see Schulting (2012:190–
191, 195–196).
 29. See also Schulting (2016b).
 30. For a critique of Longuenesse on this point, see Onof and Schulting 
(2015).
 31. That is, given that space is an infinite given magnitude (A25/B39), the 
ultimate boundaries of space cannot be determined, indeed delimited, 
for any determinate space is itself again contained in a larger space, as 
background space, or can be subdivided in ever smaller determinate 
spaces. See Onof and Schulting (2015).
 32. Notice that geometric space is not another space than the originally 
given metaphysical space, but is rather the finite representation of a part 
(parts) of space.
 33. Cf. Hanna (2005, 2008) and Allais (2009).
 34. Alternatively, one could argue that the synthesis of the imagination 
does indeed involve the understanding in some sense, but that this does 
not entail that judgements must be formed or a fully-fledged applica-
tion of the categories as clear concepts is at issue (cf. Longuenesse 1998; 
Grüne 2009). Such a reading depends on the possibility of separat-
ing the capacity of the understanding and the capacity to judge, or of 
separating the capacity of the understanding and/or judging and the 
capacity to formulate propositions. I believe it is vulnerable to the same 
problems as the reading that the synthesis of the imagination does not 
depend on the capacity of the understanding.
 35. For further discussion, see again Chap. 5 (this volume), and Schulting 
(2015b).
 36. On the aspect of retention in the synthesis of reproduction and rec-
ognition, see further Schulting (2012:190–191, 194–196). Cf. Grüne 
(2009:176).
 37. By contrast, Grüne (2009:196–197) believes that the unitary con-
sciousness, i.e. the consciousness of the unity of the content of 
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290     6 Kant’s Threefold Synthesis on a Moderately Conceptualist …
representations, for which, on her view, obscure concepts as rules are 
required, should not be associated or identified with the “consciousness 
of this unity of the synthesis” (A103), that is, in her view the conscious-
ness of unity in the manifold is not consciousness of synthetic activity. I 
believe there are no grounds for disentangling the consciousness of the 
unity in the manifold from the consciousness of the synthesis that uni-
fies the manifold. They are contemporaneous acts, or to be more pre-
cise, two aspects of the same act (see Schulting 2012:111ff.). Grüne’s 
reason for denying the identity—namely, that the synthetic activity is 
mostly not conscious, as Kant suggests (A103)—seems to rely on the 
reading that the consciousness of the unity in the manifold were lit-
erally to do with perception (Grüne 2009:196). This brings to mind 
Patricia Kitcher’s famous critique of the idea of ‘synthesis watching’ 
(Kitcher 1990:111, 126–127). But I believe this is a mistaken inter-
pretation of necessary unitary consciousness in the manifold: contrary 
to what Grüne suggests, it is not the kind of consciousness that first 
enables perception simpliciter, nor is the consciousness at issue psycho-
logical in any sense; rather, it is a logical consciousness. Moreover, the 
notion of concept as consciousness of unity, on which Grüne’s reading 
focuses, is as per Kant’s claim in e.g. B133–4, esp. the note, by defini-
tion to be seen as presupposing the synthetic unity of apperception, i.e. 
the “consciousness of […] the synthesis”, as Kant calls it at A103.
 38. The set of categories as necessary rules for objective cognition make up 
the concept of ‘object’. I argued this in Schulting (2012, esp. Chap. 10). 
See also Chap. 4 (this volume).
 39. See Onof (2016).
 40. The intimate connection between the unitary consciousness in a mani-
fold and conceptuality, as Kant indicates at A103, is taken by Grüne 
(2009:182–183) to show that concepts are required for the having (das 
Vorliegen) of intuitions. But such a view is dependent on her reading 
of the having of intuitions as presupposing the threefold act of synthe-
sis, and this is again built on the assumption that Kant distinguishes 
between a derivative and an original notion of intuition. I believe both 
of these assumptions are mistaken. However, it should be noted that her 
reading seems to be confirmed by A105: “[W]e say that we cognize the 
object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. 
But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced 
[hervorgebracht] through a function of synthesis […]” (boldface mine).
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 41. “The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination 
is the understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the tran-
scendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding. In the 
understanding there are therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain 
the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard 
to all possible appearances. These, however, are the categories, i.e., pure 
concepts of the understanding; […]” (A119).
 42. For an account of the ambiguities and potential confusion in Kant’s 
A-account of reproductive imagination, see Aquila (1989, Chap. 4).
 43. Cf. Grüne (2009:233–234). It does not concern the reproduction of 
previously caused representations.
 44. See Onof and Schulting (2015). See also Allais (forthcoming).
 45. Grüne (2009) is different here, as she appears to argue that the a priori 
syntheses are indeed responsible for the very possibility of conscious-
ness of one’s representations, implying that sensations are not yet con-
scious. But this view is not plausible, given Kant’s endorsement of 
Leibniz’s Law of Continuity (see Schulting 2015a).
 46. A113: “[T]his identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of all 
the manifold of appearances insofar as they are to become empirical cogni-
tion” (emphasis added); A116: “[…] and through this alone is cogni-
tion possible”; “[…] that can ever belong to our cognition”.
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7.1  Introduction
In this chapter, I address Kant’s argument in the B-Deduction about 
how figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa) or transcendental imagination 
accounts for the possibility of perceptual knowledge of spatiotemporal 
objects. I delineate Kant’s main argument in the ‘second step’ of 
the B-Deduction, which shows that perceptual knowledge requires 
figurative synthesis, a.k.a the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. 
This involves the question of the determination of the spatiotemporality 
of objects. I concentrate on space, although time is a vital element in the 
act of determining space (B155n.; cf. A412/B439, B48–9).
Of course, that figurative synthesis is an integral element of Kant’s 
account of perceptual knowledge is no news to attentive readers of the 
B-Deduction, but the question of how in fact figurative synthesis is 
supposed to ground perceptual knowledge has been less emphasised in 
commentaries (Friedman 2012 is one of few exceptions). What I mean 
by this is that, though there have been many interpretations of the  general 
role for figurative synthesis, it has rarely been examined in detail how 
figurative synthesis precisely accounts for the possibility of perception. 
7
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Here, I attempt to get a better picture of why and how Kant thinks 
that this specific type of synthesis is indispensable for enabling percep-
tual knowledge, specifically by addressing the relation between figurative 
synthesis and the determination of space or, more precisely, the deter-
mination of spaces. I focus on the main issues and shall not consider in 
scholarly detail tricky interpretative questions that have to do with the 
so-called ‘two-step’ structure of the B-Deduction per se, although my 
reading of figurative synthesis can be seen to provide a means of how 
finally to solve the riddle of the ‘two-step’ structure in B. Without engag-
ing the literature on this last point, the methodical issues pertaining to 
the B-Deduction will briefly be discussed in Sects. 7.2 and 7.3, and then 
later in Sect. 7.7.
Here’s a summary of this chapter. In Sect. 7.2, I discuss Kant’s goals 
in the Transcendental Deduction (TD), while in Sect. 7.3, the ‘two-step’ 
procedure is briefly addressed. In Sect. 7.4, I expand on the themes of 
figurative synthesis, geometry and the a priori possibility of representing 
a particular. Then, in Sect. 7.5, I discuss figurative synthesis in relation 
to the sui generis unity of space. In Sect. 7.6, the distinction between 
metaphysical and geometric space, which Kant makes in a late unpub-
lished essay on the mathematician Abraham Kästner, is highlighted as 
an aid to understanding the argument of the B-Deduction. In Sect. 7.7, 
I address the question of what Kant has actually proven in the ‘second 
step’ of TD. Finally, in Sect. 7.8, I briefly consider the perplexing ques-
tion of Kant’s claims about the idealism of nature.
7.2  Kant’s Goals in TD
Kant’s goals in TD are multifaceted and it is not always crystal clear, 
from reading the text, what the relation is between those goals and 
whether they do not conflict. At least three aims can be differentiated:
1. Kant wants to show that the categories are justifiably used in experi-
ence (TD, §13). ( justification or legitimation)
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2. Kant wants to derive or deduce the categories as objective conditions 
of experience from the subjective conditions of thinking itself, or 
from a principle (B90–2/A65–7). (ostensive proof  )1
3. Kant wants to show that experience is only possible on condition of 
the instantiation of the categories, so that there cannot be any experi-
ence without involvement of the categories (e.g. A95–6). (transcen-
dental argument)
But a further issue arises regarding the third of the above set of goals: Kant 
can be said to argue in TD for either the claim (3*) that the categories are 
the conditions that there is experience (de re), or the claim (3**) that the 
categories explain how experience is possible, given that there is experience. 
Although one would think that, on Kant’s account, without categories 
there would not be objects much less experience of them (see e.g. V-Met/
Schön, 28:476–477; Br, 11:313–314), it is not as if Kant argued that expe-
rience is first generated by the categories, or that the objects are somehow 
existentially created by the categories (cf. Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10). In the intro-
ductory section of the Critique, right at the outset, Kant expressly says that 
knowledge starts with experience, i.e. with sense impressions as impinge-
ments on the mind from empirically real objects (B1). This suggests that 
he takes experience as a given, and by implication it also suggests the fact 
of there being such empirically real objects that involuntarily prompt sen-
sations in us, and thus exist externally to our minds. The experience meant 
here is experience in a different sense than experience defined as the “sum 
total [Inbegrif f ] of all our objects” (V-Met/Schön, 28:477; trans. mine), 
which is dependent for its possibility on the categories. The former type of 
experience concerns experience quoad materiale or sense experience. Let’s 
call this type of experience S-experience. S-experience is not generated or 
even as such conditioned by the categories, whereas experience that is gov-
erned by the categories, namely the “Inbegriff of all our objects”, is in a way 
generated by them, namely, insofar as the form of experience is concerned. 
Call this latter type C-experience. In TD, Kant is interested in demonstrat-
ing the possibility of C-experience, not the possibility of S-experience. The 
categories enable the former, not the latter.
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Whereas on this reading (3**), TD starts with the premise that 
S-experience, and so the object(s) that cause(s) it, is given and unprob-
lematic, another reading (3*) does not see TD as starting with this 
premise, but sees the argument in TD as starting from a more mini-
mal basis, that is, the mere having of representations (as mere mental 
states), which must be justified with recourse to an analysis of the cat-
egories as conditions of such mere having. That there are objects, which 
cause representations in us, must thus first be shown to follow from 
that more minimal premise. On this second reading, the categories are 
seen as the conditions that are constitutive of experience simpliciter—
without making a distinction between S-experience and C-experience 
(and thus disregarding the ambiguity in Kant’s own use of the term 
in B1). On the former reading (3**) the account of the categories has 
just an explanatory role to play, namely to explain to which extent 
and in which sense from given S-experience there arises C-experience. 
A crucial difference between 3** and 3* is that on the latter view we 
cannot assume the fact that we experience objects (rather than just our 
own subjective inner states), and thus the fact of either S-experience or 
C-experience. That fact must first be demonstrated.2
These different ways of reading Kant’s argument reflect the well-
known discussion whether the argument in TD is either regressive or 
progressive. I do not want specifically to delve into that question here 
(for more discussion see further Schulting 2012, Chap. 4). I do not 
think, though, that there should be any doubt about the general under-
lying assumption, for Kant, that S-experience is a given and not in need 
of any justification or proof. I thus endorse reading (3**). Whatever 
the constitutive role of the categories might be, neither is the particular 
goal in TD to argue, in an anti-sceptical fashion, that we are licensed 
to conclude that we do have experience or knowledge of external spa-
tiotemporal objects starting from the premise of the mere having of 
representations; that is, to argue that any mere having of representa-
tions already implies the necessary obtaining of physical objects that 
exist independently of these representations, and that thus, by way of a 
progressively structured argument, the existence of objects is proven—
the fact alone that I could have representations that are not veridical 
disproves this type of argument. This implies that the argument also 
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cannot be to claim, in the conclusion of TD, that the categories even 
apply to the mere having of perceptions (cf. B164), ruling out strong 
forms of conceptualist readings of TD (see again Chap. 5). At any rate, 
transcendental arguments of the broadly Strawsonian sort (that is, refu-
tations of the sceptic) are not Kant’s business in TD.3
There is the further issue of whether the argument concerns the pos-
sibility of either experience or knowledge, i.e. empirical knowledge, or 
even just scientific knowledge. But, leaving aside the controversial neo-
Kantian view that solely scientific knowledge is the object of analysis, 
Kant is quite clear that he means C-experience and empirical knowl-
edge to be equivalent (B147).4 It is fairly well-established that Kant’s 
definition of ‘experience’ (Erfahrung) is different from what the English 
expression ‘experience’ denotes, which is closer to Kant’s Wahrnehmung, 
i.e. perception (mit Empfindung begleitete Vorstellung; B147), or, perhaps 
indeed equivalent to S-experience. ‘Experience’ in Kant’s narrower 
sense (C-experience) denotes a higher form of perception, which is 
formed by means of the forms of judgement, that is, through a con-
nection among perceptions (B218; Prol, 4:298 [§19]; A110; A200/
B245; A764/B792; cf. B161). Nevertheless, we should be careful not 
to think that this implies that Kant allows room for lower-level ‘experi-
ence’, in the sense of the English term, which can be expressed in prop-
ositions with a subject-predicate form or by means of demonstrative 
thought, as a way of direct reference, but which is not yet C-experience 
(see Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2). Some Kant commentators believe that, at least 
in the Prolegomena, Kant allows for this kind of experience, namely as 
what he himself calls ‘judgements of perception’. However, whatever the 
case may be regarding the account of judgements of perception in the 
Prolegomena, I do not think that in the B-Deduction Kant still adheres 
to it, given his very precise definition of judgement as being equivalent 
to objectively valid knowledge, or experience in the sense of Erfahrung, 
i.e. C-experience (see Chap. 3).5
Lastly, a crucial aspect of the Deduction’s goal, in particular, the ‘sec-
ond step’, is to show the conformity between the specifically spatiotem-
poral form of our intuition and the categories. Therefore, not just the 
legitimation or justification of the use of the categories is called for in 
TD, but also of the concept of ‘space’ itself (cf. B120/A88), which not 
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only enables geometrical science, but also the perceptual cognition of 
objects in empirical or physical space (what Sellars [1992:53ff.] calls 
coarse-grained space). The legitimation of the use of the categories coin-
cides with showing this conformity, more specifically, the conformity 
between the unity of space and the unity of apperception. The former 
unity cannot be analytically deduced from the unity of apperception. 
Hence, the ‘first step’ of the B-Deduction, in which Kant argues for 
the necessity of the unity of apperception and its instantiation in any 
unified manifold of representations, is not sufficient for showing that 
the categories apply to specifically spatiotemporal manifolds of represen-
tations. The subsumption of empirical manifolds of representations of 
objects, which are characterised by their own spatiotemporal structure, 
under the categories, by means of the unity of apperception, is thus a 
further task for the ‘second step’ of TD, which is expounded in §26 of 
the B-Deduction.
To return to the first and second aspects of Kant’s goal in TD, as 
formulated above: does the argument concern merely a legitimation of 
the categories, more precisely, showing their justified use (Aim 1)? Or 
does Kant also want to provide a proof of how they are derived from 
their subjective origin in thought (Aim 2)? Again, this relates to the 
question of whether TD concerns a regressive analysis or a progressive 
synthetic argument, where the latter addresses the constitutive role of 
the categories, and the former merely their explanatory role. If one 
thinks TD is either regressive or progressive, then one cannot claim that 
both the legitimation and an a priori proof are at issue.6 Most commen-
tators, however, have indeed claimed that the proof procedure is either 
of the two, not both; on the regressive reading, for example, it would 
make sense to say that merely a legitimation of the use of categories 
is concerned, since a proof of their subjective a priori origin is not at 
issue—just as Kant suggested in the A-preface (Axvi–xvii). A regressive 
reading starts, not with the subject, but with the fact of objective experi-
ence, and then regresses to its conditions. There is the further issue of 
whether the legitimation of the categories applies to how metaphysics 
is possible as a science of synthetic a priori knowledge (which seems to 
be how the Prolegomena portrays it) or how again experience or empiri-
cal knowledge itself is possible. These two approaches are not unrelated, 
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since showing that the categories are metaphysical concepts justifiably 
employed in synthetic a priori propositions means at the same time 
showing that they can only justifiably be used in empirical experience, 
given that synthetic a priori propositions are about possible experience. 
The claim regarding synthetic a priori knowledge and the one concern-
ing empirical knowledge hang together.
Without settling the aforementioned issues, I am going to assume 
that in TD Kant argues for the explanation of the question of how 
experience or knowledge is possible, not that there is such experience 
or knowledge (cf. Prolegomena). So, more precisely, I consider the gen-
eral argument to be grounded on the unproblematic assumption that 
there is S-experience (3**), but also already, inchoately, that there is 
C-experience or knowledge (B147), namely, the fact that synthetic a 
priori claims to knowledge are generally being made—this is especially 
clear from the Prolegomena account.7 We should keep in mind, though, 
that in the Critique itself, for the purposes of delivering a philosophi-
cal proof of the justified use of the categories, Kant does not accept as a 
given the actuality of C-experience, but wants the proof of there being 
such experience to start from a principle of thought (Aim 2). But, at 
any rate, S-experience is never the object of proof in TD, and so does 
not function in any way as a premise in that proof. At least one argu-
ment can be provided that demonstrates that Kant’s argument cannot in 
fact be such as to show that S-experience is possible. This concerns the 
relation between natura formaliter spectata and natura materialiter spec-
tata (which is discussed in Sect. 7.8). For if to prove that S-experience 
is possible were indeed (part of ) his argument, it would mean that 
Kant would have to engage in a phenomenological study of the con-
stitution of the a posteriori nature of experience and, more in particu-
lar, its dispositions (natura materialiter spectata), i.e.: first, how natural 
kinds are empirically presented in space and time, secondly, how things 
are ontologically or dispositionally constituted so as to be objects of 
our experience, and thirdly, how we would be physiologically disposed 
to being in reception of sense stimuli from objects, which empirically 
enables S-experience. This is however completely beyond the scope of 
the transcendental investigation of TD (if not the Critique as a whole).8 
It would also appear to mean that we would be able to describe the 
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transition from natura materialiter spectata to natura formaliter spectata, 
and thus in fact to beg the question against a transcendental investi-
gation, which is concerned solely with an investigation of natura for-
maliter spectata.
I leave aside the question to what extent the argument of TD is none-
theless also a progressive synthetic argument in the sense of a derivation 
of the categories from discursive thought itself (Aim 2). The derivation 
question is a controversial issue and tricky interpretative business; it is 
not required to consider it for our purposes here, which is an account of 
the ‘second step’ (see Schulting 2012 for a detailed account of the deri-
vation of the categories from apperception).9
7.3  Some Thoughts on the ‘Two-Step’ 
Procedure
In the conclusion to the first part of the B-Deduction, i.e. the ‘first 
step’, Kant writes he has shown (§20) that
1. unity of intuition is possible only on condition of the subsumption of 
the manifold of representations in any sensible intuition that requires 
a discursive running through, under the unity of apperception;
2. the combined set of logical functions of judgement is defined by the 
act of the understanding which brings the manifold under the unity 
of apperception;
3. therefore, the manifold stands under the logical functions of judge-
ment insofar as “it is given in a unitary empirical intuition” (B143);
4. the logical functions of judgement, insofar as the manifold in a given 
intuition is determined in accordance with them, are the categories;
5. therefore, the manifold of a unitary intuition stands under the cat-
egories.
In short, Kant’s main argument is that the categories, which are 
employed in judgement, enable the unity of the manifold of repre-
sentations in any sensible intuition given for a spontaneous discursive 
mind. This is in very broad terms the upshot of the ‘first step’ of the 
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B-Deduction.10 What Kant does not do in the ‘second step’, then, is to 
say simply that, since, as shown in the ‘first step’, the manifold of rep-
resentations in any unitary given intuition (for a spontaneous discursive 
mind) requires the categories, so also the manifold of a given empiri-
cal intuition, namely an intuition of spatially located objects, requires 
the categories. That implication is of course trivially true, but in making 
such a claim there is nothing in the way of showing why that would be 
true. Kant must show how the categories must be seen to apply to an 
empirical intuition of spatial objects too, and this, the manner of their 
application, cannot be analytically inferred from the conclusion of the 
‘first step’. That is, Kant must show how an empirical intuition that 
has the specific characteristic of spatiotemporality for human receptiv-
ity, which was argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, is in fact brought 
under the unity of apperception by the understanding in general, as the 
seat of the categories (since the act of the understanding is the function 
of unity in a judgement; B143; A68/B93). This is where figurative syn-
thesis comes into the picture. As I shall point out later below, figurative 
synthesis is the effect of the understanding itself, or the act of appercep-
tion, in sensibility, and is in fact the act of the mind that ‘applies’ the 
categories within the domain of spatial objects (i.e. the domain of sensi-
bility). I shall explain how this ‘application’ works in due course.
In the transitional section to the ‘second step’ (§21), Kant makes a 
few cryptic remarks regarding what he aims to do in the ‘second step’. 
He writes:
In the sequel (§26) it will be shown from the way in which the empiri-
cal intuition is given in sensibility [aus der Art, wie in der Sinnlichkeit die 
empirische Anschauung gegeben wird ] that its unity [die Einheit derselben] 
can be none other than the one the category prescribes to the manifold of 
a given intuition in general according to the preceding §20 […]. (B144–5)
The phrase “from the way in which the empirical intuition is given 
in sensibility” might be taken to mean that showing that the mani-
fold in intuition owes its unity to the understanding (categories) is 
to show that its receptivity is somehow dependent on the understand-
ing. That would mean, in the most radical reading, that the forms of 
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intuition—space and time as forms of our receptivity—are themselves, 
in some sense, products of the understanding. This is not such an odd 
view. Longuenesse (1998, 2005:34) believes this is what Kant means, 
and that it is indeed Kant’s aim in the ‘second step’ to retake the claims 
of the Aesthetic, and somehow to blur the boundary between the forms 
of sensibility and the forms of the understanding, or at least in terms of 
their constitutive origins. This is all put a bit crudely, but I come back 
to this further below, when I address the convoluted passage in the note 
to B160–1 (§26), where importantly Kant distinguishes between space 
as ‘form of intuition’ and as ‘formal intuition’, a distinction the rele-
vance of which is downplayed by Longuenesse.
Notice also that from the above-quoted passage from §21, it could 
be inferred that ‘unity’ is not a characteristic of intuition, but is 
something that the understanding uniquely brings to it, by syntheti-
cally uniting the manifold in intuition (through categorial unity), 
so that mere intuition has no unity whatsoever. First, such a reading 
assumes that categorial unity, which is a necessary unity, is the same 
as contingent unity, the unity of the array in which representations 
are prompted in the mind, say, which is not at issue in TD (B140). 
Secondly, it would be a mistake to conflate the sui generis unity of 
space and categorial unity (I discuss the distinction further below). 
The goal of TD is to show that the unity of a spatial manifold is cor-
respondent with a categorial unity, but not that the categorial unity and 
spatial unity are qualitatively identical.11
From what Kant says subsequently, in the next section (§22; B146–7), 
it is already clear that not receptivity simpliciter, or the forms of receptiv-
ity, space and time, are at issue, but the possible a priori knowledge of 
objects (in geometry) by means of the determination of “pure intui-
tion”, as Kant says, and not of “the empirical intuition of what, in space 
and time, is immediately given as real [wirklich], by means of sensa-
tion” (trans. emended). Of course, objects in space and time are given 
only insofar as they are perceived, and hence the determination by the 
understanding results in knowledge of objects only if the categories are 
applied to empirical intuition, that is to say, when sensations are given. 
(Even in pure geometry, sensations are presupposed in the distal back-
ground as the given material for the construction of geometric objects.)12 
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But the important point to note here, is that the categorial  determination 
does not concern the question of how empirical intuitions are imme-
diately given, necessarily in space and time, but how by means of the 
application of the categories to those empirical intuitions, formal unitary 
intuitions of spatially located and distinct particulars are first formed, on 
the basis of which there can be empirical knowledge of spatiotemporal 
objects (and also geometrical knowledge). The distinction between how, 
on the one hand, indeterminate objects (Gegenstände) are given in space 
and time, and how space and time itself, as forms of sensibility, are given 
with their sui generis unity and, on the other, how the understanding 
determines our intuition of them, which generates distinct particulars 
(Objekte) in bounded space, is never blurred. This then is my main thesis: 
The central claim of the ‘second step’ concerns the analysis of the pos-
sibility of spatiotemporally determinate and distinct particulars in space 
and their perception, not how space and time themselves, and thus the 
forms of intuitions, and whatever objects are empirically given in it, are 
(metaphysically) possible.
7.4  Figurative Synthesis and the A Priori 
Possibility of Representing a Particular
The approach delineated in the last section is confirmed in the section 
in TD, where the notion of a figurative synthesis is first introduced, 
namely §24. Figurative synthesis is the synthesis of the manifold of given 
representations in a sensible intuition. Through figurative synthesis the 
categories “acquire objective reality” (B150), that is, through it they get 
applied to spatially located particulars given in sensible intuition.13 This 
synthesis is called “figurative” so as to distinguish it from the mere cat-
egorial synthesis “in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general”, 
which is the “combination of the understanding” or “synthesis intellec-
tualis”. Intellectual synthesis is what is thought in the mere categories in 
regard to an intuition in general (given for a discursive mind), or, “the 
merely intellectual combination” (B151). That is, intellectual synthesis 
is in fact an abstraction from the synthesis that take places in the sensible 
manifold, which is then called figurative synthesis, when an empirical 
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judgement is made about some object. Both figurative and intellectual 
syntheses are transcendental and a priori.
Figurative synthesis is also called the “transcendental synthesis of 
the imagination”, and since it “can give a corresponding intuition 
to the concepts of understanding” (B151), i.e. the categories, Kant 
says it belongs to sensibility. Unlike concepts, the act of transcenden-
tal imagination makes it possible to represent a particular, by means of 
construction through a successive synthesis of representations given in 
sensibility. However, though operating in the domain of sensibility, fig-
urative synthesis or transcendental imagination is the a priori determin-
ing factor in sensibility, not that which is determined, the determinable, 
i.e. the manifold of representations. It can therefore not be equated with 
or seen as constitutive of sensibility itself, in terms of that which is given 
in and through the senses, nor with the pure forms of sensibility as such 
(space and time). Transcendental imagination is “a faculty for deter-
mining the sensibility a priori”, and is “an effect of the understanding 
on sensibility and its first application […] to objects of […] intuition” 
(B152; emphasis added). Neither the understanding nor transcendental 
imagination, as an effect of the understanding, turn out to be constitu-
tive of the forms of intuition, as Longuenesse suggests they are. Thus, 
contrary to what seemed at first to be suggested (§21), the issue here is 
not how objects or particulars are first given in receptivity, or presented 
to us simpliciter. Rather, Kant wants to examine the way objects are first 
constructed in sensibility by us as particulars or singular objects that are 
spatially distinct.
Recently, Thomas Land (2014:530) has interpreted the above-quoted 
passage at B151—namely, that the synthesis of the imagination “can 
give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding”—as 
saying that the productive synthesis of the imagination first “generates” 
the intuitions of space and time, and thus “generates sensible representa-
tions” (2014:541). Crucially, Land differentiates between the structure 
of space as intuition and its unity, where its unity is dependent on the 
understanding (by way of the imagination) but its structure (“strict logi-
cal homogeneity”) is not. But he also says that “the actualization of the 
capacity for having outer intuitions nonetheless depends on acts of the 
intellect, the capacity for concepts and judgement” (Land 2014:535). 
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This would appear to imply that, on his account, I cannot have intui-
tions, unless they depended on an act of the understanding (by means 
of a spontaneous act of the imagination), which is a broadly concep-
tualist standpoint (cf. Chap. 5). As said, Land distinguishes between 
the structure and the unity of an intuition, whereby the former is inde-
pendent of spontaneity and the latter is not. But given that Land means 
by “the unity of a complex representation […] the fact that it is repre-
sented as complex”, and that “the actualization of the capacity for hav-
ing outer intuitions […] depends on acts of the intellect” (2014:535), 
he has no means of interpreting the intuition’s structure, which on his 
own account is independent of conceptuality, as bona fide intuitional. It 
is odd to talk about an intuition that is not in any straightforward sense 
an intuition, independently of the understanding’s role in determining 
its unity.
This ties in with Land’s view that what he calls “a merely recep-
tive capacity for representation” (2014:537) is not the capacity that 
typifies human sensibility, but rather a kind of notional contrast to 
the receptivity that human sensibility is, since such a merely recep-
tive capacity excludes the spontaneity on which human sensibil-
ity is absolutely dependent (cf. Aportone 2014:203). But I believe 
Land just begs the question here whether our human sensibility is 
absolutely dependent on spontaneity.14 It seems that Land excludes 
the possibility, for human sensibility, of a receptivity that “merely 
represents the here and now”, which is “‘locked into’ its current 
location and the present moment” and does not “grasp that loca-
tion or this moment as one in a system of locations or a continuous 
series of moments” (Land 2014:537); as Land rightly says, “if sen-
sibility were a merely receptive capacity, it would represent the here 
and now, but not as the here and now” (2014:538). It is indeed cor-
rect to say that a “merely receptive consciousness” would not be able 
to represent a manifoldness as manifoldness, as complex, and would 
be “‘locked into’ each moment” (Land 2014:538). The manifold would 
not be represented as a manifold of representations, but there would just 
be (many) consecutive representations. But, Land says, for Kant “spa-
tial representation […] is not like that” (2014:538), and he seems 
thereby to exclude the possibility, for humans, of having a manifold 
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of representations of a spatially located object, which is short of rep-
resenting that object as located in space. In other words, Land seems 
to exclude the possibility of merely intuiting the object that is in space, 
without thereby representing something as in space, that is, grasping it 
as located “in a system of locations” (2014:537).
On Land’s account, then, intuition is always already a representa-
tion of the manifold as complex. But surely, an infant or animal, say, 
should be able to represent something in space by merely being affected 
by it, in that a variety of impressions from ‘outside’ are involuntarily 
‘impressed’ on their sense organs, and thus to have a sense of spatial-
ity, without thereby representing it as in space, i.e. by having an “aware-
ness of complexity”, and not “merely a succession of impressions” (Land 
2014:538). And if it can represent something in space by merely being 
affected by it, then it must intuit in space, since space is the necessary 
form of everything represented in space. So, on this account, intuition is 
not always already a representation of the manifold as complex, contrary 
to what Land argues.
Take the example of an elephant calf taking a shortcut through the 
wooden fence of the elephant sanctuary in a Ugandan wildlife reserve, 
rather than entering through the open gate, when it returns to its stable 
from a day out in the African wilderness, together with its mother, who 
instead enters through the gate. The elephant calf intuitively knows it 
can leap between the rails of the fence, because it has an immediate, 
instinctual sense of its own small size relative to the open space between 
the rails of the fence. It does not need to have an awareness of spatial 
complexity that is borne of the human adult capacity for imaginative 
synthesis or understanding, i.e. to ratiocinate—schematise concepts—
whether or not it should be able to squeeze itself through the fence. An 
elephant calf ’s sense of spatiality is purely intuitive.
However, Land might be thought to have a point in saying that 
the mere succession of impressions, in whatever array they might be 
prompted, does not add up to a representation of space, which therefore 
“cannot be the product of a merely receptive capacity of representation” 
(2014:538) but is the product of receptivity plus the understanding by 
means of the productive imagination. However, Kant says that space 
is the form of outer receptivity (A26/B42), and not that space is the 
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form of outer receptivity and ‘something else’, namely the understand-
ing. If beings such as infants (as well as animals, such as the elephant 
calf in the example above), who do not employ the understanding in 
their merely receptive capacity for being affected, are affected by spatial 
things, do they then not have spatial representations in the sense of rep-
resenting things in space, on Land’s account?
I believe, for philosophical as well as textual reasons, that we must 
distinguish between representing in space, being able to orient one-
self in a particular direction, as a result of e.g. a sudden noise coming 
from the left, or noticing some indistinct object in the distance (cf. 
Log, 9:33), and the representation of space or spatial objects, which lat-
ter is tantamount to the representing of something spatial as complex, 
namely, as located adjacent to something else and at some specified dis-
tance outside of me. Orienting oneself towards a sound coming from 
a particular direction requires spatial location, representing something 
that is still indeterminate in space, but the very act of directing one’s 
head left or right upon hearing a noise does not yet require the capacity 
to determine that indeterminate something as object, as “a determinate 
space” (B138), that is, as locatable in a specific place at a specific dis-
tance. Moreover, Land appears to conflate the complexity of, on the one 
hand, a homogeneous quantum such as space, which is the pure form of 
any intuition, and is independent of any conceptualising or unifying act 
of the understanding, and, on the other, the awareness or representation 
of that complexity, that is, the determination of distinct spaces, which 
as different quanta constitute that complexity; it is this determination 
that first requires a spontaneous act of unity that unites the manifold 
parts in an intuition into a synthetic (finite) homogeneous whole.
Grasping a manifold as a complex spatial quantum happens by means 
of figurative synthesis and the act of constructing geometric objects is 
typically such an act of synthesis. In §24, Kant gives some paradigm 
examples of the construction of geometric objects or figures by means of 
figurative synthesis. For example, the drawing in thought, or on paper, 
of a straight line means that we are aware of the act in accordance with a 
rule of successively synthesising segments or parts of space from an ini-
tial given point (cf. B291–2); or the describing of a circle, which comes 
down to the operating of “a function which takes an arbitrary point and 
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line segment having this point as one of its endpoints as input and yields 
the circle with the given point as center and the given line segment as 
radius as output” (Friedman 2012:237). Similarly, in describing the 
three dimensions of Euclidean space, one imagines “placing three lines 
perpendicular to each other at the same point” (B154). Kant associates 
this description of space with motion, as “a pure act of the successive syn-
thesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through productive 
imagination” (B155n.; emphasis added). It is in this respect that time 
is an indispensable element of determining space, for the movement 
in the act of successive synthesis is a process over a timespan t1–t2, 
corresponding to the successively added parts of the spatial object, such 
as a line or circle (cf. A412–3/B439–40).
Now of course, in TD Kant is not primarily interested in the possibility 
of geometrical objects or figures per se, or indeed geometric concepts, but 
rather in the possibility of empirical spatiotemporal objects. But the claim 
is, I contend, that the possibility of spatiotemporal objects and their deter-
mination is grounded on the objective determination or limitation of space 
as such, given that, as per the argument of the Aesthetic, outer objects that 
are accessible for human intuition must be spatial, and thus have space as 
their condition of possibility. Indeed, as Kant suggests at B138, the act 
of the synthesis of imagination first generates an object as “a determinate 
space” itself within the larger space in which it is contained, from which 
it is delimited by means of the categories of quality in particular.15 The 
unity of the act of synthesis, in the imagination, defines an object, and 
hence the possibility of empirical spatiotemporal objects. He writes:
Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not yet cognition 
at all; it only gives the manifold of intuition a priori for a possible cogni-
tion. But in order to cognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must 
draw it, and thus synthetically bring about a determinate combination of 
the given manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the 
unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and thereby is an object 
(a determinate space) first cognized [erkannt]. (B137–8; boldface mine)
The determination or perceptual knowledge of objects is first made 
possible by the determination of space itself as the “mere form of 
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outer sensible intuition”, which is initially only given as the manifold 
of intuition “for a possible cognition” (B137). Spatiotemporal objects 
are discriminated, or delimited, from the larger space in which they 
are necessarily perceived, in virtue of delimiting space itself in smaller 
partitions of itself. Unbounded space is the single domain in which all 
bounded particular spatial objects must be able to be located. Hence, 
the possibility of determinate spatiotemporal objects is grounded on the 
a priori determination of space itself by means of the figurative synthe-
sis. This happens by means of the categories of quantity and quality.16
This, then, is what Kant aims to show in the ‘second step’: how the 
synthetic unity of apperception, by means of the transcendental synthe-
sis of the imagination, determines a manifold of representations as given 
in space as an object, which, in virtue of that determination by the act 
of synthesis, is itself “a determinate space” within the larger space, in 
which it is contained. The distinction between the first and second steps 
thus concerns the distinction between defining the unity of conscious-
ness as an object in general (in the ‘first step’), and defining the unity of 
the synthesis of imagination in the sensible manifold (in apprehension) 
as an object as “a determinate space” within space (‘second step’). By 
showing that the unity of the synthesis of imagination determines the 
unity of space and is thus definitional of a spatially bounded object, and 
given that the synthesis of imagination is an effect of the understanding 
on sensibility, and hence an act of apperception, Kant thus shows that 
the unity of space corresponds to the unity of apperception, insofar as a 
part of space is delimited as a determinate space, a ‘something’, that is, 
an object.
The main goal of the ‘second step’ is to point out that the way a pri-
ori concepts, categories (in particular, the categories of quantity and 
quality), are indeed the functions which subsume empirical intuitions 
under concepts has to do with pointing out how the unity of space 
(and, equally, time), as the a priori form of intuition, corresponds with 
the unity bestowed on the sensible manifold by the understanding by 
virtue of the categories—this latter unity is the “qualitative unity” of 
which Kant speaks at B131 (see Schulting 2012:170, 172, 174), not 
just the category ‘unity’. The way to show this correspondence is by 
showing that the successive synthesis of the manifold of representations 
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in an empirical intuition is required so as to produce or construct a 
synthetic unity of representations as a ‘whole’, in the sense of a “whole 
of compared and connected representations” being the definition of 
a “cognition” (Erkenntniß ) (A97), within the realm of space as infi-
nite given magnitude, which first enables the determination of spatial 
objects (cf. A224/B271).
7.5  Figurative Synthesis in Relation to the Sui 
Generis Unity of Space
Does this mean that Kant wants to say that the understanding or the 
unity of apperception is responsible for, indeed generates by con-
struction, the sui generis unity of space, as some might think on the 
basis of what Kant appears to be saying in the notoriously difficult 
note at B160–1n. (see e.g. Friedman 2012:247–248)?17 This would 
mean that space (and time), as given infinite magnitudes, as singular 
and all-encompassing, itself are first generated by the understanding, 
or at least by the figurative synthesis or the transcendental imagina-
tion (Longuenesse 1998:219, 223; 2005:34), and that therefore space 
(and time) would seem to be conceptual, given that the way the 
understanding operates is by means of the application or, through 
the imagination, schematisation of a priori concepts (the construc-
tion occurs in accordance with a priori rules, these being the catego-
ries). Figurative synthesis is often thought to be an operation that is 
pre-conceptual, in the sense that it is itself not conceptual and that it 
does not require concepts (i.e. categories) (see Chaps. 5, 6), but that 
it is (merely) a necessary condition for conceptuality and/or the cat-
egories—or that it requires the categories in a Pickwickean sense, such 
as Longuenesse’s (2005) view that there is a “first application” of the 
categories, or in terms of merely obscure concepts, as Grüne (2009) 
argues. And since figurative synthesis is pre-conceptual, arguing that 
the unity of space itself is dependent on figurative synthesis would 
then not conflict with Kant’s thesis that space (and time) are intui-
tions and not concepts, and the putatively Kantian thesis that space is 
dependent on figurative synthesis.
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There are at least two main problems with this reading. First, it 
presupposes that figurative synthesis is pre-categorial, which begs the 
question of how it relates to the understanding. Kant is clear that figura-
tive synthesis is “the effect of the understanding” (B152; emphasis added), 
and hence not something that takes place independently of it. If figura-
tive synthesis is the effect of the understanding and given that the cat-
egories are the pure concepts of the understanding, it is hard to conceive 
of a way in which figurative synthesis could be said not to involve the 
categories. As Kant often says, synthesis is the unification of a mani-
fold in accordance with a priori rules. These rules are the categories (e.g. 
B162). Also, in a note to B162, Kant explicitly says that the “synthesis 
of apperception, which is intellectual […] is contained in the category 
completely a priori [ gänzlich a priori in der Kategorie enthalten]” (trans. 
Kemp Smith). I take this to mean that the intellectual synthesis of apper-
ception fully coincides with the categories. And given that, as Kants says 
in that note, the “synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must 
necessarily be in agreement with the synthesis of apperception”, the syn-
thesis of apprehension must necessarily agree with the categories. There 
is no ambiguity about the meaning of the agreement here. It means strict 
correspondence. For in the main text Kant explicitly says that the “syn-
thetic unity, […] if I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the 
understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous 
in an intuition in general, i.e. the category of quantity” (B162; boldface 
mine). That the synthesis of apprehension happens in separation from 
the categories, or that the synthetic unity in the manifold is not yet 
categorially determined, is thus interpretatively difficult to maintain.
When Kant writes in the note to B160 that the synthetic unity of 
intuition a priori belongs to space and time, not to the concept (note the 
singular!) of the understanding, he implicitly refers back to B131, where 
it is made clear that the unity of apperception is concerned, not the cat-
egory ‘unity’. But this does not imply that in the unification of space 
and time under transcendental apperception by virtue of figurative syn-
thesis, the categories (as a whole) are not involved, as Friedman (2012) 
claims. The determinate synthetic unity of space and time, as produced 
by means of apperception, is not literally pre-categorial, in the temporal 
sense of prior. What Kant means to say is that the unity of apperception, 
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which establishes the unity of space (in terms of geometrical space or 
determinate space) and time, is the necessary a priori condition for deter-
mining spaces as parts of space. The original synthetic unity of apper-
ception is not the category of unity nor simply the sui generis unity of 
space (and time), but it is the mediating unifying ground, or “qualitative 
unity” (B131) which binds the two, and thus allows simultaneously, and 
originally, the schematisation of the category of unity and thereby the 
determination of the sui generis unity of space (and time).
But also philosophically Friedman’s reading is in trouble, since if figu-
rative synthesis—which is an a priori and transcendental act as much as 
the intellectual synthesis—were independent of the understanding and 
of the categories, one wonders which further synthesis is required to 
bind figurative synthesis and the categories. The problem here is what 
Hanna (2013) has recently aptly called the “schmimagination” problem 
in response to a critique of mine (Schulting 2010); if transcendental 
imagination as one kind of a priori synthesis, namely figurative synthe-
sis, happens separately from the other kind of a priori synthesis, namely 
intellectual synthesis, then a third kind of a priori synthesis—let’s call it 
“schmimagination”—is required that connects the first two. But then a 
fourth kind of a priori synthesis is required to connect the third with the 
first two etc. The threat is one of an infinite regress, when we should in 
fact have realised that a priori or original synthesis was precisely designed 
by Kant in order to block further questions concerning the constitu-
tive ground of experience, and ex hypothesi exists only as one kind 
(cf. B145–6). The view that figurative synthesis is pre-conceptual and 
hence prior to the categories compromises the main claim of TD to find 
the common ground between determinate intuitions and concepts. This 
problem is not solved by a Longuenessian approach of distinguishing 
between the supposedly first and second applications of the categories, 
whereby in some deflationary sense the dependency relation between 
figurative synthesis and the categories is kept intact; for the “schmim-
agination” problem would now relate to how the first and second appli-
cation of the categories originally relate to each other (namely, how is 
the second application effected?), apart from the fact that Longuenesse’s 
reading lacks textual evidence and faces some other inconsistency 
problems.18
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The second problem concerns space. Kant appears to be saying that 
the “unity of space” presupposes a synthesis, which most likely would 
be figurative synthesis. He says this in B161n.19 But it should be noted 
that Kant here makes an important distinction between space as “form 
of intuition” and space as “formal intuition”, where only the latter pro-
vides the unity of space in terms of a unity applied to a spatial mani-
fold through the unity of apperception. Hence, space as formal intuition 
presupposes a synthesis. By contrast, space as pure form of intuition does 
not presuppose a synthesis. The manifold of intuition as such does not 
contain any unity in the sense that Kant means here (in conformity with 
the main claim of §15). However, confusingly Kant does also say in the 
note that in the Aesthetic he counted this unity of space as belonging to 
sensibility, and not as a unity that is imposed from the outside by the 
understanding, or an external act of synthesis. Aside from the question 
regarding what Kant means to say by saying that the unity belongs to 
sensibility—also because in the main text he says that it is not given in 
but only with the intuition (B161)—one wonders how such a synthetic 
unity is related to space. In the note (B160n.), Kant clearly says that form 
of intuition “merely gives the manifold”, and that the unity is only con-
tained in the formal intuition. There is thus reason to believe that, since 
he claims that in the Aesthetic unity was counted as belonging to sensi-
bility, Kant there does not make a distinction between form of intuition 
and formal intuition. Given the focus on the specific features of space 
(and time) in the Aesthetic, independently of the role of the understand-
ing in cognitively determining space—a task reserved for the Analytic—
that would make sense (see Onof and Schulting 2015).
Now, to return to the second problem more in particular: if the ‘unity 
of space’ that Kant counted as belonging to sensibility in the Aesthetic, 
is the unity imposed on the manifold by the understanding from the 
outside, as it were, then the question is what the role of space as ‘mere 
manifold’ can still be. That is, if formal intuition gives the unity of space, 
how much of space is there in the ‘mere manifold’, and what could that 
mean?20 At issue here is the phenomenological character of space. Indeed, 
Longuenesse (1998:219, 222–223) has claimed that Kant’s distinction in 
the note between form of intuition and formal intuition is not a mean-
ingful distinction. The two are all but the same. Secondly, if the unity of 
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space is the same unity that is established by figurative synthesis (and a 
fortiori the understanding), then there is at least the threat of a reduction 
of space as intuition to a concept, precisely what Kant argues against in 
the Aesthetic. Of course, one could still insist that figurative synthesis is 
a pre-conceptual operation and thus fully compatible with the view that 
space is not a concept or category (cf. Friedman 2012:248). But above I 
have pointed out the philosophical and interpretative problems with the 
view that figurative synthesis is not a (conceptualising, i.e. categorial) act 
of the understanding. Friedman maintains that
the same original synthesis precedes all (schematized) categories or pure 
concepts of the understanding, and therefore precedes all (schematized) 
concepts whatsoever […] none of which are identical with the ‘action of 
the understanding on sensibility’ that first gives both space and time their 
characteristic unity and singularity. (2012:248–249)
The problem with Friedman’s reading is twofold: (1) he mistakes 
the sui generis unity of space and time for the unity of apperception 
(original synthesis), and (2) he mistakenly interprets the “action of the 
understanding on sensibility”, which supposedly on his reading gen-
erates the unity of space, as somehow operating independently of or 
separately from the action of the schematisation of the categories. This 
violates against the Leitfaden argument and it begs the question of how 
“the action of the understanding on sensibility” is related, and by what 
means, to the schematisation of the categories, if the categories are pre-
cisely nothing but the a priori concepts of the understanding. (See the 
earlier discussion in this section and also note 13.)
7.6  The Distinction Between Metaphysical 
and Geometric Space
I propose that we read the distinction between space as form of intui-
tion and as formal intuition differently.21 That is, we should distinguish 
between the sui generis unity of space and the synthetic unity bestowed 
on the spatial manifold from the side of the subject. The sui generis 
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unity of space cannot be reduced to the synthetic unity that the under-
standing generates, although of course it is precisely the goal of TD to 
show that the sui generis unity of space and the synthetic unity pro-
duced by the understanding correspond insofar as the determination of 
the unity of space is concerned, but not to the extent that space as a 
whole is concerned (the unity of space as a whole is and remains under-
determined). This differentiation between the sui generis unity of space 
and the synthetic unity due to the understanding corresponds to the 
distinction that Kant makes, in his unpublished tract On Kästner’s 
Treatises (Kant 2014), between metaphysical space and geometric space. 
Figurative synthesis is responsible for the generation of geometric space, 
but not metaphysical space, not even the latter’s sui generis unity, as 
Land (2014) suggests (see Sect. 7.4 above). So any sui generis unity 
that metaphysical space has is not one that is due to the operation of 
the understanding by means of the transcendental imagination, but is 
rather intrinsic to space itself and independent of any unifying act of 
the understanding.
Before we go into detail about the sui generis unity of space, 
what does Kant mean by the distinction between metaphysical and 
geometric space? Very succinctly put, metaphysical space is a given 
absolute infinite magnitude, as Kant defines space in the Metaphysical 
Exposition of the Aesthetic (A25/B39–40). Geometric space, on 
the other hand, is a potential infinite. Space stricte dictum is meta-
physical space, “i.e. originally, nonetheless merely subjectively given 
space”. This is space as pure intuition, which is a singular representa-
tion (OKT, 20:421 [Kant 2014:309]), “cannot be brought under any 
concept”, and “contains the ground of the construction of all possible 
geometrical concepts” (OKT, 20:420 [Kant 2014:309]), Euclidean 
or non-Euclidean ones. Metaphysical space is “the pure form of the 
sensible mode of representation of the subject” (OKT, 20:421 [Kant 
2014:309]). Geometric space, by contrast, is in fact not a single space, 
but rather a plurality of spaces or sub-spaces that are defined by the 
conceptual determinations of regions of metaphysical space; metaphysi-
cal space, on the other hand, is “space […] considered in the way it is 
given, before all determination of it” (OKT, 20:419 [Kant 2014:309]; 
cf. B41, Prol §9, 4:282).
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The possibility of, for example, extending a straight line indefinitely, 
i.e. “successively generating all its parts from one point” (A162/B203) is 
grounded on the givenness of infinite space. This is what the term ‘meta-
physical space’ indicates. The “many spaces” of which Kant speaks in 
the Kästner essay concern the geometrical determinations or construc-
tions—by means of the successive synthesis of the imagination—that 
are to be thought of as “parts of the unitary original space” (OKT, 
20:419 [Kant 2014:309]), i.e. “a proper subset of the determinations of 
the single metaphysical space” (Patton 2011:282–283). As Kant points 
out, the fact that I can extend a line to infinity is made possible by the 
fact that “the space in which I describe the line, is greater than every 
one line which I may describe in it” (OKT, 20:420 [Kant 2014:309]). 
Metaphysical space is originally given as infinite, and is always already 
greater than any subset of geometrical determinations of space; by con-
trast, geometric space is “made” (a term Kästner himself uses) or con-
structed by means of the synthesis of the imagination and so finite 
with respect to metaphysical space. Therefore, metaphysical space, 
original unitary given space, cannot be dependent on, and be gener-
ated by, the synthesis of imagination, since the latter is the act of con-
struction, hence the determining factor in determining a finite space, 
not the determinable given space. The possibility of the synthetic act of 
constructing a space is grounded on the prior givenness of metaphysical 
space. It is an analytic truth that the act of construction cannot generate 
that on which what is generated by it is grounded.
Now to the unity of space. The sui generis unity of space, as 
expounded in the Metaphysical Exposition of the Aesthetic, is con-
trasted with conceptual unity, which is a unity of a multiplicity of 
representations contained under a higher representation (A69/B94; 
A78/104). The representation of space is just the representation of a 
unique, single space, which is not subsumable under a higher space, 
as it would be if space were a concept. Rather, the sui generis unity 
of space is the unity in which the multiple parts are contained, and is 
the “single all-encompassing space” whose parts are “only thought in 
it” (A25/B39). The unity of space is an absolute unity, or a totum ana-
lyticum (Refl 3789, 17:293), so not a synthetic whole, which is based 
on the combination of given parts.22 All parts or regions of space share 
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the same analytical feature of belonging to the same unique, originally 
given space. In contrast to conceptual unity, the sui generis unity of 
space is defined by its singularity (uniqueness), mereological inversion 
(the whole precedes its parts; implying infinite divisibility), and infinity 
(B39–40).
To mark the difference between the synthetic unity conferred on 
the manifold by the understanding through the transcendental syn-
thesis of imagination, and the sui generis unity of space, this spatial 
unity can be called ‘unicity’. The ‘unicity’ of space is, as said, defined 
by the essential characteristics of space: its (1) singularity; (2) infin-
ity; and (3) mereological inversion. Further topological characteristics 
of space are: (4) its continuity (no gaps in space; and its absence can-
not be represented); (5) externality (relation between parts of space) 
(6) its homogeneity (the ‘outside another’ relation applies to all parts 
of space, which are only numerically different; mutual exteriority of 
the components of a partition of space) and (7) centred externality 
(space is represented outside me, i.e. it is the form of outer sense). 
These characteristics of space form the basis of all possible spatial 
determinations.23 The ‘unicity’ of space and the unity of the under-
standing, by virtue of the unity of apperception, must somehow be 
shown to match, thus enabling perceptual knowledge of spatiotem-
poral objects, but the former (‘unicity’) is at any rate not claimed by 
Kant to be reducible to the latter unity.24 Neither is it the case that 
the ‘unicity’ of space is due to figurative synthesis, since, as I have 
said above, this synthesis is a determining25 act of the understanding 
on inner sense and hence cannot do justice to the unique phenom-
enological features of space, i.e. its character as infinite given magni-
tude, and as singular. The determining and the determinable must be 
kept apart, on pain of making Kant into a German Idealist who con-
fuses transcendental and existential conditions.26 As I argued earlier, 
the understanding cannot generate space as a single all-encompassing 
magnitude, which as Kant says in the Kästner piece is “the original 
representation of a unitary, infinite, subjectively given space”, not “the 
geometrically and objectively given space”, which is always finite, 
since “it is only given through its being constructed [ gemacht]” (OKT, 
20:420 [Kant 2014:309]). Such a claim—that synthesis generates 
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space as a single all-encompassing magnitude—would also imply a 
conflation of Kant’s explicit distinction between the roles of the two 
types of space, metaphysical and geometric space(s).
However, for the unicity of space to be grasped as a unity for the 
understanding, that is, grasped by the understanding by means of the 
unity of apperception, the unicity or unity of space presupposes a syn-
thesis, as Kant says in the B160–1 note. This brings us to the key point 
of the ‘second step’ argument, namely: What does it mean for the unicity 
of space to be grasped as a unity for the understanding ?
The unicity of space defines space as the horizon of all possible empiri-
cal objects, given that all the space that such objects occupy must be part 
of the one single space. The synthesis of the series of parts of space is 
however never complete, but can only take place in terms of a progressus 
in indefinitum (A511/B539); space is intrinsically underdetermined. But 
given the infinite divisibility of space, infinitely ever smaller objects can 
also be determined (a regressus in infinitum). The synthesis of apprehen-
sion of the manifold in a given empirical intuition enables us to perceive 
the given manifold of sensations as a unity defining a determinate spa-
tiotemporal object, as part of geometric space (A120), against the back-
ground or horizon of the unity (i.e. unicity) of metaphysical space. Of 
course, geometric space and metaphysical space are in fact the same space 
in which empirical objects can be perceived. The difference lies in the 
fact that geometric space is determinate space (and in fact consists of a 
plurality of spaces), for which figurative synthesis is the determining fac-
tor, and which enables us to locate and track empirical objects in space as 
well as construct geometrical figures in space; metaphysical space, on the 
other hand, is determinable space, space simpliciter, as the subjective con-
dition of representing objects as spatial in the first place. When we deter-
mine the unity (i.e. unicity) of space as a unity for the understanding, by 
means of the unity of apperception, we of course do not determine space 
qua metaphysical space, with its sui generis unity (i.e. the unicity which 
defines space, as described earlier). But we determine a particular space 
as a bounded object in geometrical space, and thus, through limitation, 
space as consisting of an infinite unified plurality of spaces.27
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7.7  What Has Kant Actually Proven in the 
‘Second Step’ of the B-Deduction?
To return to the topic of the goal of TD: on my reading, the prem-
ise of TD was the assumed fact of ‘experience’ in the strong sense of 
perceptual knowledge (C-experience), as well as the unproblematic fact 
of S-experience. This is not put to doubt by Kant. Neither one is the 
object of proof. But nor is even the possibility of S-experience at issue 
(as reading 3* believes). Only the possibility of C-experience is the object 
of proof, hence C-experience features as the premise of TD (reading 
3**). If this is true, then although this might appear exactly what Kant 
is claiming in §26, Kant’s conclusion cannot be that even perception 
itself, ‘perceptually seeing or sensing’ rather than ‘perceptually knowing’, 
is only possible due to the functions of the understanding. The con-
clusion of the proof cannot demonstrate more than what was assumed 
to be true in the premise. Kant, then, argues for the necessary (tran-
scendental) conditions of C-experience, that is the possible perception 
of objects, not the conditions of mere sense perception, in the sense of 
single instances of perceiving that are not combined into a unity with 
other such instances.
Kant says at the start of §26:
Now the possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever 
objects may come before our senses, not as far as the form of their 
intuition but rather as far as the laws of their combination are con-
cerned […] is to be explained. (B159; boldface mine)
This clearly demarcates the scope of the argument of the ‘second step’ 
to the possibility of the knowledge of objects that appear before our 
senses. Clearly, it is not the mere intuition of spatiotemporal objects 
that is to be explained here, as this has already been done in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. However, in the next sentence of this passage 
(at B160), Kant seems less precise in defining the goal of the ‘second 
step’s argument:
7.7 What Has Kant Actually Proven in the ‘Second Step’ …     321
Fo
 Sc
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
322     7 Figurative Synthesis, Spatial Unity and the Possibility …
For if the categories did not serve in this way, it would not become clear 
why everything that may ever come before our senses must stand under the laws 
that arise a priori from the understanding alone. (B160; emphasis added)
This passage might be, and indeed has been, read as implying that Kant 
does after all strive to explain how perception itself (in its broadest 
sense) is possible. This appears to be confirmed by a passage further on 
in the section, at B161, where Kant says that “[c]onsequently all synthe-
sis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the 
categories” (emphasis added). Kant appears to be arguing that
1. all synthesis of the manifold representations in a sensible intuition 
stands under the categories;
2. perception is grounded in a synthesis of the manifold of representations;
3. hence, perception stands under the categories;
4. experience is cognition through the connection of perceptions;
5. hence, experience stands under the categories.
But if this were indeed what Kant is saying, then one is bound to con-
clude from this that Kant wants to prove that perception simpliciter 
requires the categories, and that a fortiori there is no intuition that does 
not entail categorial determination (if we take perception simpliciter to 
be identified with intuition; see the Stufenleiter at A320/B376–7). In 
this way, one is apt to believe Kant has shown, in the ‘second step’ of 
TD, that the possibility that intuitions are not determined in accord-
ance with the categories, has hereby been excluded. Kant has thus exor-
cised the possibility of “transcendental chaos” (Allison 2012:184), by 
showing that all intuitions whatsoever, and thus all possible perception, 
are amenable to categorial determination. However, the use of the term 
‘perception’ in Kant’s text, and in the above argument, is ambiguous 
between mere perception and perception of objects, i.e. objective per-
ception (A320/B376–7) (There remains a further question, which many 
point out is related to the modality of Kant’s argument at B131, as to 
whether it is in principle possible that intuition or perception is not de 
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facto categorially determined but should at least be amenable to catego-
rial determination, but it is unclear to me what it could mean to have a 
perception that is not de facto categorially determined but must at the 
same time be able to be categorially determined, that is, to claim that 
perception per se has merely a necessary disposition to being categori-
ally determined.)
But what does Kant in fact prove in the ‘second step’? In the 
A-version of the Deduction, at A120, Kant provides an important clue 
as to how to read the link between the figurative synthesis of §24 and 
the a priori synthesis of apprehension in §26. Kant says namely, at 
A120, that the transcendental imagination is the faculty “whose action 
exercised upon perceptions I call apprehension”. That is, the synthesis 
of apprehension is not a faculty distinct from transcendental imagina-
tion, but rather is the imagination in perception, more precisely, inso-
far as perceptions are synthetically united into one representation of an 
object. It is the combination of perceptions, not perception simpliciter, 
that is necessarily dependent on the categories. This is made clear by 
Kant in §26 again and again:
[T]he possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects 
may come before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition but 
rather as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, […] is to 
be explained. (B159; boldface mine)
Thus even unity of the synthesis of the manifold, outside or within us, 
hence also a combination with which everything that is to be repre-
sented as determined in space or time must agree, is already given a pri-
ori, along with (not in) these intuitions, as condition of the synthesis of 
all apprehension. (B161; boldface mine)
As mere representations […], they stand under no law of connection at all 
except that which the connecting faculty prescribes. Now that which con-
nects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination, which depends 
on [the] understanding for the unity of the intellectual synthesis of the 
intuition and on sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension. (B164; 
trans. emended and emphasis added)
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Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehen-
sion, but the latter itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on the tran-
scendental one, thus on the categories, all possible perceptions, hence 
everything that can ever reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appear-
ances of nature, as far as their combination is concerned, stand under the 
categories […]. (B164–5; emphasis added)
In each of these passages, one notices a constraint on the claim advanced, 
namely, that insofar as the combination of the manifold of representations 
or perceptions is concerned, the manifold is conditioned by the categories. 
This fully comports with the line of reasoning starting in §13 of TD, 
which was discussed in detail in Chap. 5, and shows that Kant is com-
mitted to what in that chapter I defined as argument M*, which shows a 
modal constraint on the claims Kant puts forward in TD. M* says:
Necessarily, if intuitions are to be seen as contributing to possible knowl-
edge of objects, then intuitions are subsumed under the categories as the 
conceptual conditions under which knowledge of objects is possible.
We should heed the fact that the “transcendental action of the imag-
ination” is the “synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner 
sense”, which latter is itself just the mere manifold of representations 
(“the mere form of intuition”) and in and of itself does not contain a 
combination of that manifold (B154). As was already made clear in §15 
of TD, combination (Verbindung), hence synthesis, is not given in the 
manifold:
Yet the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come 
to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the 
pure form of sensible intuition. […] [A]mong all representations combi-
nation is the only one that is not given through objects but can be exe-
cuted only by the subject itself […]. (B129–30)
Equally, in the notorious note to B160, Kant makes it clear that 
the form of intuition does not yet contain the “comprehension 
[Zusammenfassung] of the manifold”; it “merely gives the manifold”, 
but not yet “unity of the representation”. Thus, in the conclusion to 
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TD, in §26, Kant is not suddenly claiming that mere sense perception, 
indeed the very form of intuition as the merely given manifold, is after 
all united per se. If it would indeed be the case that Kant argues in the 
concluding section of TD that, necessarily, all intuition or perception in 
the broadest sense stands under the categories and are thus synthetically 
united, then this plainly contradicts his earlier statements that intuition 
or perception does not in and of itself contain the element of combina-
tion, namely a priori synthesis.
What Kant instead shows in the ‘second step’ of TD is what it means 
for us to grasp the unicity of space as a unity for the understanding. It is 
shown in §§24 and 26 specifically that by virtue of the very same act of 
spontaneity that enables any discursive thinker to combine the manifold 
of representations in any arbitrary sensible intuition (human or other), 
as was shown in the ‘first step’ of TD, the unity (i.e. unicity) of space 
(and time) can be determined objectively through the understanding, 
by means of the categories, in virtue of the unity of apperception. Kant 
wants to say that despite the absolute, irreducible distinction between 
the forms of sensibility and the forms of the understanding, i.e. the cat-
egories, which shows their reciprocal irreducibility, we are able to grasp 
space and time as objects for the understanding, not qua space and 
time, that is, qua infinite given magnitudes, but in terms of bounded 
objects in space and time (i.e. determinate spaces and times).
This fundamental grasp of, or, acquaintance with what is the oppo-
site of our conceptuality, namely, the pure intuitions space and time, 
and every object which is contained in it, is shown to obtain by show-
ing how the transcendental unity of apperception unites the manifold 
of representation in a spatiotemporal intuition, by virtue of the synthe-
sis of apprehension. We have an intimate grasp of empirical objects in 
space and time, not because space and time itself are first generated by 
the understanding, or by the synthesis of the imagination, as Friedman, 
Land, Longuenesse and others claim, but because we know, in virtue of 
the fundamental structure of our thought—i.e. in virtue of the fact that 
it is governed by characteristic functions—what it means to determine, 
by means of these same functions, which are then called categories, 
objects in space and time (cf. Prol, 4:318). We do not just encounter 
these objects in space and time and then happen to be able to determine 
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them. How would we be able to know that we determine them cor-
rectly if this were indeed the manner in which we were confronted with 
objects? We are rather intimately familiar with them at the most funda-
mental level, in our sensible relation to them, because by virtue of the 
transcendental unity of apperception, through its “synthetic influence 
[…] on the inner sense” (B154), by combining the given manifold in 
an empirical intuition, objects are first determined as bounded objects 
in space as a unitary whole of which the bounded object is a constituent 
part. This determination has an epistemic and ontological aspect, as we 
shall see in the next section. Spatiotemporal objects themselves, not just 
their knowledge, are in some sense first constituted by the transcenden-
tal synthesis of the imagination, in contrast to space and time qua space 
and time (qua infinite given magnitudes), which as such are and remain 
fully independent of any subjective act of synthesis.
Combination of intuitions, not mere intuition, is what is argued, in 
§26, to be wholly dependent on the subjective agency of synthesis. The 
conclusion of TD is thus that knowledge of objects, which consists in 
the connection of perceptions (B161), essentially and wholly depends 
on subjective functions of thought or the capacity to judge by virtue 
of transcendental apperception, given sensory input, which is the thesis 
of radical subjectivism I have been arguing for in this book. It is dif-
ficult to understand though what it could mean for one to have intui-
tions that are not synthesised, that is, to have “merely [a] manifold” 
(bloß Mannigfaltiges) (B160n.) of representations. It would be less than 
perception of determinate spatial objects, since, given the absence of 
any synthesis of the aggregate parts of the manifold representations, the 
categories enabling the determination of such objects would be lack-
ing. One would merely be varying representations in time, though one 
would of course oneself still be located in space, and be able to have 
perceptions. But any unity between oneself, as the one who has the 
intuition or intuitions, and the sui generis unity of space, would be con-
tingent—which does not mean that the empirical (causal etc.) laws gov-
erning one’s bodily movements would not apply; it just means that in 
the case of arbitrarily varying one’s representations, the rules governing 
one’s movements have not been determined as necessarily applying, since 
the unity of apperception is ex hypothesi not involved.
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Kant’s goal in TD is to show that insofar as the determinate percep-
tual knowledge of spatially located objects and their very objectivity 
in space is concerned, our intuitions necessarily entail a priori synthe-
sis (the transcendental unity of apperception) and thus the categories. 
However, he does not (and cannot) exclude the real possibility that 
occurrent intuitions or perceptions do not correspond with figurative 
synthesis and hence with the transcendental unity of apperception, in 
which case no perceptual knowledge would result and no objectivity 
could be established, but nor would we even be aware of them as our 
intuitions. As Kant says in the A-Deduction, at A116:
All intuitions are nothing for us and do not in the least concern us if they 
cannot be taken up into consciousness, whether they influence it directly 
or indirectly, and through this alone is cognition possible.
7.8  The Idealism of Nature
There is one remaining element in the concluding §26 that may arouse 
puzzlement. Kant writes that
laws [of appearances in nature] exist just as little in the appearances, but 
rather exist only relative to the subject in which the appearances inhere, 
insofar as it has understanding, as appearances do not exist in themselves, 
but only relative to the same being, insofar as it has senses. (B164)
What Kant seems to be committed to here is the plainest form of reduc-
tive phenomenalist idealism: the laws of nature do not exist in the 
objects of nature themselves, or in nature itself, but are entirely due to 
the experiencing subject who imposes them on the objects. The objects 
of nature are lawfully governed and connected only insofar as the sub-
ject has knowledge of them and senses them. In fact, as Kant says, nature 
“depends” upon the categories, “as the original ground of its necessary 
lawfulness” (B165). It is the subject that makes and prescribes laws 
to nature (cf. B159–60), rather than nature being that which is given 
prior to, and independently of, the subject’s sensory experience of it. 
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Similarly, in the A-Deduction at A114, Kant says that “nature should 
direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, indeed 
in regard to its lawfulness even depend on this”. This is what amounts 
to Kant’s idealism about nature itself. Nature itself is ideal, not just our 
experience of it. In the A-Deduction version of the argument, this is 
made very explicit:
[I]f one considers that this nature is nothing in itself but a sum of appear-
ances, hence not a thing in itself but merely a multitude of representa-
tions of the mind, then one will not be astonished to see it [i.e. nature] 
solely in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, namely, transcendental 
apperception, in that unity on account of which alone it can be called 
object of all possible experience, i.e., nature. (A114; trans. emended and 
emphasis added)
This raises the question of how we should understand the claim that the 
categories make nature possible, to the extent that nature depends on 
them. Kant writes:
Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances, thus 
to nature as the sum total of all appearances (natura materialiter spectata), 
and, since they are not derived from nature and do not follow it as their 
pattern (for they would otherwise be merely empirical), the question now 
arises how it is to be conceived that nature must follow them, i.e., how 
they can determine a priori the combination of the manifold of nature 
without deriving from the latter. (B163)
What should be clear from the start is that Kant makes a distinction 
between nature seen from a material or empirical perspective (natura 
materialiter spectata) and nature considered from a formal or transcen-
dental perspective (natura formaliter spectata; B165). Further, nature is 
never just an aggregate of things. In the Prolegomena, Kant writes that 
“[n]ature considered materialiter” amounts to the “totality of all objects of 
experience” (Prol, 4:295 [Kant 1977:39]), or as Kant puts it here in the 
Critique, “the sum total of all appearances” (B163; cf. A114). But, at the 
same time nature in the formal sense “is the existence of things, so far as 
it is determined according to universal laws” (Prol, 4:294 [Kant 1977:38]; 
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emphasis added), it “denotes the conformity to law of the determina-
tions of the existence of things generally” (Prol, 4:295 [Kant 1977:39]; 
emphasis added). Thus, while the whole of material nature is subject to 
determination by the a priori laws that are prescribed by the categories, 
as Kant says in the above quote from B163, it is not qua the material 
existence of empirical or physical nature, that is, the fact that it exists, 
but only insofar as material objects are “combined”, i.e. determined, 
in accordance with these a priori laws, that nature is so subject. It is 
thus only under the formal perspective ( formaliter spectata) that nature 
stands wholly under, and is dependent on, the categories. These laws of 
nature are a priori general laws, to which all objects are subject insofar as 
objects obey universal principles such as that “substance is permanent”, 
or “every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws” 
(Prol, 4:295 [Kant 1977:39]), including the laws that a priori deter-
mine, by means of the categories of quality, the intensive magnitude 
of spatial objects, the material stuff that nature is made of.28 The cat-
egories only prescribe an a priori lawfulness that describes how objects 
in nature obey a certain rule-governedness in general, namely, to the 
extent that objects in nature, and thus nature as the whole of objects, 
are such objects only as determined, in their very givenness, by the 
unity of apperception, that is, are permanent phenomenal substances, 
which are bound by the law of causality, interact in a community of 
distinct objects, and are spatially located and bounded. The a poste-
riori element of experience of nature, and so the a posteriori element 
of empirical nature itself—that is, the very fact of there being particu-
lar natural objects and events—can only be established and determined 
by means of experience itself: “Experience must be added in order to 
come to know particular laws” (B165). The understanding thus cannot 
prescribe a lawfulness for objects in terms of particular empirical natu-
ral laws, which cannot as such be derived from the categories and are 
“only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding” 
(A128; cf. A126).
This then could be called the “idealism” of nature: nature in general, 
and its lawfulness in general is constituted by, and thus wholly depend-
ent on, the “subjective laws, under which alone an empirical cognition 
of things is possible”, but also “hold good of these things as objects of 
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possible experience (not as things in themselves […])” (Prol, 4:296 
[Kant 1977:40]). These a priori laws of nature are subjective, not because 
they concern psychologically necessary laws of the experience of nature or 
“rules of the observation of a nature that is already given”, whereby the 
possibility of experience is already presupposed, but they are subjective, 
because they first constitute nature itself and the very possibility of the 
experience of nature (Prol, 4:297 [Kant 1977:41]). If the laws of nature 
were contained in the objects themselves, and Kant’s analysis would 
concern the study of these laws by means of experience, then those laws 
would not be a priori laws (cf. Prol, 4:297; A125). They would not tell 
us anything about nature qua the very conception of nature, and its very 
possibility—what it means to conceive of nature at all, and as a result no 
natural science would be possible. Kant writes in the Prolegomena:
There are many laws of nature which we can only know by means of 
experience; but conformity to law in the connection of appearances, i.e., 
nature in general, we cannot discover by any experience, because experi-
ence itself requires laws which are a priori at the basis of its possibility. The 
possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time the universal 
law of nature, and the principles of experience are the very laws of nature. 
For we know nature as nothing but the totality of appearances, i.e., of 
representations in us; and hence we can only derive the law of their con-
nection from the principles of their connection in us, that is, from the 
conditions of their necessary unification in a consciousness, which con-
stitutes the possibility of experience. (Prol, 4:318–319 [Kant 1977:61]; 
emphasis added)
The “highest legislation of nature”, as Kant says, “lie[s] in ourselves”, 
in the conditions of the possible experience, that is, the forms of space 
and time and the categories, as those “principles of [the] connec-
tion” of appearances or representations (Prol, 4:319 [Kant 1977:61]). 
The understanding itself is the “legislation for nature” and “the source 
of the laws of nature”, and “without understanding there would not 
be any nature at all”. The a priori rule-governedness of nature lies in 
the “synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances in accordance with 
rules”, hence, since the necessary synthetic unity of the manifold is first 
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established by an act of transcendental apperception, Kant is licensed 
to claim that it is the “unity of apperception [that] is the transcendental 
ground of the necessary lawfulness of all appearances in an experience”, 
that is, of nature itself (all quotations from A126–7). Only in this man-
ner, by taking nature as grounded on the unity of apperception, is it 
possible to determine something a priori of nature. The pure or univer-
sal laws of nature are not drawn from experience through observation, 
but both they and our experience of law-governed nature are consti-
tuted by the conditions of possible experience. Indeed,
nature and possible experience are quite the same, and as the conformity 
to law in the latter depends upon the necessary connection of appearances 
in experience (without which we cannot cognize any object whatever in 
the sensible world), consequently upon the original laws of the under-
standing, it seems at first strange, but is not the less certain, to say: the 
understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but prescribes them to, 
nature. (Prol, 4:320 [Kant 1977:62])
In a word, “the understanding is the origin of the universal order of 
nature” (Prol, 4:322 [Kant 1977:64]). Thus, it is “we ourselves [that] 
bring into appearances that order and regularity in them that we call 
nature” (A125). It is the very subjective ground of experience and its 
objects, i.e. the “unity of apperception”, which is “the transcendental 
ground of the necessary lawfulness of all appearances in an experience”, 
hence of nature itself, which, to be sure, receives merely its “formal pos-
sibility” from it, not its material possibility (A127). This claim rein-
forces my thesis about Kant’s radical subjectivism about the possibility 
of knowledge.
Notes
 1. I mean ostensive proof in the sense that Kant indicates at A789/B817.
 2. See e.g. Carl (1989:11).
 3. For a critique of Strawson’s construal of TD, see Schulting (2008).
 4. See the discussion in Chap. 2.
Notes     331
Fo
r S
ch
ol
rly
 Pu
rp
os
s O
nly
332     7 Figurative Synthesis, Spatial Unity and the Possibility …
 5. Cf. Pollok (2008).
 6. That is, on a regressive reading that takes experience (as knowledge) 
as a premise in the argument the argument cannot be a priori strictly 
speaking, in the sense that an a priori argument is one that is mounted 
completely independently of experience. Of course, the regressive argu-
ment is still a priori in another sense of being part of a transcendental 
analysis, rather than an inductive analysis based on experience. A regres-
sive argument in the transcendental vein still seeks to provide certainty 
about the categories’ applicability, but it is not an ostensive proof that is 
strictly a priori from a pure principle of thought.
 7. That also C-experience is already implicitly claimed to exist concerns 
the fact that, to some extent, Kant is a common sense realist (see 
Ameriks 2005), namely, in the way that he accepts the fact, not just of 
there being S-experience, but also of there being scientific (mathemati-
cal, natural-scientific) knowledge.
 8. Kant of course considers, in the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic in the Critique and later in the Third Critique, the question of 
how natural kinds must be seen as organised in such a way as to be per-
ceivable and knowable by us in accordance with regulative principles. 
But these principles, and the account thereof, are still a priori, and tran-
scendental, and do not concern any examination of the constitution of 
the a posteriori, empirical nature of objects of experience per se. See 
also OP, 22:502; cf. Mathieu (1989).
 9. See Chap. 2 (this volume), for a brief discussion of my account in 
Schulting (2012).
 10. For more analysis, see Chap. 4 (this volume), and Schulting (2012).
 11. One could argue that, though spatial unity and categorial unity are 
indeed not to be identified, spatial unity is dependent on a unity that 
is different from categorial unity, namely, the synthetic unity of the 
imagination, or the synthetic unity of apperception. But this move 
presupposes that categorial unity and the synthetic unity of the imagi-
nation come apart. In the foregoing chapters, I have argued that that 
cannot not be the case (see also Schulting 2012, passim). See also note 
13 below.
 12. See Butts (1981).
 13. Friedman (2012:248) is wrong to separate the transcendental synthe-
sis of the imagination from the categories. He emphasises that the for-
mer “precedes” the latter, apparently based on what Kant writes in the 
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B160–1 note (although Kant says about the “unity of space”, not the 
synthesis, that it precedes concepts). But if at all there is an issue of the 
imagination ‘preceding’ the schematised categories, this should be read 
in terms of the imagination being the transcendental-logical condition 
of the schematisation of the categories, not in terms of the imagination 
coming before the categories in time. There is of course no schemati-
sation of the categories without the imagination. But nor is it true to 
say that one can have the imagination without the (schematised) cat-
egories, or put differently, without it ipso facto resulting in the sche-
matising of the categories. For the transcendental act of the synthesis 
of imagination is the act of schematisation of the categories, the pure 
concepts of the understanding, in the domain of sensibility. Since the 
transcendental act of the synthesis of imagination is the pure act of 
intellectual synthesis insofar as it is enacted in sensibility (as the syn-
thesis of apprehension; see A120), and given that the “synthetic unity” 
in a manifold, “if I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the 
understanding”, namely, “is the category of the synthesis of the homo-
geneous in an intuition in general” (B162; emphasis added), it is hard 
to see how synthesis “precedes” the categories, as if synthesis could take 
place without involvement of the categories—which is what Friedman 
appears to believe.
 14. The reverse, namely, that human spontaneity is dependent on human 
sensibility, and hence relative rather than absolute, was argued in 
Chap. 3.
 15. The act of the synthesis of imagination does not first generate intui-
tions, such as Land (2014) argues (see above).
 16. For more detail, see Onof and Schulting (2015:41ff.).
 17. Friedman writes: “What unites this totality [of possible perspectives 
from which the subject can be affected by outer objects] into a ‘single 
all-encompassing’ space […] is the transcendental unity of apperception, 
which entails that any possible outer object is in principle perceivable by 
the same subject” (2012:247); and: “[T]he synthesis responsible for the 
characteristic unity and singularity of space (as the pure form of outer 
sensible intuition) does indeed belong to the understanding” (2012:248). 
See also Bauer (2012:229). Bauer believes that “[s]patial unity just is a 
specific instance of categorial unity, which means that the objects we 
intuit in space will already be conceptually determined by [the] under-
standing”. This view might seem to be bolstered by Kant’s claim, in the 
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very passage from §21 that we quoted earlier, namely, “that its unity 
[i.e. of empirical intuition] can be none other than the one the category 
prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general”. However, 
reading this passage as saying that spatial unity simply reduces to catego-
rial unity begs the question against the very goal of TD, specifically the 
‘second step’, namely how two heterogeneous unities, the unity of intui-
tion and conceptual (categorial) unity, can be said to correspond such 
that cognition of spatiotemporal objects is made possible. Only catego-
rial unity can guarantee this conformity between intuition and concept. 
Hence, the categorial unity prescribed to the manifold corresponds to the 
spatial unity in the manifold, which thus produces the manifold as syn-
thetically united manifold, but it does not generate the sui generis unity 
of space, which is not a synthetic unity (see further below). For different 
viewpoints on space and unity see also Messina (2014) and Land (2014), 
whose reading was discussed above.
 18. As others have pointed out (Allison 2000), it is difficult to conceive of a 
consistent way whereby, as Longuenesse argues, the categories both are 
the rules that govern the synthesis which, on the other hand, first leads 
to the very formation of the categories as such analytical rules (concepts). 
Moreover, how can figurative synthesis be the ground of intellectual 
synthesis if it is rather the latter which is more general than the former, 
corresponding to the ‘two-step’ structure of the B-Deduction?
 19. For extensive discussion, see Onof and Schulting (2015).
 20. See again the discussion of Land (2014) above.
 21. For this section, I rely on the account that is given in Onof and 
Schulting (2014).
 22. Synthesis always proceeds part to whole, hence space and time cannot 
be generated by synthesis, since their parts are posterior to the whole 
(A24–5/B39; A77/B103; A169–70/B211; A438/B466; KU, 5:407, 
409; OKT, 20:419; Refl 5248, 18:130–131; to this last reference I was 
directed by Fichant 1997:31).
 23. For more discussion see further Onof and Schulting (2015).
 24. Longuenesse (1998:83, 2005:36) also emphasises this unicity, but 
for her both the unity and unicity of space are brought about by the 
understanding, whereas I contend that space’s unicity is precisely not 
brought about by the understanding but characterises space essentially, 
wholly independently of the understanding.
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 25. Longuenesse claims that there is a pre-conceptual determining role for 
the understanding (1998:222–223, 245), but this view is based on a 
mistaken distinction between the categories (intellectual synthesis) and 
figurative synthesis (see Sect. 7.5).
 26. See Schulting (2016) for discussion.
 27. For more details about how space is determined by means of the cate-
gories, for each set of categories, see Onof and Schulting (2015:41–45).
 28. The distinction between natura materialiter spectata and natura for-
maliter spectata should not be read as if it suggested that the matter of 
nature is not subject to the ideal subject’s faculty of determining nature 
formally. The matter of nature is as much ideal as is its form, insofar as 
matter is that to which our determinable sensations refer. Rather, Kant 
speaks of a dual perspective (hence spectata) from which nature can be 
seen: looking at nature from the material perspective means to look at 
it merely empirically (as what physical scientists do), while looking at it 
from the formal perspective means to look at it in terms of explaining 
its general metaphysical grounds of possibility (metaphysica generalis). 
However, nature as a whole, including its particular laws, is ideal, for 
particular natural laws are just “particular determinations of the pure 
laws of the understanding” (A128), and thus are ultimately grounded on 
the a priori laws that make nature ideal.
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Part III
Subjectivism, Material Synthesis  
and Idealism
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8.1  Introduction
G.W.F. Hegel may rightly be seen as one of the most discerning readers 
of Kant. Of course, already in his early, most expansive, account of 
Kant in Faith and Knowledge (1802) his interpretation is heavily slanted 
towards reading Kant’s philosophy from the perspective of an inchoate 
form of what comes to be known as ‘absolute idealism’, Hegel’s own 
form of idealism that departs from Kant’s transcendental idealism in a 
number of ways. But especially in Faith and Knowledge, and also later 
in the Greater and Lesser Logics, despite his misgivings about Kant’s 
general strategies, Hegel shows great understanding of the spirit and 
at least some of the core details of the Transcendental Deduction 
(TD). He believes that Kant’s notion of the  original-synthetic unity of 
apperception is “one of the most profound principles for speculative 
8
On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Subjectivism 
in the Transcendental Deduction
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‘a-metaphysically’, also in relation to Kant. We may not agree on all of the details, but I think 
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development” (WL, 12:22/SL, 520). In contrast to most Kantians,1 
and despite his misgivings about Kant’s procedure (WL, 12:43–44), 
Hegel also rightly sees TD as concerned with deriving the principles of 
the objective determination of representations, i.e. the categories, from 
the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception, from self-
consciousness (WL, 12:18; Enz, 8:117). Further, he rightly sees, contrary 
to some Kantians (see again Chap. 4), that there is no discrepancy 
between the object and the objective unity of representations, which 
“is the unity of the ‘I’ with itself ” (WL, 12:18/SL, 515), that is, 
that the object is identical to the subject’s original-synthetic unity of 
representations. For Hegel, as for Kant, the conditions of the identity 
of self-consciousness are in fact the same conditions that govern the 
identity of the object of my consciousness. Hegel thus correctly identifies 
Kant’s argument, in §17 of the B-Deduction, about the objective unity 
of representations, which is grounded on the transcendental unity of 
self-consciousness and first defines an object, as concerning the very 
objectivity of thought itself,2 indeed, the “identity of concept and thing, 
which is truth” (WL, 12:23/SL, 521; emphasis added).
But it is also clear that Hegel misinterprets many other crucial aspects 
of Kant’s arguments, and that his reading reveals his own philosophical 
agenda against Kant’s general strategy. In this chapter, however, I am 
interested in Hegel’s reading of TD, in Faith and Knowledge, purely as 
an interpretation; I shall not specifically focus on the extent to which 
his interpretation of Kant is biased towards, and forms an integral part 
of his proposal for, absolute idealism, which is only really developed 
in the later accounts of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of 
Logic. The intrinsic value of Hegel’s own system of thought compared to 
Kant’s will thus not be a topic of my discussion here. I also concentrate 
on the early account of Kant in Faith and Knowledge, as I believe that it 
provides the essential framework for Hegel’s view of Kant that remains 
consistent throughout his later accounts of Kant, especially the ones in 
both Logics (WL, 12:17–28 et passim and Enz, 8:112–147) and in the 
lectures on the history of philosophy (VGPh, 20:329–386).3
It has been argued in the literature on the early Hegel (e.g. Düsing 
1995, 2013:169) that Faith and Knowledge is fundamentally framed 
in a Schellingean conceptual constellation and I think that at least 
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the language and the main interest of Hegel’s essay are indeed firmly 
rooted in it. Among other things, this can be seen from the central use 
of such terminology as ‘absolute identity’, Potenzen, and the general 
dismissiveness with regard to subjectivity in general, which is much 
more outspoken than, or maybe even contradictory to, Hegel’s stance 
in, for example, the Greater Logic of 10 years later. For example, the 
Schellingean roots of Hegel’s account are manifest in a passage such as 
the following, which seems to be taken straight from Schelling’s System 
of Transcendental Idealism, published just 2 years earlier:
If the intellect is to be considered for itself as abstraction of the 
form in its triplicity, it is all one whether it be regarded as intellect of 
consciousness or as intellect of nature, as the form of conscious or of non-
conscious intelligence: just as in the Ego the intellect is thought of as 
conceptualized [intellektualisiert], so in nature it is thought of as realized. 
(GuW, 4:334/FK, 79)
The Schellingean terminology, particularly the notion of ‘absolute iden-
tity’, will nonetheless prove instrumental, I shall argue, in determining 
the way in which Hegel emphasises and weighs particular aspects of TD 
and in establishing the grounds on which Hegel believes Kant does not 
follow through on what he deems are the valuable, genuinely ‘ideal-
ist’ elements, what he calls the Keim des Spekulativen (GuW, 4:335), in 
Kant’s thought. Another closely related reason why Hegel’s account of 
Kant’s TD is of interest is the way in which Hegel can be seen as the 
paradigmatic critic of Kantian nonconceptualism, namely, the thesis that 
some sensible content is not or indeed cannot be subsumed under the 
concepts of the understanding and that intuition does not require the 
functions of the understanding (as Kant argues at B122–3, in the run-
up to TD) (see Chap. 5). Hegel believes that Kant is a nonconceptual-
ist, but also that this contradicts Kant’s firm conceptualism (cf. Hanna 
2013), that is, that Kant espouses two conflicting theories about the rela-
tion between  concepts and sensibility. Hegel thinks that the residual non-
conceptualism in Kant must, on Kantian grounds, be exorcised and that 
properly  conceived, without the unnecessary psychological and empiri-
cist baggage, Kant can be considered a thorough-bred conceptualist.
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This ties in with Hegel’s bemoaning of Kant’s alleged subjectivism (i.e. 
what I called ‘bad subjectivism’ in the introductory Chap. 1), namely, 
the position that the truth about objects is just the truth of our con-
ceptual scheme, without our categories being actually exemplified by the 
real things in themselves. This is the kind of subjectivism that says that 
what we know is true relative merely to our own perspective, because 
that is just how we are psychologically (or culturally, or epistemologi-
cally, etc.) disposed, in contrast to the ‘Critical’ subjectivism that says 
that subjective agency is first constitutive of objectivity, so that there 
would not even be anything objective, any nature, at all without the 
subjective forms of the understanding. But Hegel does not distinguish 
between bad and ‘Critical’ subjectivism. For the Hegel of Faith and 
Knowledge at least, subjectivism is bad tout court.4 Why he thinks Kant’s 
‘Critical’ subjectivism is just another form of bad subjectivism will be 
discussed further below. The charge of subjectivism is directly related to 
the critique of Kant’s so-called restriction thesis, namely, the idealist the-
sis that the categories of experience do not apply to things in themselves, 
which I shall also address.
For reasons of space, I shall not delve into the issues around 
nonconceptualism in relation to Hegel’s critique of Kant (for this, 
see my account in Schulting 2016b).5 Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
subjectivism and his putative ‘psychological’ idealism is discussed in 
Sect. 8.3. In Sect. 8.4, I address what I believe is the central flaw in 
Hegel’s interpretation of Kant, one by means of which Hegel helps 
himself to reading the productive imagination as Reason itself, in 
clear contrast to Kant’s own view of the imagination as “an effect of 
the understanding on sensibility” (B152; emphasis added). But first, I 
recount Hegel’s more general grounds for his critique of Kant as a type 
of ‘uncritical’ reflection philosophy (Sect. 8.2).
8.2  Critique of Reflection Philosophy
In Faith and Knowledge, Hegel criticises what he calls ‘reflection phi-
losophy’—of which, Hegel claims, Kant’s philosophy is a typical rep-
resentative—for relinquishing the primary goal of philosophy, namely 
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thinking “the Absolute”, for instead advancing the idea that “Reason 
should renounce its existence [ihr Sein] in the Absolute” (GuW, 4:316/FK, 
56). Hegel criticises Kant for resting content with the limited role of 
Reason as the mere empty form of the empirical and for arguing that 
Reason, in the guise of the understanding, “receives its content” (GuW, 
4:319/FK, 60) only from the opposite at which it is directed, namely 
empirical content (GuW, 4:321) or “empirical reality” (GuW, 4:320/FK, 
61). Further, Hegel finds it hugely problematic that in Kant’s view 
empirical content is considered absolute (GuW, 4:318–319), that is, 
taken for granted as the yardstick by which everything should be meas-
ured. Kant’s idea that conceptual claims about reality can be legitimated 
only if they have a basis in empirical experience is regarded by Hegel as 
wholly antithetical to what genuine philosophy should be aspiring to. It 
is the reason why Hegel criticises Kant’s philosophy for basically being 
a form of “philosophical empiricism” (wissenschaftlichen Empirismus) 
(GuW, 4:321/FK, 63).
Furthermore, for Kant, as Hegel rightly establishes, conceptuality 
and empirical content are connected only insofar as the formal nature 
of the understanding relies on external material content in the case of 
knowledge; that is, conceptual form and material content are combined 
only in terms of their “relative identity” (GuW, 4:320/FK, 61; emphasis 
added), and not conceived of in their “absolute identity” (GuW, 4:325/
FK, 68; emphasis added), whereby concept and content are no longer 
absolutely opposed but genuinely thought in their true rational rela-
tion, even if they cannot be reduced to each other. This is an impor-
tant aspect of Hegel’s critique, which says that Kant is not sufficiently 
consistent in his reflection on the relation between the various linked 
elements in cognition. Hegel speaks of a lack of “reflection on the 
opposition” (Reflexion auf die Entgegensetzung) (GuW, 4:320/FK, 62) 
in Kant, which means that the form of conceptuality, “unity”, and the 
content of the “manifold” (GuW, 4:320/FK, 62) are not thought in 
their reciprocal relation. That is to say, the opposition itself between the 
opposite terms is not thought objectively, so that the manifold is seen 
as the negative of conceptuality and at the same time  conceptuality is 
seen as the negative of the manifold.6 Instead, the opposition is taken 
absolutely, as if it were pre-given (Hegel refers to this as “the stake 
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[Pfahl ] of the absolute antithesis”; GuW, 4:323/FK, 65), so that unity 
of the concept and the empirical manifold “confront one another as 
abstractions” (GuW 4:320/FK, 62). What Hegel means by this is that 
the form of the concept and the matter of the empirical manifold are in 
fact considered, by Kant, to be merely formal, secondary, abstractions of 
the unity that they necessarily form in cognition, a unity that, according 
to Hegel’s reading of Kant, they always already form. The abstractness of 
reflective considerations of the relation between unity and manifold is 
put thusly by Hegel:
[T]he manifold gets determined by the unity […] just as the emptiness of 
identity gets plenished by the manifold […]. Whether active or passive, 
each supervenes to the other in a formal way, as something alien. This 
formal cognition only brings about impoverished identities, and allows the 
antithesis to persist in its complete absoluteness. (GuW, 4:344/FK, 94)
This abstractness is a direct consequence of the mode in which reflec-
tion philosophy operates, namely by way of a reflective approach, 
which starts from a formal point of view—“a fixed Ego-point” ( fixen 
Punkts der Egoität) (GuW 4:332/FK, 77)—and seeks to combine its 
own formality (its forms and procedures) with a content that comes 
from outside it, from what is real (and not formal). The formal point 
of view is the point of view of the understanding as “the principle of 
opposition” (GuW, 4:334/FK, 79), which seeks to unite with external 
content, with which it never really coalesces. Such a formal perspective 
mutatis mutandis translates to all topics that reflection philosophy con-
cerns itself with, regardless of whether it involves issues of theoretical 
or practical philosophy. This issues, as Hegel puts it, in a principle of 
“the absoluteness of finitude and, resulting from it, the absolute antith-
esis of finitude and infinity, reality and ideality, the sensuous and the 
supersensuous, and the beyondness of what is truly real and absolute” 
(GuW, 4:321/FK, 62; emphasis added). Indeed reflection philosophy, 
because of its formal starting point issuing in the hypostatisation of 
the antithesis, ipso facto fails to attain knowledge of what philosophy 
aims to be about: the Absolute, infinity, the truly real, that is, what is 
beyond mere belief and finite cognition and what is truly, uncondition-
ally, the case in reality.
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This, then, is the main characteristic of reflection philosophy: it 
remains stuck in its reflective oppositions (mind/world, form/content, 
a priori/a posteriori, subject/object, unity/manifold, reality/ideality, 
finitude/infinity, etc.), while failing to reflect on these reflective oppo-
sitions, to take these oppositions into account as unreflected assump-
tions (insofar as their putative absoluteness is concerned). Paradoxically, 
Hegel in fact accuses reflection philosophy, including Kant’s, of a deter-
minate lack of reflection, precisely by taking the reflective starting point 
absolutely, as an unproblematic assumption. The result of this is relativ-
ism, subjectivism, psychologism, and an idealism that has not thought 
through its own reflective constructions and its own theoretical assump-
tions, instead absolutises these presupposed oppositions, issuing in a 
dogmatic philosophical dualism, which is unable to achieve what it is 
striving for: knowledge of what is truly real, without it being uncriti-
cally constrained by any unreflected assumption or presupposition. The 
main problem with reflection philosophy, including Kant’s, thus is 
its pervasive dualist outlook and the relativism or scepticism that this 
results in.
But especially in light of Kant’s notion of the synthetic a 
priori—Hegel’s appreciation of which will be addressed more in detail 
below—the dualism characteristic of reflection philosophy that one 
encounters in TD7 is internally inconsistent: for if conceptuality rests 
basically on an a priori synthesis, as Kant argues, “it surely contains 
determinateness and differentiation [Unterschied ] within itself ” (WL, 
12:23/SL, 520; emphasis added) and, since determination is first estab-
lished by means of a priori synthesis, determinateness—and thus the 
determinate difference or antithesis between form and content—is not 
provided by the sensible manifold, by content, externally, but is inter-
nal to a priori synthesis. It might seem that Hegel has a point that 
even if it is the case that the manifold is external to the concept, then 
its externality, and thus its distinction from the concept, is something 
that can only be determined from within the concept. To put this dif-
ferently, “differentiation is an equally essential moment of the concept” 
(WL, 12:22/SL, 519). Material content and “empty reflective identity” 
or “abstract universality” are not opposed to each other in the sense that 
they are really external to each other and “intrinsically separate” (an und 
für sich getrennt) (WL, 12:22/SL, 519–520).
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This is a conceptualist argument also often used by Kantians in 
fending off nonconceptualist readings of the relation between intui-
tion and concept (see Schulting 2016b). But of course, saying that the 
distinction between intuition and concept can only be determined 
within the perspective of conceptuality if conceptuality is the necessary 
condition of determination, as it is on Kant’s account, does not imply 
that intuition itself is conceptual, nor does it imply that intuition 
and concept are always coextensive (and intrinsically inseparable). 
This would appear to undercut any strong criticism of so-called 
dualist positions in reflection philosophy, specifically of what Hegel 
calls Kant’s “psychological reflex” (WL, 12:22/SL, 520) of seeing 
conceptuality as constrained by sensibility; Hegel appears to want 
to conflate conceptuality and intuition, to the extent that intuition is 
not just necessarily combined with conceptuality insofar as cognitive 
claims (made by the understanding) about objects are made, but is in 
fact necessarily conjoined with conceptuality simpliciter, regardless 
of the question whether the understanding makes actual claims about 
objects. Hegel sees Kant’s cognitive constraint, which can be expressed 
by the modal claim M*,8 discussed in Chap. 5, purely as the result of 
the aforementioned “psychological reflex” of a formal epistemological 
standpoint. But the result of such a strongly conceptualist critique of 
Kant’s epistemological modesty is that the absolute distinction that 
Kant carefully made between the forms of conceptuality and the forms 
of sensibility, in the context of a critique of the rationalists’ conceptual 
idealism, threatens to be blurred.9
8.3  Subjectivism and Kant’s Putative 
“Psychological Idealism”
As a result of Kant’s “reflective” bias, made manifest by his choice for a 
discursive type of logic, there is an emphasis, according to Hegel, on the 
purity of the concept, which consequently relies on empirical content 
to acquire meaning: Hegel speaks of the concept’s “emptiness [Leerheit] 
[which] gets its content and dimensions quite exclusively [schlechthin 
nur] in, and hence through, its connection with the empirical” 
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(GuW, 4:321/FK, 63; cf. GuW, 4:344). And because of this, Hegel 
believes, Kant’s idealism about objects (see Chap. 4) is nothing but a 
“completion and idealization of [Lockean] empirical psychology”, for 
which the highest standpoint is that of the subject’s viewpoint (GuW, 
4:322/FK, 63; cf. GuW, 4:326). On this view, the Kantian thesis about 
the objectivity of objects, the main claim of TD, does not establish 
the truth about the very things that exist in the world (as things in 
themselves), but is merely about the way in which we, as cognising 
subjects, take objects to be, how they appear to us as finite human 
beings, not how things are essentially. Hence, Kant’s idealism is merely 
a subjective idealism, “a subjective (banal) idealism” (Enz, 8:123/Enc, 
91), an “idealism of the finite” (GuW, 4:322/FK, 64), which ultimately 
takes the form of a scepticism, and hence is not the true, objective 
idealism that thinks the opposition of finite and infinite, of the sensuous 
and the supersensuous, of mind and world, thereby thinking their 
true unity, and thus true or “authentic reality” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 68). 
Hegel sometimes puts this in terms of a “middle term” that is lacking in 
reflection philosophy, whereby each of two extremes are nullified, come 
to nothing, in their very opposition or antithesis: it is this nullification as 
opposites which constitutes what Hegel calls the Absolute or absolute 
identity (GuW, 4:344, et passim). This “middle term” is lacking in 
reflective thought, which merely thinks in abstract oppositions (finite/
infinite, form/content, subject/object, etc.), and does not think the 
reciprocal mediation of the opposite terms.
It is clear that the premise of Hegel’s critique of Kant is the possi-
bility of thinking the absolute identity of the finite and the infinite, of 
the empirical manifold and the concept. Hegel dismisses Kant’s abso-
lute distinction between intuition and concept out of hand. This would 
appear to be begging the question against Kantian premises, as a result 
of which Hegel’s critique seems to be misdirected from the get-go. It 
would of course be fair to say that Hegel rightly criticises Kant for just 
accepting that human reason should be directed to the empirical, and 
that anything that is not measured by a possible empirical application 
amounts to empty sloganeering if one disagrees with Kant’s assertion 
that conceptual claims must have a basis in empirical reality, otherwise 
they lack real validity. It does seem, at first sight at least, that Hegel is 
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right to believe that in Kant’s hands philosophy is but an uncritical “cul-
ture of reflection raised to a system” (GuW, 4:322/FK, 64), nothing 
more than a common sense philosophy in fact (GuW, 4:322), whereby 
“genuine” (wahre) (GuW, 4:325) philosophy in terms of a philosophy 
that has the idea of “absolute objectivity” as its central topic is degraded 
as “empty musing” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 67); absolute objectivity or iden-
tity is, for Kant, at most a “postulate never to be realized” (GuW, 4:325/
FK, 68). And for Hegel, such a metaphilosophical stance smacks of an 
at heart anti-philosophical philosophy.
For Hegel, philosophy should rather start with, and have as its 
singular content, the idea of absolute objectivity—the idea that 
expresses the absolute “sublatedness of the antithesis” (das absolute 
Aufgehobensein des Gegensatzes) or “absolute identity”, which is the 
“only authentic reality” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 68; trans. emended)—not 
end with it as a mere postulate, as Kant does. What is meant by this 
is that it would be odd to assume that, for example, the distinction 
between mind and world, between subject and object, is a pre-
philosophical irreducible and absolute given; that would be uncritical 
from a purely philosophical point of view. Hegel accuses Kant of just 
such an uncritical assumption of a pre-philosophical given. The “only 
authentic reality” of which Hegel speaks is therefore not the truly true 
world outside the mind, but reality that no longer knows an absolute 
distinction between mind and world, a reality where mind is no longer 
external to the world, but also a reality where the world is no longer 
external to the mind. Hence, Hegel speaks of an “absolute identity of 
thought and being” (GuW, 4:345/FK, 94). Hegel’s view of idealism is 
one of a realism sans phrase, where neither mind nor world are reduced 
to each other.
By contrast, Kant’s Critical view requires an externally given, 
based on the fact that the logic to which Kant’s thinking is indebted 
is discursive, demanding a strict separation of two irreducible stems of 
knowledge (A15/B29), which must be combined only for the purposes 
of acquiring knowledge (A51–2/B75–6). Hegel criticises Kant’s reliance 
on sensations given in the empirical manifold in intuition as the only 
true means by which we have direct access to reality, i.e. to the things in 
themselves that affect us (cf. B182/A143). This givenness of sensations, 
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as the means to have access to reality, is never explained by Kant, but 
just assumed as a fact—Hegel calls it something “incomprehensible” 
(GuW, 4:332/FK, 76) in Kant’s system of thought, something that 
is not accounted for. However, the assumption of the givenness of 
sensations and their relation to reality does not imply that Kant 
assumes—as Hegel has us believe—that there is an absolute distinction 
between mind and world, which cannot be bridged. The distinction 
between a formal ‘I think’ and a material given content (see further 
below, Sect. 8.4) might be read as such, but does in fact not support the 
metaphysical position that says that mind and world are distinguished 
in an absolute sense. Such a position would moreover conflict with 
Kant’s restriction thesis about the possibility of cognition of absolute 
truths. We have no insight into the truth about things in themselves, 
hence we cannot posit an absolute distinction between mind and world, 
as this would suggest that we do have insight into the truth about a 
relation between things in themselves.
It is with the above-sketched view that Hegel reads Kant. A very 
different general conception of philosophy than Kant’s thus lies at the 
root of Hegel’s critique of Kant. Yet Hegel believes that his critique of 
Kant is, at least to some extent, internal to Kant’s thought itself. The 
germ of this idea Hegel finds in Kant’s adage that “neither the concept 
in isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all; [and] that 
intuition by itself is blind and the concept by itself is empty” (GuW, 
4:326/FK, 68; cf. A51/B75). Here, Kant shows that only when 
both concept and intuition are connected with each other a form of 
objectivity, an identity between thought and being, is achieved. But the 
fact that Kant identifies this identity in consciousness, that is, in human 
experience, and does not qualify it in terms of a “rational cognition” 
(vernünftige Erkenntnis) (GuW, 4:326/FK, 68), means, according to 
Hegel, that Kant does not follow through on the promise of advancing 
the idea of absolute identity and absolute cognition (Erkennen des 
Absoluten) (GuW, 4:326/FK, 68), and thus “it falls back into absolute 
finitude and subjectivity” (GuW, 4:326/FK, 68). The identity here, 
the identity between concept (as the form of thought) and intuition 
(as the form of reality), is merely a “finite identity” (GuW, 4:326/
FK, 68), namely only to the extent that human, empirical cognition is 
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concerned. But Hegel thinks that this step is unwarranted on Kant’s 
own premises. This is the bad subjectivism that Hegel laments in Kant, 
namely, the ‘mere’ subjectivism that rests content with the finite identity 
of its cognition of empirical objects, and conflicts with the putative true 
speculative side of Kant’s thought (more on this later, in Sect. 8.4).
And therefore, in Hegel’s view, Kant’s transcendental idealism is 
in effect nothing but a “psychological idealism” (GuW, 4:331/FK, 
75), by which Hegel means that, importantly, the categories are “only 
determinations derived from self-consciousness” (WL, 12:22–23/
SL, 520), but are not determinations of, or instantiated in, the things 
in themselves. The relation between the subjective and the objective is 
just two different sides “of my subjective viewpoint” (meines subjektiven 
Betrachtens) (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76).10 The immediate problem with such 
a formal, merely subjective viewpoint—Kant’s alleged “psychological 
idealism” (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76)—is that the identity of the formal 
subject “finds itself immediately confronted by or next to an infinite 
non-identity, with which it must coalesce in some incomprehensible 
way” (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76). This “confrontation” concerns the 
subject’s relation to things in themselves via, and only via, the subject’s 
sensations. It is only by means of an act of determination, by the 
subject, of these sensations, which are encountered in inner sense, 
that the objects of our empirical cognition get their objective form 
(this occurs by means of the categories of quality: reality, negation, 
limitation).11 The objectivity is, as it were, imposed on the things that 
we encounter by virtue merely of our sensibility, and only on their 
subjective appearance, in sensibility. The “realm” of things in themselves 
itself, apart from the good services of the determining subject, which 
applies categories to sensible content in intuition, i.e. “[o]nce it is 
abandoned by the categories, […] cannot be anything but a formless 
lump” (GuW, 4:332/FK, 76); on Kant’s account, the realm of things 
in themselves is in effect nothing but “an infinity of sensations” (GuW, 
4:332/FK, 76). The manifold of sensibility, empirical consciousness, 
sensations, are all in themselves something “unintegrated” 
(Unverbundenes) (GuW, 4:330/FK, 74), and since sensibility is our only 
mode of access to things in themselves, if sensibility is not determined 
by the understanding, things in themselves have no determinacy either.
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On Kant’s view, then, “the world is in itself falling to pieces”, which 
is only first given substantiality and objective coherence, even possibil-
ity and actuality, by the subject (GuW, 4:330/FK, 74). That even pos-
sibility (meant here is what Kant calls real possibility) and actuality are 
provided by the subject is only half true, for Kant makes a distinction 
between existence as given with things in themselves, and the determi-
nation of existence by means of the category of existence (see the discus-
sion in Chap. 9): the subject by no means provides the modal condition 
for the existence simpliciter of things (cf. A92/B125). Yet, in Hegel’s 
eyes, Kantian objective determination is solely and necessarily a deter-
mination projected by the human being (welche der Mensch hin-sieht, 
und hinauswirft) (GuW, 4:330) on the world and as such is unable to 
remove the antithesis between it and the things in themselves:
Objective determinateness and its forms first come in with the 
connection between them [the Ego and thing-in-itself ]; […] the thing in 
itself becomes object insofar as it obtains from the active subject some 
determination […]. Apart from this they are completely heterogeneous. 
(GuW, 4:331/FK, 75)
In this way, the objectivity of the categories, and their necessity, 
becomes something contingent and subjective again, for it does not 
determine things in themselves as such, but only from the perspective 
of subjective experience, as appearances.12 The knowledge about objects 
established by the understanding is not true knowledge of how things 
truly are. Notwithstanding the objective determination of objects that 
the understanding establishes by means of the categories, we remain 
fully incognisant of the true nature of objects, namely, as things in 
themselves. Or as Jacobi put it, “all our so-called knowledge is nothing 
but the organization of our ignorance” (as quoted by Harris 1977:15).
Hegel thus charges Kant’s idealism with restricting our knowledge to 
appearances, and hence precluding genuine, real knowledge of things in 
themselves. In fact, Hegel accuses Kant of a contradiction: it does not 
stand to reason to say, on the one hand, that the forms of  knowledge 
(the categories), by means of the original-synthetic unity of appercep-
tion, first establish the very objectivity of objects (the claim of B137 
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in the Critique), and then, on the other, to deny that those forms are 
instantiated by the objects whose essence is defined by them (WL, 
12:24), and instead apply to the subject’s own manifold of  sensations 
only. But it seems that Hegel here just conflates the conditions for 
the objectivity of objects (of knowledge) and the conditions for the 
 existence of objects, what makes objects things that have an existence 
independent of our knowledge of them (cf. the discussion in Chap. 4, 
Sect. 4.10). In Chap. 9, it shall be argued that what makes objects 
objects is not the same as what makes things things.
Strikingly, Hegel reasons that if what is determined by the 
understanding is only appearance, then the understanding itself can also 
only be appearance, and is nothing in itself:
The things, as they are cognized by the intellect, are only appearances. 
They are nothing in themselves, which is a perfectly truthful result. The 
obvious conclusion, however, is that an intellect which has cognizance only of 
appearances and of nothing in itself, is itself only appearance and is nothing 
in itself. But, on the contrary, Kant regards discursive intellect, with this 
sort of cognition, as in itself and absolute. Cognition of appearances is 
dogmatically regarded as the only kind of cognition there is, and rational 
cognition [Vernunfterkenntnis] is denied. If the forms through which 
the object exists are nothing in themselves, they must also be nothing in 
themselves for cognitive Reason [erkennende Vernunft]. Yet Kant never  
seems to have had the slightest doubt that the intellect is the absolute of the  
human spirit. The intellect is (for him) the absolute immovable [ fixierte], 
insuperable finitude of human Reason. (GuW 4:332–333/FK, 77)
The italicised sentence exhibits a strange inference: why would 
the fact that what we know by means of the understanding is only 
appearance and not knowledge of things in themselves, imply that the 
understanding is itself just an appearance, thereby undermining Kant’s 
claim that what we know by means of the understanding is absolute, 
“fixed”? The apparent contradiction here is: what determines something 
only as appearance (Erscheinung) and not an sich, cannot itself be 
said to be an an sich, hence is itself nothing but illusion (Schein), and 
merely subjectively valid. But, apart from the fact that Kant clearly 
distinguishes between Erscheinung and Schein (cf. B69–70), Kant 
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never says that what the understanding determines is absolute, or that 
the understanding is itself absolute. Rather, we can determine that we 
only know appearances, precisely because we must determine from the 
limited perspective of the understanding—reason has no immediate 
insight into reality. Kant’s reasoning is internally consistent, because 
on account of the Copernican hypothesis we can only determine a 
priori of things what we have put into things beforehand (Bxviii). 
This has got nothing to do with a dogmatic assertion about the scope 
of our cognition, but instead shows a modesty regarding the reach 
of the understanding (and of reason). Surely, one cannot interpret 
modesty as itself dogmatic (see Ameriks 2000:288–291), which is what 
Hegelians often argue, nor must an insight regarding our limitations by 
implication amount to a limited, merely subjective and thus not a true 
or objectively valid, perspective, or worse, be mere Schein. Of course, 
from the Hegelian perspective of the Absolute, what the understanding 
determines is mere appearance, but this perspective begs the question 
against Kant.13
In the Science of Logic (WL, 12:17ff.), Hegel is more forthcoming 
about why he thinks that Kant’s conclusion that categorial knowledge 
is not about things in themselves is contradictory. In Hegel’s reasoning, 
the object in the intuition is still something “external, alien”, a mere 
“appearance” (WL, 12:18/SL, 516), which through thought is being 
changed into a Gesetztsein, a thing that is no longer just something that 
presents itself in its immediacy, but is something posited, by reason, as 
being a thing, an object. Although the object has An-und-fürsichsein 
already inchoately in intuition, it is only really an und für sich if it is 
so apprehended in thought. When the object is indeed apprehended in 
thought, in Hegel’s view, it is no longer an Erscheinung, but genuinely 
a thing in itself that is also grasped as such by thought, something-
in-and-for-itself. Its genuine An-und-fürsichsein is its objectivity 
for thought. Hegel thus has an entirely different understanding of 
Erscheinung than Kant, even though he presents it as in line with the 
essence at least of Kant’s own view in TD. In Kant’s view, however, 
clearly an Erscheinung does not get suddenly changed into a thing in 
itself, when it is determined by the categories of the understanding. 
This explains to a large extent why Hegel thinks Kant’s idealism is a 
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defective, merely “psychological” idealism, but also, and by the same 
token, why Hegel is mistaken about a central plank of Kant’s idealism 
about objects.
8.4  Distinguishing Between the “Empty ‘I’” 
and the “True ‘I’”: The Clue to Hegel’s 
Misreading of TD
Despite Hegel’s general dismissiveness about Kant having “decided 
without reservation for appearance” (GuW, 4:341/FK, 90), which 
shows his idealism to be “psychological” at heart, and that, in Kant’s 
reflection philosophy, “the highest Idea [is] corrupted with full 
consciousness”, Hegel nonetheless does believe there to be a “truly 
speculative” side to Kant’s philosophy (GuW, 4:343/FK, 92). This “truly 
speculative aspect of Kant’s philosophy” (GuW, 4:343/FK, 92) concerns 
his notion of the productive or transcendental imagination. Hegel 
writes:
[W]e must […] place Kant’s merit […] in his having put the Idea of 
authentic a priority in the form of transcendental imagination; and 
also in his having put the beginning of the Idea of Reason in the intel-
lect itself. For he regarded thinking, or the form, not as something sub-
jective, but as something in itself; not as something formless, not as 
empty apperception, but as intellect, as true form, namely as triplicity 
[Triplizität]. The germ of speculation [Keim des Spekulativen] lies in this  
triplicity alone. For the root judgment [ursprüngliches Urteil ], or duality, 
is in it as well, and hence the very possibility of a posteriority, which in 
this way ceases to be absolutely opposed to the a priori, while the a priori, 
for this reason, also ceases to be formal identity. We will touch later on 
the still purer Idea of an intellect that is at the same time a posteriori, the 
Idea of an intuitive intellect as the absolute middle. (GuW, 4:334–335/
FK, 79–80)
Apart from the imagination, there are two additional key terms that 
Hegel mentions here, which display the “germ of speculation” in the 
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argument of TD: Triplizität and the intuitive intellect. Though highly 
interesting and extremely relevant to an understanding of Hegel’s own 
project and his relation to Kant, I shall not be able to discuss the latter, 
as this would require a deeper analysis than I have space for here; the 
role and significance of the intuitive intellect in Hegel’s understanding 
of Kant is also not undisputed.14 At any rate, from the text of Faith 
and Knowledge it is evident that, one way or the other, like Schelling 
the early Hegel takes inspiration from Kant’s discussion of the 
intuitive intellect in §§76–77 of the Third Critique, which he takes 
as confirmation of his reading of Kant’s arguments in TD about the 
productive imagination as the original-synthetic unity.
Here, I shall concentrate on his notion of triplicity (Triplizität). 
What Hegel singles out for special status in Kant’s account in TD is the 
notion of the “original synthetic unity of apperception” (GuW, 4:327/
FK, 69), or the “original identity of self-consciousness” (GuW, 4:328/
FK, 71) (cf. B131–6), which Hegel identifies with the transcendental 
imagination. This original-synthetic unity is an important idea “because 
of its two-sidedness, the opposites being absolutely one in it” (GuW, 
4:328/FK, 71). This, then, is what the notion of triplicity conveys: an 
original unity or identity in which opposites are primordially united 
and, importantly, within which they are also first differentiable; indeed, 
triplicity is reflected by Kant’s central idea of the synthetic a priori of 
concept and intuition.
As Kant indeed argues in §15 of the B-Deduction,15 the  original- 
synthetic unity of apperception is not a synthetic unity that is an 
a posteriori aggregated unity, a unity of “an aggregate of  manifolds 
which are first picked up” by a unifying subject, but, as Hegel argues, 
a “true synthetic unity or rational identity”, i.e. “that identity which 
is the connecting of the manifold with the empty identity, the Ego”, 
or “the concept”. From this original-synthetic unity, “the Ego  as 
thinking subject” and “the manifold as body and world first detach 
 themselves”. The productive imagination or the original-synthetic unity 
of apperception should not be seen as a “middle term” (Mittelbegriff ) 
which is positioned between, on the one hand, “an existing absolute” 
but empty formal ‘I’ of the subject of understanding, and, on the other, 
the “difference” of the manifold in intuition, i.e. “an absolute existing 
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world”. Rather, the productive imagination lies at the root of both the 
formal subject of understanding and the world of objects (GuW, 4:328–
329/FK, 71, 73).
Here, then, lies the clue to Hegel’s reading of Kant’s notion of the 
synthetic a priori, while simultaneously suggesting that it is Kant’s 
most speculative idea, showing the reality of absolute objectivity, and 
claiming that it provides an internal critique of Kant. This last aspect 
concerns the alleged fact that while Kant introduces the speculative 
idea, in the form of the original-synthetic unity of apperception, 
he does not himself adhere to it, for he reallocates this speculative 
principle to the mere understanding—that is, “he expresse[s] [the Idea] 
and [subsequently] consciously destroy[s] it again” (GuW, 4:335/
FK, 80). The clue is the distinction that Hegel makes between, on the 
one hand, a so-called “empty identity”, or “formal identity”, or the 
“abstract Ego”, and, on the other, “the true Ego”, which is an “absolute, 
original synthetic identity, which is the principle” (all quotations 
from GuW, 4:328, 331/FK, 71–72, 75), namely, the principle of 
original-synthetic unity of apperception.16 Significantly, Hegel says 
that TD cannot be understood unless one distinguishes between the 
representing (accompanying) ‘I’ (Kant’s ‘I think’), which is the subject 
of thought, from the original-synthetic unity of apperception, that is, 
the productive imagination, between the “empty Ego” and the “true 
Ego”. What licenses Hegel to make a distinction between these two 
‘Ego’s? And what is the connection with the notion of productive or 
transcendental imagination?
Hegel wants to argue that the transcendental imagination, which 
according to him is the “true ‘I’”, or the original-synthetic identity, is 
not the understanding, or the reflecting or judging or accompanying 
‘I’, or judgement. For, as Hegel argues, the understanding, the reflect-
ing ‘I’ and judgement first appear as one of the opposites that are origi-
nally united in the original-synthetic unity. The original-synthetic unity 
is present in both opposites respectively, in the understanding, which 
is the reflecting subject, as well as “immersed”, undifferentiated, in the 
manifold of intuition (GuW, 4:327/FK, 70). However, it is, logically, 
not present as the absolute identity of opposites, but merely as a rela-
tive identity, either implicitly, as in the sensible manifold, or explicitly, 
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as in the understanding, which differentiates itself from the manifold, 
or even more so in judgement, which shows that opposition literally, 
namely in the way predicates and subjects are visibly divorced (S is P).17 
Whereas in the sensible manifold neither the relative difference nor the 
relative identity between it and the form of the understanding come to 
the fore—in it, “identity is completely identical with the difference just 
as it is in the magnet” (GuW, 4:327/FK, 70)—in the understanding 
a relative identity, and thus a relative difference, with the manifold in 
intuition is made explicit, by the manner in which the understanding or 
conceptuality places itself over against empirical content or sensibility. 
This “placing itself over against” marks out discursive (Kantian) concep-
tuality essentially; it shows the dualism inherent to discursive conceptu-
ality. Hegel writes:
[T]he synthetic unity is only concept because it binds the difference in 
such a way that it also steps outside of it, and faces it in relative antithesis. 
In isolation the pure concept is the empty identity. It is only as being 
relatively identical with that which it stands against, that it is concept. 
(GuW, 4:328/FK, 70).
Hegel takes Kant at his word that through the accompanying ‘I’ 
no manifold is given (B135), hence it is an “empty ‘I’”. Since it is 
merely formal, the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ is dependent on a manifold of 
representations for thought content. But he also takes Kant to mean 
that the “empty ‘I’” first arises out of the absolute identity with the 
manifold, so that the differentiation between the formal, empty ‘I’ 
and the manifold is secondary with respect to the original-synthetic 
unity, the absolute identity, which alone is the “true I”—which, in 
Hegel’s understanding, makes the formal, empty, accompanying ‘I’ a 
derivative ‘I’, compared to the original-synthetic unity of appercep-
tion. But this just begs the question against Kant, who argues, quite 
clearly, in §16 of the B-Deduction, that the accompanying ‘I’ of the 
‘I think’ of  self-consciousness is the non-derivative original ‘I’ of the 
identity of  self-consciousness, which is grounded in an original act 
of a priori synthesis (for extensive discussion, see Schulting 2012, 
esp. Chap. 6). The fact that the act of accompanying is grounded 
8.4 Distinguishing Between the “Empty ‘I’” and the “True ‘I’” …     359
Fo
r S
ch
lar
ly 
Pu
rp
os
e
 O
ly
360     8 On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Subjectivism …
in the a priori synthesis does not license a sharp separation between 
the two, in the way that Hegel suggests, namely, that the one empty 
‘I’ of the understanding is derivative of and secondary to the true ‘I’ of 
the transcendental imagination (i.e. the original-synthetic unity). The 
grounding is a logical grounding, which means that for every act of 
accompanying her representations by a reflective ‘I’, there is an instance 
of a priori synthesis, and, reciprocally, every instance of a priori synthe-
sis ipso facto entails an act of accompanying. The analytic unity of the ‘I 
think’ accompanying her representations is “rigorously coextensive”, as 
I put it in Schulting (2012), with a priori synthesis (see B133–4). This 
means that no a priori synthesis fails to result in an act of accompanying 
by the ‘I think’, and no act of such accompanying is not grounded in 
an a priori synthesis. For the ‘I think’ and original-synthetic appercep-
tion reduce to the same act of self-conscious thinking, for every actual 
instance of self-consciousness, that is, in Kant’s account, every actual 
instance of judgement. There is nothing in Kant’s account that suggests 
that the understanding, or judgement, or the accompanying ‘I think’ is 
not the original apperception, which is an original a priori act of synthe-
sis or an original-synthetic unity.
I cannot here rehearse the very complicated story of Kant’s view of 
original, transcendental self-consciousness, but the prising apart of 
the ‘I’ that accompanies her representations from the original self-
consciousness, as Hegel does, is at any rate not at all warranted. Not only 
is it not warranted, but it also makes it hard to understand how Hegel’s 
reading comports with Kant’s emphatic notion of self-consciousness 
as having to do with an act of spontaneity: it appears that Hegel wants 
to divorce the idea of the original-synthetic unity or identity from any 
kind of activity on the part of the thinking subject, indeed from the ‘I’ 
that accompanies her representations (this seems similar to McDowell, 
as I suggested in Chap. 5). For Kant, the original-synthetic unity 
between subject and object, between the form of our thinking and the 
material content in sensibility is not a given, primordial identity, even 
if an a priori one, but something that needs to be established in an 
act of understanding, by a subject aware of her act of accompanying, 
and combining, her representations as her own, for every occurrent 
cognition.
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Hegel accuses Kant of both, contradictorily, arguing that the original-
synthetic unity lies at the root of every possible combination of oppo-
sites (understanding and sensibility) and assuming that the very faculty 
that establishes this original-synthetic unity is also opposed to that which 
it unites, in other words, is also one of the opposites in the combination. In 
other words, that which unites opposites cannot itself be a component 
in that unity, namely, one of the opposites. This charge is the nub of 
Hegel’s claim that Kant’s account is internally contradictory, or at least 
not true to its most speculatively promising insight. But the alleged 
contradiction arises only because Hegel distinguishes sharply between 
the empty ‘I’ and the true ‘I’, where only the latter is the unity of oppo-
sites, and the former is merely one of the opposites. Hegel’s criticism 
thus begs the question against Kant’s claim that the understanding, by 
means of the productive imagination in sensibility (cf. B151–2), is itself 
the original-synthetic unity of apperception.
By virtue of a misapprehension of the merely formal distinction 
between the accompanying ‘I think’, i.e. the ‘I’ expressing the analytical 
unity of apperception, and the true ‘I’ of the original-synthetic unity of 
apperception, Hegel unjustifiably prises apart the productive imagina-
tion and the understanding, and thereby subtly shifts the idea of a priori 
synthesis—as that which, from a formal perspective, combines material 
content (as in Kant)—to an idea of a priori synthesis that a priori com-
bines form and material content simpliciter, i.e. absolutely. In the latter 
perspective, form can then no longer be seen as outside the a priori com-
bination between form and content, because it is itself part of the com-
bination. It would then be inconsistent for Kant, as Hegel argues, to 
hold that material content must be pre-given, that is, must be provided 
from outside form or the formal perspective of the combining subject 
of the understanding. Material content and form of thought are always 
already conjoined. But if the claim of unity in a manifold of representa-
tions in intuition is conditional, namely, insofar as the manifold is united 
by an act of the understanding, is there a unity in the manifold in intui-
tion, then there is no inconsistency in Kant’s argument in the way that 
Hegel claims. And indeed the inconsistency charge does not hold up, 
because for Kant the original-synthetic unity is never a unity between 
form and matter, mind and world, simpliciter or unconditionally. Only 
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insofar as content is a priori determined, by means of the binding capac-
ity of the understanding by virtue of the imagination, is there a unity 
between form and content, sensibility and understanding (see Schulting 
2016b). By contrast, Hegel believes this binding force, i.e. the orig-
inal-synthetic unity of apperception, to be present already in sensibil-
ity tout court in an inchoate form, implicitly, and only subsequently 
made explicit in the understanding and judgement—this is similar to 
McDowell’s reasoning that the conceptual capacities are already opera-
tive in sensibility but do not necessarily figure in discursive activity or 
in judgement (see the account of McDowell’s position in Chap. 5). For 
Hegel, as for McDowell, the actualisation of conceptual capacities that 
originally bind form and content is not due to the understanding, or 
due to an act of judgement, even if it is or can (and must) be made 
explicit in judgement in order for a conceptual cognition to arise out of 
it. That which is responsible for such an actualisation in sensibility is, 
according to Hegel, purely and only the productive imagination.
It is clear that Hegel regards pure intuition and pure concepts 
as abstract, and empty forms, which do not have an independent 
being. It is not the case, in his view, that the dualism of manifold and 
understanding, the antithesis, must be seen as primordial. The mani-
fold does not exist independently of the principle of synthetic unity, 
Hegel says (GuW, 4:328). This excludes the possibility of essentially 
nonconceptual content, content that is not always already conjoined 
with conceptual form, even if only rudimentarily. There is no reality 
outside conceptual form, which the latter must in some conceptu-
ally incomprehensible sense be applied to. Also in the Greater Logic 
(WL, 12:20–22), Hegel argues that Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
mistakenly assumes an absolute opposition between the form of 
thought and material content, which should provide reality to the con-
cept, as if this content as our access to reality were independently and 
beforehand available or present—this is in conformity with how Hegel 
interprets Kant’s putative view that reality cannot be “conjur[ed] out 
of ” (heraus zu klauben) (GuW, 4:325/FK, 67) concepts, alluding to 
Kant’s critique of the ontological proof of God’s existence (Kant indeed 
uses the term ausklauben at A603/B631). The stuff of sensibility or 
sensible content is not what “must be validated as the real in contrast 
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to the concept”, Hegel says (WL, 12:21/SL, 518).18 But Kant does of 
course not presuppose that objective reality is given outside  determinate 
conceptuality. He does assume that objective reality is given (from the 
empirical perspective), even if this assumption is not thereby already 
philosophically justified (see the argument in Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2); yet 
he also argues that objective reality is necessarily grounded on  certain 
conditions of possibility insofar as what is given is conceptually 
determined as objectively real (from the transcendental perspective). 
Sensibility, for Kant, is not the real, but merely refers to it, insofar as 
its material aspect is concerned, not insofar as its constitutive form is 
concerned (which is dependent on the understanding, and the forms of 
intuition, space and time). But of course, it cannot be denied that there 
remains an unbridgeable disparity between Kant’s and Hegel’s views of 
what amounts to objective reality.19
8.5  Conclusion: The “Speculative Idea” 
“Through the Shallowness” of the 
Deduction
In Hegel’s opinion, Kant privileges the “unity of reflection” (GuW, 
4:325/FK, 67) as the highest standpoint of philosophy. He remains 
stuck in oppositions: mind and world, form and content, ‘I’ and nature, 
etc. Hegel’s view of philosophy, by contrast, is that the idea of “absolute 
objectivity” is the “absolute sublatedness [Aufgehobensein]” (GuW, 
4:325/FK, 67–68; trans. emended) of such oppositions, which thus 
is the “only authentic reality” (GuW, 4:325/FK, 68) at which genuine 
philosophy should aim. True idealism is the acknowledgment that 
neither opposites (body/soul, ‘I’/nature, form/content, mind/world) 
have independent existence—that is, as such they are “nothing” (GuW, 
4:325/FK, 68). Hegel sees this true idealism in Kant’s adage that neither 
concept nor intuition have independent existence (this is at any rate 
how he reads it), or indeed in his famous question “How are synthetic 
a priori judgments possible?” (GuW, 4:327/FK, 69), which expresses 
an original identity of heterogeneous elements. But unfortunately, 
when parsing Kant’s arguments in TD, Hegel believes “[o]ne can 
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[only] glimpse this Idea through the shallowness of the deduction of 
the categories” (GuW, 4:327/FK, 69). While this idea of a primordial 
identity of what is different or dissimilar is Kant’s truly vernünftige 
insight, he again squanders it, Hegel says, by declaring finite cognition, 
in virtue of the merely “formal identity” of the understanding, to be the 
only legitimate form of knowledge.
But I have argued that Hegel’s reading of Kant starts from a very dif-
ferent assumption, namely, that dualistic positions are uncritical and 
thus unjustifiable in real philosophy. Kant’s methodological starting 
point is, prima facie, quite unalike. Kant thinks in terms of differentia-
ble elements of cognition, through analysis, with a view to seeking their 
unity in cognition. The synthetic a priori is not an assumption; it must 
first be shown to obtain by virtue of an “analysis of the faculty of the 
understanding” (A65/B90). Hegel focuses on the synthetic character of 
thought in a much broader sense, not necessarily just empirical cogni-
tion, and it seems Hegel’s basic assumption is the reality of the synthetic 
a priori, which can be shown to be manifest in the way that we think 
about being tout court, specifically in the Greater Logic. Both Kant 
and Hegel look for the element of synthetic unity that lies a priori in 
thought, whether in the narrower (Kant) or broader (Hegel) sense, but 
from a different angle: Hegel seeks consistently for the unity of reason 
in the employment of concepts, whereas Kant looks for the synthetic 
unity that lies in acts of the understanding in empirical judgements about 
objects, insofar as these judgements are objectively valid. Kant indeed 
works, as Hegel claims, with differential terms of reflection (form/con-
tent; a priori/a posteriori; subject/object; ‘I’/nature), but he does not 
identify these with metaphysical entities; they just serve the formal anal-
ysis of the possibility of empirical cognition. Kant is not a metaphysical 
dualist by conviction. Yet Hegel charges Kant with “fixing” or “absolut-
ising” the terms of reflection in their opposition, suggesting that Kant 
does give them a metaphysical status. The result of this “fixing”, accord-
ing to Hegel, is that one never achieves real rational unity, that is, unity 
from the perspective of reason (rather than from the perspective of the 
narrower understanding) between the various terms of reflection, and so 
real, unconditioned unity between subject and object, form and matter, 
mind and world, thought and being, etc.
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But the difference between Hegel’s and Kant’s approaches cannot 
be sublated in a Hegelian-type dialectic, for, despite their shared focus 
on the synthetic unity in thought, their methodologies and start-
ing assumptions are irreducibly different. To put it succinctly, Hegel’s 
critique of Kant begs the question against Kant’s own philosophi-
cal methodology, which is based on a discursive logic; it can therefore 
not be an internal critique if it does not accept the philosophical 
methodology (or at least account for the differences in methodologies, 
which to all appearances Hegel fails to do). Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s 
discursive logic is legitimate to the extent that we accept Hegel’s general 
assumptions about what philosophy is supposed to be; but any critique 
of Kant must take into account those assumptions. No philosophical sys-
tem is viewpoint neutral. Yet it is precisely Hegel’s quintessential belief 
that philosophy must and indeed can be viewpoint neutral, and that his 
own absolute idealism provides just the means to achieving such view-
point neutrality. Hegel’s bias is one that consistently seeks the unity of 
thought from within the broad perspective of reason, asking the ques-
tion of what is rational, while Kant’s focus on unity is aimed at justify-
ing the employment of a priori concepts in particular judgements about 
objects, that is, in order to make empirically justified knowledge claims 
about the world. Hegel’s aim is more concerned with the intra-concep-
tual coherence or consistency of such and other knowledge claims or 
employment of concepts within the larger context of concept use and its 
systematic and historical conditions.20
All in all, the Hegelian criticism that Kant’s philosophical meth-
odology must be seen as resulting from contradictions in Kant’s own 
thought, or that Kant himself alludes to the viewpoint neutrality of 
absolute idealism, that is, the speculative idea of an absolute identity, 
even if merely inchoately, fails, as I have argued, because Hegel misap-
prehends the intimate relation between the accompanying (putatively 
merely reflective) ‘I’ of the understanding and the original-synthetic 
unity, the latter of which he rightly associates with the productive 
imagination but wrongly dissociates from the understanding. Hence, 
whatever the merits of Hegel’s own philosophical beliefs and the con-
sequences of his critique of Kant for his own thought, Hegel’s so-called 
internal critique of Kant does not stand up to scrutiny.
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Notes
 1. For exceptions, see Reich (2001), Longuenesse (1998), and in particular 
Schulting (2012).
 2. Cf. Pippin (2005:32). See also my discussion of Pippin’s views in 
Chap. 3 (this volume).
 3. See, by contrast, Houlgate (2005), who believes there is a chasm 
between Hegel’s critique of Kant in Faith and Knowledge and Hegel’s 
later philosophy. My view in this respect agrees with that of Sedgwick 
(2012), who thinks there is deep continuity between the early (Faith 
and Knowledge) and later (the Logics) views, even if of course Hegel’s 
later system of thought has developed beyond the rudiments of the 
account in Faith and Knowledge.
 4. For a recent discussion of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s subjectivism, see 
especially Houlgate (2015) and Ameriks (2015). To a large extent, I 
agree with Ameriks’s criticisms of Houlgate, but I think that Ameriks 
underestimates Kant’s own subjectivism, particularly concerning the 
so-called Copernican turn that Houlgate rightly highlights as involving 
our conceptuality as much as our sensibility. In other words, unlike 
Ameriks, I believe that Kant’s idealism already affects his theory of 
concepts (see further Chap. 9).
 5. I also largely refrain from commenting on the vast secondary literature 
on Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Important discus-
sions are found, among many more, in Ameriks (2000, 2015), Bowman 
(2013), Bristow (2007), Düsing (1995, 2013), Ferrarin (2016), Görland 
(1966), Horstmann (2004), Houlgate (2005, 2015), Longuenesse 
(2015, Part II), Kreines (2015), McDowell (2009), Pippin (1989, 1993, 
2005, 2014, 2016), Redding (2010), Sedgwick (1992, 1993, 2001, 2005, 
2012), the essays in Verra (1981) and Westphal (1996, 2000). See also my 
review of Bristow’s book in Schulting (2009) and my review of Sedgwick 
(2012) in Schulting (2016a). I discuss Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s critique 
of Kant extensively in two separate essays (Schulting 2016b, c).
 6. Sedgwick (2012, passim) highlights this element of Hegel’s critique 
of Kant: conceptuality and sensibility are mutually determining, 
in contrast to Kant’s emphasis on the determination, by the under-
standing, of sensibility, as the merely determinable.
 7. “The entire deduction is [merely] an analysis of experience and it posits 
an absolute antithesis (Antithesis) and a dualism” (GuW, 4:334/FK, 78).
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 8. (M*) Necessarily, if intuitions are to be seen as contributing to possible 
knowledge of objects, then intuitions are subsumed under the catego-
ries as the conceptual conditions under which knowledge of objects is 
possible.
 9. See further my account in Schulting (2016b).
 10. This comment might appear to conflict with Hegel’s later, true 
interpretation of Kant’s main claim that objectivity is indeed nothing 
but the unity of self-consciousness (WL, 12:18). But the unity of 
self-consciousness that is meant there is the “true ‘I’”, of which Hegel 
speaks in Faith and Knowledge, not the so-called reflective or “empty 
‘I’” of the ‘I think’ accompanying my representations, which he 
dismisses as merely empirical. See further Sect. 8.4.
 11. See Schulting (2012, Chap. 8). See also Chap. 9 (this volume).
 12. See also WL, 12:21–22. Hegel’s critique of Kant here is not arbitrary, 
for the claim that Kant’s subjectivism/restriction thesis is not licensed 
follows from Hegel’s belief that the manifold in intuition is already 
sublated in the concept, thus showing its essence, and so it cannot be 
claimed that in the end the concept is again merely applicable to the 
manifold in intuition.
 13. But see Schulting (2016c) for a more favourable view of the relation 
between Kant’s and Hegel’s metaphysical logics.
 14. See e.g. Westphal (2000).
 15. Notice that, like Hegel, neither Kant sees the a priori synthetic unity as 
a product of an act of combination, but sees it as lying at the root of any 
necessary combination (see B129–31). Cf. Schulting (2012:141ff.).
 16. Cf. Sedgwick (2005).
 17. Judgement is paradigmatic for the relative identity of the formal ‘I’ or 
formal identity of the understanding, which is derivative of the “true 
‘I’” underlying it. The “true ‘I’” is the original “identity, as the uncon-
ditioned, [which] sunders itself, and appears as separated into the form 
of a judgment, as subject and predicate, or particular and universal” 
(GuW, 4:328/FK, 72). Judgement is “the prevailing appearance of 
 difference” (trans. mine), and the original identity is only visible in the 
copula in a judgement, but it “is not something thought, something 
cognized; on the contrary it expresses precisely our non-cognizance of 
the rational” (GuW 4:329/FK, 72). Judgement only shows the antith-
esis of the particular and the universal, of subject and object, not their 
identity or unity. It appears that Hegel takes the copula ‘is’ to be deriva-
tive of the Being that lies at the root of the judgement, reminiscent of 
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Hölderlin’s view of judgement as the “diremption” of original Being. 
For Hegel, original Being is Reason itself.
 18. Indeed, Hegel comes to argue, in the Logic, that reality is in fact 
derived or generated from the concept (WL, 12:24–25/SL, 522), con-
trary to Kant’s view that existence cannot be produced by the under-
standing or reason. Reality is not something external, in Hegel’s view, 
“but must be derived from the concept itself in accordance with scien-
tific requirements” (WL, 12:21/SL, 518). The sensible or intuition is 
prior to, or given before, conceptual understanding, insofar as it will be 
made clear that reason is their condition. That reason is their ground is 
shown by the way that reason proceeds from “the dialectic” or “noth-
ingness” of sensibility or intuition (WL, 12:21/SL, 519). Unlike for 
Kant, the truth of concepts is not at all conditioned on their being 
applied to sensibility or intuition (WL, 12:20–22). (Hegel does not dis-
tinguish between the formal and material, existential aspects of reality, 
as does Kant.)
 19. See further Schulting (2016c).
 20. See further the discussion in Schulting (2016c).
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9.1  Introduction
Kant grants that by means of the pure concepts in abstraction from 
sensible intuition we can and indeed must still think things in them-
selves as the ground of the appearances that we cognise as the empiri-
cally real objects of experience (cf. A96; Bxxvi; A143/B182). But what 
exactly do we think, in thinking things in themselves? This is an impor-
tant question to ask in the context of Kant’s subjectivism, since many 
commentators take Kant’s idealism to argue that objects are only ideal 
in regard to how they appear to us as spatiotemporal objects (appear-
ances), but not insofar as they are also things in themselves. If we 
abstract from what constitutes the spatiotemporality of objects, we 
can thus perfectly well conceive of their intrinsic nature, implying that 
Kant’s subjectivism does not affect the way we think about things in 
themselves, in abstraction from the properties that conform to our 
subjective conditions of knowledge (space and time). Or so these read-
ers argue. This would mean that we can be metaphysical realists of 
sorts about things in themselves, as indeed Hegel thinks we must (see 
Chap. 8), and thus that the categories are not limited to application to 
9
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372     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
appearances or indeed, as many contemporary so-called  metaphysical 
interpretations of Kant’s idealism claim, that we can be confident in 
claiming that the things that we know as spatiotemporally distinct 
objects, as appearances, are the same things that also have an in itself 
or intrinsic side, of which we are cognitively ignorant. Standardly, these 
readers believe that Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction 
(TD), which is centrally about the applicability of the categories to 
spatiotemporal objects, is wholly separable from Kant’s idealism, which 
is centrally about space and time as subjective forms of intuition that 
are expounded in the Transcendental Aesthetic, not in TD. In Chap. 4, 
I provided an argument, which showed that Kant’s argument in TD is 
best seen in line with a benign form of phenomenalism. In this chap-
ter, I show that Kant’s subjectivism about conceptuality, the thesis that 
our thought, in virtue of the principle of apperception or transcen-
dental self-consciousness, is solely constitutive of the very conception 
of what an object is or what objectivity means, already entails ideal-
ism about objects. From Kant’s very notion of our discursivity idealism 
follows.
That idealism is entailed by our discursivity, and not first by the 
forms of our receptivity (space and time), does not mean that Kant’s 
argument for transcendental idealism is not crucially informed by 
the forms of our receptivity. But here I am not concerned with his 
arguments for idealism from space and time. Nor does it mean that 
because our discursivity entails idealism, the mere representation of a 
thing in itself entails idealism, suggesting that we cannot even think 
anything that is beyond our mere representation, that is, conceive 
of the very notion of a thing in itself. Robert Adams rightly believes 
that “in extending our categories ‘farther than the sensible intuition’ 
we can think consistently about things as they may be in themselves” 
(1997:810). Nevertheless, notwithstanding Kant’s observation at 
A96 that the pure concepts of the understanding can indeed “be 
extended further than experience can grasp (the concept of God)”, 
such an extension would appear to come down to what Kant says is 
a “transcendental use of a concept”, which “consists in its being 
related to things in general and in themselves” (A238/B298), and the 
possibility of which at one point Kant effectively rejects (A246/B303). 
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The operative question thus is what this supposedly consistent thought 
about things in themselves amounts to, if not the “real possibility of 
such things” (Adams 1997:810)? Do the categories have a relation at 
all to a thing in itself or do they “only signif[y] the unity of thinking 
in general” (B314/A259),1 by means of which nothing determinate 
is thought (Prol, 4:355), that is, do they constitute only a logical 
possibility (B302–3n.)?
The thesis that our conceptuality—as defined by my thesis of 
Kant’s radical subjectivism—implies idealism does not mean that we 
cannot even represent the notion of a thing in itself. That is to say, it 
does not constitute a short argument, namely an argument to the 
effect that, as Karl Ameriks has explained, the “mere reflection on 
the notion of a form of representation is taken to be sufficient for the 
Unknowability Thesis” (Ameriks 2000b:128),2 the latter amounting 
to the positive claim that we cannot have knowledge of things in 
themselves. It is not because the object—which, as represented, is 
formally distinguishable from its representation—can, trivially, only 
be represented through a representation and so not purely, without the 
mediation of representation, as a thing in itself, that idealism is entailed. 
The reason why the thought of a thing in itself implies idealism is not 
so much conceptual per se as that it has to do with the nature of a 
thing in itself, to which we have no access because of the limitations 
of our discursivity. This involves a complex, ‘long’ argument concerning 
transcendental materiality, or material synthesis, which is the ground 
of discursive judgement and thus of the very conceptual elements 
of possible experience, on the grounds of which the thing in itself 
can ex hypothesi not be determined as such, that is, as it is in itself. 
An exposition of this ‘long’ argument for idealism from the categories 
follows in Sect. 9.5 and following.
On my reading, the thing in itself (de re) is not identical strictly 
speaking to its being thought by means of mere concepts, so that the 
mere thought of a thing in itself does not eo ipso reach the thing in 
itself itself. I contend that the thought or concept of a thing in itself 
does not exhaust all of the thing’s properties, whose essence we thus 
cannot determine or define (other than a thing’s logically deducible 
characteristics, i.e. the a priori concepts of the understanding which 
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374     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
make up the intension of the concept of an object in general, that is, 
a possible object of knowledge, which should not be conflated with 
the thing in itself ).3 As Kant is reported to have said in one of his 
metaphysics lectures from 1784–85,
we can think a thing as omnimode determined, but we cannot determine 
it really, for then we would have to be omniscient so that we could think 
all of a thing’s possible predicates. (V-Met/Volckmann, 28:410; trans. and 
boldface mine)
Crucially, the thing in itself as it is conceived of is not necessarily 
how the thing in itself is or may be as such (de re). Put differently, 
the concept of a thing in itself does not map isomorphically onto 
the thing in itself (de re), which is exactly why according to the 
Critical Kant we are precluded from having knowledge of it through 
conceptual analysis alone.4 Idealism is not entailed because there is a 
putative thing that is ideal on the grounds of it being entirely or partly 
dependent on the epistemic or logical conditions of its being thought, 
or because the thing in itself is merely the concept of that which 
remains in abstraction from these conditions. Idealism is entailed 
rather because discursive thought is not capable of establishing, even 
merely conceptually, the thoroughly determined nature of the putative 
thing that is being thought.5 In fact, the thought or concept of a thing 
in itself does not pick out an object defined in any straightforward 
sense (i.e. a determinable distinct particular). The idealism here 
concerns the inherent limitation of discursive thinking, of our very 
conceptuality, as a result of which we cannot have a determinate 
concept of a thing in itself. This limitation is part and parcel of Kant’s 
radical subjectivism.
In arguing, in the following sections, that idealism affects our very 
conceptuality, I am thus going against the suggestion made by Adams 
that
Kant sees our possibility of conceiving of things in themselves as 
drastically limited, in the first instance, by a limitation, not of our active 
conceptual faculty, but rather of our passive intuitive faculty. (1997:806)
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
se
s O
nly
I am also going against Erich Adickes in this regard, who writes:
It is thus not in the categories themselves and their positive characteristics 
that there lies an obstacle to knowing the things in themselves through 
them. (Adickes 1924:70)6
Again, I am of course not claiming that idealism is not concerned with 
the limitations of our sensibility, but I am claiming that the limitation 
also already affects our conceptual faculty. If we relate this to the ques-
tion regarding the possibility of the categories providing the minimal 
form of thinking an object in general, thus putatively enabling the 
thought of things in themselves as they are, in abstraction from sensible 
constraints, then it seems that, if not all the categories (see B300ff.), 
at least the categories of quality do not fit this framework, in particu-
lar, the category of limitation and, concomitantly, negation.7 It is to 
an account of these categories that I shall turn to support my claim 
that idealism already follows from discursivity or subjectivity alone. I 
shall make use of arguments that Kant provides in a transitional section 
in the Transcendental Dialectic, concerning the transcendental Ideal, 
where he speaks of the transcendental prototype or also the thing in 
itself in its proper metaphysical context (at A576/B604, Kant connects 
the topic of the transcendental Ideal with “the concept of a thing in 
itself ”).
As a corollary of the above set of claims, my general view on Kant’s 
idealism is that Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves amounts to a distinction between two kinds or classes of 
‘object’ (in the general sense) which map onto one ontological realm, 
namely Being itself, and only one of which is a determinate object for 
our cognition and only one of which is a completely determined indi-
vidual, a thing in itself.8 The one kind of object is not (numerically) 
identical to the other, while the one object represents, in some sense, 
a delimited part of the other. (One might argue that there is some sort 
of non-numerical identity between the two kinds of object, in that 
both kinds of object can be constituents of a composite entity; see Ertl 
2016.) Furthermore, there is no one-to-one isomorphism between 
phenomenal object or appearance and thing in itself, which is not to say 
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376     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
that there are not any isomorphisms between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal.9 The ‘object’ (in the general sense) is either an appear-
ance as an empirically real object (in Kant’s sense) or a thing in itself 
that is transcendentally real, whereby the empirically real object is, in 
some sense, a limitation of the transcendentally real ‘thing’, of reality 
tout court. Note that by reality tout court I do not mean empirical or 
physical reality. Reality tout court is, as such, not the reality of the 
appearances that we are able to determine as the objectively real spa-
tiotemporal objects of empirical nature. I also note that, whereas the 
putative real thing in itself is completely individuated and so is an 
individual (see below Sect. 9.6), one is not licensed to speak of the 
empirically real object of possible experience (i.e. the appearance) in 
terms of an individual.10 Only things in themselves are individuals 
strictly speaking.
I thus depart from two-aspect (one-object) readings of ideal-
ism, either the methodological version famously espoused by Henry 
Allison and others or the more recent metaphysical or ontological ver-
sions (e.g. Langton 1998; Allais 2006, 2007, 2015). There is consider-
able prima facie textual support for two-aspect readings (see Rosefeldt 
2007:170), but I believe both versions of two-aspectism run up against 
identity problems that have to do with their inability to account for 
the assumption that, apropos of the methodological two-aspect view, 
two exclusionary perspectives relate to one and the same thing/object 
and, as to the metaphysical two-aspects or two-properties reading, 
one and the same thing/object has two different exclusionary sets of 
properties (i.e. spatiotemporal properties and intrinsic properties) or, 
if not expressed in terms of metaphysical properties, is specifiable by 
“two ways of knowing the same things” (Allais 2006:160). As is well 
known, Kant believes that things in themselves are not spatial (A26/
B42), for spatial properties are not intrinsic properties but extrinsic 
ones and things in themselves are essentially and exclusively charac-
terised by their intrinsic properties; this means that spatial properties 
cannot be considered to be properties of the same things that are essen-
tially and exclusively characterised by their intrinsic properties, or 
in other words, exclusionary properties cannot be properties of one 
and the same thing.11 I also think that metaphysical two-aspectism 
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cannot account for the centrality of subjective agency in establishing 
the spatiotemporality of appearances, which was discussed in Chap. 7. 
Current metaphysical readings of idealism are conspicuously defi-
cient in explaining this major reason behind Kant’s subjective turn in 
philosophy.
My central claim here is thus that idealism is already entailed by our 
very conceptuality, independently even of sensibility, or, Kant’s subjec-
tivism centrally involves his idealism (in the sense of the fourth strand 
of my thesis of Kant’s radical subjectivism; see Chap. 1, Sect. 1.4). 
However, I deny that this means that the transcendentally real is an 
“empty category” or has no “ontological status” (Ameriks 2003:103). In 
fact, although I do not believe that the pure thought of a thing in itself 
has any object for itself (strictly speaking), on my reading the non-ideal, 
i.e. the thing in itself, has indeed a greater ontological status than the 
ideal, i.e. the phenomenal object (cf. Ameriks 2003:104). That is to say, 
there is some thing or entity or Being that is substantially more than the 
phenomenal object of experience, and whose truth thus transcends the 
evidence we have for our phenomenal experience. This ties in with my 
view of Kant’s idealism as a benign form of phenomenalism, which I 
argued in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
In Sects. 9.2–9.4, I present the negative argument for idealism 
from conceptuality, by delineating how the categories are restricted 
to their application to appearances and do not reach things in them-
selves, while allowing thoughts about that which goes beyond appear-
ances. This will mainly be done by canvassing passages in the Critique 
and the Prolegomena, where Kant indicates the limits of the use of 
the categories. I also critically engage with Allen Wood’s identity 
interpretation of idealism, which in my view conflicts with Kant’s 
own strictures on establishing the putative identity relation between 
appearances and things in themselves (Sect. 9.4). In Sect. 9.5, I rehearse 
the main elements of the central argument of TD. In Sects. 9.6–9.8, 
I then advance the positive argument for idealism from conceptuality, 
by arguing that (1) our conceptual (discursive) rules for determining 
objects (a priori synthesis) are grounded on a different kind of a priori 
synthesis, which I call material synthesis, which concerns what Kant 
calls the “sum total of all possibility” (A573/B601), that (2) material 
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synthesis concerns the thoroughgoing or complete determinacy of an 
individual, which Kant identifies as a thing in itself proper, and that 
therefore (3) we cannot, per impossibile, by means of the rules for deter-
mining objects determine the ground of those very rules. Hence, we 
cannot determine a thing in itself, just because our conceptual rules for 
determining objects eo ipso prohibit this.
9.2  Do the Categories Have Meaning Beyond 
the Bounds of Sensible Experience?
In the concluding sections of the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 
Kant writes that
it would be absurd [eine Ungereimtheit] for us to hope that we can know 
more of any object than belongs to the possible experience of it or lay 
claim to the least knowledge of how anything not assumed to be an 
object of possible experience is determined according to the constitution 
that it has in itself. (Prol §57, 4:350 [Kant 1977:91])
The reason for this, Kant says, is that objects are only knowable under 
certain conditions, that is, under the conditions of space and time 
as well as the concepts of the understanding, which “have no other 
use than to make experience possible”. Indeed, “if this condition 
[of sensibility, D.S.] is omitted from the pure concepts of the 
understanding, they do not determine any object and have no meaning 
whatever” (Prol, 4:350 [Kant 1977:91]).12
At the end of the Schematism chapter in the Critique, Kant asserts 
that without the schematisation of the concepts of pure understanding 
no relation to objects is provided. He is quite clear as to denying the 
possibility of “amplify[ing] the previously limited concept”, that is, the 
concept limited by a restricting condition concerning sensibility, so 
that “the categories in their pure significance, without any conditions 
of sensibility, should hold for things in general, as they are, instead of 
their schemata merely representing them how they appear”, and would 
thus “have a significance independent of all schemata and extending 
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far beyond them” (B186/A147).13 The significance that pure categories 
could have is only a “logical significance”, concerning “the mere unity 
of representations”, which yields no “concept14 of an object”. Kant 
concludes that
[w]ithout schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of the 
understanding for concepts, but do not represent any object. This signifi-
cance comes to them from sensibility, which realizes the understanding at 
the same time as it restricts it. (B186–7/A147; emphasis added; cf. B253)
At B178 Kant is even clearer as to the putative application of categories 
to things in themselves:
[T]hey cannot pertain to things in themselves (without regard to how 
and whether they may be given to us) at all [auf Dinge an sich […] gar 
nicht gehen können15].
Nevertheless, Kant insists in the same Prolegomena passage quoted above 
that it would be “a still greater absurdity if we conceded [einräumen] no 
things in themselves” (Prol, 4:350–351 [Kant 1977:91]), even though 
it is true to say that the categories are not applicable to things in them-
selves and so cannot strictly speaking represent them as such. That the 
categories do not pertain or refer to things in themselves does not, as 
Kant says, imply there not being, in some sense, such things. It is not 
implied by the categories’ inability to apply to a thing in itself that the 
thing in itself is not what it is, whatever it is, nor that there is no thing 
in itself (e.g. presumably because it is merely a limiting concept). The 
position that Kant adopts in the Prolegomena is consistent with the view 
that he espouses in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant acknowl-
edges and indeed considers necessary the extramental being of things in 
themselves, which appear as and which we determine to be the empiri-
cally real objects that we experience. In the Critique, Kant speaks like-
wise of the threat of incongruity, for if we were not capable of at least 
thinking things in themselves, “the absurd proposition [would follow] 
that there is an appearance without anything that appears” (Bxxvi).16 
Apart from the conceptual absurdity of an appearance that has no 
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380     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
ground of appearing, it is clear that if there were only objects as appear-
ances, which we can cognise, but no things that are the substrate or 
ground17 of these appearances, which at various points Kant says are 
“mere representations” (e.g. B235–6/A190–1),18 then the central claim 
of TD that our representations have objective validity or objective real-
ity would not amount to much and would thus lack probative force. It 
is true that in order for representations to have objective reference, by 
being unified in an objective unity of representations, it is both neces-
sary and formally sufficient for them to be governed by the dual formal 
conditions of knowledge (the pure concepts and the pure forms of intu-
ition), which establish cognition of things merely as appearances (see 
Chap. 4). However, there still has to be a materially sufficient condition 
which grounds empirical knowledge of an actual given object that is 
more than just an object in general; and in order to cognise the actual-
ity of things perception is required, i.e. sensation, which, in our experi-
ence, is the connecting characteristic to the thing itself (B272/A225).19 
Thus, by implication, if there were not things that existed in themselves 
(in some sense) independently of our minds to which they appear, we 
would not have sensible perception, and a fortiori cognition, of things 
either. This would uproot the whole project of the analysis of knowl-
edge.20
It seems clear, then, as Adickes has demonstrated in his classic Kant 
und das Ding an sich (1924) by canvassing ample textual support in the 
First Critique, that the fact that there are in some sense things in them-
selves apart from their way of appearing to us as cognisers is never in 
doubt for Kant. However, we should be aware that
(1)  the existence of putative things in themselves can only first be deter-
mined by virtue of the application of the modal category of exist-
ence, through judgement, so that their existence is not guaranteed 
as a matter of course, as Adickes seems to believe; Bird (2006:536, 
555ff.) rightly criticises Adickes on this point, for being too quick 
in assuming the actual existence of things in themselves. However, 
Bird then wrongly concludes that Kant is not committed to the 
actual existence of things in themselves. That the conceivability of 
things in themselves does not eo ipso imply their actual existence 
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does not imply that they do not actually exist. We should distin-
guish between a general claim regarding the existential independ-
ence of things in themselves from our minds and specific claims 
regarding the fact that particular things in themselves or a singular 
thing in itself exist(s) or do(es) not exist;
(2)  by means of applying the modal category of existence it is only 
determined that a thing exists; it does not tell us anything about 
the mode in which it exists (for that at least further categories are 
needed, not least the categories of quality).
Nevertheless, though we do not know things in themselves as we 
know them in the way that they appear, we do know, by extrapolation, 
that they must exist (in some sense) independently of the manner in 
which we intuit them to be, given possible experience. (This does not 
mean that mere conceivability implies existence, but only that if we 
experience determinate appearances, things in themselves as their 
underlying ground must exist.) Strictly speaking, it is not the thing 
in itself as such that we know exists, but that of which we determine 
in judgement that it exists. Existence (as a category) is first bestowed 
upon the thing by the determinative power of the understanding; 
more accurately, the category of existence is applied to the object of 
experience, the appearance, not to the thing in itself as such. But that 
does not mean that the thing so determined does not exist mind- 
independently, nor that it is not the mind-independent thing in itself 
only that is the denizen of Being. The determination of existence in 
thought should not be conflated with de facto existence, nor should 
the de facto existence of a thing in itself be confused with the way(s) in 
which it exists or the ways in which it is determined to exist, which for 
us is only as a phenomenal object or appearance.
As has rightly been noted many times by Ameriks (e.g. 2000b) 
in response to typical objections raised first by Jacobi and then by 
champions of German Idealism, there is nothing contradictory in 
claiming to know something, in a very general sense, regarding that 
which transcends the limits of knowledge as long as we distinguish 
between kinds of cognition, only one of which yields determinate 
knowledge. Kant makes a clear distinction between thinking or 
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conceiving, on the one hand, and knowing, on the other hand (B146); 
to put it differently, we have no “determinate knowledge” (Bestimmtes 
Wissen) of things in themselves or of “pure beings of the understanding” 
(Verstandeswesen) (Prol §32, 4:315 [Kant 1977:57]; trans. emended), 
but we can still entertain the notion of ‘thing in itself ’ without 
contradiction. One could also term this distinction as one between 
positive knowledge about things in themselves and negative knowledge 
about them (i.e. knowledge that such and such does not pertain to 
them), corresponding to Kant’s distinction between ‘noumenon’ in a 
positive and in a negative sense (in its problematic use).
So far so good. It is only at this point that the controversy starts. 
First, as Adickes, as one of the first as far as I know, pointed out 
very extensively and very clearly in the course of his aforemen-
tioned book, there is a lingering ambiguity in, on the one hand, 
holding the view, as Kant does, that the categories can have no 
meaning and do not determine any object outside of the realm 
of sensible experience and, on the other hand, believing that 
we must be able at least to think the underlying things in them-
selves that we do not cognise other than by way of cognising their 
appearance(s) and so claiming to know at least something, if only con-
ceptually (non-determinately), about some thing that transcends the 
confines of cognition. If we non-determinately know something about 
that which transcends the limits of knowledge by thinking it, then 
it would appear that at least some concepts, if not the pure concepts 
(categories), are employed in so doing. And this would imply that those 
concepts must yield some meaning and cannot be entirely without sense.
Indeed, as Kant writes in the section Phenomena and Noumena, 
“if […] I leave out all intuition, then there still remains the form of 
thinking, i.e., the way of determining an object for the manifold of a 
possible intuition” (B309/A253–4). Significantly, Kant continues, 
“the categories extend further than sensible intuition, since they think 
objects in general without seeing to the particular manner (of sensibil-
ity) in which they might be given” (cf. B150). Such passages appear 
to lend credence to the view espoused by Adams, whom I quoted in 
the beginning. The gloss we thus need to give on those passages in the 
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Critique where Kant seems to stress the lack of meaningfulness of the 
categories in abstraction from their application to sensible intuition is 
that meaning or reference (Bedeutung) must be interpreted as having 
to do with cognitive relevance in terms of yielding assertoric empirical 
knowledge (B310/A255; cf. A239/B298, A262/B318, A289/B346).21 
Lack of sense (Sinn or Bedeutung),22 then, does not mean utter con-
ceptual or semantic meaninglessness—Kant’s theory of concepts is not 
verificationist.23 Apart from their necessary empirical significance in 
the case of knowledge, categories still have general significance in terms 
of providing the concept of an object in general. As Kenneth Westphal 
rightly notes, “[i]f the categories were utterly devoid of content when 
abstracted from sensibility, there would be no difference between 
any two (alleged) categorial concepts” (2004:43).24 Furthermore, 
in abstraction from the way we cognitively determine a thing, which 
yields genuine objective knowledge, we are still able to think notion-
ally, or to have at least the notion of, the thing in itself or think up 
patently transcendent or even impossible objects (cf. A96). And in fact, 
as indicated earlier, Kant must allow this possibility if we are to talk 
sensibly about appearances as the objects of our cognition. Also, if we 
are to talk meaningfully about such prominent things in themselves as 
the moral self and God, which are objects of Kant’s primary concern 
even in the First Critique but most importantly in the practical context, 
then he cannot allow that categories (in particular, the relational cate-
gory of cause) do not apply at all to things beyond possible experience, 
that is, things in themselves, not least the noumenal self (cf. B575).25 
In general, as Kant affirms in the paragraphs following the sections of 
the Prolegomena quoted at the start of this section, although “we cannot 
[…], beyond all possible experience, form a definite notion [bestimmten 
Begrif f ] of what things in themselves may be”, we are “[y]et […] not 
at liberty to abstain entirely from inquiring into them” (Prol, 4:351 
[Kant 1977:92]).
In the next two subsections, I address the conundrum of the 
transphenomenal application of the category of substance to the 
thinking self, which particularly evinces the ambiguity of the reference 
or, in Kant’s words, the Bedeutung of the categories in general.
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9.2.1  Categories and Self-Reference
Even in a purely theoretical context the category of substance, 
say, would appear to have some significance beyond the bounds 
of sense, if only because, in abstraction from the sensible condi-
tions of empirical knowledge, we can (and must) make sense of 
the ‘I’ of transcendental apperception, which grounds theoretical 
knowledge. This ‘I’ refers to someone in particular doing the syn-
thesising—viz. the ‘I’ as a substantial thing in itself, so the noumenal 
and not the empirical self—rather than to a mere activity.26 The self- 
reference at issue in apperception concerns a consciousness of one-
self doing the action or activity of synthesising, not a mere conscious-
ness of activity in any merely general sense27; and, as Kant asserts, 
“[w]here there is action, consequently activity and force, there is also 
substance” (A204/B250).28 Of course, ‘substance’ as pure category, 
which is first derived from the ‘I’ of apperception (see Schulting 
2012), is nothing but a function that, in the context of possible 
experience, serves to determine something that is relatively permanent 
or enduring. In abstraction from sensible experience, and so apart 
from the constraints of space and time, the category is nothing but 
a logical function, which has no object, in any strict sense, for itself. 
Nevertheless, the ‘I’ of self-consciousness does point to a more 
substantial underlying nature than is manifest at the phenomenal 
level; that is, an ‘I am’ is expressed by it (B422n.; emphasis added). 
For, although one is not licensed to positively (categorically) assert 
its substantiality, the ‘I’ that exercises the act of apperception is not 
merely a function of thought that is universally applicable (the ‘I’ 
is not a universal, or, a concept strictly speaking; cf. B404/A346). 
Again, this is because a particular someone—and this someone is 
not the phenomenal self (cf. B157), which is first grounded on the 
apperceptive self—has to exercise the function of thought, albeit that 
I, being that particular someone that apperceives, cannot gain any 
direct access to my self ’s complete inner nature, not even, as I claim 
in this chapter, by merely thinking it—the access is immediately 
intuitive, not conceptual (cf. B153–9).29
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Therefore, a distinction should be heeded between, on the one 
hand, the necessary reference to an otherwise indeterminate subject 
as a particular person (i.e. a substantial thing in itself ), not a mere 
activity, in any self-conscious act of thought or act of apperception 
(the ‘I’ of apperception) and, on the other hand, the noumenal 
self itself as a putative fully determinate thing in itself that is the 
unknowable and indeterminable ground of the ‘I’ of apperception and 
to which the apperceptive ‘I’ refers.30 It is evident that the noumenal 
and the phenomenal self are not congruent, but I contend that also 
the noumenal self and the logical ‘I’ of apperception need not be, 
and probably are not, congruent (cf. A356–9). This is not to say 
that insofar as we speak of the transcendental subject no reference at 
all is thereby made to a thing in itself, i.e. the noumenal (personal) 
self.31 But what I am implying is that the transcendental subject, 
qua the logical characteristics of the thinking subject, is not, or at 
least need not be, equivalent to the noumenal (personal) self (Kant’s 
‘I’ is not a Cartesian res cogitans determined or determinable as a 
separable substance; it is merely the thinking thing as a function of 
combination manifested in discursive thought, i.e. the act of thinking 
which, to be sure, nonetheless expresses my substantial being or 
the fact that I am [B422n.]).32 However, at A492 Kant does seem 
to identify the transcendental subject with the noumenal self (cf. 
Ameriks 2000a:281).
9.2.2  The ‘Substantial’ and the Transcendental Subject
To understand the relation between the agent of thought and the self 
as substance, it might be helpful to bring to mind here Kant’s talk of 
“the substantial” (Substantiale) (B441; Prol, 4:334), which differs from 
the notion of ‘substance’ in some important ways.33 The ‘substantial’ 
is the notion of an object “which subsists, insofar as one thinks in it 
[an ihm] merely the transcendental subject without any predicates” 
(B441/A414; trans. emended). At A355–6, Kant makes it clear, regard-
ing this “transcendental subject”, that
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it is obvious that the subject of inherence is designated only transcenden-
tally through the I that is appended to thought [dem Gedanken], without 
noting the least property of it, or cognizing or knowing anything at all 
about it [oder überhaupt etwas von ihm zu kennen, oder zu wissen]. (trans. 
emended)
This transcendental subject, which is but “a something in general” 
(Etwas überhaupt), is a simple representation, as it is the concept of 
something completely undetermined. Through this ‘I’, or the transcen-
dental subject, nothing but “an absolute but logical unity of the subject” 
is thought, and through it I do not think the “real simplicity of my sub-
ject” (A356).
The ‘substantial’ as such cannot be thought, because it is that which 
is always already presupposed in whichever thoughts we have; that 
is, it is that in which inhere our thoughts or determinations, more in 
particular, the pure categories as the functions of thought. At B422, 
Kant asserts that “the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking 
them [i.e. the categories], obtain a concept of itself as an object of the 
categories”, the reason being that “in order to think them, it must take 
its pure self-consciousness, which is just what is to be explained, as its 
ground”. Similarly, at B404/A346, Kant speaks of “the simple and in 
content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot 
even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies 
every concept”. Significantly,
[t]hrough this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further 
is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = X, which is 
recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about 
which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept. (emphasis 
added)
Quite clearly, then, this “consciousness in itself [Bewußtsein an sich] is not 
even a representation distinguishing a particular object” (B404/A346). If 
I were to try to determine the properties of the thinking subject, I would 
be “turn[ing] in a constant circle”, as in doing so I would have to make 
use of it as that which accompanies all of my thoughts.
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Concluding, the absolute unity and substantiality of the thought of 
the subject, through the pure categories, do not tell us anything about 
the determinate properties of the subject as an object, as substance. 
As indicated before, it is however not at all implied that the subject of 
thought is reducible to the functional unity governing any judging, or 
is indeed mere “impersonal” activity (Keller 2001:4ff.). There is still 
enough warrant for claiming that there is a noumenal self that is the 
ultimate ground of my thinking or thoughts, which are the predicates 
that inhere in the unity of the ‘I’. It is only that, due to the nature of 
discursive thought, which is shown by the fact that I must always be able 
to accompany whichever thoughts I have with this irreducible ‘I think’, 
I cannot represent my pure thinking being as a determinate subject, “as I 
am in myself ” (B157), solely through the categories. In short, I cannot 
determine my complete, noumenal thinking self, evidently not with the 
help of the senses, but also not by any pure (rational) means.
9.3  We Can Make the “Connection” to the 
Thing in Itself “Distinct”
Coming back to the main question: what exactly do we think of the 
thing in itself if what we think of it does of course not have to do with 
the spatiotemporal properties of a fully-fledged object? Does it mean 
that by virtue of merely thinking the form of an object, without con-
sidering the way in which “we intuit [it] to be” (B59/A42), I think the 
thing as it is in itself ? Accordingly, does it mean that since the appear-
ances that are cognised are, as Kant asserts, only empirically real and 
hence transcendentally ideal because of the limiting condition of sen-
sibility, that idealism does not affect the way I might think the thing 
in abstraction from the sensible conditions of cognition so that what 
I think through the pure understanding is the transcendentally real 
thing in itself ? In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant still held the view 
that the intellect knows things as they are in themselves, such that the 
pure intellect has its proper intelligible objects, whose essences it knows 
by purely thinking them (see e.g. MSI, 2:392, 384). But this cannot be 
Kant’s position in the Critique, when we know that it was precisely the 
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role and function of the intellect with respect to objects that changed 
between the Dissertation and the Critique.
If we return to the concluding section of the Prolegomena, then 
we find a preliminary answer to the question whether we are able to 
think the thing in itself as the thing in itself proper. Kant writes that 
the relation to what lies beyond the bounds (Grenzen) of reason—he 
makes a distinction between limits (Schranken) and bounds (Grenzen), 
which always point to something positive, “whereas limits contain mere 
negations”—is a particular one, namely
an actual connection [wirkliche Verknüpfung] of a known thing [des 
Bekannten] with one quite unknown [einem völlig Unbekannten] (and 
which will always remain so), and though what is unknown should not 
become the least more known—which we cannot even hope—yet the 
notion of this connection must be definite, and capable of being rendered 
distinct. (Prol, 4:354 [Kant 1977:94–95])
Kant is clear that
as we can never cognize these beings of the understanding as they are in 
themselves, that is, determinately, yet must assume them as regards [im 
Verhältnis auf ] the sensible world and connect [verknüpfen] them with it 
by reason, we are at least able to think this connection [Verknüpfung] by 
means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense. 
(Prol, 4:355 [Kant 1977:95]; emphasis added)
What we thus think, when we try to think beyond the limits of sensibil-
ity, is the connection between what is known through the categories and 
empirical intuition and that which necessarily lies beyond it. But we do 
not think, strictly speaking, that which lies beyond it.34
9.4  Wood’s Identity Interpretation
Recently, an interesting version of the two-aspects reading of idealism has 
been advanced by Allen Wood, which he calls the Identity Interpretation 
(Wood 2005). Wood’s view epitomises the idea that Kant’s notion of 
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discursivity is separable from idealism, the view that I reject. Succinctly 
put, Wood believes that we can think the thing in itself as it is in itself. 
According to Wood, Kant’s talk of appearances and things in themselves 
concerns the same object, which is in line with Allison’s epistemological 
one-world reading, as with most other two-aspects readings. However, 
Wood (2005:65) appears to regard the distinction, not as due to two ways 
of considering but as having to do with two kinds of property of the same 
object that are being referred to (perhaps similar to Allais 2006); phenom-
enal properties are aspects of underlying things in themselves, and it is 
these aspects that we cognise through our forms of perceiving spatiotem-
poral objects. Wood contends that, although there is no identity between 
the sensible characteristics of appearances and things in themselves, there is 
identity between, on the one hand, the objects thought through the pure 
concepts of the understanding in abstraction from the sensible features of 
these objects as appearances and, on the other hand, things in themselves. 
The “fundamental point” of the identity interpretation, Wood asserts, is 
“that every appearance is identical to a thing in itself, and the distinction 
is not between two different entities but between two ways of thinking 
about or referring to the same entity” (2005:65). Regarding the thinkabil-
ity of things in themselves Wood further writes:
Although things in themselves cannot be sensed, appearances can be 
thought through the pure understanding, simply by thinking of them in 
abstraction from the ways they can appear to us. Thus while the sensible 
criterion for identity cannot apply across the gulf separating phenomena 
from noumena, the intelligible criterion can apply. […] [Kant] seems to 
regard it as entirely permissible and even inevitable that we should be able 
to think the phenomenal objects around us solely through pure concepts 
of the understanding, hence as they are in themselves. (2005:69)
We call something an appearance insofar as it can be intuited by us and 
therefore cognized through our understanding; but we can think the same 
thing while abstracting from the relation to our faculties that makes it a 
possible object of cognition. (2005:73)35
Wood’s interpretation is problematic for three main reasons. (1) It 
seems to me that Wood’s interpretation is flatly contrary to Kant’s 
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censure of Leibnizian strategies. Wood appears to do precisely that for 
which Kant criticises Leibniz. Kant writes:
[F]or him [i.e. Leibniz] appearance was the representation of the thing in 
itself, although distinguished from cognition through the understanding 
in its logical form [der logischen Form nach], since with its customary lack 
of analysis the former draws a certain mixture of subsidiary representa-
tions into the concept of the thing, from which the understanding knows 
how to abstract. (A270ff./B326ff.)
Wood, like Leibniz, intellectualises appearances, which according to 
Kant amounts to abstracting from the irreducibly sensible properties of 
appearances.
(2) Wood draws on the Leibnizian principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles,36 referring to the Amphiboly chapter in the Critique. He 
believes that Kant holds that
when objects are represented in pure understanding, the criterion to 
be used in individuating them is the Leibnizian one—the identity of 
 indiscernibles—while when they are given to us through the senses, the 
principle of their individuation is their positions in space. (Wood 2005:68;  
cf. Van Cleve 1999:149ff.)
Kant indeed asserts that if an object is presented with the same inner 
determinations, “then it is always exactly the same if it counts as an 
object of pure understanding, not many but only one thing (numer-
ica identitas)” (A263/B319). However, although what Kant says here 
holds true for the putative37 identity of a thing in itself in contrast 
to some other thing, I believe Leibniz’s principle (and Kant’s refer-
ence to it) cannot be put to use in trying to establish, as does Wood, 
the identity of the appearance—supposedly thought merely through 
the understanding—and the thing in itself,38 that is, to bridge “the 
gulf separating phenomena from noumena” (Wood 2005:69), which 
though is the main point of his identity interpretation. Incidentally, 
Wood is ambiguous as to whether the identity relation holds, on the 
one hand, between the concept or the thought of the thing in itself 
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“as an object of pure understanding” and the thing in itself or, on the 
other, between the appearance and the thing in itself.39 These surely 
are not the same identity relations, although it appears that he means 
the two relations to come down to the same, for the identity is really 
between the appearance and the thing in itself, once the appearance 
has been stripped of its appearance properties. But this strikes me as 
a lot of tautological window dressing. Wood’s intention is to enable 
the conception of thinking appearances through the pure understand-
ing (2005:69), by way of abstracting from their sensible properties, but 
what he thereby effectively achieves is not establishing the identity of 
appearance and thing in itself across the conceptual gulf, but merely 
confirming the trivial truth that a thing is the same as itself and thus 
different from something else, for what is an appearance without its 
‘appearance’ features?
Moreover, I think, contrary to Wood, that Kant does not endorse 
the view, neither in the Amphiboly section nor anywhere else in the 
Critical corpus, that sheerly by virtue of Leibniz’s principle objects are 
individuated,40 even if the objects concerned are (mere) objects of pure 
understanding (whatever these amount to) or things in themselves, for 
that matter. What I should like to stress here, against Wood’s unwar-
ranted use of the textual evidence, is that Kant’s aim in his criticism of 
Leibniz is not to partly endorse Leibniz’s principle—viz. insofar as things 
in themselves are concerned (although he also does not explicitly deny 
its applicability in that restricted case41)—but rather to point out that 
Leibniz’s principle is to no avail for acquiring knowledge of objects of 
any sort, since “pure concepts of the understanding yield no knowledge 
on their own” (FM, 20:280 [Kant 2002:371]); for only in the catego-
ries’ schematisation to sensible experience is cognition of objects stricte 
dicta first possible. This is the reason why Kant writes that “that puta-
tive law [Leibniz’s principle, D.S.] is no law of nature” but “simply an 
analytical rule or comparison of things through mere concepts” (A272/
B328).42
(3) Wood’s assumption of the possibility of thinking things through 
the pure understanding is based on a mistaken conception of what a 
pure concept of an object or “an object of pure understanding” amounts 
to. He appears to conflate the pre-Critical and Critical views of the 
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intellect’s relation to objects. As I pointed out earlier, the pure concept 
of an object is constrained by the limits of discursive thought as much 
as our sensible intuition of an object is constrained by the forms of 
space and time. This means that one is not licensed to argue that for 
the Critical Kant things in themselves satisfy the conditions under 
which objects are thought (i.e. the intellectual conditions).43 As a result 
of this, a disparity exists between the object of pure understanding, 
which is a mere transcendental object and constrained by the a priori 
concepts that come with discursivity, and the thing in itself. This 
disparity cannot be bridged by means of any speculative attempt of 
putting to use metaphysical principles (e.g. Leibniz’s identity principle). 
Nevertheless, at A249, quoted by Wood (2005:65), Kant seems to 
suggest that the thing in itself is the object of the understanding, 
which is the object of “a cognition […] in which no sensibility is 
encountered” and which would refer to a different “world” (a mundus 
[…] intelligibilis) (A249), “a world thought in spirit (perhaps also even 
intuited)” (A250). However, first, Kant argues that it would here, in the 
same passage, concern an object of a non-sensible intuition; earlier he 
refers to intellectual intuition. Clearly, Kant hypothesises here about a 
pure employment of the understanding, that is, about “a pure and yet 
objectively valid [use of the categories]”. But he soon makes it clear that 
the object to which “through the understanding” our representations are 
“in fact related” is indeed “only the transcendental object”, a
something = X, of which we know nothing at all nor can know 
anything in general (in accordance with the current constitution of our 
understanding), but is rather something that can serve only as a correlate 
of the unity of apperception for the unity of the manifold in sensible 
intuition, by means of which the understanding unifies that [dasselbe, i.e. 
the manifold, D.S.] in the concept of an object. (A250)44
Significantly, then, the transcendental object is nothing in abstraction 
from sensibility (cf. A277/B333; A109). Kant continues:
This transcendental object cannot even be separated from the sensible 
data, for then nothing would remain through which it would be thought. 
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It is therefore no object of cognition in itself [Gegenstand der Erkenntnis 
an sich selbst] […] Just for this reason, then, the categories do not represent 
any special object given to the understanding alone, but rather serve only to 
determine the transcendental object (the concept of something in gen-
eral) through that which is given in sensibility, in order thereby to cognize 
appearances empirically under concepts of objects. (A250–1; emphasis 
added)
This gainsays Wood’s contention that through the pure use of the 
understanding, through mere concepts, we are able to think the thing in 
itself as it is, for clearly, as Kant notes, the “categories do not represent 
any special object given to the understanding alone”. The thing in itself, 
i.e. “that which is given in sensibility”, is only indirectly related to the 
understanding. The concept of a noumenon results from the “thinking 
of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intu-
ition”. Does this mean that I thus represent a pure object, i.e. the thing 
as it is in itself ? No. Kant insists:
[I]n order for a noumenon to signify a true object, to be distinguished 
from all phenomena, it is not enough that I liberate my thoughts from all 
conditions of sensible intuition, but I must in addition have ground to 
assume another kind of intuition than this sensible one, under which such 
an object could be given; for otherwise my thought is empty, even though 
free of contradiction. […] [A]lthough our thinking can abstract from that 
sensibility, the question still remains whether it is not then a mere form of a 
concept and whether any object at all is left over after this separation. The 
object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, i.e., 
the entirely undetermined thought of something in general. This cannot be 
called the noumenon; for I do not know anything about what it is in itself ; 
and have no concept of it except merely that of the object of a sensible 
intuition in general […]. I cannot think it through any categories. (A252; 
emphasis added; cf. B306–7)
For the Critical Kant, the pure (unschematised) concept of an object 
does not map, one to one, onto the thing in terms of its in-itself nature. 
In fact, the pure concept of an object does not have or refer to any par-
ticular object or thing for itself. Kant clearly links this limiting fact to 
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the nature of the functions of our discursive thought. He writes towards 
the end of the Amphiboly section:
If by merely intelligible objects we understand those things that are 
thought through pure categories, without any schema of sensibility, then 
things of this sort are impossible. For the condition of the objective use 
of all our concepts of the understanding is merely the manner of our 
sensible intuition, through which objects are given to us, and, if we 
abstract from the latter, then the former have no relation at all to any sort 
of object. Indeed, even if one would assume another sort of intuition than 
this our sensible one, our functions for thinking would still be without 
any significance in regard to it. (B342/A286; emphasis added)
This, as Kant continues, does not exclude the problematic notion of a 
noumenon, that is, noumenon in the negative sense, but we cannot
assume beyond appearances objects of pure thinking, i.e., noumena [in 
the positive sense, D.S.], since those do not have any positive significance 
that can be given. […] Thinking in itself, to be sure, is not a product of 
the senses, and to this extent is also not limited by them, but it is not on 
that account immediately of any independent and pure use, without assistance 
from sensibility, for it is in that case without an object. (B343/A287; 
emphasis added)
There cannot be a positive argument to the effect that we may infer 
that, when we abstract from the sensible constraints of the knowledge of 
an object, there obtains an identity between the object thought through 
the pure concepts and a putative thing in itself, “[f ]or one must con-
cede that the categories alone are not sufficient for the cognition of 
things in themselves [allein noch nicht zur Erkenntnis der Dinge an sich 
zureichen]” (B343/A287). This is Kant’s clearest statement regarding the 
alleged possibility of thinking, through the categories, things in them-
selves (cf. also B306–7). The pure concept of an object is nothing but 
the set of the purely logical characteristics which make up that concept, 
i.e. the categories; and, as we also know from Kant’s arguments in the 
Paralogisms regarding the nature of the self (see again above Sect. 9.2), 
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these do not determine an object for themselves (in abstraction from 
sensibility).
Wood crucially neglects the difference between the pre-Critical 
concept of an object (whereby, as I said earlier, the Kant of the 
Dissertation indeed holds that the intellect cognises the intelligi-
ble object) and the Critical concept of an object which may be said 
to correspond to a noumenon in a negative sense only. The pure 
understanding of an object (or an appearance) is not isomorphically 
related, and a fortiori identical, to a thing in itself by way of its mere 
intellectual grasp, by merely entertaining the notion of a thing in itself 
or by abstracting from the appearance properties of an object. This 
means that, strictly speaking, things in themselves cannot even be 
thought as such in any objectively significant, determinate sense.45 What 
is thought about a thing in itself is merely the noumenon in a nega-
tive sense—i.e. empty concepts, or at least concepts without any pos-
itive ontological reference, or Bedeutung as Kant would say. The 
positive content of our thoughts of things in themselves consists, as 
Kant pointed out in the Prolegomena passage quoted earlier (Sect. 9.3 
above), merely of (analogical) relations or “connections” between our 
knowledge and what lies beyond its limits, what is “quite unknown”.
As a run-up to discussing those aspects of the transcendental Ideal cen-
tral to the topic of this chapter, I now turn to a brief rehearsal of the main 
argument of the TD, in particular the element of objective determination.
9.5  Objective Determination in TD
As we have seen in detail in Chap. 4, in TD Kant expounds the 
necessary conditions which must be satisfied to enable the sense of 
an object as object, which at the same time enables the experience of 
such an object (B197; A111). Kant asserts, controversially, that this 
dual possibility—that is, the possibility of the experience of an object 
and the possibility of an object itself, of objectivity simpliciter—is 
grounded in one unconditional subjective principle, which he calls the 
principle of transcendental apperception (the thesis of Kant’s radical 
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396     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
subjectivism). This principle is transcendental self-consciousness 
insofar as it concerns the thinking or judging subject who is conscious 
of her own representations, which she regards as her own and as such 
apperceives or takes as belonging together. It is the central claim of 
TD that the form in which transcendental apperception—in that it is 
the pure function constitutive of discursive thought—determines the 
logical relation of concepts in general, is also the necessary form in 
which it gives unity to the manifold of representations in an intuition, 
representations which in some way are related to the thing that is 
perceived and judged about in any arbitrary determinative judgement 
a is F. This central idea is expressed most fundamentally and succinctly 
in the so-called Leitfaden passage (A79/B104–5). This is not the place 
to expand on the perplexing issues surrounding this controversial 
passage, which concern the way how the Leitfaden should be read 
in regard to deriving the categories from the forms of judgement and 
how the deduction of the categories in TD ties in with the former.46 
What is important to emphasise here is that insofar as the unitary 
form of the intuited object, by means of a synthetic unity of the 
representations that one has, is determined as such in the unifying act 
of transcendental apperception, one is licensed to say that the set of 
functions of transcendental self-consciousness—the “same function” of 
which Kant speaks in the Leitfaden passage—which are the rules for the 
unity of consciousness, is the original, subjective ground of knowledge 
itself, that is, of objectively valid cognition. Indeed, transcendental self-
consciousness is the very ground or, as Kant says in a Reflexion from the 
1770s, the “original” of an object in general.47
It is for this reason that Kant calls the principle of self-consciousness 
the original-synthetic principle of apperception (subheading §16), for 
it is both the ground of the conceptual form of a judgement, which is 
established by means of an analytic unity of the representations in their 
purely conceptual relation of subordination, and the ground of the 
unity of a manifold of representations in an empirical intuition. The 
original synthesis of apperception grounds, in one act, both the analytic 
and synthetic unity of representations, by whose complex relation a 
judgement is characterised. To put it succinctly, a judgement is an 
objective unity of representations, whereby ‘objective’ should be seen in 
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terms of a qualitative unity that is established by the synthetic function 
that grounds both analytic and synthetic unities of representations. So 
when Kant claims that this objective unity of apperception, which is 
the definition of judgement, is the ground of our concept of an object, 
and thus constitutes an object (B137), “not merely something I myself 
need in order to cognize an object but rather something under which 
every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me” (B138), 
he makes a claim to having established not merely the necessary 
conditions for the object to be an object of experience or thought, but 
also the sufficient condition for the object to be an object for me (at 
least formally). Object is a function of judgement.
Obviously, as Kant affirms and as we saw earlier in Sect. 9.2 above 
and more in detail in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10, we do not produce the thing 
as to its existence (“dem Dasein nach”; A92/B125; B72), in the same 
way that one may say, a bit awkwardly perhaps, that judgement ‘pro-
duces’ the object qua its necessary form, viz. as an object in general. We 
should further notice that the concept of an object, even if only in very 
general terms, can be made concrete only if we explain subsequently the 
necessary application of the set of functions, the categories, that make 
up the concept of an object, to appearances in an empirical intuition. 
Concrete knowledge stricte dicta is only possible when the categories are 
schematised.48
On account of the probative force of the argument in TD Kant limits 
the domain of possible knowledge, and hence the domain of what we 
determine to be an object. What can be analytically shown to be an 
object for cognition eo ipso determines what cannot be so shown. The 
object, as object, is only knowable to the extent that the categories are 
applied to sensible intuition and regard the phenomenally substantial 
thing in space and time. The thing that is determined as the object of 
our judgement is ex hypothesi not the thing as it may be apart from the 
very general categorial properties that it must have if it is to be an object 
of our judgement.49 That implies that, though the categories provide 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowledge of an object 
in general, they do not provide us with the sufficient conditions for the 
knowledge of any particular existent thing as an individual. The only 
access that we have to the existing thing appears to be the a posteriori 
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398     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
determinable sensations that are the result of the thing’s affecting our 
sense organs (and hence our minds) (cf. again B72), which prompts the 
occurrence of representations in our mind. Kant’s distinction between 
appearance and thing in itself is thus not the arbitrary distinction for 
which it is often lambasted, but issues from the very conceptual limits of 
discursively determining the properties of a putative individual. We just 
cannot know what the properties of a thing as it is in itself, as individual, 
could be, unless we encountered them in an empirical experience or else 
they mysteriously “migrate[d] into my faculty of representation” (Prol 
§9, 4:282)—but notice that Kant dismisses even the possibility of the a 
posteriori cognition of the properties of a thing in itself.
Put differently, even though by means of judgement we are fully 
capable of determining, through the forms of the understanding and 
intuition, the very general properties that any particular object must 
have, and so indicate its formally necessary and sufficient conditions 
if it is to be an object of our knowledge, we cannot possibly syntheti-
cally grasp all of its possible properties, even essential ones, that make 
up the particular thing’s essence—what makes it an individual, a thing 
in itself. Given the nature of our discursive form of thought, it is not 
possible, for a given empirical judgement (in experience) nor in a con-
secutive series of empirical judgements, to exhaustively determine 
the thing that we judge about. A judgement is always a relative posit-
ing of predicates which to be sure can be linked with other predicates, 
through syllogistic reasoning, indefinitely, such that our knowledge of 
the object of our judgements gradually increases (a procedure for which 
the practice of science is paradigmatic). Only to the extent that under 
the conditions of an identical apperceiving subject of judgement—the 
self-conscious representer—a unity has been brought into the manifold 
of representations in a “certain intuition” (B132), as Kant says, one can 
say that one knows an object, that is, the something in general = X (the 
transcendental object [A109]50), which is the correlate of the unity of 
my representations (cf. A251). This means that only those representa-
tions that, at any given time, are occurrently apprehended by the judger 
determine an object for her judgement. For example, I judge that some 
x is ‘oblong’ and ‘flat’ and not that I judge that e.g. it is ‘rust-encrusted’ 
and ‘bulky’, which are also possible predicates attributable to the object 
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of my current judgement, e.g. the large steel plate that I perceive and 
about which I judge that it is oblong and flat—suppose, while abstract-
ing from the aesthetic connotations and being a welder by profession, I 
am gazing at one of Richard Serra’s massive constructions. For any series 
of predicates attributed to the transcendental object of one’s judgement, 
in this case, the large steel plate that I perceive outside me, a synthesis 
must be performed in order to bring any of a series of possible predi-
cates into a unity with all other predicates attributed.51 The synthesis of 
a set of predicates constitutes the object qua object of my judgement. 
This is what is meant by the idea that an object is always only a function 
of judgement, which makes the object of my judgement an ideal object.
This is all very general and needs elaborating, something I do in 
Schulting (2012) (see also Chaps. 2–4, this volume). What I am going 
to do next is to concentrate on one class of categories in particular, 
i.e. the categories of quality (reality, negation and limitation), in the 
context of my theme of the relation between subjectivity and idealism. 
It is these categories that make it clear that the categories are only 
“serviceable” in regard to objects of experience, that is, phenomenal 
objects, and not in regard to intelligible or noumenal objects (B344/
A288). Simply put, these categories make it clear that I cannot even 
have, through the pure understanding, a definite notion of a thing in 
itself. To connect this even more intimately to the issue of idealism, 
in the next section I address relevant aspects of Kant’s account of the 
prototypon transcendentale in the Transcendental Dialectic, where he 
speaks of the ‘thing in itself ’ in its proper metaphysical context.
9.6  On Another Kind of A Priori Synthesis: 
Material Synthesis and the “Sum Total 
of All Possibility”
In the third chapter of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, 
which is about the Ideal of pure reason and forms the transition to the 
critique of the proofs of God’s existence, Kant provides what I believe 
is the key to a proper understanding of the relation between the object 
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400     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
as a phenomenon or appearance and the thing in itself, and thus of the 
putative possibility of thinking, through the pure categories, the latter. 
There, Kant explains that a thing in itself is an individual (individuum) 
in terms of a metaphysical or ontological substrate, which is completely 
or thoroughly determined. This concerns the ground of the object that 
is determined through the categories of the understanding and the 
forms of intuition (notice again that, for Kant, the object of experience, 
the appearance, is not an individual, although at A582/B610 he does 
appear to suggest otherwise).
We saw earlier, in Chap. 4, that the conditions of the possible 
experience of an object are at the same time the conditions of the 
possibility of the object of experience (B197/A158; A111), for unlike 
things in themselves objects depend entirely on possible experience 
for their being objects (cf. FM, 20:274). The principle of possible 
experience of objects is analytic (B135) and hence, from the probative 
force of the analysis of the concept of an object, the limits of what 
can be determined as object are thereby defined. Now the non-trivial 
analytical principle that, by means of an underlying a priori synthesis 
(B135), establishes the determination of the form of an object (i.e. the 
object for us; A582/B610), which is grounded on a priori synthesis, 
rests itself on a further synthesis of a particular kind. At A578/B606 Kant 
speaks of a “synthesis of the manifold in respect of its content” (trans. 
Kemp Smith; emphasis added) as concerning “all the possibility of 
things” (cf. B600). This synthesis, unlike the synthesis brought about 
by the synthetic act of the understanding regarding the manifold of 
intuition, is a “sum total of all possibility” (Inbegriff aller Möglichkeit) 
(A573/B601) or an “all of reality” (All der Realität) (A576/B604). 
Significantly, Kant also speaks of the “material for all possibility” 
(Materie zu aller Möglichkeit) (A573/B601, trans. emended; cf. A267/
B323).52
This means that the a priori necessary form of the object of knowl-
edge or experience presupposes, logically, that the matter which grounds 
the very knowledge of an object, that is, that without which it would 
not be possible in the first place to have a priori synthetic knowl-
edge of an object, is transcendentally given (it concerns certain “data”; 
A573/B601).53 We are not talking here about the de facto givenness 
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of sensations, which are the concrete empirical matter or content of an 
appearance (B34/A20), that is, the empirically given, but about the tran-
scendentally given matter (“transcendental matter”; A143/B182), which 
corresponds in some way to the sensations that are the empirically given 
content of appearances. Thus, the transcendental form of an object pre-
supposes, insofar as the object’s real possibility is concerned, the tran-
scendental content or matter of the thing that is being determined as the 
object of experience. It is this transcendentally given matter which makes 
the thing materially possible. This matter is that which individuates the 
thing underlying the object of experience as what it is qua thing, qua 
individual. It concerns the “complete material condition of its possibil-
ity” (vollständige materiale Bedingung seiner Möglichkeit) (A576/B604).54 
The forms of the understanding, the categories, together with the forms 
of intuition alone cannot satisfy this material enabling condition.
How can this condition of material possibility be further charac-
terised? The application of concepts to objects rests essentially on the 
principle of excluded middle (principium exclusi tertii, i.e. PET), which 
comes down to the principle that for any arbitrary predicate F either F 
or ¬F be attributed to the object.55 This principle, which is the mini-
mally required condition for knowledge of objects, hangs together with 
the principle of determination or more precisely “the principle of deter-
minability” (Grundsatze der Bestimmbarkeit) (A571/B599), which states 
that of each predicate F a further predicate G can be predicated (cf. 
Chap. 3). That is, each given predicate F is further determinable by at 
least one of two contradictorily opposed predicates G or ¬G.
However, as Kant writes at B601, when we are concerned with 
something that exists, a thing rather than a predicate alone, there is 
not just a logical determination of predicates, whereby of each given 
pair of opposed predicates always only one can be predicated (F or 
¬F), but also of a transcendental comparison of the thing itself with 
all of its possible predicates, that is, a real determination of the thing 
in relation to all possible predicates or, more exactly, properties that 
essentially belong to it. In this case, for all possible predicates F, each F 
or its contradictorily opposed ¬F must be predicated, for things that are 
the objects of predication, rather than mere predicates, are thoroughly 
determined individuals. It concerns the existing object qua its ‘being’ 
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or essence (qua its thinghood, A574/B603), thus the existing object 
as thing in itself, which if we were to know it completely, and thus in 
itself, we would know in terms of all its possible predicates or properties. 
More precisely, as Longuenesse writes,
[i]f one could have cognition of the exhaustive division of the ‘infinite 
sphere of all possible determinations’, and could exhaustively specify 
all the subspheres to which the thing belongs and to which it does not 
belong, then one would know the thing in its complete determination 
and, thus, as the individual thing it is. (1998:295)
The determination of a concept falls under the generality (universalitas) 
of the principle of non-contradiction PNC (and, equally, PET; A572/
B600n.).56 But the determinability of a thing, qua its ‘being’, falls 
under totality (universitas) or the “sum total” (Inbegriff ) of all possible 
predicates predicable of it (see B600n.), i.e. all of its attributable prop-
erties. This totality or “sum total” of all possible predicates or proper-
ties—Kant also calls it “the whole of possibility” (gesamte Möglichkeit) 
at A572/B600—must be understood in terms of a maximally possible 
increase of determinacy. That is to say, one must see it as a standard 
or exemplar of a completely determined individual, not in terms of a 
mere aggregate or set of predicates. This standard is exactly applicable 
to one thing, which Kant calls the “Ideal of pure Reason” (B602).57 
Only in this case, that is, in the case of a thing in itself (B604), is the 
thing completely determined and do its concepts or predicates apply 
to their object fully. To put it differently, in the case of a thing in itself, 
its concept fully corresponds to it; there is no longer a discrepancy 
between the determinacy of the thing and its determinate concept. In 
the case of a thing in itself, it is therefore also not apt to distinguish 
between the metaphysical and epistemological senses of its ‘deter-
mination’, because in this case (and this case only) the epistemic and 
ontological determinations coincide—or, the logical predication is not 
distinguishable from the attribution of properties to the thing itself.
This idea of an exemplar of a completely determined individual is of 
course neither an empirical concept nor a concept of the understand-
ing (a category, or even the set of categories), which would effectively 
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represent it through an empirical intuition, or purely through concepts 
alone—even though it is true to say that a thing that is the object of 
judgement falls under the category of totality,58 which makes the deter-
minate appearance of the thing a relatively individuated whole of per-
ceptions, i.e. an empirical object that is distinguishable from other 
empirical objects (cf. A582/B610).
The concept of a thing in the metaphysical sense—viz. a thing 
realiter, a Sache—rests on the metaphysical principle of thoroughgo-
ing determination (principium omnimodae determinationis; henceforth 
POD).59 POD is the metaphysical principle of the individuation of 
things.60 This principle, which concerns the logically material (not: 
empirical) content of determinative knowledge, must be seen in con-
nection with “a common correlate” (B600n.), which is the collective 
possible predicates attributable to the thing, that is, any possible thing 
about which one judges. The thoroughly determined thing or individ-
ual, which concerns the collective possible predicates attributable to a 
thing,
is a transcendental ideal which is the ground of the thoroughgoing deter-
mination that is necessarily encountered in everything existing, and 
which constitutes the supreme and complete material condition of its 
possibility, to which all thinking of objects in general must, as regards the 
content of that thinking, be traced back. (A576/B604)
In other words, in any determination of an object by the understand-
ing, the individual as transcendental Ideal of a thing in itself is always 
already presupposed as metaphysical ground. More in particular, the 
actuality of an object as appearance (determined in virtue of the sche-
matised categories) is grounded upon a disjunction of the set of actu-
ally attributed predicates from the greater set of all the object’s possible 
predicates, that is, the predicates or properties that it possesses as indi-
vidual or thing in itself. The determination of an actual object in fact 
occurs by means of the category of limitation, which is the combina-
tion of the categories of reality and negation—a thing is determined 
through negation, which results in a limitation of the transcendentally 
given reality.61
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The thing in itself is in fact the collective possible predicates predi-
cable of, or the collective possible properties attributable to, it. That is, 
a thing in itself is the whole of all predicates that can be determined of 
the thing that essentially possesses those predicates, that is, when seen 
(idealiter) as a thoroughly determined individual. Any actually existing 
thing is eo ipso a thing in itself, i.e. a thoroughly determined individual. 
There is nothing besides the whole of all its possible predicates that the 
thing in itself is, in addition to its predicates. It is a realist mistake—
often made—to think that there is an unbridgeable gulf between what 
the thing in itself is ontologically (qua its ontological determinacy), and 
how it would be epistemically determined in judgement if it were thor-
oughly determined, namely as an individual with all of its properties. If 
all possible epistemic determinations of a thing have been given, then 
the entirety of its determinations, its complete determinacy, is the thing 
ontologically; that is, the complete determinacy of a thing corresponds 
to its being that particular thing with all its properties. No gap exists 
between a thing and its complete (ontological) determination, though, 
as I argue here, there is an unbridgeable one between it and any single 
(epistemic) determination or finite series of such determinations.
Call epistemic determination ‘ε-determination’ to distinguish it 
from ontological determination or determinacy, which henceforth is 
called ‘ο-determination’ or ‘ο-determinacy’ (ο standing for omicron). 
An ε-determination concerns the logical predication of a subject 
(A6–7/B10–11), whose substratum (x) is determined as referring 
to an object of empirical cognition (a determinate appearance), 
whereas ο-determination or ο-determinacy concerns the possession of 
properties by a thing.62 Now, as said, there is no discrepancy between 
the thing metaphysically speaking, as having all of its properties, and 
its thoroughly determined concept. In other words, concept and thing 
truly correspond, or the putative ε-determination and ο-determination 
coincide, just in case the thing in itself is a thoroughly determined 
individual and one were indeed able to ε-determine the thing in 
itself completely. A thing’s ο-determination is thus the complete 
set of all possible ε-determinations attributable to it. However, this 
does not imply that the ε-determination or set of ε-determinations in 
any given particular empirical judgement or series of such judgements 
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about some arbitrary object x for my judgement, coincides with 
the thing in itself underlying x. Any single ε-determination or 
finite set of ε-determinations of x is not identical to the set of all x’s 
possible ε-determinations, after all. From the perspective of empirical 
judgement, it is therefore correct to distinguish strictly between the 
ε-determination of x and its ο-determination. It would though be 
a mistake to think that, in the Kantian transcendental context, an 
ε-determination of x is merely a justified true belief about x at best, 
but not yet knowledge of x (see Chaps. 3, 4). The ε-determination of 
an empirical object, by means of the categories, truly corresponds to 
the actual object so determined, albeit that the object so determined is 
not a thing in itself (see Chap. 4)63; this latter proviso makes perfectly 
logical sense, since, as said, an actual ε-determination or finite set 
of actual ε-determinations does not correspond to the totality of all 
possible ε-determinations, or, the complete (ontological) determinacy 
or ο-determination of a thing, which is Kant’s definition of a thing in 
itself.
Yet, later on in Sect. 9.8, we shall see that, in Kant’s theory of pos-
sible experience, not even all possible ε-determinations of objects as 
appearances in fact correspond to the ο-determinacy or ο-determination 
of a thing in itself. There is thus an unbridgeable discrepancy between, 
on the one hand, all possible ε-determinations of objects of possible 
experience—“the totality [Inbegriff ] of all objects of experience”—and, 
on the other, all possible predicates or the ο-determination of the thing in 
itself. But recall that ε-determination and ο-determination do coincide, 
just in case the thing in itself is completely determined, which though is 
logically impossible for us to achieve, as will become clear.
As said earlier, the determination of a thing—which, for us, comes 
down to an ε-determination of an actual object—occurs by means of 
the categories of quality, in particular the category of ‘limitation’. The 
appearances as objects of possible experience are as it were ectypa, copies 
or negations, of the prototype (prototypon) that the thing in itself is, and 
from which they take their “matter [Stoff ] for their possibility” (A578/
B606). This matter must be transcendentally affirmed, by means of the 
category ‘reality’, for what is effectively determined as the object of cog-
nition to be an existing thing at all; it gives the object its thinghood, 
9.6 On Another Kind of A Priori Synthesis: Material Synthesis …     405
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
se
s O
ly
406     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
its reality sensu stricto (B602). Wolfram Hogrebe speaks aptly of the 
“predicative protoplasm” (prädikative Protoplasma) or also the “proto-
object” (Protogegenstand ), or likewise, with a hint of Heideggerian 
etymology, the “dugout of all objects of predication” (Unterstand aller 
Gegenstände der Prädikation) (Hogrebe 1989:63, 65).
Objective ε-determination of a thing thus occurs by means of the 
categories of quality, in particular, through a negation of the thinghood 
or reality of a thing in its complete determinacy, which amounts to a 
limitation of the sum total of all its possible predicates, i.e. a limitation 
of transcendental matter (B111: “[L]imitation is nothing other than 
reality combined with negation.”).64 Anneliese Maier circumscribes 
this graphically by saying that “by means of limits or negations we 
mould, as it were, the manifold of finite objects from the infinite 
totality of reality [All der Realität]” (Maier 1930:41). This limitation of 
the transcendental matter (of the illimitatum, as it were, of the all or 
totality of reality) determines the unitary manifold of sensations, which 
constitutes the realitas phaenomenon or the matter of appearances that is 
the result of the thing in itself affecting our sensibility and is effectively 
determined through the category of reality.
Kant asserts that “transcendental negation”, which is nothing as such 
or “not-being in itself ” and as such indicates a “lack”, is logically pre-
ceded by “transcendental affirmation”, which expresses Being itself 
(A574–5/B602–3). Being is always already transcendentally affirmed, 
which does not mean that, per impossibile, the existence of any arbitrary 
object or thing is affirmed before the existence of the object or thing 
is determined in a judgement (see Sect. 9.2). The Being meant here 
is reality simpliciter, not phenomenal reality, which is first the result 
of the application of the category of reality in any arbitrary empirical 
judgement. The Being that is transcendentally affirmed in an objective 
ε-determination by virtue of the negative quality inherent to judge-
ment is “reality (thinghood) […] through [which] alone […] are objects 
Something (things)” (A574/B602).65 Transcendental affirmation con-
cerns the Being that is affirmed in any arbitrary logical predication, 
irrespective of it being a logically affirmative or negative predication S 
is P, or, S is not P, respectively, given that these judgements concern 
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
empirical judgements about objects of experience. Transcendental affir-
mation means that the something = x of predication—the x underly-
ing the subject predicate in either S is P or S is not P as judgements 
about objects—is determined as a “Something”, as a really existing 
thing, while a transcendental negation indicates a denying or negating 
of this Something, that is, a “lack” (A574–5/B602–3), or, a non-exist-
ence (notice that transcendental negation is not negation as category, 
which is in fact the determination as such in either affirmative or nega-
tive empirical judgements).66 Any and all judgements about an object, 
whether negative or affirmative, rest on a transcendental affirmation.
9.7  Determination, Judgement and the Thing 
in Itself
At this point, the question might arise as to whether in determin-
ing an object of experience, by means of ε-determination, we in fact 
attribute (or not) a predicate to the thing in itself that appears to us. 
Are the predicates that are being attributed to a thing, in a judgement, 
the properties of the very thing in itself ? This is important to know, as 
one would expect a determinative judgement to result in the determina-
tion of the thing judged about. That is to say, are the predicates I attrib-
ute to the object of my judgement aspects or properties of the thing 
that I judge about in terms of a thing in itself, or merely in terms of an 
appearance? Are the properties that I determine to belong to the thing 
that I judge about, really also properties of the thing in itself qua thing 
in itself if as per Kant’s restriction thesis what I can determine of the 
thing can only be its appearance properties?
In answering these questions, we must first note again that Kant’s 
theory of judgement is not a theory of ontological predication 
(see Chap. 3). Contrary to Wolff and others in the School metaphysics, 
Kant rejects the view that predicates relate directly to the thing (or the 
Sache) about which is judged that it is so and so (cf. A68/B93) or that 
we would be able to apply in a judgement a conceptus infimus which 
would determine the individual completely (cf. A655ff./B683ff.).67 
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Kant denies that there can be singular concepts, for we have no notion 
of the lowest species (Log, 9:59, 97). This means that whatever predi-
cates I apply to the object of my judgement, by means of the applica-
tion of the categories to the object of my empirical intuition, they never 
apply to the thing in itself qua thing in itself (cf. A358–9)—namely, in 
terms of the thoroughly determined individual, or the complete set of 
its possible predicates. This follows from the fact that, as we saw before, 
ε-determination does not map isomorphically onto ο-determination.
Likewise, analytic judgements, which do not depend on the 
schematisation of categories to empirical intuitions, do not determine 
things in themselves. James Van Cleve is therefore mistaken, when he 
states the following:
An upholder of Kant’s system must […] either admit that the pure cat-
egories do apply to things in themselves, or else maintain that things in 
themselves are never the subject matters of any true judgments. But the sen-
tence I just italicized expresses a negative and universal judgment; if the 
sentence is true, the corresponding pure categories must have application 
to things in themselves. (Van Cleve 1999:138)
Van Cleve is mistaken, for neither in this case do the categories have 
application in the sense that they would determine things in them-
selves qua things in themselves. The predicate in Van Cleve’s italicised 
sentence is only predicated of the subject concept <things in themselves>, 
not of the thing in itself or things in themselves that would be the 
underlying real substrate of this concept if the judgement were objec-
tively valid. The italicised sentence is not an objectively valid judgement, 
but merely a logically valid (and as it happens, false) statement. As I 
showed in Chap. 3, the objective validity of a judgement should not be 
confused with its truth value. So the truth (or falsity) of a judgement 
does not imply that the judgement is or is not objectively valid. Analytic 
judgements are examples of judgements that can be true or false, but are 
not ipso facto objectively valid, in the sense of referring to objectively 
real objects.
This is the case with the example that Van Cleve uses. As with any 
other judgement, the substrate is a transcendental object, an x, for 
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which in this particular case—the subject being the concept <things in 
themselves>—there is ex hypothesi no experience possible, hence no 
ε-determination, and a fortiori no real application of the categories. It 
is perfectly possible to formulate judgements (more accurately, proposi-
tions) about the concept <thing in itself>, but it is never possible to actu-
ally apply categories so as to determine the thing in itself de re. In other 
words, it is not possible to make synthetic, objectively valid judgements 
about things in themselves qua things in themselves (rather than just 
analytic statements about the concept <things in themselves>).
Although in a judgement about an object a truth-value is necessarily 
attached to the relation between concept and thing,68 as also in the 
case of Van Cleve’s example, the resulting correspondence is not a one-
to-one or immediate relation between the predicates in a proposition 
and the properties of the thing qua thing in itself. This means that the 
determinate object of judgement is not numerically the same as the 
transcendental substratum (the thing in itself properly speaking), out 
of which by means of limitation the determinacy of the object judged 
about is ‘carved’, as it were (cf. Maier 1930:41, quoted above). The 
determinate object of judgement is by implication not numerically 
identical to the thing in itself as the thoroughly determined individual, 
for although in judgement I do determine, by virtue of ε-determination, 
the thing that is the substrate (the transcendental object = x) of my 
judgement, what I determine of it concerns only the modes in which 
it appears to me, mediated by the forms of space and time, never the 
thing in itself qua thing in itself, not even if I abstracted from the 
appearance properties (spatiotemporality). Determinations, that is, 
ε-determinations, relate to the thing as accidents relate to substance (cf. 
A186/B229).
That which, in an ε-determination, I attribute to a thing is the prop-
erty of the thing itself, but only insofar as the thing appears to me, as 
an object in space and time and as such as the particular object of 
my judging with such and such properties, namely as a transcenden-
tal object = x underlying the subject in a proposition that has certain 
predicates—not as thing in itself, namely, as the individual with all 
of its possible predicates. Thus, the determination that I give to the 
thing, in judgement, is strictly speaking an ε-determination of it qua 
9.7 Determination, Judgement and the Thing in Itself     409
Fo
r S
ch
ola
rly
 Pu
rp
os
es
 O
nly
410     9 Subjectivism, Material Synthesis and Idealism
appearance, for me, not as thing in itself.69 This is not an arbitrary 
thought on Kant’s part, but follows analytically from the constraints of 
discursive judgement, which sees ε-determination in terms of a catego-
rial limitation of the totality of possible predicates applicable to an x 
about which one makes a judgement (a ‘carving out of ’ its ontologi-
cal determinacy or ο-determination). Put differently, the property or 
set of properties determined by virtue of ε-determination is only one 
or a subset of the complete set of all possible properties of the thing in 
terms of its complete ontological determinacy or ο-determination. It 
would of course in fact be impossible, that is, logically contradictory, 
that any single or finite series of predicates or ε-determinations that is 
predicated or determined of the thing, in a judgement, would corre-
spond one-to-one, in a numerically identical fashion, to the complete 
set of all possible predicates or ο-determination, which define the thing 
in itself as thoroughly determined individual. Therefore, a predica-
tion F of a thing (an x) cannot be an attribution of F to the thing qua 
thing in itself, though F is of course one of the possible predicates that 
define the thing in itself. In idealist terms, an attribution, by means of 
ε-determination, of F to a thing (x) is an attribution of F to the thing 
(x) as appearance, F being just one predicate from among the totality 
of all possible predicates predicable of x, which as and only as totality 
refers to the thing in itself.
Notice that, although my reading might seem close to a metaphysi-
cal two-aspect reading, it cannot in fact be labelled thus, for I reject any 
numerical identity between the thing in itself qua thing in itself and 
the thing qua ε-determined in a judgement, namely, as an appearance; 
ε-determinations are the product of a limitation of ο-determinacy, but 
they are precisely not aspects of numerically the same things that by defi-
nition have ο-determinacy, as metaphysical dual aspectists standardly 
believe (see further below, Sect. 9.8).
What is also at issue here is that the thing in itself should be seen 
as the ground of the appearance, rather than as an aggregate of phe-
nomenal objects as derivative beings that are somehow contained in 
an alleged actual ens originarium (cf. A579/B607). This is confirmed 
by Kant at the end of the section on the transcendental Ideal: Strictly 
speaking, the limitation by means of which “objects of the senses” are 
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determined in an empirical judgement is a limitation, not merely of “the 
sum total of all possibility” (A573/B601), but, more specifically, of “the 
material for the possibility of all objects of sense”, i.e. “the one all-encom-
passing experience”, “in which the real of all appearances is given” 
(A581ff./B609ff.; trans. emended and emphasis added). Limitation here 
thus indicates the schematised use of the category as applied to objects of 
possible experience. Objects of experience are limitations of the totality 
of all possible objects in nature.
9.8  Limitation and Idealism
Does the above analysis decide in favour of the two-aspects reading 
of idealism in its metaphysical version? I think not, for, as I said in 
the last section, the two-aspects reading illicitly assumes the numeri-
cal identity or sameness of the thing across the noumenal and phe-
nomenal realms (unless one adopted the composite view, as suggested 
earlier, but I think a composite view skirts round the real issue of the 
relation between the thing in itself or things in themselves and appear-
ances). Disregarding even the fact that the thing in itself concerns an 
ens rationis, not an empirically given thing, as we saw above, the deter-
minate set of predicates attributed to the thing judged about—even 
an indefinite amount of such ε-determinations—constitutes an object 
that is ex hypothesi numerically different from the complete set of 
all possible predicates that constitutes the thing as it is in itself, as a 
thoroughly determined individual. Two-aspect readings of the tran-
scendental distinction, either of the metaphysical or methodological 
kind, cannot account for this constitutive difference. Both interpreta-
tions fail to grasp the implications of Kant’s theory of discursive logic 
for the status of the object to which the judging intellect relates. They 
also fail to understand the very concept of determination (and thus 
the relation between ε-determination and ο-determination), as well 
as what it means for an individual to be an individual. One aspect of 
this misunderstanding is that one is wont to insist on an absolute dis-
tinction between the metaphysical and epistemological senses of the 
notion ‘determination’. As we have seen, such an absolute distinction 
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is valid only insofar as this distinction correlates with the distinction 
between appearance and thing in itself. But as soon as one talks about 
the thing in itself and its possible complete determinacy, then the 
distinction is wrong-headed, because it is precisely the metaphysical 
properties or determinations that are being talked about, not merely 
how we determine, by virtue of ε-determination, the thing in a judge-
ment.
Longuenesse (2005) appears to sidestep the idealism issue and thus 
the question about the identity between appearance and the thing in 
itself altogether by espousing a thoroughly empirical-realist view of the 
transcendental Ideal. Her view of the principle of complete or thor-
oughgoing determination (POD) can be labelled reductionist.70 For she 
reads POD in such a way that it merely concerns the comparabili ty of 
one object of experience with another, with every other possible, object 
of experience, that is, in terms of the totality of possible experience—
presumably relying on Kant’s suggestions in this direction at the end 
of the chapter on the transcendental Ideal (B609ff.).71 Longuenesse 
emphasises the one sphere of which there are subspheres as the whole of 
objects of possible, empirical, experience, not as the omnitudo realitatis 
in a transcendental sense.72 That is to say, in her view, the totum 
realitatis “is a sensible, conceptually indeterminate whole necessarily 
presupposed as the background of any empirical given” (Longuenesse 
1998:308; cf. 2005:223). However, this can only be partly correct, 
since the sum total of the thing’s predicates of which Kant speaks, is not 
coextensive with the putative totality of “the predicates of appearance” 
(A581/B609; emphasis added). Even if all of the spatiotemporal, 
sensibly experienceable, properties of all appearances were determined, 
it would still not be tantamount to the complete determination of the 
thing in itself (or all things in themselves), in terms of the totality of 
reality (All der Realität; A576/B604). All possible ε-determinations 
of appearances in empirical space, that is, nature itself, do not map 
onto the ο-determination of the thing in itself as the totality of reality. 
This is confirmed by Kant in the Prolegomena, when he asserts that 
the “sensible world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected 
according to universal laws”, which “has therefore no subsistence by 
itself ” and “is actually not the thing in itself and consequently must point 
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to that which contains the ground [den Grund ] of this appearance, to 
beings [Wesen] which cannot be cognized merely as appearances, but as 
things in themselves” (Prol, 4:354 [Kant 1977:95]; trans. emended and 
emphasis added; cf. 4:353).
Longuenesse (2005:218) appears to regard the object of empirical 
experience as the same individual thing that is completely determinable, 
and although Kant does speak of thoroughgoing determination of an 
object of sense (A581–2/B609–10), I believe the passage as a whole 
should be read in a non-reductionist fashion as saying that “the thing 
itself (in appearance), namely the real” is the transcendental object, 
which we subsequently determine, by means of what would be the 
schematised category of limitation applied to sensible spatiotemporal 
content in intuition, as the object of experience. Although reality for 
us, as discursive cognisers, is of course always “empirical reality” (A582/
B610), this does not mean, on Kant’s view, that by implication all 
reality is empirical.73
Remarkably, Longuenesse also claims that POD is not a new 
principle, but one that “Kant could have given as a corollary of the 
principle of all synthetic judgments” (2005:219), thus as a principle 
of the understanding. Longuenesse’s reading of POD illustrates what 
a thoroughgoing empirical realism, which shows no particular interest 
in the metaphysical issues surrounding Kant’s idealism, results in, viz. 
a reduction of the thing in itself to the whole of possible experience, 
to the sensible world. I think Longuenesse’s view contradicts Kant’s 
differentiation between what makes a thing a thing or a “Something” 
(A574/B602) and the way in which appearances are the determinate 
objects of experience. She conflates the material (ontological-
metaphysical) conditions of the synthetic content necessary for the 
conception of things as things and the transcendental (epistemological-
metaphysical) conditions for the necessary form of any object if it is to 
be an object of empirical experience.
As in TD it was made clear that the analytic principle of self-con-
sciousness rests on a synthesis of intuitive empirical content, which 
thus establishes the concept of an object in general and hence con-
stitutes the principle of experience, I have argued here that the 
principle of possible experience itself in turn necessarily rests on a 
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synthesis of the “the data, the material so to speak, or the transcendental 
content, for the possibility and the thoroughgoing determination of 
all things”, what Kant calls the “transcendental substratum” (A575/
B603). The latter synthesis is governed by POD, a genuinely new meta-
physical principle that is not just implied by the principles of possible 
experience, as Longuenesse would have us believe. This also explains 
the necessary presupposition of the thing in itself as the ground of an 
appearance (Bxxvii), with which it a fortiori cannot be identified, not 
even with the whole of all possible appearances. For the “transcendental 
substratum” is not the whole of possible experience, even though it is 
the whole of possible experience that is presupposed, as Kant says, as 
“the material for the possibility of all objects of the senses” (A582/B610; 
emphasis added).
9.9  Conclusion
Whereas Longuenesse’s apparent reduction of the thing in itself to 
the totality of experience wholly neglects Kant’s idealism, the current 
treatments of the topic of idealism, specifically in their two-aspect 
form, fail to recognise the limits imposed by our very discursivity 
in that these interpretations assume the object’s identity across the 
transcendental boundary. Contrary to this assumption, it should be 
observed that the object as appearance is not numerically the same 
as the thing in itself, not even if we abstracted from the appearance 
properties and consider the thing merely through concepts, as Wood 
would have it (as we saw in Sect. 9.4). Nor is it the case that purely 
through thinking the thing in itself we would thereby be able to pick 
out a noumenal object, as Adams suggests. As I have explained, this 
relates to Kant’s conception of a thing in itself as having to do with 
its complete determinacy (its ο-determination), which we can only 
grasp notionally, that is, as an Ideal of Reason—it is an ens rationis. 
Kant clearly states that “in order to cognize a thing completely one 
has to cognize everything possible and determine the thing through 
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it, whether affirmatively or negatively”, which for human beings is 
impossible. He continues:
Thoroughgoing determination is consequently a concept that we can 
never exhibit in concreto in its totality, and thus it is grounded on an idea 
which has its seat solely in reason, which prescribes to the understanding 
the rule of its complete use. (A573/B601)
What would be known ‘completely’, were we able to determine a 
thing qua its “Being” (Sachheit) (B602) as such—putatively by means 
of the categories of quality, in particular reality—would be the whole 
of its possible predicates. But a conceptual grasp of the complete thing 
in itself, other than purely notionally (as an ens rationis), is logically 
impossible, for it would mean, contradictorily, that our discursive 
synthesis in an actual judgement or indeed in an indefinite series of 
judgements (ε-determination) is tantamount to the complete synthesis 
of the thing’s possible predicates (ο-determination). We can have the 
concept or notion of a thing in itself, an individual—and indeed we 
must, as I argued in Sect. 9.6—but we cannot ε-determine a thing’s 
ο-determination. Also, what is completely determined, the thing in 
itself, is ipso facto no longer determinable. Therefore, that which is 
objectively ε-determined through limitation cannot, by implication, 
be numerically identical to that from which what is objectively 
ε-determined is delimited, that is, to the ‘illimitative’ real or the thing 
in itself. A delimitation of reality that results in a determined object 
by implication cannot be numerically identical to that from which the 
determined object is delimited, namely the all of reality.
This, it seems to me, refutes the idea that what in abstraction from 
sensibility we think, through the pure concepts, as general rules for 
the objective determination of representations that constitutes the 
object of knowledge, would be the thing in itself as such, namely the 
thoroughly or completely determined individual that is in fact the very 
metaphysical ground of the possibility of employing the pure concepts 
in predication. Therefore, the categories do not, in and of themselves, 
determine any individuated thing or object for the understanding 
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alone. In conclusion, Kant’s thesis about the subjective constraints 
of discursive thought itself already leads to idealism, namely, the 
restriction of the applicability of the categories to the transcendental 
object, which is the necessary correlate of our sensibility only, and is not 
serviceable even to conceive of things in themselves other than purely 
notionally. We thus do not have access, by means of the pure categories 
in abstraction from the constraints of sensibility, to intelligible objects, 
or to things in themselves qua things in themselves, contrary to what 
Adams, Wood, and others have suggested. This shows Kant’s radical 
subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge of objects, which affects 
not just our sensibility but also our conceptuality.
Notes
 1. See also B166n.
 2. Cf. Ameriks (2000b:163). Ameriks criticises Reinhold on this point, 
but see Schulting (2016) for a more positive (Kantian) outlook on 
Reinhold’s reading of the Unknowability Thesis.
 3. Cf. A241ff./B299ff.
 4. Precisely the identification of the concept of the thing in itself with the 
being of the thing in itself brought Hegel to think, against Kant, that 
there is no gap at all between thought and being, and that thus Kant’s 
restriction thesis is ungrounded. See again Chap. 8.
 5. It is interesting to note that Johann Friedrich Flatt, who was professor 
of philosophy and Hegel’s teacher in the Tübinger Stift, stated in his 
reply (Antikritik), published in the Philosophisches Magazin, to a review 
of his work Fragmentarische Beyträge zur Bestimmung und Deduction 
des Begriffes und Grundsatzes der Causalität und zur Grundlegung 
der natürlichen Theologie; in Beziehung auf die Kantische Philosophie 
(Frankfurt/Leipzig: Crusius, 1788), which Reinhold published in 
the Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung of 3 January 1789, that, contrary 
to Reinhold’s view of the unrepresentability of the thing in itself, 
the most that can be shown is that “keine dem ausser dem Gemüthe 
vorhandenen Gegenstande, nach seiner durchgängigen Bestimmung 
betrachtet, vollkommen entsprechende Vorstellung, für uns möglich 
sey” (Philosophisches Magazin II, 3, 1789, p. 387, published in reprint 
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in Aetas Kantiana; emphasis added). Flatt’s view may be seen as a 
precursor of the position that will be defended here. In Schulting 
(2016), I made an attempt to combine Reinhold’s views with the view 
that Flatt here advances. See further Henrich (2004:367ff.). I thank 
Manfred Baum for the reference to Flatt.
 6. See for Adickes’s views further below, Sect. 9.2.
 7. At least some of the categories, like substance and causality, would 
appear to have a transcendent function, most clearly in practical 
philosophy. Cf. Martin (1969:232ff.). See further Sect. 9.3.
 8. Like Van Cleve (1999:8), I believe that appearances, which he calls 
“virtual objects” or “intentional objects”, have no special kind of being 
of their own (existing apart from things in themselves). There is just 
one realm of being, of which appearances, as a distinct class of objects, 
are in some sense part. Van Cleve has a somewhat similar reading as 
mine; he writes: “My interpretation is nonetheless dualistic in the fol-
lowing sense: the distinction between appearances and things in them-
selves is a distinction between two separate universes of discourse—not 
between two ways of discoursing about the same class of objects. If 
there is a sense in which I believe in one world only, it is […] a world 
whose only denizens are things in themselves” (1999:150). On Van 
Cleve’s interpretation of idealism and my differences with it, see again 
Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
 9. Cf. Van Cleve (1999:158).
 10. Collins (1999:15) is therefore wrong to suggest that empirical objects, 
appearances, can be called individuals. But Collins’s reading is 
consistent with his anti-representationalist reading of Kant’s idealism.
 11. For further discussion, see Schulting (2011:7–16, 2017a).
 12. Cf. B150; B298; B300; A242.
 13. Cf. Martin (1969:167).
 14. In Kant’s own copy of the Critique, “cognition” (Erkenntnis) is sub-
stituted for “concept” (Begriff ) here, which makes more sense, as of 
course the pure categories do provide us a concept of the object, but not 
a cognition of the object, where cognition is understood as objectively 
real cognition.
 15. In the Italian Gentile translation gehen auf is aptly translated as riferirsi, 
meaning ‘refer to’.
 16. Cf. Prol §32, 4:314–315; A251ff.
 17. Cf. V-Met/Mron, 29:857.
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 18. On this aspect, see again Chap. 4, Sect. 4.10.
 19. Cf. B182/A143: “[T]hat which corresponds [entspricht] to the 
sensation in these [appearances] is the transcendental matter of all 
objects, as things in themselves (thinghood, reality).”
 20. One could of course argue that the project in the Critique is precisely 
to demonstrate that there are things that exist extramentally, so that 
the thing’s existence cannot figure as the premise of the argument. 
This would mean not only that we cannot assume the existence of 
things, but also that, since it is based on something non-mental that 
prompts it, we cannot be sure of having sense perception either unless 
we assume some inner sensation-producing faculty of the mind or God 
having planted sense ideas in our minds (both of which Descartes sug-
gests are possibilities we cannot rule out). This in turn would invite the 
familiar transcendental argument strategy, espoused by so many readers 
of Kant. But I believe that Kant is not trying to demonstrate the exist-
ence of extramental things, i.e. that they exist, but rather, more mod-
estly and quite like Descartes for that matter, he wants to demonstrate 
the terms under which our representations acquire the objective reality 
or validity that connects them to extramental things (A197/B242).
 21. Cf. Ameriks (2000a:xxxv, n. 40). See also Westphal (2004:46) and 
Ameriks (2015).
 22. See B299. Unlike Frege, Kant does not appear to differentiate Sinn 
from Bedeutung (cf. Bird 2006:526ff.).
 23. Cf. Bird (2006:529). At A248/B305, Kant makes an ostensibly cru-
cial distinction regarding “pure categories, without formal conditions 
of sensibility, [that] have merely transcendental meaning [Bedeutung], 
but are not of any transcendental use [Gebrauch]” (trans. emended). 
Thanks to Tobias Rosefeldt for pointing this out. I take Kant’s remark 
to confirm my view that the categories do not pertain or refer to puta-
tive transcendent objects, and nonetheless continue to have some 
transcendental significance. It is not clear what the categories having 
meaning beyond the bounds of sense could yield in terms of them hav-
ing a putative object for themselves, in abstraction from the conditions 
of sensibility, for, as Kant says in the same passage, “(as merely pure 
categories) […] they do not have any use at all if they are separated 
from all sensibility, i.e., they cannot be applied to any supposed object at 
all ” (A248/B305; emphasis added). A bit earlier on, Kant writes more 
clearly: “The merely transcendental use of the categories is […] in fact 
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no use at all, and has no determinate or even, as far as its form is con-
cerned, determinable object” (see also B343/A287). For categories to 
have an object that is subsumed under them, “a function of the power 
of judgment [Urteilskraft]” is needed, i.e. a schema. “If this condition 
of the power of judgment (schema) is missing, then all subsumption 
disappears, for nothing would be given that could be subsumed under 
the concept” (B304). What is expressed is “only the thought of an 
object in general […] in accordance with different modi” (ibid.), i.e. 
the various pure concepts that together make up the intension of the 
concept of an object in general. The distinction between a logical object 
thought purely through the categories and an objectively real object 
would then amount to the distinction between the logical characteris-
tics contained in the concept of an object in general and any concrete 
schematisation of such a concept to a particular object, which can only 
be an object of sensible experience (cf. Grier 2001:81–83, 89). Kant 
is clear that “they [i.e. the categories] are merely the pure form of the 
employment of the understanding in regard to objects in general and of 
thinking [des Denkens], yet without any sort of object being able to be 
thought or determined through them alone [ohne doch durch sie allein 
irgend ein Objekt denken oder bestimmen zu können]” (A248/B305; 
emphasis added; cf. B147). Clearly, a logical “object in general” is not 
ipso facto a thing in itself.
 24. Cf. Westphal (2004:50–51) on the transcendental significance of the 
categories. See also Lau (2015:451).
 25. See also Ameriks (2000b:191–192n.4). Cf. Ameriks (2000b:254n.52, 
2003:149).
 26. Cf. Ameriks (2006:60), Rosefeldt (2006) and Heimsoeth (1984:247, 
259). See also FM, 20:270, where, interestingly, Kant connects the 
“logical I” with the “I that I think and intuit” and which is “a person”, 
in contrast to the “I that belongs to the object that is intuited by 
me”, which “is, similarly to other objects outside me, a thing” (Kant 
1983:73; emphasis added).
 27. Notice that at B157 Kant writes that “in the synthetic original unity 
of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, 
nor as I am in myself [wie ich an mir selbst bin], but only that I am”. 
This suggests that in apperception I am not conscious of myself as a 
thing in itself, nor as an object, but only of myself as being while doing 
the synthesising. However, the consciousness of this act of synthesis is a 
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transcendental self-consciousness, not a mere (empirical) consciousness, 
and so points to the noumenal self.
 28. Cf. Heimsoeth (1984:262).
 29. Ameriks (2000a:268) has suggested that the reason for thinking that 
there are real non-spatiotemporal essences might lie in Kant’s belief 
“that we are familiar with the essences of certain operations, and that 
in particular logic gives us the essence of our acts and thoughts. […] 
[T]he (theoretical) characteristics I have qua mind, which are just 
those I have through the acts of synthesis I carry out according to the 
categories, could in a sense be had without temporality because the 
categories have a meaning that is non-temporal”. I agree with the gen-
eral purport of Ameriks’s point here. However, the important question 
I believe is what the “essence of our acts and thoughts” is supposed 
to amount to other than a mere logical unity of thought, which, 
true, is necessarily carried out by a subject but, importantly, does not 
pick out an object (cf. B404/A346), i.e. an individual (a “personal 
being” sensu stricto; cf. Ameriks 2000a:277). The characteristics 
that are due to me being the subject and operator of my thoughts do 
not determine me substantially rather than merely qua the unity of 
the set of logical functions that are operated by me; there is indeed 
a subsisting transcendental, even personal subject of thought here, 
but this trans cendental subject cannot be equated with a numerically 
identical underlying substance. So (1) the self of pure thought is not 
simply to be taken as numerically identical to the noumenal self (as 
a thing in itself ) and (2) it is not the case that we literally think the 
latter’s nature merely by thinking, i.e. through mere thought, or, as 
Heimsoeth puts it referring to the Kant of the Lectures on metaphysics, 
through immediate intuition (see Heimsoeth 1956:233, 1984:242–
243). See further Heimsoeth (1956:236ff., 241, 245ff., 1984:247, 
253, 259–260). See also especially Ameriks (2006:60). See further 
Schulting (2017b).
 30. Cf. Heimsoeth (1956:241, 1984:253ff.).
 31. Cf. Refl 6001 (1780s), 18:420: “The soul is in the transcendental 
apperception substantia noumenon” (trans. mine). See also in particu-
lar B429: “[I]n the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the 
being itself, about which, however, nothing yet is thereby given to me 
for thinking.” Cf. Ameriks (2006:59).
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 32. Cf. B158, Prol, 4:334n., where Kant talks about apperception 
as “the feeling of an existence”. See Heimsoeth (1956:244–245, 
1984:258–259, 266); cf. Heimsoeth (1956:249–250) and Martin 
(1969:211).
 33. Cf. Heimsoeth (1956:74ff., 247). See further Schulting (2012:125–
135).
 34. What we know is the relation (Verhältnis) between two “dissimilar 
things” (unähnliche Dinge) (Prol, 4:358), which is an analogical 
relation.
 35. See also Guyer, who writes: “[Kant] never denies that the categories 
enter into our conception of things in themselves. Therefore, being an 
epistemic condition, as the categories clearly are, cannot itself be a suf-
ficient reason for exclusion from the concept of things in themselves” 
(Wood et al. 2007:15). Indeed, not from the concept of things in them-
selves, but to my mind it excludes the possible determination of the 
properties of a thing in itself qua itself, i.e. as a thing in itself proper, or 
the complete set of its properties (see further Sects. 9.6–9.8). Guyer, as 
so many others, conflates the concept of a thing in itself (de dicto) and 
the thing in itself (de re).
 36. The principle of the identity of indiscernibles =df ‘an object x 
is identical to an object y if x has exactly the same properties as 
y’ {∀x∀y(∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x = y)} (cf. Kant A272/B328; B337/ 
A281); this is often paired with the principle of indiscernibility 
of identicals =df ‘to a thing x are attributed exactly the same 
properties as are attributed to a thing y if x and y are identical’ 
{∀x∀y(x = y → (Fx ↔ Fy))}. In his critique of Leibniz, Kant famously 
argues that although the former principle might hold for things 
in themselves (that is, things in themselves are qualitatively and 
numerically identical or the same), this does not hold for appearances; 
two appearances might have the same qualities, but could very well 
differ qua numerical identity.
 37. Van Cleve carefully notes that it is not clear “whether it is Kant’s view 
that Leibniz’s principles do definitely hold for things in themselves (as 
he sometimes says), or only that they would hold for the noumena in 
the positive sense, it being problematic whether things in themselves are 
noumena in that sense. (They are not noumena in the positive sense 
for us, but may be so for other beings)” (1999:292n.41). Notice that 
Kant says of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles that it 
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“holds merely of concepts of things in general [Begriffen der Dinge über-
haupt]” (A272/B328; emphasis added). On the use of the principle of 
identity of indiscernibles, see also Quarfood (2008:615ff., 2011).
 38. Cf. Van Cleve (1999:150, 292n.44).
 39. “Is an appearance the very same entity as a thing in itself ? […] the 
identity interpretation says yes” (Wood 2005:66); “Once we have 
abstracted from the sensible—e.g., the spatiotemporal—properties of 
the object as appearance, hence from our empirical cognition of it, it 
must be the same as itself thought solely through pure concepts of the 
understanding and distinct from any thing which is represented as other 
than it (for instance, from a different appearance regarded as it is in 
itself )” (Wood 2005:69).
 40. Notice that traditionally the principium individuationis and the 
principium identitatis were distinguished anyway. I thank Wolfgang Ertl 
for pointing this out.
 41. Cf. Martin (1969:174–175).
 42. Cf. Quarfood (2011).
 43. Cf. Maier (1930:45–46). Maier writes (quoting A282n.): “Realitates 
noumena, nur durch den reinen Verstand gedachte und erkennbare 
Realitäten (wie sie auf dem Standpunkt der Dissertation angenommen 
werden), die als gegenständliche Korrelate der reinen Kategorie 
gelten könnten, gibt es nicht, jedenfalls nicht in der Bedeutung 
von intelligiblen Bestimmungen. Wir können sie höchstens rein 
logisch als positive Prädikate überhaupt, als Bejahungen denken, ohne 
imstande zu sein, ‘ein Beispiel von dergleichen reiner und sinnenfreier 
Realität’ anzuführen” (boldface mine).
 44. On the different senses of Kant’s notion of ‘transcendental object’, see 
Willaschek (1998:333–335).
 45. Cf. e.g. Prol, 4:359, where interestingly Kant asserts, regarding one 
prominent thing in itself, that “the Supreme Being is quite inscrutable 
and even unthinkable in any determinate way [auf bestimmte Weise 
sogar undenkbar] as to what it is in itself ” (Kant 1977:99; emphasis 
added). We can of course conceive of the Supreme Being, in having an 
understanding of Him as necessarily having the properties of  ‘eternity’, 
‘omnipotence’, and ‘omnibenevolence’, but we cannot conceive of 
Him “in any determinate way”. That is, all our talk about the Supreme 
Being remains perfectly speculative, however logically or conceptually 
consistent.
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 46. For further discussion, see Schulting (2012, Chap. 5). For a much 
briefer account, see also Chap. 2 (this volume).
 47. It concerns Reflexion 4674 from the Duisburg Nachlass (Refl, 17:646). 
Kant writes further that “the mind [das Gemüth] is […] itself the arche-
type [Urbild ] [of the possibility] of […] synthesis” (Refl, 17:647 [Kant 
2005:160]). Guyer and Wood (Kant 1998:54) fundamentally underes-
timate Kant’s claim by maintaining that it is about merely an analogy 
between the way I conceive of myself and the way I must conceive of 
objects.
 48. See further Chaps.  4 and 7.
 49. The ontological status of the latter kind of thing concerns what Kant 
calls the Sachheit, das Reale of a thing (B182/A143; B207ff.). At B182, 
Kant explicitly associates “reality” with the “thinghood” of things in 
themselves as regards their “transcendental matter”.
 50. Cf. A104; A613–14/B641–2.
 51. Put in a nutshell, the knowledge that I can have of an object, of which I 
can acquire a priori insight that can thus be analytically demonstrated, 
concerns the knowledge of an object, insofar as, as Kant says in the 
B-preface (Bxviii), I have put certain, both intuitive and conceptual, 
forms into it.
 52. Surprisingly, Longuenesse (2005:213n.5) suggests that the Critical 
philosophy made this view about material synthesis as the ground of a 
priori synthesis irrelevant (!). According to Longuenesse (2005:213), it 
is not reality, as matter, that precedes form, but form (a priori forms of 
sensibility) that precedes matter.
 53. This is one of the reasons motivating Kant to distinguish between the 
form of the known object (appearance) and the thing itself.
 54. Longuenesse (2005:227–228) assumes that for the Critical Kant 
the form of possibility precedes matter. She seems to forget to distin-
guish, first, between the necessary form of possible objects of experi-
ence, where indeed possibility precedes actuality, and the a posteriori 
givenness of the material, sensible content that is a precondition of 
experience at all and so necessarily precedes the necessary form of pos-
sibility. Furthermore, let’s not fail to recall that in matters metaphysical 
Kant adheres to an essentially Aristotelian view of matter as preceding 
form; hence, Kant speaks of “material for [zu] all possibility” (A573/
B601; trans. emended). On the other hand, Longuenesse would appear 
to be right in holding that in the Transcendental Analytic, from the 
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transcendental perspective that looks at the conformity of concept and 
the form of an object, form precedes matter, for on the Copernican 
view everything has to be conceived from within the form that reason 
puts into things (cf. Bxvii).
 55. Though formally distinct from it, PET (p ⋁ ¬p) in its turn rests ulti-
mately on the principle of non-contradiction PNC [¬(p ⋀ p)]. PET 
grounds the logical necessity of a cognition, whereas PNC determines 
its logical possibility (cf. Log, 9:53).
 56. Regarding universality, see also the Jäsche Logic, §21, in Log, 9:102–
103.
 57. Cf. B596, where Kant speaks of an “idea in individuo”: it concerns the 
prototype of an individual. For further discussion, see Verburgt (2011).
 58. Cf. Heimsoeth (1969:429).
 59. See A571/B599. Cf. Refl 5270–5274, 18:138–140.
 60. Cf. Longuenesse (2005:216).
 61. Cf. Refl 5905, 18:380. See also WDO, 8:138n.
 62. Kant does not seem to consistently distinguish between ‘predicates’ 
(Prädikate) and ‘properties’ (Eigenschaften), using both to character-
ise things (for the application of the term ‘predicate’ to things see e.g. 
A571–2/B599–600; A573/B601; V-Met/Volckmann, 28:410, quoted 
at the outset of this chapter). But Kant’s transcendental idealism also 
makes it difficult to apply this distinction (predicates/properties) rig-
orously to how objects of experience are determined in judgements 
and how things can be said to have properties: do the predicates predi-
cated in a judgement about an object correspond to the properties of 
the object, that is, are the properties possessed just by the object of my 
judgement, or also by the thing in itself underlying it? My distinction 
between ε-determination and ο-determination reflects this difficulty in 
Kant.
 63. Of course, I could still be mistaken about empirical properties of 
the object that I judge about, but I cannot be mistaken about the 
instantiation of the categories in any object that I judge about, because 
the instantiation of the categories is constitutive of the objective 
validity of my judgement, and thus of the very objectivity of the object 
of my judgement (see again Chap. 4 for discussion). Hence, the true 
correspondence mentioned here concerns transcendental truth.
 64. In Refl 3063, 16:638, Kant likens infinite judgement to judgement 
of determination. Cf. A576ff./B604ff. and PND, 1:395. See further 
Longuenesse (1998:294ff.).
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 65. Reich (2001:185) associates transcendental affirmation explicitly with 
the category of reality. Transcendental affirmation could be labelled 
‘original’ affirmation. A determinate negation (‘is not’ in the judge-
ment S is not P) cannot be thought without already having presupposed 
(originally) its opposite, that is, by having affirmed reality (the same 
holds of course for a determinate affirmation, ‘is’ in any judgement 
S is P).
 66. Cf. Refl 5270, 18:138.
 67. Cf. Longuenesse (1998:293). In regard to the notion of conceptus 
infimus, see Stuhlmann-Laeisz (1976:78ff.).
 68. For discussion, see again Chap. 3.
 69. See Kjosavik (2008:393), who points out, somewhat vaguely but 
in essence correctly, that the “imposition” of an objective structure, 
through synthesis, is not “directly upon a thing in itself ”, but rather 
“upon a matter that is given to us” (Kjosavik quotes ÜE, 8:215).
 70. Longuenesse differentiates between “legitimate (critical)” and “illegiti-
mate (intellectualist) uses of the principle of complete determination” 
(2005:213). She herself indeed talks about a “critical reduction”, i.e. 
the disentangling of the principle as well as the notion of the whole of 
reality “from the rationalist illusion” (2005:214). See also Longuenesse 
(1998:308ff.). For a critique of Longuenesse’s reading of POD, see also 
Verburgt (2011:250–252).
 71. Cf. Adickes’ critique of Cohen’s neo-Kantian notion of the “Inbegriff der 
wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse” (Adickes 1924:34n.). Longuenesse’s 
interpretation bears a close resemblance to Cohen’s. Longuenesse writes: 
“The infinite sphere whose division would yield all concepts of possible 
entities, in which infinite judgement thinks the object thought under its 
subject-concept is then the infinite sphere of the concept: ‘object given 
in space and time’, that is to say ‘object of experience’” (2005:218; cf. 
Longuenesse 1998:297).
 72. Cf. Longuenesse (1998:296). She speaks of the “infinite sphere of all 
possible determination” in terms of a “merely logical representation”, 
“logical space”. Although it is true, of course, that Kant criticised the 
hypostatisation of the totality of possible determinations, that is, the 
“all of reality”, into an ens realissimum that would contain all these 
determinations, he does not thereby mean such a totality to be “merely 
logical”. On the contrary, the logical space of all possible determina-
tions has an ontological thrust, which is why Kant asserts that the con-
cept of such a completely determined object is “transcendent” (A571/
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B599) and serves as transcendental Ideal. Longuenesse rejects the infer-
ence from the “logical (conceptual) primacy of reality to its ontological 
primacy” (1998:308), but she simply confuses ontology with empirical 
reality, or actuality, here.
 73. The passage that appears to lend support to Longuenesse’s reading 
should, I believe, be read as suggesting that we distinguish between 
“the thing itself (in appearance), namely the real” (emphasis added) and 
“the real of all appearances” (das Reale aller Erscheinungen) (A582/B609; 
emphasis added; the Guyer/Wood translation is not precise here, by 
rendering the last passage as “the real in all appearances”), whereby two 
kinds of reality are to be distinguished: empirical reality, i.e. “the real of 
all appearances”, and reality simpliciter, i.e. Being (A574/B602), which 
is the reality referred to “in appearance”.
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